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Opinion: It’s Time We Talk About Our Traditions

By: Seringe ST Touray

The Introduction

The second most feared title in today’s Gambian society is the title of “Njeke.” The Njeke acts as the maid of honor, culturally, serving as a wedding bride’s companion or confidant. She supports the bride emotionally and practically, assisting with wedding preparations and rituals, and representing her in key interactions. The most feared title is “Yai,” meaning ‘mother,’ or ‘mother of the night.’ The bearer of this title guides the bride through the cultural traditions, provides advice on marital responsibilities, and ensures emotional and ceremonial support throughout the wedding process.

On the surface, these roles and responsibilities seem justifiable. Look closer, and you’ll find the unspoken practices of how culture is monetized to bankroll a perfectly prevalent and discriminatory caste system unfolding before our eyes. The social hierarchy comprises the Freeborn (Géer) ruling class, Artisans (Ñeeño), who are traditionally skilled workers (such as Griots, Blacksmiths, and Leatherworkers), servile groups (Jaams), who serve the Freeborn often as laborers or in domestic roles, and, in some cases, religious leaders who hold a respected and separate status.

To add to an already problematic system, the infusion of money has dragged culture to new depths, where many are compelled socially and emotionally to empty their savings to give to a distant relative they’ve never heard of, only to sleep in the dark because they can’t afford electricity. Class-based pride, flamboyance, and an essentially ‘showing off’ attitude have taken our society by storm, with almost every participant silently complaining about the absurd system behind closed doors, yet putting on pretend smiles as they answer the call of their true gods – namely, the cultures and traditions they despise but won’t denounce publicly. To many, the misfortune of being named a Njeke or a Yai seems like a call to a higher cultural power, but one which brings devastating financial consequences.

The Vicious Cycle

The culture of monetary contributions in some of our local traditional weddings creates a cycle of obligation rather than choice, where giving money is an unwritten yet socially enforceable contract. When extended family sends money for a wedding, they expect the same or more when their own children marry. Over time, and historically, inflation and economic downturns make monetary contributions harder to reciprocate, turning this tradition into a burden. This mirrors how banks traditionally lend money with the expectation of interest, knowing the repayment value will potentially exceed the loan. Both systems benefit from changing monetary value favouring the lender while disadvantaging the borrower. This is not to say that all participants are unwilling. In many cases, families will, while expressively dreading every moment among their own trusted inner circle within the extended family, harness their last savings to pour into the tension-filled culture over their own family obligations, from children’s school fees, utility bills, medical bills, and general comfort.

The pressure to contribute financially to wedding ceremonies, especially for those holding the titles of Njeke or Yai, can be devastating. The expectation of financial generosity often forces them to dip into savings meant for other life necessities, creating a cycle of stress and emotional strain as they try to meet these cultural obligations.

The Collector

The bookkeeper, or better known as “The Collector,” manages contributions from guests. They record financial gifts given by attendees, typically announced publicly, sometimes with a loud speaker during the ceremony, along with the names of those who gave money. The official opinion is that this practice is rooted in the culture of transparency, accountability, and acknowledgement. Unofficially – it segregates those that have, and those that have less in a spectacularly classist display. These announcements create intense competition, resulting in pressure. Gifts and contributions to the extended family are largely seen as mandatory regardless of one’s financial situation, forcing people to participate in a culture where their own significance is determined by their financial worth. To some, this is seen as counterproductive to celebrating love, but rather to appease culture. In fact, some families reject their daughter’s choice of partner if her partner’s financial situation doesn’t accommodate such lavish cultural displays – unapologetically choosing waste over affection.

The role of the Njeke or Yai in this environment is especially precarious, as they are expected to maintain appearances and uphold tradition, often at the cost of their own financial well-being. The pressure to contribute financial gifts places them in a difficult position, especially when their own financial resources are limited.

The Extravagance

Disclaimer: this part may be considered sensitive, as it’s grounded in a religious context. In exploring the culture of lavish spending on wedding ceremonies in an economy that cries itself to sleep, I reflected on what motivates people in The Gambia – culture, or religion. The clever ones will say that since religion is a way of life, our culture is a byproduct of our religion. The problem is – this could not be further from the truth. According to a 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom by the United States Department of State, about 96% of our population are Muslims, mainly Sunni, with about 3% Christians, mainly Roman Catholics. Both religious scriptures condemn the attitude of lavish spending and senseless extravagance as a whole.

The Quran, for example, unequivocally teaches that extravagance for the sake of status or self-indulgence is harmful. Surah Al-Isra (17:26-27) (Sahih International) teaches, “And give the relative his right, and also the poor and the traveler, and do not spend wastefully. Indeed, the wasteful are brothers of the devils, and ever has Satan been to his Lord ungrateful.” The verse, linking wasteful spending to negative traits, is similar to Christian teachings against the pursuit of earthly wealth and status. However, without much knowledge or background on Christianity, regrettably, I leave that to a more informed audience to contextualize better. Here’s the point overall – a society that prides itself on religious doctrines has now largely allowed itself, much like with politics, to be governed by materialism.

The financial pressures linked to traditional roles like Njeke and Yai contribute to this materialistic mindset, as these titles are often associated with extravagant expectations that require substantial monetary contributions. The prioritization of material wealth in these cultural and religious contexts has put immense financial strain on those expected to fulfill these roles.

The Conclusion

This prioritization of materialistic culture over faith-based morality or morality as a whole is reminiscent of how many people engage in acts of social contribution, but only for the praise and recognition. It’s reasonable to believe that the titles ‘Njeke’ and ‘Yai,’ originally intended as harmless practices for support, transparency, accountability, and acknowledgment, have over time become increasingly defined by status and materialism, much like many of our most significant institutions.

In fact, over the course of writing this opinion piece, I spoke to many people who directly or indirectly participated in the culture of flamboyance, specifically pertaining to marriage, and all agreed that the material focus on our cultures is an insidious threat. Yet, when you tell them it’s morally wrong to prioritize materialism, what do they say? ‘Everyone else does it…’ or ‘kum nehut bokut’ – a Wollof phrase meaning ‘those who oppose the system do so because they’re not part of it,’ a condemnatory statement that conveniently overlooks the moral aspect. And my personal favourite: ‘You can’t do everything right.’ Unfortunately, I have to give this one to them – much as it pains me to admit it!

The ironic karma in all of this, though, is that no matter how much effort you put in appeasing certain culture, you can never truly satisfy it. Instead, such culture will judge you for even trying, focus on your lows instead of your highs, and whisper about your misfortunes, if any. A more reliable path to happiness is pragmatism, and for the religious, both pragmatism and faith. The most unproductive path to happiness is worrying about what everyone else will think, or say.

Safeguarding the National Interest: Transparency at a Crossroads for FAR Ltd. and PetroNor—Governance and Accountability in The Gambia’s Oil and Gas Sector

By: Ousman F. M’Bai
Financial Crime, Regulation & International Asset Recovery Lawyer/UK
Founder: ProffMaXX (Gambia) Ltd (Ground Water Drilling, Exploration & Production)

After the Raid: FAR Ltd.’s Sudden Exit from The Gambia

FAR Limited
Chairman’s Review: Annual Report: 31 December 2023.

The Gambia Blocks A2 and A5

‘The Company has successfully negotiated with The Gambia Government for an extension to the permit term of Blocks A2 and A5 for an additional 12 months, a substantial reduction in the permit statutory costs, and no obligation for expenditure on the licence for a 12 month period commencing on 1 April 2023.

The Company undertook a remarketing of Blocks A2 and A5, with the substantially lower fixed permit statutory cost structure. The marketing efforts were unsuccessful, and after year end, the Company has surrendered Blocks A2 and A5 and closed its office in The Gambia’.

This passage confirms that FAR Ltd. made a sudden, unannounced exit from The Gambia, relinquishing its rights to licence blocks A2 and A5. Their abrupt departure, like a vessel leaving port under cover of night, left The Gambia facing more than just financial loss—it was a blow that reverberated across the nation.

When FAR Ltd., a relatively obscure company with no significant hydrocarbon experience, first acquired 100% of The Gambia’s A2 and A5 licence blocks, few raised concerns. The nation, like many others, was captivated by the prospect of an oil and gas discovery similar to the SNE Sangomar field. FAR Ltd.’s tenuous association with that field was enough to roll out the red carpet. However, the goodwill of The Gambia’s government was not reciprocated. As time would reveal, FAR Ltd. merely used The Gambia as a bargaining tool for its own financial advantage, ultimately sacrificing the country’s economic interest by declaring that the A2 and A5 blocks were not extensions of the SNE Sangomar oil and gas field. With this simple yet devastating assertion, The Gambia was denied its rightful stake in a shared reservoir within the A2 block of the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin, which straddles the maritime boundaries of both countries, as indicated by 3D seismic data.

Like any shrewd operator, FAR Ltd. shielded itself from potential legal repercussions by securing a release agreement from The Gambia’s government. This agreement allowed FAR Ltd. to scuttle away without facing penalties, fees, or any liability for the licence blocks it had surrendered. It is difficult to comprehend how such an agreement could have been made, considering the national interest at stake. The arrangement reflects a troubling exploitation of The Gambia, potentially facilitated by enablers who ensured FAR Ltd.’s preferential treatment. This situation underscores FAR Ltd.’s troubling impact on The Gambia. The exploitative traits embodied by figures like Tippu Tip continue to resonate in modern Africa, just as they did one hundred and fifty years ago.

Background: FAR Ltd. and The Gambia

FAR Ltd. arrived in The Gambia in 2016, at a time when the country was experiencing political instability. It was granted licences for the A2 and A5 blocks, believed to be hydrocarbon-bearing, with the A2 mapped on 3D seismic data as a contiguous extension of the SNE Sangomar field. At the time, FAR Ltd. held a 13% stake in the Sangomar field, alongside joint venture partners Woodside Energy and Petrosen.

Despite these associations, FAR Ltd. lacked both the capital and operational capacity required to advance exploration efforts independently. Consequently, it brought in Petronas under a joint arrangement to fund the exploration work.

Despite lacking experience as an operator, FAR Ltd. proceeded to drill its first well, Samo, in the A5 block in 2018, claiming to have found only oil shows. In 2021, it claimed to have drilled a second well, Bambo, in the A2 block, again asserting that oil was not found in the primary well, though it did identify oil that was deemed commercially non-viable in the secondary sidetrack. These ambiguous results and FAR Ltd.’s inexperience raised serious concerns about the credibility of its findings.

In the lead-up to the Bambo drilling, FAR Ltd. was embroiled in negotiations with Woodside Energy over a default notice issued due to FAR Ltd.’s non-payment of its capital call on its SNE Sangomar stake. The notice put FAR Ltd. at risk of losing its entire stake without compensation. Against this backdrop of uncertainty, FAR Ltd. sold its stake in the SNE Sangomar field to Woodside Energy for $126 million in 2020, with full payment received in July 2021. This sum was in addition to a guaranteed future payment of $55 million, payable by 2027. However, despite being aware of the 3D seismic data indicating that the SNE Sangomar reservoirs extended into The Gambia’s A2 block, it appears that neither Woodside Energy, Petronas, nor Petrosen conducted any due diligence to validate FAR Ltd.’s drilling results in The Gambia. Perhaps the timing was strategic: by concluding the deal before FAR Ltd.’s drilling activities in The Gambia, Woodside Energy may have aimed to absolve itself of any due diligence responsibility.

A year after the deal, Petronas quietly divested its stake in The Gambia, selling it back to FAR Ltd. before exiting the country. FAR Ltd. reacquired a full interest in the blocks and secured a 12-month permit extension from The Gambia’s government, with terms that were remarkably beneficial, including reduced statutory costs and no expenditure obligations for the period starting in April 2023.

In what resembles an attempt to accelerate financial gains, FAR Ltd. appears unwilling to wait until the maturity date of the $55m payment in 2027. Instead, the company has engaged Gneiss Energy Limited, a UK-based corporate finance advisory firm specialising in the energy sector, to help market and sell the contingent $55m payment owed by Woodside Energy. This raises the question: what’s the rush?

Specifics of the Local Legal Environment in The Gambia and How It Has Played a Role in Oil and Gas Sector

The local legal environment in The Gambia is small and concentrated within a 25 – kilometre radius. The legal profession operates as a fused system, meaning there is no distinction between the roles of barristers (advocates) and solicitors (transactional lawyers). While many law firms are referred to as ‘chambers,’ most are sole practices focused primarily on general local law matters. In instances where a practice has more than two members, with the exception of a few, the additional members are often family, either parental or otherwise. These firms generally lack the necessary legal research facilities and IT infrastructure to meet the demands of international clients, particularly in complex oil and gas transactions.

There are only a few ‘firms’ that seem to have made significant breakthroughs in this sector, and these are generally practices with some connection to foreign firms.

Overall, the local legal environment lacks the specialised technical expertise required to handle complex transactions, particularly in oil and gas. As a result, there is a heavy reliance on foreign advisory firms, mainly based in the UK, for technical assistance.

However, even when foreign expertise is brought in, its effectiveness is often undermined by entrenched practices within the local legal system. These practices include conflicts of interest and a failure to differentiate between confidentiality, legal privilege, and regulatory disclosure requirements. At the heart of this issue is the imbalance created by well remunerated law firms, pitted against a timid, unimaginative, and underpaid civil service, too willing to sacrifice national interests without due consideration.

These issues have caused significant harm to the success of foreign direct investment in The Gambia, and in many cases, have stunted the country’s development objectives.

The Key Players: Amie Bensouda & Co LLP

One of the leading legal practices in The Gambia is Amie Bensouda & Co LLP, founded in 1995 by Ms. Amie Bensouda as a sole practice. Around 2007, her son, Aziz Bensouda, joined the firm, later becoming a partner. To this day, it remains a small family-run practice supported by a network of professionals across government, banking, accounting, insurance and media sector giving it unparalleled local reach.

While Ms. Bensouda’s legal skills have been central to her practice’s success, her extensive network within The Gambia’s public institutions has also played a significant role. Entering the legal field in the early 1980s, she held key positions within the Ministry of Justice, including heading the Civil and Company Law Division, which brought her into close contact with influential figures across government. She later served as Solicitor-General and briefly held the position of Attorney General in 1994, during the transition period following the military coup led by Yahya Jammeh.

Evidence presented at The Gambia’s Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) revealed that Ms. Bensouda drafted the decree that legitimised Jammeh’s seizure of power. She justified her actions as a damage control effort to prevent further destabilisation by what she described as a dangerously erratic Jammeh.

Her appointment as Lead Counsel to the Janneh Commission—a body established to investigate President Jammeh’s illicitly acquired wealth —was noted by many ethical observers with interest. During her tenure, questions arose regarding the process for disposing of Jammeh’s seized assets. A professional disagreement emerged with the Secretary to the Commission, a respected financial expert, who reportedly raised concerns over the asset disposal approach in a memo. The then Attorney General, Mr Ba Tambedou, subsequently removed the Secretary from his position. According to public reports, assets valued at up to $1 billion were disposed of by the Commission at significantly reduced amounts, a process that drew criticism from various quarters for perceived issues with transparency and fairness, impacting the national treasury. While the role of Lead Counsel did not confer authority over asset disposal, which remained the Commission’s responsibility, these developments underscore the importance of clear, accountable processes in such high-stakes matters.

Ms. Bensouda’s brother, Habid Drammeh, also held several influential positions, including Minister of the Interior in 2017, Secretary General of The Gambia Civil Service between February and September 2018, Director General of The Gambia Tourism Authority in the early 2000s, and Director General of the Gambia Transport Service Commission.

When FAR Ltd. arrived in The Gambia, Ms. Bensouda was already retained as local counsel for several parastatals and the country’s largest local authority. In a close-knit society like The Gambia, where social structures are informal, her deep connections and prominent status provided her with significant access to the corridors of power, aligning her with the classic definition of a domestic PEP. It is therefore unsurprising that FAR Ltd. retained her son, Aziz Bensouda, as local counsel. Aziz’s practice benefits from extensive familial and established professional networks, which may make it challenging to assess his independent legal expertise.

Profile of the Pseudo Uncle and Nephew – The Two Cousins

Fafa Sanyang, currently The Gambia’s Ambassador to the UAE, served as Minister of Energy and Petroleum from 10 April 2017 until 4 May 2022, when he was replaced by Abdou Jobe. The current officeholder is Nani Juwara. Sanyang (not worthy of the title Mr.) is reportedly a cousin of Jerreh Barrow (unrelated to President Adama Barrow), the Director General of The Gambia Petroleum Commission. Both Sanyang and Barrow benefitted from government-sponsored opportunities to advance their studies in specialised fields in preparation for their public service roles. However, their tenures have been marked by colossal incompetence, resulting in disastrous consequences for The Gambia’s energy and petroleum sectors.

Sanyang holds a bachelor’s degree in geology from the University of Sierra Leone (1989), a master’s degree in marine management from Dalhousie University, Canada (1997), and another master’s degree in engineering geology from the University of Leeds. He also claims to be a fellow of the Geological Society of London, though the relevance of this credential remains questionable. According to his Wikipedia page, Sanyang oversaw a $165 million deal between the National Water and Electricity Company (NAWEC) and Sinohydro Corporation in April 2017. However, details of this deal are conspicuously absent from public records.

Sanyang ensured that his cousin, Jerreh Barrow, received prestigious scholarships, and his career progression within the departments Sanyang headed was virtually guaranteed as he steadily climbed the ranks. Jerreh Barrow claims to hold a master’s degree in applied geophysics from Chiang Mai University (2008) and a bachelor’s degree in geology from the University of Ghana, Legon (2004). He has held various positions within The Gambia’s Geology Department, including Deputy Director, before being appointed Commissioner of Petroleum in 2015, a position he continues to hold. While his role in 2015 carried less authority, the situation changed dramatically under his cousin’s leadership at the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. Sanyang’s tenure as Minister set in motion a series of actions culminating in the enactment of the Petroleum Commission Act of 2021. This legislation created a near-fiefdom, centralising significant power in the hands of the Commissioner and granting him unrestrained authority over all matters related to petroleum, oil, and gas exploration, development, and production.

Under this new framework, the Commissioner has emerged as a central figure and power broker, reducing the ministry and other related departments to mere rubber- stamping functions. Although Jerreh Barrow was not directly appointed to succeed his uncle as Minister, the institutional structure was manipulated to ensure that he retained significant influence. In essence, the Commissioner’s office holds the central authority, allowing Barrow and his uncle to shape the narrative surrounding the country’s oil and gas prospects. This consolidation of power has set The Gambia on a path to failure, as placing such authority in incompetent hands inevitably jeopardises the national interest.

From Partial Stake to Full Control: FAR Ltd.’s Acquisition of Blocks A2 and A5

At the time of FAR Ltd.’s arrival in The Gambia, the country’s oil and gas prospects were largely shaped by the actions and omissions of key individuals in positions of authority. Among these influential actors were the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice at the time Ba Tambedou, as well as the Petroleum Negotiation Committee, which became involved later. From the outset, nepotism was a notable structural flaw. The emergence of a troubling family connection—a domestic PEP mother and son and a pseudo uncle- nephew (or cousins)—further complicated matters. Central to these concerns was FAR Ltd.’s acquisition of The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks, licences previously held by Erin Energy.

FAR Ltd.’s arrival coincided with Erin Energy’s liquidity crisis, which led to Erin selling 80% of its licence to FAR Ltd. for $13 million. Of this, $5 million was paid in cash, with the remainder structured as costs to be incurred by FAR Ltd. A key issue arose regarding the remaining 20% interest held by Erin Energy. Some internal discussions among stakeholders reportedly touched upon concerns that a perceived defect in the Model Licence Agreement might limit the government’s ability to acquire the remaining interest. Subsequent negotiations, involving various government offices, ultimately led to FAR Ltd. acquiring this 20% share for $4 million—a sum viewed by some as significantly below the interest’s potential value. Observers have since questioned whether the legal advice surrounding this transaction received sufficient scrutiny and whether alternative interpretations were considered by relevant governmental offices, including the Attorney-General and Ministry of Justice.

In 2017, the Africa Legal Support Facility (ALSF) engaged Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner (BCLP), Johnny West of Open Oil as a consultant, and local counsel—including Aziz Bensouda—to review the legal and fiscal frameworks governing petroleum projects. The objective was to renegotiate petroleum licences with international oil companies, but this arrangement raised serious concerns about a potential conflict of interest, given Bensouda’s dual role as counsel for FAR (Gambia Ltd), whose parent company FAR Ltd. had a history of seeking to amend contracts in its favour.

From the moment FAR Ltd. was granted the licences for A2 and A5 blocks, its poor financial standing and lack of expertise in exploration quickly became apparent. This raises serious concerns about the rigour with which The Gambia’s Petroleum Commission, as the regulator, vetted FAR Ltd. against internationally established investment criteria for oil and gas licence acquisition. While FAR Ltd.’s marketing pitch may have invoked optimism about its potential to deliver for The Gambia, this did not justify the reckless disregard for caution that followed.

The Petroleum Commission, under its powers set out in the 2021 Act, plays a pivotal role before any licence is granted. It is required to liaise with the Petroleum Negotiating Committee and the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, presenting all relevant facts about any application. The Negotiating Committee, chaired by none other than the Commissioner of Petroleum, Jerreh Barrow, is composed of representatives from key institutions, including the Ministry of Finance, Gambia Revenue Authority, GIEPA, PURA and The Gambia Maritime Authority. Any concerns regarding licences or the general operation of oil and gas exploration must be reported to the Ministry of Petroleum, with legal advice sought first from the Commission’s in-house counsel and, if necessary, from the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice.

Additionally, the Commission is tasked with overseeing all exploration rights, including scheduling regular supervision and review meetings to assess licensees’ fulfilment of obligations. Such reviews must be thoroughly documented, with detailed agendas and accurate records of discussions and decisions.

Drilling Operations and Data Transparency: FAR Ltd.’s Denial of Verification Access

An effective and well-managed Petroleum Commission would maintain a vigilant interest in FAR Ltd.’s drilling activities, particularly following the unsuccessful Samo well. However, FAR Ltd. operated with little meaningful independent oversight or supervision. During the drilling of the Bambo well, although a small number of officials from the Ministry of Petroleum were allowed on the drill ship, they were denied access to crucial verification points, including data generated during drilling. The licensing regime granted FAR Ltd. ownership and custody rights over all drilling logs and data, which significantly undermined The Gambia’s ability to verify the accuracy of the drilling information in real-time. FAR Ltd.’s brazen refusal to allow verification of its drilling data has jeopardised the national interest.

The drilling reports submitted by FAR Ltd. were alarmingly inadequate and lacked detail, being accessible only to Jerreh Barrow and the Minister of Energy and Petroleum, Abdou Jobe. These reports contained no well logs, pressure data, seismic information or crucially well coordinates (i.e. the precise location of the wells drilled). Moreover, FAR Ltd. promptly plugged the wells after drilling, making any further independent examination impossible. To make matters worse, FAR Ltd. unilaterally designated the Bambo well and its side-track as a ‘tight hole,’ refusing to make any public disclosures about it. This raises serious concerns about FAR Ltd.’s operational competence and integrity. Following the surrender of its licence, the rights to the data reverted to The Gambia; however, none of the limited data left behind has met integrity parameter tests, further casting doubt on its reliability. FAR Ltd.’s claim that the SNE Sangomar field does not extend into The Gambia’s A2 block must be investigated and should be legally challenged by any future Gambian government if Woodside Energy and Petrosen fail to establish the truth sooner.

Examining Conflicts of Interest: An In-Depth Analysis

Upholding ethical and legal standards in the oil and gas sector is critical, particularly given the enormous financial stakes involved. Conflicts of interest, in all their forms, incentivise corruption and place national interests at significant risk. They can potentially arise from unrestrained hiring of the children of domestic PEPs, when legal practitioners represent both private corporations and public bodies, or when family members hold key government positions, potentially overseeing one another. Such situations raise serious concerns about compromised loyalty, improper influence, and personal gain.

A relevant example of the risks associated with conflicts of interest in the oil and gas industry is the Halliburton scandal in Nigeria. Halliburton and its subsidiary KBR were found to have bribed Nigerian officials to secure multi-billion-dollar contracts for constructing liquefied natural gas facilities. The improper relationships between corporations and government officials in this case resulted in significant financial harm and compromised Nigeria’s national interests. Halliburton was eventually fined $1.5 billion, underscoring the severe legal consequences of international scrutiny when conflicts of interest and corruption are uncovered.

FAR Ltd., Local Counsel and The Petroleum Commission: What’s at Stake?

FAR Ltd.’s business strategy in the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin aimed to maximise returns with minimal investment. To achieve this, the company deployed key personnel from its Senior management team to both Senegal and The Gambia. While Cath Norman ingratiated herself within the corridors of power in Senegal, Rolf Stork operated in The Gambia as a facilitator, coordinating interactions between the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and the Petroleum Commission, all the while being strategically guided by local counsel on local law matters. Both individuals demonstrated remarkable agility and stealth. Cath Norman succeeded in forging a close relationship with the then President of Senegal, Macky Sall, while Rolf Stork played a facilitative role in The Gambia, liaising with the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and the Petroleum Commission.

Although Stork did not have direct access to former President Yahya Jammeh or current President Adama Barrow, he developed working relationships with notable figures such as Jerreh Barrow, Fafa Sanyang, and the Bensoudas. These interactions proved advantageous for FAR Ltd. In Senegal, Cath Norman secured a $126 million cash payment for FAR Ltd. from Woodside Energy, while in The Gambia, Rolf Stork negotiated a licence extension before FAR Ltd.’s eventual exit from the country without incurring penalties or liabilities.

The nature of these relationships, particularly involving Jerreh Barrow, Fafa Sanyang, and Aziz Bensouda, raises concerns about whether the national interest was adequately protected during these negotiations. However, there is no suggestion that any of these individuals engaged in unlawful conduct.

Local counsel’s role included registering FAR Ltd.’s subsidiary, FAR (Gambia) Ltd., and negotiating 100% licensing rights in the A2 and A5 blocks. Counsel also facilitated the farm-out of the licence in a joint venture arrangement with Petronas. While these actions appear procedurally correct, questions arise regarding the transparency of financial transactions, particularly as none of the payments were routed through Gambian financial institutions. The absence of such transactions from the public record raises issues of transparency, though there is no evidence of illegal activity.

The Petroleum Commission and the Ministry of Energy held regular meetings with FAR Gambia Ltd., during which the company had legal representation. However, government representation was notably absent, prompting concerns about whether FAR Ltd.’s performance was properly assessed, particularly in light of its failed drilling operations.

After FAR Ltd.’s second failed well, Bambo, the company dismantled most of its operations in The Gambia, leaving Rolf Stork as its primary representative. This sudden operational shift, coupled with the introduction of a new team unfamiliar with previous activities, warrants closer examination whether it was done to conceal information.

Implications for Governance and Accountability – How FAR Ltd Misled The Gambia – Removal of Well Commitments & Penalties

Despite FAR Ltd.’s underperformance in the A2 and A5 blocks, the company requested a two-year licence extension from 1 October 2022, seeking relief from its contractual obligation to drill one well per year. A penalty clause requiring FAR Ltd. to pay $22 million in case of default was included. FAR Ltd. argued for the extension and a waiver of the penalty, claiming that it had drilled two wells—the Bambo well and its side-track—and promised to submit a technical geoscience review.

Though FAR Ltd. did not deliver the geoscience review, hopeless Jerreh Barrow recommended granting the extension and waiving the $22 million penalty. This recommendation was supported by the Petroleum Negotiation Committee and approved by the Minister of Petroleum. While there is no evidence to suggest improper conduct, the lack of independent verification of the side-track well and the failure to obtain critical data raises concerns about the thoroughness of the decision-making process.

Following the extension, FAR Ltd. took a 12-month pause before initiating negotiations to surrender its licence, citing difficulties in securing a joint venture partner. The company requested a waiver of the $4 million statutory cost and proposed no further technical work during the period. Once again, Jerreh Barrow presented FAR Ltd.’s case, asserting that the company had spent over $100 million in The Gambia. However, FAR Ltd. had previously indicated in investor presentations that its joint venture partner, Petronas, funded much of its operational costs. This discrepancy should have warranted further scrutiny, although there is no suggestion that Jerreh Barrow acted improperly.

The drowsy Petroleum Negotiation Committee failed to demand detailed financial records before endorsing the recommendation, and Petroleum Minister Jobe, asleep at the wheel, granted FAR Ltd. a release from its obligations. The lack of public disclosure surrounding these negotiations raises concerns about transparency. However, there is no conclusive evidence of unlawful conduct by any of the parties involved.

The Gambia, a small nation in severe economic distress, makes it difficult to justify how any citizen could agree to waive such substantial costs for FAR Ltd. given that the company received $126 million in payments, with the potential for millions more in the future. By sacrificing the national interest, the state has been deprived of significant financial benefits, especially considering its exclusion from the shared Senegal/Gambia sub-basin reservoirs a direct result of FAR Ltd.’s incompetent drilling programme.

To fully grasp the scale of the financial loss, one must consider the situation in reverse: had The Gambia terminated FAR Ltd.’s licence, the company would have sued for billions, citing the potential value of the undiscovered oil in these blocks. FAR Ltd. would never have waived such a claim without compensation. The actions and decisions of those involved in these negotiations represent a profound betrayal of the trust of the Gambian people.

The PetroNor A4 Licence Block Saga – A Repeat of Past Mistakes?

The handling of the A4 block appears to echo some of the same concerns raised in the FAR Ltd. case, as much of the earlier mentioned assistance provided by the ALSF is being nullified due to a repeat of the same incompetence and reckless disregard for safeguarding the national interest in the A4 block. Following the poorly negotiated settlement in the arbitration case between The Gambia and African Petroleum (now PetroNor), overseen by Fafa Sanyang, Lamin Camara, and Ba Tambedou, the implications for The Gambia could not be worse.

In this settlement, PetroNor was granted 100% of the rights to the highly valuable A4 block, with a significantly reduced signature bonus of $4 million and a 30-year lease over the block in the event of a discovery. To put this in perspective, BP paid a $10 million signature bonus for the A1 block alone. Moreover, PetroNor was exempted from paying the signature bonus for the first 12 months, and this waiver has been extended multiple times as PetroNor has consistently failed to make the payment and has done next to nothing with the block.

The result of this settlement, combined with the Petroleum Commission’s lack of enforcement rigor, has left the nation shackled, much like Tippu Tip did to our forebears. Consequently, The Gambia is being deprived of the opportunity to advance its oil and gas exploration potential, as credible and genuinely interested companies are being kept out of the market. The A4 block, located adjacent to BP’s former A1 block, which has yielded excellent seismic data, remains a highly competitive prospect. The degree of incompetence and negligence displayed by Gambians in safeguarding the national interest is truly heart-breaking.

Conclusion: Safeguarding the National Interest

The recurring theme of opacity in the handling of oil and gas transactions presents challenges to governance and accountability in The Gambia. FAR Ltd.’s operations, and the subsequent management of its exit, have raised valid concerns about whether national interests were adequately protected. While no allegations of illegal activity have been substantiated, the processes involved in these transactions highlight the need for improved oversight and transparency.
As noted in a recent Financial Times article, How Culpable Are External Lawyers in Corporate Wrongdoing?, Professor Elise Maizel argued that law firms can play a pivotal role in corporate governance. Although corporations in many jurisdictions are being held to higher standards of accountability, law firms often maintain plausible detachment regarding their clients’ conduct. A similar argument can be made regarding the need for greater responsibility in The Gambia’s energy sector.
Moving forward, it is critical that independent oversight bodies, strict codes of conduct, and full public disclosure be implemented to safeguard The Gambia’s natural resources. Without transparency, the nation risks further losses. It is vital that all parties involved in these negotiations act in the best interests of The Gambia, ensuring that its valuable resources are managed responsibly for the benefit of its people. Cry, beloved Gambia—how much longer must you suffer at the hands of your own people?

Editor’s Note

On 30 October 2024, the Fatu Network sent a detailed list of questions related to issues raised in this article to the following individuals: Fafa Sanyang, Jerreh Barrow, Lamin Camara, Abdoulie Jobe, Kanni Touray, Nani Juwara, Rolf Stork, Ba Tambedou, Dawda Jallow, Ms Amie Bensouda, and Aziz Bensouda. None provided comprehensive answers to the specific questions. Jerreh Barrow submitted a written critique and offered a sit-down interview, while Aziz Bensouda provided a written response jointly with his mother, Ms. Bensouda. Their response is in part summarised as follows:

The statements provided by Ms Bensouda and her firm clarify that she has never represented or advised the Government of The Gambia in matters related to FAR Ltd. or the A2 and A5 licenses. Ms Bensouda’s firm’s involvement has been solely as counsel for FAR Ltd. Her firm’s work is limited to Gambian local matters and does not extend to financial or technical advice. Moreover, they are not familiar with any ‘Master License Agreement’ nor its purported ‘defectiveness.’ For inquiries on waivers, extensions, or commercial decisions, reference should be made to the Petroleum Commission or FAR Ltd. The Government of The Gambian government had engaged international legal and financial experts, ensuring that all actions align with global industry standards, with records accessible from the Ministry of Petroleum and Petroleum Commission.

The Shadow Over West Africa Oil & Gas: A Deep Dive into FAR Ltd, Woodside Energy, Petronas, and Petrosen’s Accountability in The Gambia

By: Ousman F. M’Bai

Financial Crime, Regulation & International Asset Recovery Lawyer/UK;
Founder: ProffMaXX (Gambia) Ltd (Ground Water Drilling, Exploration & Production)

FAR Ltd: Jeopardising The Gambia’s Oil & Gas Prospects

FAR Ltd.’s handling of The Gambia’s oil and gas prospects in the Senegal/Gambia shared sub-basin has raised serious concerns about its operational competence and judgement that may have negatively impacted the nation’s resource future. Yet, the response from The Gambia’s government and other entities involved has been astonishingly muted. It begs the question: why has there been no investigation into how this debacle was allowed to unfold?

Despite FAR Ltd.’s troubling conduct, it continues to hold its 100% licence stake in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks, with seemingly no repercussions. The Gambia’s government, along with the governments of Senegal, Woodside Energy, and Petronas, have all remained conspicuously silent. The inertia surrounding the matter signals more than mere oversight; it points seemingly to a potential systemic lack of scrutiny and accountability.

The Gambia’s Missed Opportunity and Senegal’s Tainted Windfall

The Gambia’s government, having effectively surrendered the country’s economic sovereignty to Senegal, maintains the position that there are no oil and gas resources in The Gambia. Remarkably, the Petroleum Minister recently issued a communiqué downplaying the nation’s oil and gas potential, reinforcing the false narrative that no significant resources exist within the country. This conclusion—potentially influenced by FAR Ltd.’s poor performance and Senegal’s control over the country’s unsophisticated elites overlooks a crucial fact: the issue is not whether oil is directly found in The Gambia, but rather The Gambia’s undeniable right to a fair share of the resources from the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin, which straddles the maritime boundaries of both countries.

Meanwhile, Senegal and its state-owned oil corporation Petrosen, together with Woodside Energy, celebrate what they claim is a monumental discovery. They proudly assert that this will contribute to Senegal’s sustainable development and provide lucrative returns for investors, notably Woodside Energy. However, they appear to omit critical discussion of how they stand to gain significantly from FAR Ltd.’s controversial claim that the SNE Sangomar oil and gas field does not extend into The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks. The ethical implication of this omission raises significant concerns and questions about transparency in the management of shared resources. At the core of this issue is the exclusion of The Gambia from its rightful share of the sub-basin’s resources. There can be no valid explanation for this mistreatment and exploitation of The Gambia, especially given that Senegal has resource-sharing agreements with both Mauritania to the north of the MSGBC basin and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

3D Seismic Data and FAR Ltd.’s Dubious Findings

Woodside Energy, Petrosen, and Petronas, through its Gambian subsidiary PC(Gambia) Ltd, all possessed clear 3D seismic data indicating that The Gambia’s A2 block is a contiguous extension of the prolific SNE Sangomar field. Yet rather than critically evaluating FAR Ltd.’s findings, these entities accepted without question the conclusions from FAR Ltd.’s failed drilling programme— raising concerns about the adequacy of due diligence.

From the outset, FAR Ltd lacked both the capital and technical expertise necessary for successful exploration. When it entered The Gambia in 2016, the country’s institutions were in disarray. FAR Ltd secured 100% stakes in the A2 and A5 blocks through a deal that has not been fully disclosed, raising concerns about transparency and potential exploitation of weak governance. A strategy often associated with problematic investment practices is to identify a gateway to the heart of government decision- making, then appoint the son, daughter or relative of that individual to represent the so- called investor’s interest.

Facing an inability to meet its obligations, FAR Ltd brought in Petronas as a joint venture partner through its subsidiary PC(Gambia) Ltd. However, Petronas’s presence in The Gambia has been equally shrouded in mystery. It has made no public disclosures, offered no transparency, and failed to release any transactional accounts or information regarding its operations in the country. FAR Ltd.’s assertions are the only source of information on this partnership.

FAR Ltd.’s Inadequate Drilling Programmes

FAR Ltd.’s amateurish approach to drilling was evident in the failure of its first well, Samo, in the A5 block, based on less accurate 2D seismic data or none. Unsurprisingly, FAR’s Chief Geologist admitted they had “drilled low.” Nonetheless, the company reported encountering two structures but failed to disclose any details regarding their relationship to the SNE Sangomar reservoirs. For its second well, Bambo, FAR Ltd concealed significant issues, including a major accident during drilling. Both the primary and secondary wells missed their targets, leading FAR Ltd to wrongly conclude that the Bambo and Soloo prospects were commercially non-viable. This conclusion ignored

clear evidence from 3D seismic data showing that the SNE Sangomar field extends into The Gambia’s A2 block. And FAR Ltd.’s own findings that both prospects have easy access to the prolific source kitchen that feeds oil into the SNE Sangomar field.

FAR Ltd.’s Financial Collapse and The Senegal Deal

Adding to the intrigue, in June 2020, FAR Ltd defaulted on a capital call for its joint venture stake in the SNE Sangomar field. In response, it was forced to sell its 13% stake to Woodside Energy for $126 million in July 2021. This transaction, structured to guarantee FAR Ltd future payments up to $55 million, raises serious questions. It appears that Woodside Energy and Petrosen conducted no meaningful due diligence before finalising this deal, preferring instead to validate FAR Ltd.’s dubious findings and dismiss The Gambia’s rightful claim to a stake in the SNE Sangomar field located inside the Senegal/Gambia sub basin.

Despite repeated requests for clarification from Woodside Energy, Petrosen, and Petronas on their role in this saga, no substantive responses have been provided. Woodside Energy’s reply, in particular, ignored the crux of the matter, deflecting to its pre-emption of FAR’s sale in the Rufisque, Sangomar, and Sangomar Deep (RSSD) joint venture. It made no mention of the default notice served on FAR Ltd, nor did it acknowledge the implications of FAR Ltd.’s actions in The Gambia. The strategic silence on these matters is telling.

FAR Ltd.’s poor financial standing left it ill-prepared to meet its obligations regarding development, production, and royalty payments under its licence, had it confirmed that the SNE Sangomar field extended into The Gambia’s A2 block. Such a finding would have compelled Woodside Energy and Petrosen to acknowledge The Gambia’s shared stake. FAR Ltd.’s ineptitude has effectively made The Gambia the sacrificial lamb.

The Case of Petronas and Lack of Transparency

In August 2022, barely a year after Woodside’s acquisition of FAR Ltd.’s stake, Petronas surrendered its interest in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks back to FAR Ltd for an undisclosed amount. This move raises disturbing questions about the nature of the transaction, the nature of the relationship between Petronas and FAR Ltd and the potential denial of The Gambia its rightful share of the sub-basin’s resources. Petronas has yet to respond to inquiries on whether its actions comply with local and international regulations.

In an era where corporate transparency and accountability are paramount, the actions of Woodside Energy, Petronas, Petrosen, and FAR Ltd stand as an affront to ethical standards. The ongoing denial of The Gambia’s rights to its resources condemns millions of Gambians to perpetual poverty while benefiting a select few. This level of corporate governance raises serious ethical concerns that must be met with international outrage.

Environmental Risks Posed by the FPSO Vessel Near The Gambia’s Territorial Waters

Amidst all of this, The Gambia’s entire maritime coast and ecosystem is exposed to a significant risk of serious pollution from oil spills and leaks due to the presence of the FPSO Leopold Sedar Senghor in close proximity to its territorial waters. An FPSO (Floating, Production, Storage, and Offloading) vessel is a modified oil tanker, redesigned for use at sea as a facility for oil and gas production, processing, storage, and offloading. These vessels are directly connected to production wells deep below the seabed by numerous interlinked pipes, often spanning hundreds of kilometres. The multipurpose function of the vessel, combined with the extensive network of pipes, increases the risk of accidents through leaks and spillage. However, there is no evidence of any coordinated collaboration between The Gambia’s government, the government of Senegal, and Woodside Energy to implement proactive emergency safeguarding measures in the event of an accident.

Paralleling Precedent: The Mozambique Tuna Bonds Case

In the recent landmark corruption case in the High Court Commercial Division in London, the Mozambique “Tuna Bonds” case, Justice Robin Knowles described the scale of the scandal as “nothing short of a tragedy.” He criticised the defendants for focusing solely on their own financial gain, rather than on assisting Mozambique in making the most of its resources.

The parallel with The Gambia is clear. Just as Mozambique was exploited, The Gambia’s vulnerabilities as a small, weak state are being exploited by external entities and internal enablers. The international community must not allow this injustice to persist.

Conclusion: FAR Ltd, Woodside Energy, and The Gambia’s Future

The Gambia’s rightful share of the oil and gas resources in the Senegal/Gambia sub- basin has been sacrificed due to FAR Ltd.’s incompetence and the complacency, if not the lack of action from companies like Woodside Energy, Petrosen, and Petronas. FAR Ltd.’s reacquisition of 100% of The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks has put the nation in a perilous position, effectively holding the country hostage with a gun to its head.

Gambians must not remain silent in the face of this corporate exploitation. The ethical and legal failings of those involved must be addressed, and those who have sought to profit from The Gambia’s resources at its expense must be held accountable.

Woodside Energy, now holding 82% of the RSSD, has the power to right this wrong. However, their willingness to engage meaningfully with the reality of The Gambia’s situation will serve as a true measure of their commitment to justice, transparency, and the right to development. The world is watching.

Editor’s Note: On 28.08.24 The Fatu Network wrote to Woodside Energy, Petrosen and Petronas seeking clarifications and their response to the issues raised in this expose. To date, Petronas and Petrosen have not responded. Woodside Energy provided the following response attributable to a Woodside Energy spokesperson:

‘In December 2020 Woodside exercised pre-emption rights to acquire FAR Senegal’s participating interest in the Rufisque, Sangomar and Sangomar Deep (RSSD) joint venture. The transaction completed in 2021 and in no way related to any of FAR’s assets in The Gambia. Further details can be found in the announcement released to the Australian Securities Exchange at the time of the transaction.’

The Fatu Network wrote to FAR Ltd on 5.08.24 and they have not responded to date.

Whither The Gambia? – The Saga of a Small Nation and its Missing Oil and Gas Resources

By: Ousman F. M’Bai

Financial Crime, Regulation & International Asset Recovery Lawyer/UK
Founder: ProffMaxx (Gambia) Ltd (Ground Water Drilling Exploration & Production)

The MSGBC

The MSGBC basin has been one of the world’s most prolific regions for oil and gas discoveries, until the recent unprecedented oil discovery in Guyana surpassed it. The basin is estimated to hold about two billion barrels of oil and 25 trillion cubic feet of gas. Located onshore and offshore on the Atlantic coast of West Africa, specifically between Mauritania and Guinea Conakry, MSGBC is an acronym for the countries that comprise the onshore part of this geological province with interconnected maritime boundaries: Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Guinea Conakry.

The basin covers a total land mass of about 340,000 km² and an estimated offshore area of 100,000 km² with water depths between 2000 meters and 4000 meters. This offshore area spans over the AGC (Agence de Gestion et de Coopération entre le Sénégal et la Guinée-Bissau), a joint maritime zone between Senegal and Guinea Bissau.

The basin is not a single continuous span but consists of three major connected subbasins:

  1. Mauritania Offshore Basin: This basin stretches from the north of Mauritania down to the Senegal River in the southern border between Senegal and Mauritania.
  2. Northern or Senegal/Gambia Subbasin: Located between the Senegal River and the River Gambia. The specific area of the subbasin relevant to this article is between the River Gambia and River Saloum.
  3. Southern Senegal/Guinea Bissau Subbasin: Extending south from the river Gambia through the Casamance region into Guinea Bissau.

Geology of the MSGBC Basin

The basin developed in complex stages over millions of years, beginning with the opening of the North Atlantic and the splitting of North America from Eurasia and Africa during the late Permian to Early Triassic period. This process continued into the late Jurassic when the breakup of Africa from South America began, culminating in the opening of the Atlantic, which was completed in the Albian period. Marine deposits began forming in the early Jurassic in Morocco, advancing southward as the sea encroached on the land, reaching the southernmost edge of the basin in the late Jurassic. The rock formation after the split is identified as ranging from the middle Jurassic to the Holocene, consisting of a carbonate-rock unit with varying thicknesses between 2,300 meters and 3,200 meters in the three subbasins.

During the Albian, carbonate rock deposits continued to form progressively in the middle offshore part of the basin, known as the Northern or Senegal/Gambia basin, creating an elevated gradient. This feature is unique to this subbasin and is absent in the northern part of the Mauritania subbasin and the southern part of the Casamance subbasin, which are mostly characterized by deep-water sediments with shallow areas.

Cenomanian rocks, represented by thick marine shales sandwiched between marine sandstones, were deposited after the opening of the Atlantic. Widespread Turonian or Cretaceous rocks, commonly black shales often positive as hydrocarbon source rocks, range in thickness from 50 to 150 meters.

There is a mild westward sloping Mesozoic and Cenozoic platform, with a paleo shelf-edge trend between 35 to 100 km wide in the northwest, which balloons out to the west. It parallels the 2000-meter bathymetric contour before extending south across the Dome Flore offshore Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry. To the west of the paleo shelf-edge, in water depths greater than 2000 meters, sedimentary thickness exceeds 12,000 meters, and the formation is characterized by a curved fault plane that dips near the surface towards the edge of the Jurassic to lower Cretaceous platform.

Hydrocarbon Source Rocks in the Basin

The total petroleum system of the basin is made up of three parts. The first part, lying on the Palaeozoic platform deep below sea level, is the lower Palaeozoic. Above this is the Mesozoic-Cenozoic platform, which supports the second part of the sub-salt system, consisting of Triassic and Jurassic source rocks. These rocks are potentially hydrocarbon-bearing, but they are so deep below the seabed that they are difficult to reach, and there has not been any exploration for oil or gas in this system. The third part is the Cretaceous-Tertiary system. These source rocks are confirmed to be hydrocarbon-bearing, and it is where most of the oil discoveries have been made. The Cretaceous-Tertiary system is subdivided into three zones: the lower Cretaceous, the upper Cretaceous, and the Tertiary. The lower Cretaceous is dominated by Aptian and Albian source rocks, the upper Cretaceous features Cenomanian and Turonian source rocks, and the Tertiary is characterized by Senonian-Maastrichtian sandstones.

Discoveries in the Mauritania/Senegal Subbasin

In 2015, Kosmos Energy using 3D seismic data made the largest global discovery of gas in the tortue-1 field which straddles the Mauritania and Senegal maritime boundary. Located at 120km offshore in water depth of 2,850m, the prospect has a projected recoverable gas resource of 15 trillion cubic feet. Further appraisal drilling in the area discovered the Guembeul-1 and Ahmeyim-2 wells in 2016 and the whole complex is now renamed The Greater Tortue Ahmeyim-1(GTA-1). In 2018, Senegal and Mauritania signed an inter-governmental co-operation agreement on an equal split of 50/50 of resource and revenue to develop to production this cross-border gas prospect. The project was given a unique status in 2021 as the GTA ‘National project of strategic importance’. The development is led by BP as operator, Petrosen (Societes des Petroles du Senegal (the Senegal State oil corporation)) SMH (Mauritienne des Hydrocarbon) and Kosmos Energy.

The unprecedented scale of this discovery intensified exploration further offshore in the deeper edges of the MSGBC basin with BP leading its joint venture partner Kosmos Energy. Their efforts paid off massively with the discovery of the Yakaar- Teranga gas field at water depth of 8,364 in northern Senegal. With an estimated 25 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas explorable to 2053, it was flagged as the world’s largest discovery in 2017. These discoveries are a lifeline to Senegal and Mauritania and if the revenue to be generated from them are managed efficiently, it will propel their economic growth for years to come.

Discoveries in the Southern Senegal/Guinea Bissau Subbasin

Guinea Bissau has recently experienced potentially transformative drilling explorations in its 11 offshore blocks within the subbasin. Newly acquired 3D seismic data has identified significant amounts of oil in the shallow reservoirs atop the salt-induced Flore Dome and Gea Dome. These structures are in a vast expanse of water in the Atlantic between latitudes 10.7◦N and 12.5◦N, known as the joint maritime zone between Senegal and Guinea Bissau.

The demarcation of these territorial waters followed a protracted disagreement between the two countries, with Senegal, aware of the natural resource potential of the area, insisting on a perpendicular delimitation of their maritime boundary. The dispute was amicably resolved with the establishment of the Agence de Gestion et de Coopération entre le Sénégal et la Guinée-Bissau (AGC). The AGC’s primary objective is to facilitate collaboration between the two countries in sharing resources to develop the oil and gas prospects in the area.

Recent developments in Guinea Bissau have revealed an underhand deal between the former President of Senegal, Mr. Sall, and his Bissau counterpart, Mr. Embalo, which has caused outrage among Bissau-Guineans concerning the prospective revenue split between the two countries at production. More details on this will follow.

Discoveries in Senegal – The Gambia subbasin – FAN-1, SNE & Sangomar Field

The discovery of the SNE-1 Sangomar field has ignited debate about its exact geographic boundary and whether it extends into The Gambia’s maritime area. These debates intensified in June 2024 when Senegal produced its first oil barrel from a well in the field, making it the newest oil-producing nation in Africa. This journey began in 1960, when the Senghor Government prioritised promoting investment in oil and gas exploration. Although Senegal’s first oil well in DiamNadio in 1960 was not commercially viable, it spurred successive governments to introduce policies attracting foreign investment. Significant reforms began under President Abdou Diouf and continued more vigorously under his successor, Abdoulie Wade. Wade succeeded in creating a stable and predictable environment for multinational investors, a policy continued by his successor, Macky Sall.

FAR Ltd, an Australian company focused on African oil and gas exploration, acquired licenses for three contiguous Senegalese blocks (Rufisque, Sangomar, and Sangomar Deep) in 2006. Incorporated in Western Australia in 1984 as First Australia Resources NL, it became FAR Ltd in 2010. These blocks cover 7,500 km² in the productive MSGBC basin, located in the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin.

The blocks contain four prospects. On the paleo shelf-edge trend running between the mouths of the Saloum and Gambia rivers, about 50 km offshore, are SNE-North-1 and SNE-1 (Sangomar Offshore). The SNE-1, renamed Sangomar Field Development Phase 1 (SNE-1 Sangomar) by President Macky Sall, is contiguous with the northern edge of The Gambia’s A2 block. The deeper water prospects are Sangomar Deep FAN-1 and FAN South-1.

In 2013, FAR Ltd made a strategic decision to buy the licenses, previously held by Hunt Ltd, including modern 3D seismic data covering targeted 2,050 km² of the blocks. FAR Ltd enhanced the data, identifying hydrocarbon layers in the FAN-1 and SNE-1 fields and mapping four initial drillable prospects, followed by another seven. However, as a small venture capital company, FAR Ltd lacked the capital and expertise to drill offshore wells, prompting it to seek joint venture partners. FAR Ltd farmed out 85% of its license interest to Cairn Energy (operator, 40%), ConocoPhillips (35%), and Petrosen (10%).

At the time, FAR Ltd.’s Managing Director Cath Norman said:

“We are very pleased to have secured leading independent Cairn Energy as a farm in partner and Operator in our Senegal Project. With this agreement FAR has secured a highly experienced Operator to drill and fund it through the first exploration well to be drilled off the Senegalese coast for some years.

Cairn Energy funded most of the exploration costs and paid FAR Ltd.’s past costs, running into millions of dollars. The first well, FAN-1, was successful, revealing a gross oil-bearing interval of 500 meters with potential recoverable oil resources of 2.5 billion barrels. Cath Norman, FAR Ltd.’s Managing Director, highlighted the drilling risks and uncertainties about source rock capacity:

‘One of the key risks out here is that the presence of source was unknown. We know in this part of West Africa the source rocks turn on and off. And whether they exist out here to have the capacity to be filling the billion-barrel traps that we had mapped was a complete unknown to us. So, seeing a 500-meter oil interval is a great start’.

The SNE-1 Sangomar field, with a footprint of 400 km², was forecast to have a recoverable oil resource of 641 million barrels, the biggest discovery in Senegal’s history. FAR Ltd was awarded the Breakthrough Company of 2016 by the Oil and Gas Council Africa. The field also contained significant gas reserves. Cath Norman, describing the drilling team’s encounter with the field in one of her representations said:

‘Field was in fact larger. It was not until we drilled the 4th well that we stepped out of the gas cap and managed to intercept some of the secondary reservoirs in the oil leg. We are now four times the size of the field when we originally mapped it.’

Ms. Norman described the field’s geology: a carbonate platform with extensive oil reservoirs in stack formation. The deeper S500 series reservoir is in the lower Cretaceous, while the upper S400 series reservoir is in the upper Cretaceous, topped by a gas cap. Connectivity tests confirmed good inter-well connectivity in both reservoirs. Indeed, Ms. Norman touched on this when she said in a presentation:

‘Connectivity is the last piece of the puzzle we need to resolve. Our field is really a field of two primary reservoir families. There is a deep reservoir unit which we call our 500 series. It’s made up of thick and blocky sand. They are lovely and young and clean with great porosity.’

She continued:

‘The upside is that the cream on the cake is proving a lot more of the connectivity of the thin sand that sits above the 500 series. We call that our 400 series and the focus of our next two wells will be which our JV are committed drilling in Nov to flow test some of those upper sands and also running interference tests which involves setting gauges, setting up the wells to be listening wells and then drilling a pulsing well and then looking at how those pulses proliferate across the thin sand. We will get a measure of connectivity of how continuous they are across the field’.

In fact, those connectivity tests were done, and Cairn Energy confirmed in one of its Appraisal Reports in 2018 that there was good correlation of the gross reservoir packages. It reported that connectivity in the S400 upper reservoirs was demonstrated by interference tests in a clearly preferred orientation and that the DST in the S500 lower reservoir confirmed expected good inter-well connectivity.

Ms. Norman has confirmed this because in the concluding part of her presentation she said:

‘Each well we drilled in the appraisal programme confirmed that we have 100meter gross oil column across all of the wells. We have the same high quality 32-degree oil quality across all the field, and we have good correlation between all of our principal reservoir units’.

FAR Ltd.’s success in Senegal was largely due to its joint venture partners, particularly Cairn Energy, ConocoPhillips, Petrosen, and later Woodside Energy. The type of drill rig used also played a significant role. Norman noted the difference in performance between the 5th generation semi-sub vessel and the 7th generation drill ship, which reduced non-productive rig time significantly. This is what she said:

‘When we drilled our first two exploration wells, we had a fifth-generation semi subcontracted for the drilling at $650,000 a day. That is just the rig rate not the total spread. When we drilled four appraisal wells some 18 months later, we contracted a rigg for $330,000 a day. It was a seventh-generation drill ship and performed immensely better than the semi-sub we had on our first drilling mission. We are just in the process of tendering for a rig now for our drilling programme in Nov. Looks likely we will be able to secure the equivalent of a seventh-generation drill ship for under $200,000 a day. Cost of drilling has come down by two-thirds. What is actually more important to us is the efficiency of the drilling. When we drill our first appraisal well, we had 70% non-productivity rig time. Which is abysmal. We had out 10% non-rig time for the four other appraisals well we drilled. And on one of the well, we had 3% non-productivity rig time. So, our JV is moving ahead very quickly now to secure rigs for continuing with appraisal and getting on with development drilling’.

FAR Ltd.’s entire operational focus was in the SNE-1 Sangomar field and the company given its long presence in Senegal from 2006 had developed deep connections and working relations at the highest level within the government, the office of the President of Senegal who at the time was Mr Macky Sall.

Today, there are more than twenty-three successfully drilled wells in the SNE-1 Sangomar field, and the first oil barrel was produced in June 2024. The revenue split is 82% for Woodside Energy and 18% for Petrosen. FAR Ltd.’s previous 15% stake in the field will be discussed later.

Oils and Gas Exploration in The Gambia

The Gambia’s foray into oil and gas exploration can best be described as sporadic. Between 1965, when it gained independence from Britain, and 1994, the country saw limited exploration activities. During the First Republic under Sir Dawda Jawara (1970- 1994) and the early years of the Second Republic under Yaya Jammeh, exploration efforts were scattered and intermittent. Some companies were involved in early exploration in the 1950s, but these were limited in scope and consisted mainly of initial studies. The country’s first oil well was drilled by Chevron in 1979, but it was not successful. This lethargy for oil exploration may have been shaped partly by Britain’s limited economic view of the country. During the colonial period, Britain saw The Gambia as an insignificant peanut-producing territory within its larger colonial empire. Britain showed little interest or enthusiasm for the economic development of the country beyond maintaining the lucrative supply line of raw peanuts to the UK.

Britain was circumspect about The Gambia’s viability as a state given its small size, being a narrow strip of land within Senegal with a tiny coastline on the Atlantic Ocean to the west. When the movement for independence began to gather unstoppable momentum, there were diplomatic discussions within the United Nations about whether merging with Senegal might be a better prospect for the country. However, this plan never advanced beyond discussions, and The Gambia was left to map its own path when Britain departed in 1965. The country had already been affected by British colonialism; before colonization, The Gambia was a much larger territory, with its northern border deep inside Sine Saloum near Kaolack, Senegal. British traders preferred to stay close to the banks of the River Gambia (no more than 30km wide at its broadest). As a result, Britain abandoned much of the territory to the French, who expanded further into The Gambia in 1850, reducing it to its current size.

For much of the 60s and 70s, while Senegal was busy exploring its oil and gas prospects both onshore and offshore, the government of Sir Dawda Jawara in The Gambia remained largely indifferent to the vast natural resources in and around the country. This lack of curiosity and ambition was evident when, in 1975, The Gambia agreed to its northern and southern maritime boundaries with Senegal along parallel equidistance lines running 200 meters east to west from the territorial sea baseline to the outer edge of the continental shelf. By that time, Senegal had a far better understanding of its offshore natural resources and readily agreed to the deal. The Gambia effectively shot itself in the foot, closing the door to an unimaginable National Wealth Fund from oil and gas that could have transformed the country’s socioeconomic development for generations if managed properly. A much wiser agreement would have been a perpendicular line on either side of the maritime boundary with common zones of mutual control with Senegal. All the SNE-1 Sangomar acreage would have been in this zone, rendering much of the discussion in this paper irrelevant. This approach is exactly what Senegal agreed upon with its southern neighbour, Guinea Bissau, maximizing its current oil and gas prospects in the AGC.

The Jammeh Era

Much of the credit for the limited progress The Gambia has made in oil and gas exploration goes to the government of Yahya Jammeh, who, for the first time in the nation’s history, established a Ministry of Petroleum in 2002. His government included policies for oil and gas exploration and development in its National Development Plan. The National Energy and Petroleum Act 2004 was passed into law, although it was largely based on legislation from Ghana.

Oil and gas exploration licences were made available for six separate blocks offshore The Gambia. Erin Energy was one of the first companies to acquire a licence for one of the blocks. However, there was a problematic period when several of the licenses were traded among insiders, with little benefit to the country. A case in point is the licenses in blocks A1 and A4 granted to African Petroleum Ltd, a company then majority-owned by Mr. Frank Timis. Mr. Timis, a Romanian-Australian billionaire, is a controversial figure in the oil and gas scene in West Africa. His activities in the subregion were negatively highlighted in a 2019 independent investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and BBC Africa Eye. Although oil was reportedly discovered offshore in 2003, Mr. Jammeh publicly criticised what he considered to be an insultingly low production sharing percentage offered by the exploration companies at the time. He declared that he would rather leave the oil in the ground than agree to an unfair sharing agreement. Jammeh’s intransigent conduct in this regard betrayed his intelligence. He failed to realise the importance of opening dialogue with Senegal for joint exploration and production in Sangomar, especially at a time when Senegal had made significant progress. Unwittingly, he too failed The Gambia.

Since then, there had been limited activity in oil and gas exploration until after 2016, when Jammeh was forced to leave office following his loss in the general election to Adama Barrow. Jammeh initially refused to hand over power but eventually went into exile.

Enter FAR Ltd – The Gambia

FAR Ltd entered The Gambia during a tumultuous period in the nation’s history, marked by elevated uncertainty and disarray as a new government struggled to assert control after two decades of brutal dictatorship. Government institutions were either not fully functional or non-existent, and there was no effective regulatory environment for oil and gas exploration. FAR Ltd quickly established a subsidiary, FAR (Gambia) Ltd, and acquired the 100% interest held by Erin Energy in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks. These blocks are located south of the SNE-1 Sangomar field offshore Senegal, covering 2,682 km² within the MSGBC basin, specifically the Senegal/Gambia subbasin, about 50 kilometres offshore in water depths ranging from 50 to 1,200 meters. FAR Ltd forecasted a recoverable oil resource of one billion barrels in the blocks on an unrisked best estimate of 100%.

The license deal, giving FAR Ltd 100% working interest in blocks A2 and A5, effectively meant The Gambia owned none of its oil and gas resources upon discovery. All rights to explore, drill, produce, and sell resources from the blocks belonged to FAR Ltd and other licence holders. The Gambia had imprudently hinged its hopes on royalties’ payment at production. This arrangement, despite any savings The Gambia might have made from associated expenses, was to say the least, disadvantageous. Even Senegal had the foresight to retain an 18% interest in its blocks.

The exact terms of FAR Ltd.’s original licence have never been publicly disclosed. What is known is that FAR Ltd often referred to a minimum term of drilling one exploration well a year. Details about performance-related clauses, supervision, frequency of reviews, and dispute resolution mechanisms remain unknown. These elements are crucial in properly drafted commercial agreements but are often watered down or omitted in the African context.

FAR (Gambia) Ltd operated with a small team, including an Australian Asset Manager, reportedly based in The Gambia for some time. FAR Ltd would have had a good idea of working practices in The Gambia. The team was housed in the same building as the Ministry of Petroleum. Cath Norman from FAR Ltd highlighted that this proximity facilitated better and easier cooperation with the government.

Just before FAR (Gambia) Ltd.’s contractual drilling commitments in The Gambia were due, FAR Ltd claimed financial difficulties, as it had done in Senegal. Fortunately, Petronas, a major Southeast Asian oil and gas company, agreed to farm-in, initially taking a 40% interest in the A2 and A5 block licenses, later revised to a 50% split. FAR Ltd was the operator under the licenses, despite lacking prior experience in the MSGBC basin. Petronas had the option to assume the role of operator, though the terms and conditions were never made public.

To facilitate the deal, Petronas established a subsidiary in The Gambia, PC (Gambia) Ltd. Exploration and drilling activities were purportedly channelled through these two Gambian-registered subsidiaries in whose names the licence blocks were held. Board memberships and financial details of these companies have not been publicly disclosed. Notably, the lawyer retained by FAR Ltd for its subsidiary, FAR (Gambia) Ltd, shares chambers with their mother, a domestic PEP who has represented several parastatals and the country’s largest local authority. A former Attorney General, she also has family ties to high-ranking government positions, including a brother who served as Minister of the Interior and head of the Gambia Civil Service.

Samo-1 FAR Ltd.’s first well in The Gambia

The SAMO-1 well is located slightly off-centre within the A5 block on the PSET shelf edge trend. The reservoir sand for SAMO was deposited over 100 million years ago by ancient rivers that likely once occupied the area where the River Gambia currently flows. The SAMO-1 reservoirs were formed adjacent to where these rivers reached the coast. FAR Ltd forecasted a pre-drill estimate of 825 million barrels of recoverable oil on a 2P basis for this prospect.

In preparation for drilling, FAR Ltd claimed to have contracted a Stena DrillMax sixth-generation drillship and Exceed Ltd, a drilling management company based in Aberdeen, Scotland, to operate the drillship and drill the well. However, in a 2018 appraisal, Cairn Energy reported that no 3D seismic data was available for this prospect, suggesting that FAR Ltd relied on less accurate 2D data or none at all for its assessments. In an interview with Gavin Collery, Ms. Norman of FAR Ltd stated that 3D seismic data was available, but her remarks seemed to conflate the SAMO-1 well with the Bambo well, which is known to have undergone 3D mapping.

Lacking the necessary expertise and financial resources, FAR Ltd required Petronas to fund the project. Ms. Norman acknowledged this in a 2017 interview with Mr. Collery, stating, “It’s always best practice and prudent to bring a partner in when you have got a large equity position both to ratify your technical evaluation but also to share the cost.”

Later, in a presentation, Ms. Norman added, “FAR will continue to operate both licenses through the exploration phase, including the drilling of Samo-1, although Petronas will have the right to become the operator in the development phase.”

Despite these assertions, the actual drilling of the SAMO-1 well remains unclear. FAR Ltd was initially expected to handle the drilling, but this is complicated by a statement from FAR Ltd.’s Asset Manager, Mr. Rolf Stork, who remarked, “Petronas carried FAR drilled one well, SAMO-1. We drilled it as an operator. Big undertaking for a small company like FAR.”

Ms. Norman further clarified Petronas’ supervisory role in the joint venture, stating, “Petronas brought in as partners JV. 40% each. Petronas carried us through the drilling of the exploration well.” However, the specifics of Petronas’ involvement beyond funding remain ambiguous, with no public disclosure from Petronas or PC (Gambia) Ltd regarding their activities in The Gambia.

The SAMO-1 well, reportedly drilled to a depth of 3,200 meters into the seabed, did not yield oil. FAR Ltd claimed to have continued collecting extensive logging data to evaluate other prospects. Initially believed to be an extension of the SNE-1 Sangomar field, post-drill evaluations revealed that SAMO-1 was not connected. Mr. Peter Nicholls, FAR Ltd.’s chief geologist and exploration manager, explained, “We came in structurally a bit lower… two structures instead of one big field. There was oil in the system, but it was not able to be trapped.”

FAR Ltd suggested that the oil might have migrated to the Bambo well in the A2 block. Mr. Nicholls noted, “The interesting thing about this Bambo prospect is that if you follow the migration path, where the oil from SAMO-1 is likely to end up is overlying that feature, potentially 300 million barrels or more.”

FAR Ltd.’s objective after the failed SAMO-1 prospect was to trace the oil’s migration path to an accumulation zone. Success depended on the accuracy of structural maps, predictions of sand characteristics in accumulation zones, identified fault lines, formations, shale types, and effective drilling. With modern drilling techniques and geophysical mapping, the role of luck is reduced, yet the question remains: why and how did FAR Ltd fail The Gambia?

The second well – Bambo-1 (side track-1) & Soloo

In 2020, FAR Ltd moved on to its next drilling prospects, the Soloo and Bambo wells. These are located to the north of the A2 block, nearly side by side on an elevated gradient of the PSET shelf trend, part of the SNE-1 Sangomar field extending into the A2 block. The available 3D seismic data predrill confirmed the geological formation as a continuous extension of the SNE-1 Sangomar field into The Gambia. FAR Ltd.’s Exploration Manager and chief geologist Mr. Nicholls noted:

“You could see that Soloo could well be an extension of the SNE. As a matter of fact, it’s very much mapped as an extension of SNE into The Gambia, and that is Woodside and other JV Partners in SNE will see that SNE does extend into The Gambia. So that’s not a contentious issue. It’s the way it’s seen and mapped as extending into our block.”

In a predrill presentation, Ms. Norman commented on the Bambo well:

“You can see clearly that the Sangomar oil fields extend south into The Gambia. In fact, the location of the Bambo-1 well is 500 meters from the border to the south, drilling into the extension of the Sangomar field that we call the Soloo prospect.”

The predrill forecast estimated recoverable oil from the Bambo-1 well at a billion barrels. FAR Ltd planned to drill through three prospects: Soloo upper, Bambo upper, and Soloo deep, categorized as the S390, S400, and S500 series, respectively. The Soloo upper in the S390 series had the highest chance of success at 36%. The predrill seismic data indicated that all three prospects were within the same depth and level as the primary reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar field.

FAR Ltd again acted as the operator, reassembled the same drill team from the failed SAMO-1 prospect, and contracted the same Stena IceMax Drill ship (not the seventh generation vessel used by Cairn Energy in the SNE-1 Sangomar field). FAR Ltd reported that the drill rig was operational offshore Mexico, and this was advantageous as it meant FAR Ltd would not be using a cold stack rig. However, there was no disclosed verifiable evidence that this rig was service worthy and fit for purpose. FAR Ltd.’s headquarters was reportedly in Banjul, The Gambia, but the operational base was in fact in Dakar, Senegal, where supply boats delivered all necessary pipes and goods for the drill vessel.

In November 2021, FAR Ltd finalised well locations and commenced drilling soon after. In December 2021, FAR Ltd reported that the wells, particularly Soloo Deep, did not contain commercially viable quantities of oil or gas.

A subsequent press release stated:

“Bambo-1 was initially drilled to a depth of 3216m MDBRT (Meters drilled below the rotary table), and wireline logging was completed. The Bambo-1 well was then plugged, and the Bambo-1 ST1 (side-track) well drilled to a depth of 3317m MDBRT, after which wireline logging was undertaken.

The drilling and logging data from the main well and the side-track well indicated that several target intervals had oil shows, confirming a prolific oil source in the area. Initial interpretation of cuttings and wireline logging suggested these zones had oil in poor-quality reservoirs and in traps that might have been breached, leaving residual oil. Rocks and fluid samples were recovered from several intervals in the Bambo well, and laboratory analysis in 2022 will provide additional data about the oil potential identified in the Bambo well.

The Soloo prospect objectives in the Bambo-1 well, which represented the potential southern extension of the Sangomar field in A2, indicated some oil shows but no significant oil volumes. However, oil shows in the Bambo prospect reservoir, encountered in both the Bambo-1 and Bambo-1 ST1 wells, highlighted up-dip potential to the south in the A2 Block, mapped as the new Panthera prospect. Other reservoirs in the Bambo drilling campaign show oil potential, opening additional exploration opportunities in both the A2 and A5 Blocks.

The well and side-track have been plugged and abandoned as planned for this type of exploration drilling.”

The press release emphasised that the Soloo and Bambo-1 prospects were not
extensions of the SNE-1 Sangomar field. It did not clearly disclose that drilling had not
gone as planned. The drill rig had an accident at 3216 meters below the seabed, forcing
FAR Ltd to halt operation before reaching the target depth of 3450 meters MDBRT. They
then planned a side-track well, Bambo-1 ST1, which also fell short of the target zone.
FAR Ltd and its JV partner Petronas designated the well a ‘tight hole’ and released
minimal information during drilling.

The cause of the accident was unclear, and FAR Ltd did not provide details. Ms. Norman, FAR Ltd.’s Managing Director, commented:

“FAR is pleased with the experienced drilling team and contractors who quickly adjusted the Bambo-1 drilling program to suit the geological setting and best meet the drilling program’s objectives. FAR is well-placed to achieve these objectives through the side-tracked well and drilling through the undrilled Soloo Deep prospect. We are encouraged by the presence of oil in potential reservoirs and look forward to completing the well in the coming weeks.”

FAR Ltd.’s drilling programme appeared unfocused, attempting to drill through three separate reservoirs in a stacked formation—a technique not tried in the successful SNE-1 Sangomar field. This ambitious approach led to challenges, including a sudden loss of fluid mid-drilling, necessitating diversion through an unplanned side-track well.

Curiously, FAR Ltd made no reference to Petronas having any role in this drilling, unlike the SAMO-1 well. Instead, the company pointed to an unidentified drilling team and contractors. Several plausible reasons for this drilling failure include the inexperience of the crew, inaccuracies in the geophysical survey data, errors in seismic data interpretation, or an ill-equipped drill rig. However, given the geophysical team’s successful track record in the SNE-1 Sangomar field, it is unlikely they were the issue. The limited information available about the drilling crew suggests that FAR Ltd.’s inexperience as an operator was the main problem. The company failed to effectively coordinate the drill crew, drill rig, and geophysical team to overcome the complex drilling challenges.

FAR Ltd.’s finding of no commercially viable oil and gas in the Bambo-1 and Soloo wells contradicts the predrill 3D seismic data showing these wells as connected to the successful SNE-1 Sangomar field reservoirs. Ms. Norman stated predrill:

“The outcome of that process is that we have a net billion barrels of oil potential in our two blocks offshore Gambia. Following the risk audit of FAR’s evaluation of the potentials, we have confirmed a P50 un-risked 1.1 billion barrels of potential in The Gambia. We have always expected our acreage to be highly prospective because it is contiguous with our acreage in Senegal. We have drilled 11 wells offshore Senegal, 8 on the same trend that extends into The Gambia, and 8 into the same reservoirs that will be our primary reservoirs in The Gambia.”
(Emphasis underlined by author)

The 3D seismic data indicated that all the successful wells in Senegal’s SNE-1 Sangomar field were in the same primary reservoirs (S400 and S500 series) as the wells in The Gambia. The Gambian prospects were charged with oil, as proven by Cairn Energy and admitted by FAR Ltd, confirming that all wells in the S400 and S500 reservoir series are connected.

This raises the question: what separates the Soloo and Bambo-1 prospects from the SNE-1 Sangomar field? Is there a risk that FAR Ltd.’s finding—that its SNE-1 Sangomar field does not extend into The Gambia’s A2 block—is based on its failed drilling programme?

The Bambo and Soloo prospects have multiple reservoir targets, with two main reservoirs in the S400 series being hydrocarbon-bearing in the SNE-1 Sangomar wells. FAR Ltd has not identified at least to the public in the Gambia which reservoirs in the Bambo and Soloo prospects do not contain commercially viable oil or which targets may have been missed due to drilling failure.

A troubling coincidence is that the prolific SNE-1 Sangomar S400 and S500 series reservoirs suddenly do not contain commercially viable oil at the boundary line where the field extends into The Gambia. FAR Ltd claimed that the reservoir for the Bambo-1 well was poor and unable to trap oil due to seal breaches, the same reason given for the failed SAMO-1 well.

The geophysical features of the PSET shelf edge in the SNE-1 Sangomar field and the A2 and A5 blocks are nearly identical, formed over the same period and close in time and space. The reservoirs in the A2 and A5 blocks are good, but the seals, made of black/grey shales, are reportedly underdeveloped according to Far Ltd. If true, this suggests that the oil in The Gambian prospects has migrated into an unidentified accumulation zone.

FAR Ltd does not dispute this, but it raises the question: does FAR Ltd have a duty to consider and determine the phenomenon of oil migration from The Gambia?

The Source Kitchen & the phenomenon of oil migration in the MSGBC – Senegal/Gambia subbasin

The hydrocarbon source ‘kitchen’ that feeds all the reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar field lies deep below the seafloor of the basin, migrating up the slopes of the PSET trend in a westerly direction into the reservoirs.

The Soloo and Bambo prospects have easy access to this source kitchen, similar to other reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar field. FAR Ltd.’s Ms Norman underscored this point in one of its presentations:

“I would like to walk you through what the exploration opportunity looks like for FAR. Starting with the Sangomar oil field, which is a known oil field sitting on the shelf edge of a carbonate platform being fed by oil generated in the source kitchen deep out to the west. You can see on the bottom left of the seismic line that I’m showing you is right through the Sangomar oil field, and I’m going to step through to the south to show you the prospects further to the south in the Gambia. The first, of course, are Soloo and Bambo that we’ll be drilling with the Bambo 1 well just to the north of our blocks in A2. You can see that they have easy access to the source kitchen and that source kitchen is very prolific to generate enough oil to house 5 billion barrels of oil just in place just to the north in Sangomar, which means we have a really rich source rock that’s capable of generating a lot of oil in this region. As we step further to the south, we have the Jobo prospect at about 280 million barrels, the Jato prospect at about 130 million barrels, and then Malo, a very large prospect out to the east at about 265 million barrels. All on a P50 best estimate basis. So, lots of follow-ups in our A2 and A5 blocks. We are not just about drilling Bambo this year.” [Emphasis underlined by author]

The migration path of oil into an accumulation zone or reservoir is directed by hydrostatic pressure exerted by gravity on the source kitchen. Often, the migration path follows natural fault lines within hydrocarbon formations. When these fault lines remain active and overlap with a trap, the trap becomes the main accumulation zone. The oil remains trapped in the accumulation zone if the reservoir is made of good porous sandstone or limestone and has mature seals to prevent further migration or degradation by water.

Apart from gravitational pressure, other key factors determining the migration path of oil into an accumulation zone or reservoir include buoyancy, the geothermal gradient of the hydrocarbon formation, the size of the fault lines, and the porosity and permeability of the reservoir sandstone. Primary migration and accumulation of oil may have started millions of years ago but can continue as long as the source kitchen releases oil and the fault lines are active, allowing secondary migration into other reservoirs.

The viscosity of the oil in the SNE-1 Sangomar field, at 32◦, makes it a light fluid, similar to the residual oil in The Gambian prospects. Therefore, it would migrate at a much faster velocity over long distances under normal geothermal conditions. Since The Gambia’s A2 block is physically contiguous with the SNE-1 Sangomar field, as shown by 3D seismic data, the migration of a large volume of oil from there into the SNE-1 Sangomar field would be quick and effortless.

The SNE-1 Sangomar field is at the centre of a geographic phenomenon in the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin, part of the MSGBC basin. It contains giant reservoirs or accumulation zones into which oil is fed from the source kitchen. It also serves as the most likely trap zone for oil migrating along the PSET shelf from different directions, particularly from The Gambia.

The acreage of the SNE-1 Sangomar field is unusually extensive. It sits on a depression on the PSET and has a lower gradient compared to the Soloo, Bambo, and SAMO-1 prospects in The Gambia. It supports two known separate gigantic oil reservoirs in stacked formation, the lower and upper reservoirs, with a substantial gas cap. These reservoirs are in lateral formation, separated by thick layers of ancient rock. The secondary migration paths into these reservoirs are confirmed to be through separate stratigraphic fault lines from the source kitchen in a west-to-east direction.

Basin modelling from FAR Ltd.’s exploration in the A2 and A5 blocks identified a secondary migration path running the length of the PSET from south to north, from SAMO-1 towards Bambo-1. The SNE-1 Sangomar field lies north on this migration path. If the oil in the SAMO-1 well could not be trapped due to a lack of mature seals (though it has a good reservoir) and its migration path is charted towards the Bambo and Soloo prospects as FAR Ltd has acknowledged, then those two are not the accumulation zones, as they are reported not to have oil in commercially viable quantities.

The oil must have migrated further into an alternative trap, and the most probable location of that trap, in terms of time, distance, and space, is the extensive SNE-1 Sangomar reservoirs.

The substantial gas cap on the SNE-1 Sangomar field is further evidence of the secondary migration of an enormous volume of oil into these reservoirs, particularly the S400 series. The gas cap resulted from thermal regeneration, where increased temperatures in the hydrocarbon formation caused chemical reactions that converted oil into gas. What remains in the reservoir is the current volume of oil that has not been heated into gas.

Oil reservoirs maintain equilibrium through hydrostatic pressure. When this pressure is disrupted at any point, the fluid will naturally flow toward areas of lower pressure. The giant S400 and S500 series reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar field have had 23 wells drilled in them, and there could be even more. Numerous pressure tests conducted by FAR Ltd, and its JV partners confirmed the connectivity of the wells in those reservoirs. Therefore, the historic pressure within the reservoirs was disturbed well before it was determined whether the SNE-1 Sangomar field extended into The Gambia.

For obvious reasons, FAR Ltd. seems to focus its efforts on identifying a separate accumulation zone (however unlikely) for the prospects in The Gambia. Despite these efforts, the company has made little progress in pinpointing a distinct migration path and accumulation zone for the billion barrels of oil it once predicted in its Gambian blocks. It has been seven years since the drilling of the SAMO-1 well and three years since the drilling of Soloo and Bambo-1, along with the Bambo-1 sidetrack-1. Yet, FAR Ltd. has not provided any substantial updates on the extensive research it claims to be conducting on the logging data from these unsuccessful wells. Instead, the company is now shifting its focus to the Panthera, Jato, and Malo prospects within the A2 block, which are located in the same area and gradient as the Bambo well, in close proximity to the SNE-1 Sangomar field.

The question must be asked: Is it necessary for there to be a separate oil accumulation zone in The Gambia if geophysical analysis confirms that oil migrates or migrated from the Gambian prospects into the SNE-1 Sangomar field or across the maritime boundary into Senegal? If this is the case, what potential difficulties would FAR Ltd have encountered in navigating the contractual and political challenges that might have arisen, given that, before selling its stake in 2020, it partly owned the SNE-1 Sangomar field?

Specifically, this points to several issues:

  1. FAR Ltd.’s contractual relations with its joint venture partners in the SNE-1 Sangomar field.
  2. Its contractual relations with the Gambian government regarding the A2 and A5 blocks. This points to FAR Ltd.’s obligation under specific clauses dealing with development and production of the oil and the payment of royalties to The Gambia.
  3. The potential contentious issue of shared stakes between The Gambia and Senegal.

How might these factors have impacted the oil production revenue-sharing agreement and the production schedule of the joint venture partners in the SNE-1 Sangomar field if The Gambia were to assert its right to a share of the oil and gas? Woodside Energy and Senegal would clearly want to avoid any delays in their production schedule from the SNE-1 Sangomar field. It seems FAR Ltd was caught between a rock and a hard place!

The Law – Conflict – Natural Resources along/near to Maritime boundaries

Both The Gambia and Senegal are signatories to the United Nations International Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The convention does not specify how states should share or exploit natural resources between their maritime boundaries, nor does it address the migration of natural resources, such as oil, from one country into an accumulation zone across maritime boundaries. It encourages nation-states to adopt principles of equitable dealing, good faith negotiations, and respect for sovereignty in bilateral and multilateral agreements. These concepts often carry legal nuances that are challenging for courts and judges to apply consistently.

Natural resources below the seabed between countries are of strategic importance and require active cooperation between states to harness their value. However, the absence of international law detailing how ownership rights over these resources should be determined has led to “safari justice” in some parts of the world, where might prevails and weaker countries struggle to protect their interests. Another aspect of this issue is related to the jurisdiction of maritime boundaries. It is commonly assumed that strict adherence to surface maritime boundaries automatically determines ownership rights of resources deep below the seabed, which can lead to significant injustice. Oil and gas, for instance, are migratory substances that can cross maritime boundaries due to gravitational pressure differences. The Senegal/Gambia sub-basin of the MSGBC is exclusively shared by the two countries, and equitable principles suggest that its sub-seabed resources particularly in the area between The Gambia and Saloum rivers should be jointly shared. This should not be contingent on proving oil migration from Gambian wells to the SNE-1 Sangomar field. The aggressive stance of the Macky Sall government and the oil companies in the SNE Sangomar exemplifies the excesses of unchecked capitalism. At a deeper level, it also questions Sall’s moral value as a Senegambian.

The same principles of equitable dealing and good faith negotiations apply in private international investment agreements. Investors must perform their license obligations in good faith, which has both substantive and procedural perspectives. Substantively, it involves the host state’s obligations to the investor and vice versa. Procedurally, it refers to arbitration proceedings for dispute resolution. Good faith encompasses fairness, honesty, loyalty, and transparency, essential for maintaining justice in international investment law. It requires parties to comply with their obligations competently and with mutual trust and cooperation.

When there is a perceived conflict of interest or lack of transparency or competence in the performance of a license obligation by an investor, the state’s interests are vulnerable. Aside from FAR Ltd.’s failure to find a separate oil and gas accumulation zone in its Gambian blocks, was it within its competence to determine for the Gambian government whether the missing oil from the failed wells may have migrated into the SNE-1 Sangomar field? FAR Ltd had already charted the likely migration path of oil from SAMO-1 well to Bambo-1 well. Why stop there? If the hypothesis is valid that oil migrated from the Gambian prospects into the SNE-1 Sangomar reservoirs, how does that reflect on FAR Ltd.’s performance if the Gambian government lacks clarity on this issue? It is the responsibility of the Attorney-General (with assistance from external counsel if necessary) to advise the government on whether the investor has performed its obligations competently and in good faith.

This task is easier with the active participation of the government through a relevant regulatory authority, as demonstrated by Petrosen in Senegal during the development of their prospects. In contrast, the government of The Gambia was unable to take similar action. It had both hands tied behind its back, having given away 100% of its interest in both blocks. Unfortunately, the government could not rely on its Attorney General, Ministry of Petroleum, GNPC, or Petroleum Commission to intervene, for reasons apparent to most Gambians. Independent legal and geotechnical advice was urgently needed. Furthermore, the involvement of FAR (Gambia) Ltd.’s lawyer creates a potential significant conflict of interest, even in the absence of any clear indication of wrongdoing.

The Political Agenda – Senegambia

The legal framework for oil and gas exploration in The Gambia is complex, and the political landscape further complicates matters. FAR Ltd.’s performance in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks has not improved the situation. FAR Ltd has effectively put a nail in The Gambia’s oil and gas exploration prospects by finding that the SNE-1 Sangomar field does not extend into The Gambia without fully addressing the potential migration of oil from The Gambia into the SNE-1 Sangomar field. This outcome benefits Senegal, where former President Macky Sall negotiated an extremely poor production sharing agreement, allowing Woodside Energy to retain 82% of the revenue while Petrosen, Senegal’s state oil corporation, received only 18%. Mr. Sall would likely have preferred to avoid any reduction in Senegal’s share, and FAR Ltd.’s findings reinforced this by negating The Gambia’s claim to exploration and production rights, unlike in Mauritania to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

Senegal, under Macky Sall, adopted a silent but sophisticated policy of economically merging The Gambia with Senegal (a feat that could not be achieved politically during the Senegambia Confederation) by supporting a new regime in The Gambia that aligned with Senegal’s strategic interests. In 2016, this opportunity arose when former Gambian dictator Yahya Jammeh reneged on his promise to hand over power after losing the general election. Adama Barrow, the declared winner, fled to Senegal, and Macky Sall spearheaded diplomatic efforts in West Africa and the EU to force Jammeh out. He succeeded, and Jammeh fled into exile to Equatorial Guinea. Barrow was sworn in as President of The Gambia in Dakar, Senegal, and was escorted into the country by Senegalese security personnel. Since 2016, Barrow’s close protection officers and guards at the State House have been Senegalese soldiers and security agents. Barrow regards Sall as an elder brother, advisor, guardian, and protector against coups. The relationship between the two is more accurately described as subservient—anything Macky wanted for Senegal from The Gambia, Macky got. Their relationship, shaped by their differing levels of sophistication and experience in state affairs, appears to reflect an exercise of undue influence. One is a geologist with extensive senior government experience, while the other, despite being a successful estate agent and skilled money manager, is a high school dropout with no prior government experience. Many of Barrow’s government’s decisions since 2016 have effectively surrendered The Gambia’s economic sovereignty and security to Senegal—a gift that eluded Senegal since the two nations were divided by colonial history.

It is unsurprising that Barrow and his government have not made a single pronouncement regarding the country’s oil and gas prospects within its maritime boundary with Senegal. Even if he wanted to, achieving success would be difficult. Sall was notoriously corrupt and engaged in underhand deals. In 2021, Guinea Bissau’s president, Umaro Sissoko Embalo, signed a secret oil and gas sharing agreement with Sall, without informing his cabinet or parliament. The deal, unfavourable to Guinea Bissau, allocated only about 30% of revenue to the country. Armando Lona, editor-in-chief of O Democrata, criticized the agreement as illegal since it lacked parliamentary approval and accused the president of secrecy regarding national resources. The Guinea Bissau parliament revoked the agreement, and Sall sacked his energy minister, Amadou Hott, who did not dispute the agreement when challenged in a media interview.

Given Sall’s history, it is plausible that he has managed to silence Barrow and his government regarding oil and gas matters near their maritime borders. The opposition, parliament, and civil society in The Gambia have been silent on the subject, reflecting a lack of curiosity and ambition to safeguard national interests, reminiscent of the Jawara government during the First Republic.

There is a sense in The Gambia that discussing joint exploration, production, and revenue sharing of natural resources with Senegal is taboo, especially now that Senegal has started oil production. The commonly cited phrase, “The Gambia and Senegal are two heads of the same body,” discourages open discussion on the topic. Consequently, the government of The Gambia has failed, unlike Mauritania and Guinea Bissau, to foster intergovernmental dialogue about shared natural resources across maritime boundaries with Senegal.

As a result, Senegal is the sole beneficiary of a vast oil and gas field in the shared Senegal/Gambia sub-basin. Under normal circumstances, applying principles of equity, these resources should be shared, regardless of the discovered accumulation zone being on the Senegalese side. The Gambia’s failure to protect its share of the resources can be attributed to its weak institutions at every level. Since 2021, Mr. Jerreh Barrow has served as the sole Commissioner of The Gambia Petroleum Commission. The Commission is the authority responsible for overseeing resource exploitation, including monitoring and ensuring compliance with national policies and regulations for petroleum activities. A concerning clause in the model Production Sharing Agreement (PEPLA) stipulates a Signature Bonus to be determined by the Licensee at the time of bidding, in addition to a further $2 million payment required upon the Commissioner’s approval of the first Development and Production Plan. This payment structure also applies to any subsequent amendments or new development plans. Additionally, production bonuses of $10 million are to be paid at various stages of development. The clause links the payment of substantial bonuses to the Commissioner’s approval, which could raise concerns about potential conflicts of interest or corruption. A more robust anti-corruption measure might involve requiring approval from a board or committee rather than an individual, thereby enhancing transparency and accountability.

The Gambia National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), responsible for encouraging petroleum operations, has abandoned initiatives to cooperate with oil and gas exploration companies as JV partners, unlike Petrosen in Senegal. The GNPC has been mired in corruption, limiting its activities to storage and distribution of petroleum products. A recent government task force, led by the Minister of Finance, found that despite having expensive computers and software, GNPC staff preferred manual entries, making record-keeping and transaction tracing difficult. Reports indicate that over $20 million has been misappropriated at the GNPC, which is just the tip of the iceberg.

BP (British Petroleum) exits The Gambia’s – A1 Block

It is therefore not surprising that BP exited The Gambia in August 2021 by surrendering its license in the A1 block. This block, along with the A4, had a chequered history. In 2006, African Petroleum acquired a 100% working interest in these blocks from Buried Hill Ltd. The licences were extended thrice, as it appeared the company was unable to fulfil its drilling obligations. When negotiations to extend the license failed, the government of The Gambia terminated the licenses for the blocks in 2017.

African Petroleum denied the termination, asserting that the government had not enacted the proper termination procedure and that its licenses remained in force until this was done. This led to an expensive and protracted arbitration proceeding lodged by African Petroleum at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) against The Gambia.

The Government of The Gambia secured the services of Cherie Blair KC, wife of former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. They secured the services of Cherie Blair KC, wife of former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. At the time, Mrs. Blair, though well-respected for her advocacy in human rights and administrative law, did not have experience in international oil and gas arbitration proceedings. The case was led admirably by a legendary Gambian US-based attorney who provided distinguished service but without a decisive victory through no fault of his but the weakness of the Gambia’s case.

While proceedings were ongoing, the government of The Gambia, in an unprecedented act of disregard for the arbitration process, opened bidding on the A1 block and sold it to BP in April 2019 before the matter was concluded. The case was eventually settled with The Gambia surrendering the A4 block back to African Petroleum in September 2020. There has never been a public disclosure of the full details of the settlement and the legal costs incurred by The Gambia in the case.

It was partly through this case that certain individuals in The Gambia who prioritise personal gain over national development opened a secret passage (disguised under the name of the Tony Blair Institute) between Tony Blair, former UK Prime Minister, and the office of the President of The Gambia. On April 18, 2018, Mr. Blair hosted President Barrow at a discussion panel held at the famous Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs. Mr. Blair is known within closed circles in The Gambia to have quietly jetted in and out of the country during the period leading to BP’s exit from The Gambia. What most Gambians do not know is that behind many seemingly charitable foundations operating in The Gambia are consulting businesses for profit. Cherie Blair KC heads Omnia Strategy, an advisory firm that has picked up a phenomenal workload in the short time it has been operating, largely from developing countries.

BP’s exit from the A1 block rendered the minor result in the arbitration case a Pyrrhic victory. At the time, the Gambia Ministry of Petroleum issued a press release indicating that BP had informed the government its decision to exit was due to a change in its corporate strategy towards low carbon energy. While this might be true, BP itself did not comment on the issue. The circumstances surrounding BP’s exit from The Gambia raise serious questions about the true underlying reasons for its decision.

BP had already acquired 2D and 3D seismic data for the block and completed an environmental impact assessment at substantial cost. It had modelled two prospects in its block located very near the SNE-1 Sangomar field. The Eland prospect had a resource estimate of 936 million barrels of oil (MBO) in-place and 344 MBO recoverable with a total risk of 24%. The Oribi prospect had a resource estimate of 1,180 MBO in-place and 350 MBO recoverable with a total risk of 10%. All that remained was to drill a well, yet BP chose to pay the Gambian government a settlement of $30 million to walk away.

It would be interesting to know the composition of the negotiation team, including the legal personnel on both sides, for this settlement. It remains unclear what factors determined the $30 million settlement and how it was utilised by the Gambian government, as no public disclosure has been made.

BP is a giant in oil and gas exploration around the world, possessing the requisite expertise in exploration and production. It also has a strong due diligence unit that is highly sensitive to corrupt practices in the industry. This sensitivity reflects the UK government’s recently amended legislation on Bribery and Corruption, which covers the activities of UK-listed companies wherever they occur in the world.

BP’s decision to abandon The Gambia came in the aftermath of FAR Ltd.’s failed drilling of the SAMO-1 well, which is adjacent to and on the same trend as BP’s former A1 block. When FAR Ltd drilled SAMO-1, it reported finding no oil accumulation zone but did find traces of oil that may have migrated. FAR Ltd further indicated that the oil migration path from the SAMO well charts towards the Bambo and Soloo wells, which were mapped to be in the same two primary reservoirs as the eight others, and now twenty-three, wells that FAR Ltd and its joint venture partner Woodside Energy have drilled in the SNE-1 Sangomar field. The Bambo and Soloo prospects are even closer to BP’s previously held A1 block than the SAMO-1 prospect.

If BP had any concerns, it did not share them publicly. However, there is no doubt that its decision must have been based on extraordinarily strong reasons that were not in its interest as an investor.

FAR Ltd Laughing all the way to the bank

– Far sold stake in SNE-1 Sangomar
– Full detail of deals.
– Petronas sold back shares to FAR and left JV.
– FAR license exemption in The Gambia

It appears FAR Ltd. has emerged as the winner in the murky affairs surrounding The Gambia’s missing oil and gas. In June 2020, FAR Ltd. was in a dire financial state, having defaulted on its development cash call for the SNE-1 Sangomar field, putting its entire 13% stake in the joint venture at risk. The default clause read:

“Under the JOA default provisions, if a defaulting party has not fulfilled its financial obligations within six months from the date of notification of the default, it will forfeit its participating interest without compensation. Unpaid amounts accrue interest at the LIBOR rate + 2%.”

FAR Ltd. embarked on cost-cutting measures, including making several staff redundant and requiring all senior executives and non-executive directors to accept a 20% salary or fee reduction effective 1 July 2020.

In this abysmal financial context, FAR Ltd. embarked on its now-failed Bambo-1 well and side-track well, which it claimed were not extensions of the SNE-1 Sangomar field. Throughout the pre-drilling preparation, FAR Ltd. was in talks with Woodside Energy, which had issued the default notice and to whom FAR would have had to forfeit its stake if it did not pay up. At that time, Woodside Energy held about 69% of the stake in the SNE-1 Sangomar field.

In July 2021, three months before drilling the Bambo-1 well, FAR Ltd. was forced to sell its entire interest in the Senegal RSSD Project to Woodside Energy to avoid forfeiture without compensation. The transaction was approved at a general meeting of its shareholders on 28 April 2021. FAR Ltd. received a cash payment of US$126 million from Woodside Energy on 7 July 2021. Additionally, FAR Ltd. stands to receive future payments leveraged on the total volume of oil produced from the SNE-1 Sangomar field until 2027.

According to a notice FAR Ltd. issued to its shareholders on 12 June 2024:

“The contingent payment of up to US$55 million is payable in the future based on
various factors relating to the sale of oil from the RSSD Project.

The contingent payment comprises 45% of entitlement barrels (being the share of oil
relating to FAR’s 13.67% RSSD Project exploitation area interest) sold over the previous
calendar year multiplied by the excess (if any) of the crude oil price per barrel (capped
at US$70) and US$58.

The contingent payment terminates on the earliest of 31 December 2027, three years
from the first oil being sold (excluding any periods of zero production), and a total
contingent payment of US$55 million being reached.”

This deal raises very serious and disturbing questions:

  1. FAR Ltd.’s entire stake in the SNE-1 Sangomar was 15%. This has been revised down to 13% but there is no disclosure of what happens to remaining 2%.
  2. Was this deal disclosed pre-drilling of the Bambo-1 well to the Gambian public and the government of The Gambia?
  3. Given FAR’s stakes in the SNE-1 Sangomar field and in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks through its subsidiary FAR (Gambia) Ltd., and its role as the operator during drilling in the Gambian prospects, what measures, if any, were put in place to protect The Gambia against potential conflicts of interest from FAR Ltd especially in the context of question 4 below on migration of oil? PC Gambia (Petronas) could not properly perform this role as FAR Ltd.’s joint venture partner in The Gambia?
  4. Even if the primary reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar have not extended into The Gambia, does this transaction meet the transparency expected in international investment agreements in oil and gas if oil migrates or has migrated from The Gambia into the SNE-1 Sangomar field?
  5. What due diligence did Woodside Energy and Petrosen carry out to validate FAR Ltd.’s finding that the SNE-1 Sangomar did not extend into The Gambia’s A2 block and to rule out any possibility of oil migrating from the underdeveloped reservoirs in the Gambian prospects into the SNE-1 Sangomar field?

In August 2022, FAR Ltd. reacquired 100% ownership of blocks A2 and A5 when PC (Gambia) Ltd., the subsidiary of Petronas that previously held the other 50% stake in the blocks, conveniently returned them to FAR Ltd. It is difficult to see the business case for Petronas’s involvement in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks and the justification it provided to its shareholders for taking such an enormous loss willingly.

In the meantime, FAR Ltd. has renegotiated a two-year extension to its exploration licence with the government of The Gambia, exempting it from the yearly commitment to drill a well and all other consequential taxes, fees, and expenses payable to the government.

FAR Ltd. reported that this would enable the company to consider options for delivering value while minimising its expenditure over the two-year extension period. The company aims to capitalise on the exploration data acquired from the two unsuccessful wells already drilled, without significantly drawing down existing capital.

This negotiation with the government of The Gambia would have been heavily influenced by legal advice from members of the same family or connected individuals acting on behalf of both the government and FAR Ltd. It is difficult to justify exempting FAR Ltd. from its contracted drilling obligations and all taxes and expenses payment to the government of The Gambia for the next two years, especially after having received US$127 million plus potential future millions.

There is no official gazette or publication indicating that parliamentary assent has been granted to exempt FAR Ltd. from its tax liabilities to the government of The Gambia. It would be a surprise if there had been. The government of The Gambian remains cash strapped and unable to meet basic needs for hospitals, schools, police, and infrastructure. With this arrangement, FAR Ltd. is arguably recouping every penny it claimed to have spent in The Gambia through its subsidiary under its so-called corporate social responsibility.

In the meantime, FAR Ltd. has outlined its plan for prospects Panthera, Jatto, and Malo in its A2 block, each of which it claims (as it did with the other unsuccessful prospects) contain multiple potential oil-bearing reservoir targets. However, any exploration on these prospects is conditional on FAR Ltd. finding a suitable joint venture partner to fund the cost. Thus, the extension granted to FAR Ltd. is likely to be longer if it cannot find a joint venture partner with deep pockets and one should add relevant expertise. This situation places The Gambia in a precarious position.

Given that the Gambian wells were found not to contain significant oil and gas reserves, it could be argued that FAR Ltd. strategically avoided the costs and risks associated with further exploration and development. However, this outcome also meant it evaded the possibility of discovering and developing untapped resources, which would have required them to pay royalties to the government of The Gambia. The real issue lies in the decision of the government of The Gambia to sign away 100% working interest in its exploration blocks without thoroughly exhausting all possibilities. This decision leaves The Gambia with nothing to show for its potential resources—a short-sighted move that is difficult to justify.

FAR Ltd. would likely point to the extensive cautionary exemption statement in its presentations, which it would claim absolves it of any liability for inaccuracies in its geophysical data.

Senegal/Gambia Relations

On 24 March 2024, Senegal elected a new president, Mr. Bassirou Diomaye Faye, after Macky Sall was forced by popular pressure to step down at the end of his final term. The new government, with Prime Minister Ousman Sonko at the helm, has vowed to follow and apply principles of honesty in governance. In his inaugural visit to The Gambia, the first since his election, President Faye extended an open arm of cooperation, solidarity, and respect to the government of The Gambia. This reflects his new foreign policy, which places a bold emphasis on unity and solidarity within Africa. He emphasised that the bond between the two countries will be strengthened and that nothing will change from what has already been established. It is hoped that this new government will reflect the level of honesty in governance it has spoken about in its actions, bringing transparency to all matters relating to dialogue, exploration, and production of the shared natural resources between the two countries. However, a recent high-level intergovernmental meeting between the two countries, attended by President Faye, Prime Minister Sonko, and The Gambian Vice President Jallow, focused on key areas of strategic importance but notably omitted the most sensitive topic: oil and gas. This omission raises concerns about future developments.

The curse of oil and gas in African Countries

Oil and gas have been a curse for almost all producing Sub-Saharan African countries. These nations are endowed with vast natural resources that could have propelled them into the league of developed countries. However, they have failed due to sheer mismanagement and chronic corruption. This is what sets them apart from successfully managed countries like Norway, Qatar, and the UAE, which have similar vast resources. Senegal could turn a new and refreshing chapter in resource management in Africa by emulating the successes of Norway—eliminating corruption, strengthening efficient institutions, and setting up a responsibly managed Sovereign Wealth Fund. It will need to act quickly to register any success because the era of oil and gas is rapidly ending as the world transitions to renewable energy. For The Gambia, the curse has struck even before oil and gas are discovered!

Conclusion

The results from FAR Ltd.’s exploration drilling in the SAMO-1, Bambo-1, and Soloo Deep prospects have confirmed the presence of oil. In the cases of SAMO-1 and BAMBO-1, although the reservoirs were of excellent quality, they were unable to trap the oil due to underdeveloped seals. The oil in these prospects likely migrated to an accumulation zone, which remains unidentified. The most likely location of this accumulation zone is in the SNE-1 Sangomar field. However, FAR Ltd.’s inability to identify the accumulation zone or confirm the migration path of the oil leading to speculation about oil migrating to the SNE-1 Sangomar field is due to several factors: its lack of technical expertise and funds, approach to exploration, drilling, and the accuracy of its geophysical survey data.

This failure is not FAR Ltd.’s alone. The government of The Gambia’s policy on oil and gas exploration has also failed at the level of execution. There is a serious lack of transparency in the relationship between Gambians, the government of The Gambia and FAR Ltd. This relationship appears to operate beyond confidentiality and into the realm of secrecy. Given the country’s weak institutions and the lack of proper regulatory oversight on oil and gas exploration, a vacuum is created where important decisions on matters of national interest are made by connected individuals behind closed doors. The national interest is put at risk when the performance of relevant stakeholders cannot be measured or when failures are not sanctioned.

With Senegal progressing at speed with oil production, there is an urgency for the government of The Gambia to expedite its oil and gas exploration with vigour. The exploration should be competently executed to achieve the purpose of finding an accumulation zone in The Gambia or at the very least establish the migration path of the oil from The Gambia to an established accumulation zone across the maritime boundary with Senegal, anywhere within the subbasin. The resources deep under the seabed in the Senegal/Gambia subbasin, in particular the SNE-1 Sangomar field should not be claimed by Senegal alone. It is overly simplistic to rely solely on surface maritime boundaries as the criterion for determining whether a country should share the natural resources below the seabed with its immediate neighbour. Similarly, it should not be necessary to provide evidence of oil and gas migration from The Gambia to the SNE-1 Sangomar field to justify such sharing. The government of The Gambia should initiate proactive inter-governmental dialogue with Senegal for greater clarity and understanding of the hydrocarbon and geophysical formation across their maritime boundaries. They must agree a protocol for joint resource and revenue sharing on exploration and production of oil and gas in the Senegal/Gambia subbasin of the MSGBC.

Successive governments since independence have failed The Gambia on all the indices of development. It is the smallest country in mainland Africa and potentially by far the easiest to develop if it had the right leadership and progressive orientated people. But despite its manageable size and potential natural resources, The Gambia has suffered the misfortune of having extremely poor leadership and an unenterprising population. The wealthy and so-called intellectuals and professionals have become the biggest enablers of the forces both internally and externally that undermine the economic and political sovereignty of the nation. All of these, give weight to previously held reservations that The Gambia cannot be a viable state. The saga of the exploration of oil and gas on The Gambia’s maritime coast and many other recent developments in the nation’s history should open frank discussion by the people about the future of the country. The Gambia is on the cusp of becoming a failed state (if not already) and there is not a flicker of light shining through this long dark tunnel that it has any chance left to its own accord to save itself. Developing a country requires a collective national effort. If this cannot be achieved, an appealing alternative for The Gambia, given Senegal’s new and dynamic leadership committed to justice, might be to consider full integration with Senegal. This would, in a way, correct the injustice of the Berlin Conference, where the two brotherly nations were divided without their consent. But Senegal, wary of its ‘tainted’ oil and gas lottery win, might shut the door on The Gambia. In that case, The Gambia risks drifting into the wilderness and becoming a basket case – an unsettling prospect. The only way to avoid this fate is for The Gambia to build strong institutions and demand its fair share of the resources in the Senegal-Gambia sub-basin. The Gambia must be resolute in this pursuit. For The Gambia, for Justice, for Development!

Reference Material

  1. Assessment of the Undiscovered Oil and Gas of the Senegal Province, Mauritania,
    Senegal, The Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau, Northwest Africa
    By Michael E. Brownfield and Ronald R. Charpentier
  2. The SNE Discovery Offshore Senegal – Moving a Frontier Basin to Emergent
    Eric Hathon, Exploration Director, Cairn Energy PLC 12th June 2018
  3. Lithostratigraphy and Characterisation of Paleocene Limestones for Optimal
    Exploitation (Senegal, West Africa): Comparative Study of the Bandia and Popenguine
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    PRODUCTION) BLOCK A5
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    OE 25 June 2020 FAR signs Gambia JOAs with Petronas. Seeks drilling partners.
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    Gambia/Senegal 4th June 1975
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    February 26, 2018
  24. Petronas’ petroleum stake acquisition gets Gambia nod by Fatou Touray Kerr Fatou –
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  25. Offshore Engineer: Far Signs Gambia JOAs with Petronas. Seeks Drilling Partners
    Jun 25, 2020
  26. Offshore Mag: Multiple oil shows from Bambo well offshore The Gambia
    Dec. 23, 2021
  27. The drillship Stena IceMAX has finished drilling and formation evaluation operations for
    FAR’s deepwater Bambo-1ST1 side-track well offshore The Gambia.
    CSN: Bambo-1 well drilling commences offshore The Gambia
    December 8, 2021
  28. Petroleum Africa: Bamboo-1 Well Offshore The Gambia Nears Total Depth
    Monday, December 6, 2021
  29. Status and Prospect of Drilling Fluid Loss and Lost Circulation Control Technology in
    Fractured Formation
  30. Jingbin Yang,1 Jinsheng Sun,1,2, * Yingrui Bai,1 Kaihe Lv,1 Guodong Zhang,1 and
    Yuhong Li3
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    By Ben Sayers and Richard Cooke; TGSPublished at: December 12, 2018
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    Fred Akanni, Editor August 7, 2017.
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    By E. Hathon1, Publisher: European Association of Geoscientists & Engineers
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  35. EIK: FAR The Gambia signs new joint operation agreement with PC The Gambia:
    Published 27th June 2020.
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    capping stacks can be used to stop spills when the blowout preventer fails.
    January 14, 2014, By Antony Matson, Mauricio Madrid
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  38. Oil and Gas: Drilling Technologies – www.oil-gasportal.com
  39. The Design of Geological Exploration with Side Track Drilling by Stanislav V. Varushkin,
    Zhanna A. Khakimova – PERM Journal of Petroleum and Mining Engineering.
    Volume/Tom 18 N0. 1 2018.
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    By Julia Payne, November 10, 2017
  41. AOW: Technical Aspects of The Gambia A1. Overview of Tenure Over the A1 Block. –
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Editor’s Note: On August 5, 2024, The Fatu Network reached out to FAR Ltd, inviting them to respond to the claims presented in this exposé. As of the time of publication, FAR Ltd has not provided a response.

This article was updated on 25.10.24 to correct the following points:
  • The African Legal Support Facility (ALSF) did not provide support to the Government of The Gambia in its arbitration proceedings with African Petroleum.
  • Mr Jerreh Barrow is not related to President Adama Barrow.
The Lawyer for FAR Ltd (Gambia) Ltd has denied on behalf of his mother that she was the local counsel for the Government of The Gambia on Energy, Oil and Gas.

REBUTTAL (Verbatim): By: Jerreh Barrow, Jambanjelly

It was with keen interest I read through Mr. M’bai’s featured article (The Saga of a Small Nation and its Missing Oil and Gas Resources) on the Fatu Network. Given the importance of some of the issues raised to the Gambian public, it is necessary to set the record straight. However, because this article will end up being too long if I try to address all the problematic parts, I will therefore focus on the most serious errors and misrepresentations. In my view, the crux of his suggestions, which needed to be addressed, centered around the question:

SHOULD THE GAMBIA AND SENEGAL SHARE RESOURCES IN THE SANGOMAR-FIELD?

The author said, YES. I would however implore each and every reader to answer this question objectively, but only after reading the following:

According to the author: “Because The Gambia and Senegal share the same sub-basin, then they should share the oil and gas found in the SNE-1 Sangomar field” and that “Senegal is the sole beneficiary of a vast oil and gas field in the shared Senegal/Gambia sub-basin.”

He also said: “Under normal circumstances, applying principles of equity, these resources should be shared, regardless of the discovered accumulation zone being on the Senegalese side.”

And that: “It should not be necessary to provide evidence of oil and gas migration from The Gambia to the SNE-1 Sangomar field to justify such sharing.”

From the first quote above, the main (geological?) justification Mr. M’bai gave for the claim is that both Gambia and Senegal are located in the same ‘sub-basin’ and therefore should share the ‘oil and gas resources found in Sangomar.’ I noted that he has also given Mauritania-Senegal as a ‘precedent’ for joint field development. What he did not understand though is that, in addition to sharing the MSGBC and/or any sub-basin, there are other criteria (principally geological) that must be met by those resources to be the subject of joint field development or sharing.

Geological Criteria for Cross-border Resource Sharing

The international practice of cross-border joint resource development has well-established geological criteria. The primary condition essential for even contemplation of ‘resource sharing’ is ‘common reservoir,’ which is different from ‘common sub-basin.’ Once a common reservoir is established, the presence of hydrocarbons on both sides of the internationally recognized boundary, the type and other characteristics of hydrocarbon if it exists, among others are investigated. A geological sub-basin basically is a subdivision of a basin and comprises a structurally separate unit of a basin. It may include reservoirs, seals, source rocks. A ‘Reservoir’ on the other hand, is a single sedimentary rock unit such as sandstones, limestones capable of holding and discharging fluids in this instance, hydrocarbons. There could be many reservoirs in a sub-basin.

An analogy to the ‘sub-basin’ – ‘resource sharing’ notion being suggested by the author would be equating a basin to a country, a sub-basin to a region, and a reservoir to a farm/land. To suggest that if we share a sub-basin, then we should share the resources in that ‘sub-basin’ would be equivalent to suggesting that two settlements in a region, say West Coast Region, should share the lands in their respective settlements simply because they are in the same West Coast Region. We know ownership of land is attained by well-established criteria, not simply by residing in a locality. Another analogy would be that the North Atlantic being a geographic subdivision of the Atlantic Ocean. If the author’s reasoning is anything to go by, then it would be conceivable that because the Gambia and the USA share the North Atlantic Ocean, then the Gambia should share the fish in US waters. I don’t think that is how natural resource sharing works. I’m not saying such established rules are fair, all I’m saying is that is the accepted and operated norm.

The author further stated: “It should not be necessary to provide evidence of oil and gas migration from The Gambia to the SNE-1 Sangomar field to justify such sharing,” implying there need not be any geological basis for such sharing, but he has also noted that:

“The exploration should be competently executed to achieve the purpose of finding an accumulation zone in The Gambia or at the very least establish the migration path of the oil from The Gambia to an established accumulation zone across the maritime boundary with Senegal, anywhere within the subbasin.”

The author made numerous references to “Senegal/Gambia sub-basin,” apparently coined to implant in the reader’s mind a picture to support his theory. For the record, the most common nomenclature used in geoscience circles for the subdivisions of the MSGBC is not “Senegal/Gambia” but rather “Northern sub-basins” starting from the Gambia River all the way to Senegal River and Casamance sub-basin, from the Gambia River to the south.

As to why the Gambian wells have not yet found oil, I have to state here that oil and gas are natural resources and like all natural resources, they are finite and unevenly distributed. Meaning they are found in certain locations and not in other locations, and at any such location, their boundaries start somewhere and end somewhere. A simple analogy will be different minerals such as gold are found in different parts of the world or even different parts of the same country. To bring this closer to home in the Gambia, the mineral sands are mainly found along the coast. Laterites are mainly exposed in the eastern parts of the country, kaolinite mainly in Kundam area, plastic clays are found in riverine areas etc. This is just how geology has decided!

Precedents for Cross-border Resource Sharing

The reader also referenced the Senegal-Mauritania joint field development as a precedent to support the claim. There are differences between that and the Gambia-Senegal situation as explained in Figure 1 on the two maps and explanations that follow.

Figure 1: Two maps, to the left a Mauritania-Senegal maritime border map, marked by the white dotted line, and to the Right, Senegal-Gambia border marked by the black line.

Senegal-Mauritania Map:

  1. From the left map, you will notice that the Greater Tortue Oil field (marked by a small oblique dotted black line with a yellow irregular polygon), is located right on the established internationally agreed and accepted Mauritania-Senegal northern border. Neither on the Senegalese side nor on the Mauritanian side of the maritime boundary.
  2. Note on the Mauritanian side of the border, Tortue-1 well was drilled in 2015 and it made a discovery, then in 2016, Guembeul-1 was drilled on the Senegalese side, which was also a discovery. In 2016 Ahmeyim-1 was drilled on Mauritanian side, it was a discovery, and GTA-1 was subsequently drilled on the Senegalese side in 2019 and it made a discovery. Information collected such as reservoir properties confirmed that these resources are located/hosted in the same reservoir (note, I do not say sub-basin). Also note to the north of the GTA is another field called Greater BirAllah, which is indeed located in the same subbasin as the GTA, but not on connected reservoirs. This is located within Mauritania’s maritime boundary, and since no connected reservoirs have been established has not been a subject of any joint field development.

Gambia-Senegal Map Now let us look at the Senegal-Gambia Map on the right. To the north were the SNE wells (numerous drilled between 2016-2018), all of them encountered significant oil. Then to the south of the border on the Gambian side, in 2018 Samo-1 was drilled and it was an unsuccessful well (not a failure though, in exploration jargon unsuccessful wells do not equate to a failure). Then in 2021, the Bambo-1 well was drilled very close to the border to test the extent of the Sangomar field and it was unsuccessful (not a failure). The desire to find oil on the conjugate reservoirs on the Gambian side of the border partly explains the reason FAR’s efforts were directed towards establishing the extension of the Sangomar field.

Let me hasten to add that I am not suggesting that none of the reservoirs in Senegal extends into The Gambia or that those that may extend are not oil bearing in the Gambia. No, far from that. On the contrary, the reason why Gambia continues to search/explore for oil is because there are strong indications that some of the reservoirs in the Gambian jurisdiction are oil-bearing, whether they are extensions of reservoirs in Senegal or not. The reason being that the Mauritania-Senegal-Guinea-Bissau (“MSGB”) Basin lies approximately at depths ranging from 50 to 1,500 metres (Figure 1).

From 1,504km² of modern 3D seismic data acquired in Blocks A2, prospects and leads similar to the “shelf edge” plays FAR has successfully mapped [three] prospects and leads (Figure 2).

A2 Update Reservoirs on the Carbonate Shelf edge are highly compartmentalized. This is one of the reasons over 10 appraisal wells were drilled in the Sangomar field.

Legal Basis for Resource Ownership

According to the author:

  1. The absence of international law detailing how ownership rights over these resources should be determined has led to “safari justice” in some parts of the world, where might prevails and weaker countries struggle to protect their interests. Another aspect of this issue is related to the jurisdiction of maritime boundaries.
  2. “It is commonly assumed that strict adherence to surface maritime boundaries automatically determines ownership rights of resources deep below the seabed, which can lead to significant injustice.”
  3. “Under normal circumstances, applying principles of equity, these resources should be shared, regardless of the discovered accumulation zone being on the Senegalese side.”

He seems to suggest in point 1 above that there is no international law on ownership rights over resources in this maritime zone. However, there is the Law of the Sea, which provides the comprehensive legal framework for the governance of the world’s oceans and, as indicated by the author, both The Gambia and Senegal are signatories to this convention.

Article 56 of the Law of the Sea, speaking about “Rights, jurisdiction and duties in the exclusive economic zone” (where these resources are located) states that, “States have sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.”

To end this particular subject and from the above, it is clear that his conclusions are defective in many different dimensions. Neither a geological basis, nor a precedent or legal ground for such a claim has been provided.

WHAT FAR’S ACQUISITION OF 100% INTEREST IN A2 AND A5 MEANS!

On this theme, the author’s wrong understanding of the concepts of ‘working interest’ and ‘revenue share’, referring to FAR’s interest in the Gambia, noted that:

“The license deal, giving FAR Ltd 100% working interest in blocks A2 and A5, effectively meant The Gambia owned none of its oil and gas resources upon discovery. All rights to explore, drill, produce, and sell resources from the blocks belonged to FAR Ltd and other licence holders. The Gambia had imprudently hinged its hopes on royalties’ payment at production. This arrangement, despite any savings The Gambia might have made from associated expenses, was to say the least, disadvantageous. Even Senegal had the foresight to retain an 18% interest in its blocks.”

It is important to explain the difference between the concepts of ‘working interest’ and ‘revenue shares’. First and foremost, holding 100% working interest in an oil and gas licence does not equal owning 100% of the revenues, as insinuated by the author. On the contrary, working interest in oil and gas agreements represents the share of investment that a company contributes towards the fulfillment of the work obligations. The percentage that the company/government takes, referred to as government/company’s take, is determined by the application of the fiscal regime (royalty is not the only revenue stream for government). The fiscal regime is a package of tools (see below) at government’s disposal deployable for capturing ‘economic rent’. It is worth mentioning that the Gambian licensing regime is not a PSA, as purported by the author, but rather a ‘Royalty-Tax regime’. These are two different mechanisms for capturing economic rent.

Equating working interest to revenue share is an oversimplification of a rather intricate calculation of revenues that takes into account the cumulative resource expenses, operating cost, royalty (including the rate), transfer pricing rules, thin capitalization, double taxation, signature and other bonuses etc. See below in Figure 2, a comparison of the different government takes for different projects in the region. This is a result comparing the Government’s take in various oil and gas licences in the region, including the Gambia, Senegal and Guinea. You can see that Government’s take in most of these projects is over 60%, contrary to the author’s misrepresentation. The Petrosen 18% participating interest is part of government’s take but not the total government take.

Figure 2: A chart showing the Government’s take in a number of Oil and Gas projects in the region including the Gambia and Senegal.

In frontier exploration such as the Gambia, and many other places in the world, governments will almost always only hold a minority working interest, which is often a ‘carried interest’, because they don’t want to contribute/put tax-payer’s hard-earned monies into a highly risky business as oil exploration. This is what prevails in Ghana, Nigeria, Namibia and Norway (during the early days of its exploration journey). Article 10 part 14 of Ghana’s Petroleum Exploration Act states that, “A petroleum agreement shall contain a term that the Corporation shall (a) hold an initial participating carried interest of at least fifteen per cent for exploration and development…” Such arrangements may change as the basin matures, and with dwindling risk, States become bolder in asserting control. Again, remember it does not represent government’s take! Refer to Article 18.1 of the A2 and A5 licences, which gave the government right to take up to 15% participating interest in these licences at development and production. Basically, what that means is that FAR will bear all of the exploration cost, which at the time of their exit is over $100 million, but if they find commercially viable oil, government can immediately get up to 15% interest. Meaning it will be responsible for funding 15% of the cost of development and production. But government’s entitlement to the revenues, as I said, will in addition include taxes such as Corporate Income Tax, royalty (often representing the largest chunk of government’s take), additional profit payments and bonus.

FAR Farming-out to Petronas

Executive Summary This benchmarking study compares the terms prevailing in Gambia’s three signed contracts, for blocks A1 (BP), A2 and A5 (FAR and Petronas), with terms prevailing in other oil projects selected for their similarities.

But it is important to understand the limitations of a fiscal benchmarking exercise. Projections at this high level cannot embrace nuance of interpretation, which requires extensive analysis across a dozen jurisdictions. Also, fiscal regimes are compared under one notional set of economics. They need to be tested against different market conditions. Specifically, in the Gambian case:

  • Prospectivity: GoTG must obtain the best view of prospectivity, and test different prospectivity scenarios: what results look like for both government and investor look very different depending on whether the field is 100 million, or 1 billion barrels of oil.
  • Project economics: A similar approach must be adopted for costs, including those associated with water depth: the apparent difference in signed GoTG agreements for example is largely due to lower royalties in the deeper water A1 and A4 blocks, an industry norm to make such projects more attractive to investors.
  • Senegal: The Senegalese analogue should be studied in more depth, to determine the position of companies operating there with regard to extending into Gambia.

Figure 1: “Government take” (AETR) results for GoTG’s two signed agreements, based on the PEPLA, relative to projects from Senegal (3 projects), Mauritania, Liberia, Guinea, Ghana and Guyana. Detail in body of report.

Figure 1 shows “government take” results for the Gambian contracts versus a selection of other projects, mainly along the West African continental shelf. What these results mean, and how these projects were selected, is discussed below.

Sharing of risk and reward is a common and normal practice in a highly risky and capital intensive venture like the Petroleum business. I wrote on this topic in 2017 and to avoid repetition, readers are referred to The Point newspaper article of 14th April, 2017, titled: GAMBIA’S PETROLEUM SITUATION: Erin-FAR DEAL: https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/article/gambias-petroleum-situation-erin-far-deal

TRANSPARENCY

The author had on numerous instances decried the lack of transparency around the governance of the sector. In particular he concluded that:

  1. “There is a serious lack of transparency in the relationship between Gambians, the government of The Gambia and FAR Ltd. This relationship appears to operate beyond confidentiality and into the realm of secrecy.”

And

  1. “It is difficult to justify exempting FAR Ltd. from its contracted drilling obligations and all taxes and expenses payment to the government of The Gambia for the next two years, especially after having received US$127 million plus potential future millions. There is no official gazette or publication indicating that parliamentary assent has been granted to exempt FAR Ltd. from its tax liabilities to the government of The Gambia.”
  2. Comments: The relationship between the Gambians, the government and FAR is primarily prescribed in the A2 and A5 licences, premised on Petroleum Act 2004 and many other legislations such as NEMA, IVAT etc. For example, the NEMA sets out the environmental obligations during the execution of these licences. The IVAT prescribed the fiscal obligations.

    With respect to the specific obligations of FAR, these are all summarized in the A2 and A5 licences, which are all public documents. Readers are referred to the following:

    1. Gazette No. 41, of 31st July, 2023, where A2 & A5 licences, Petronor licences, Deeds of Amendments of the A2, A4 and A5 licences were publicized.
    2. Gazette No. 65 of 20th October 2023, and No. 35 of 24th June 2024 on the annual public report on Petroleum operations by the Petroleum Commission since its establishment.
    3. Numerous local and international newspaper publications, press statements etc. regarding the licensing round, outcomes and BP’s exit.

See below under the heading BP LICENCES the other publications, and National Assembly updates on the sector.

FAR Drilling

According to the Author:

  1. “In a 2018 appraisal, Cairn Energy reported that no 3D seismic data was available for this prospect, suggesting that FAR Ltd relied on less accurate 2D data or none at all for its assessments”
  2. “Since The Gambia’s A2 block is physically contiguous with the SNE-1 Sangomar field, as shown by 3D seismic data, the migration of a large volume of oil from there into the SNE-1 Sangomar field would be quick and effortless.”
  3. “In 2020, FAR Ltd moved on to its next drilling prospects, the Soloo and Bambo wells. These are located to the north of the A2 block, nearly side by side on an elevated gradient of the PSET shelf trend, part of the SNE-1 Sangomar field extending into the A2 block. The available 3D seismic data predrill confirmed the geological formation as a continuous extension of the SNE-1 Sangomar field into The Gambia”

Comments: First, I seriously doubt Cairn was accurately quoted in the first item, because Cairn understands that in the year 2018, no company would drill a deep offshore well on 2D data. This is because the cost of acquiring 3D is so insignificant compared to the cost of drilling, no sensible person would drill on 2D in the year 2018. The second point is that in the first quote, he says no 3D and in the second he said there is, which squarely contradicts each other. The truth is that both wells were drilled using 3D. Cairn was probably referring to the Jammah-1 well which was drilled in 1979 (40 years ago) on 2D. He also says the well is located in the A5 block, which is not the case, as can be seen in the maps he showed.

He further stated that:

  1. “FAR Ltd further indicated that the oil migration path from the SAMO well charts towards the Bambo and Soloo wells, which were mapped to be in the same two primary reservoirs as the eight others, and now twenty-three, wells that FAR Ltd and its joint venture partner Woodside Energy have drilled in the SNE-1 Sangomar field. The Bambo and Soloo prospects are even closer to BP’s previously held A1 block than the SAMO-1 prospect.”
  2. “The results from FAR Ltd.’s exploration drilling in the SAMO-1, Bambo-1, and Soloo Deep prospects have confirmed the presence of oil.”
  3. “In 2020, FAR Ltd moved on to its next drilling prospects, the Soloo and Bambo wells.”

In 1, 2 and 3, the author in one sentence refers to ‘Soloo well’ in another ‘Soloo Prospects’, ‘Samo well’ and ‘Samo-1 prospect’, ‘Samo-1, Bambo-1, and Soloo Deep prospects’. What he does not understand is that there is a difference between a ‘well’ and a ‘prospect’. Samo-1 and Bambo-1 are wells and the names are simple labels. The ‘Samo prospect’ has a geological connotation, referring to the aggregate of target reservoirs. Furthermore, there is no ‘Soloo well’ contrary to the quotes in 2 & 4. The real issue that needs to be understood here is that deep water oil exploration is such a technologically challenging, financially risky and knowledge intensive activity that only a serious and committed investor will spend many years and over $100M to undertake in a frontier environment.

BP Licence
The author asked:

  1. “It would be interesting to know the composition of the negotiation team, including the legal personnel on both sides, for this settlement. It remains unclear what factors determined the $30 million settlement and how it was utilized by the Gambian government, as no public disclosure has been made.”

Comments:
I refer readers to the Ministry’s press release of the 18th of April 2018, updating the general public on the results of the evaluation and listing the companies involved in the licensing round. When BP was granted the licence, publications were made in local newspapers. For example, on the 2nd of May 2019, The Standard newspaper published an article titled “Gambia, BP Sign Oil Exploration Deal.” There was also a press statement regarding BP’s exit made by the government’s spokesperson, which was featured in local newspapers, including The Point in its article of the 12th of August 2021 titled “Gov’t Gets Back D1.5B from BP.”

Furthermore, the BP licence, containing the terms and conditions of the grant, was published in the Gazette as a public notice on Gazette Number 20 of 27th March 2020 (GN. No 59/2020). Subsequently, see the October 28th, 2021, Standard newspaper publication titled “Gambia Opens Mini Licensing for Block A1,” as well as Gazette Number 55 Vol. 138 of 8th December 2021 (GN. No 185/2021).

Also, refer to the press release issued around August 2021, which listed those who supported the Government in the BP negotiation, including the African Legal Support Facility, Addleshaw Goddard, DLA Pipers, and Open Oil. Having worked with individuals from these entities for years, I can attest to their competence, and a simple web search will provide information on these organizations. Furthermore, the African Legal Support Facility has published information about its support for The Gambia’s Petroleum Sector. The BP negotiations ended very well for The Gambia and on terms consistent with the agreement. I also refer readers to BP’s public statements of February 12 and August 4, 2020, on its policy shift that resulted in its exit from The Gambia.

In addition, during numerous National Assembly sessions, the NAMS and, by extension, the public were informed about developments surrounding exploration activities. For instance, during the fourth session (12th November–22nd December 2020), in response to Question No. 209/2020 by Hon. Alh Mbow of Upper Saloum, the Hon. Minister updated on the FAR-PETRONAS licence, the Petronor agreement, and the BP licence situation.

Similarly, during the second ordinary session of the 2021 legislature, in response to Question 4 by Hon. Alhagie Mbow – Upper Saloum Constituency, the Honourable Minister provided specifics on the funds received from 2017 to 2021 and where these funds were deposited. Likewise, in 2022, during the fourth legislative session, in response to Question No. 0176/2022 from the member for Bakau, the Hon. Minister elaborated on FAR’s acquisition and its extension. In 2023, answers to Questions 141/2023, 143/2023, and 144/2023 gave an overview of FAR’s tenure. These submissions also included details of the funds received.

Equally, during the recent third ordinary session of the 2024 legislative session, information about the situations concerning FAR, Petronor, and BP was provided. I believe these are public records!


African Petroleum Matter
Similar misrepresentations are found in the article regarding the African Petroleum arbitration and the subsequent settlement agreement. The fact, backed by records, is that African Petroleum initiated arbitration against The Gambia in 2017. At some point, given the very good job done by the lawyers representing The Gambia, the company, through partners, persistently requested an out-of-court settlement. This request was accepted in 2020 after strategic considerations, and the negotiations ended on terms very favorable to The Gambia.

A press briefing was held in September 2020, where the details of the agreement terms were given, including the payments made to the government. It is also worth stating that the African Legal Support Facility did not fund The Gambia’s costs for this arbitration, as claimed by the author. Instead, these costs were reimbursed by African Petroleum as part of the settlement. Referring to the legislative updates, this matter, as mentioned above, is in the public domain.


FAR’s Gambian Operations
In questioning and attempting to discredit FAR’s records and efforts in The Gambia, the author suspected that one of the reasons for FAR’s failure could be attributed to the use of a 6th-generation drillship, Stena Drillmax. This is despite quoting Cath Norman as saying that the discoveries in Senegal were made with a 5th-generation vessel.

A careful reading of Cath’s statement shows that she was highlighting the comparison of speed and cost regarding the use of the 7th generation, not necessarily questioning operational capability. A simple internet search on Stena DrillMax and IceMax, used in The Gambia in 2018 and 2021 respectively, will demonstrate the operational capability of these vessels.

The author also noted:
“Given FAR’s stakes in the SNE-1 Sangomar field and in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks through its subsidiary FAR (Gambia) Ltd., and its role as the operator during drilling in the Gambian prospects, what measures, if any, were put in place to protect The Gambia against potential conflicts of interest from FAR Ltd., especially in the context of migration of oil? PC Gambia (Petronas) could not properly perform this role as FAR Ltd.’s joint venture partner in The Gambia.”

The insinuation that FAR (plus Petronas) somehow invested over a hundred million dollars in exploration in The Gambia during the tenure of their licenses as part of a scheme, with the objective of “not finding” oil but conniving with Senegal, lacks evidence.

Conclusion
There are good records on how the Petroleum Sector has been governed, and these are available to anyone interested in the matter.

 

RESPONSE TO MR. BARROW’S REBUTTAL (Verbatim)

By: Ousman F. M’Bai

Should The Gambia and Senegal Share Resources in the Sangomar Field?

The article does not suggest that shared sub-basin resources automatically lead to joint ownership by states. Instead, as Mr M’Bai argued, the matter involves two key points:

  1. The presence of shared reservoirs in the s400 and s500 series, as shown in the article under the subheading The Second Well – Bambo-1 (Side Track-1) & Soloo, and in Map 18, which illustrates the reservoir series extending into The Gambia.
  2. Even if shared reservoirs were not present, as FAR Ltd. erroneously reported, the migration of oil from Gambian prospects is a critical factor. See the section on oil migration in the article.

In summary, if shared reservoirs exist, oil migration is less relevant. However, both points remain vital in understanding resource claims.

Common Nomenclature for Subdivisions of the MSGBC

On the first page of the article, the common nomenclature is explicitly acknowledged. However, using the term “Northern Sub-basin” without further qualification is overly abstract and fails to clearly identify the location. The article provides a more accurate and comprehensive geographical context for the sub-basin, supported by Maps 1 and 2.

Precedents for Cross-Border Resource Sharing

The difference between the Mauritania-Senegal maritime boundary map and the Senegal-Gambia map is that the former is more natural and accurate. In contrast, the latter seems deliberately drawn to restrict the SNE Sangomar fields within Senegal’s territorial waters. In the article Oil Does Not Care About Boundaries by a geology expert, GeoExpro Magazine, this boundary is criticised as unreliable. Mr M’Bai echoed this criticism in his analysis, particularly in the discussion above Map 19.

Legal Basis for Resource Ownership

The article does not dispute the existence of international laws governing resource ownership. What is the law question. Rather, it focuses on HOW these laws should be applied, particularly concerning:

  1. The exploitation of natural resources across maritime boundaries.
  2. The migration of resources like oil and gas between these boundaries.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) underscores principles such as equitable dealing, good faith negotiations, and respect for sovereignty, as discussed under the subheading The Law – Conflict Over Natural Resources Along Maritime Boundaries.

FAR’s Acquisition of 100% Interest in Blocks A2 and A5

At no point does Mr M’Bai equate working interest with revenue sharing. Instead, the article correctly outlines the implications of FAR Ltd.’s acquisition of 100% interest in Blocks A2 and A5, highlighting the consequences of The Gambia’s short-sighted approach. FAR capitalised on this without making significant discoveries, leaving The Gambia with little benefit. The AETR chart referenced applies only at the point of production and provides no immediate consolation. The consequences are further explored in the section FAR Laughing All the Way to the Bank.

FAR Farming Out to Petronas

While it is true that sharing risk and reward is common in capital-intensive ventures, the lack of financial transparency in the FAR-Petronas relationship in The Gambia remains deeply concerning.

Transparency

The core argument remains that the relationship between FAR Ltd. and The Gambia was marked by secrecy. Examples include the concealment of the drilling accident and the sale of its stake in the SNE Sangomar field to Woodside Energy. In response to your specific points:

  1. Gazette Nos. 41 and 65 relate to events occurring long after FAR Ltd. had surrendered its licence and exited The Gambia. Informing Gambians after FAR’s departure is moot.
  2. Your comments on the FAR drilling are misplaced. The article distinguishes between the SAMO well in Block A5 and the Bambo well in Block A2, and the reliance on 2D seismic data is discussed under SAMO Well. You appear to confuse SAMO with Jammah-1, a mistake similar to Cath Norman’s conflation of SAMO with Bambo in her interview with Gavin Colery.

Moreover, FAR did not spend $100 million of its own funds in The Gambia. No transactional evidence has been provided to substantiate this claim.

BP Licence

Mr M’Bai’s central argument concerning the BP negotiations is unchanged:

  1. The composition of the Gambian and BP negotiation teams has not been disclosed.
  2. While you refer to international legal practitioners, the local Gambian firm retained remains unnamed.
  3. A press release from August 2021 is referenced, but you do not specify the source or provide sufficient detail.
  4. The public has never been informed of the factors determining the $30 million settlement, leaving doubts about the outcome.

African Petroleum Matter

You claim that the settlement details were disclosed in a September 2020 press release, but:

  1. The specific press release is unidentified.
  2. The local Gambian firm involved remains undisclosed.
  3. If arbitration costs were reimbursed, evidence of such reimbursement has not been publicly provided.
  4. The settlement was among the weakest achieved, a topic to be explored in greater detail in my next article.

FAR’s Gambian Operations

Your comments here fail to grasp the severity of FAR Ltd.’s actions and their impact on The Gambia. You repeat the unsubstantiated claim that FAR spent over $100 million on exploration without providing any documentary proof. FAR’s financial and operational incompetence casts doubt on the accuracy of its finding that the s400 and s500 reservoirs do not extend into The Gambia. The Petroleum Commission did not independently verify this, and neither Woodside Energy, Petronas, nor Petrosen conducted due diligence, despite standing to gain from exclusive ownership of the sub-basin’s resources. For further details, see the GeoExpro Magazine article Oil Does Not Care About Boundaries.

I trust this addresses the points raised in your note. Given this, I do not accept that the premises of our article are unclear to the extent that an interview with you is necessary to address the written questions we previously sent. I would, however, appreciate it if you could use your best endeavours to provide a written response to those questions.

Kotu Residents Face Yearly Nightmare as Rainy Season Returns

By Alieu Jallow

As the rains begin in the Greater Banjul Area, flooding fears grip communities along the Kotu stream, and for Dippa Kunda’s Kaddy Kaloga, it’s a familiar dread she’s lived with for years.

“We’re grateful to the Almighty Allah during the dry season, but once the rains begin, our peace of mind disappears. When it rains, our houses flood. You can’t even tell the difference between the inside and outside; it’s all waterlogged. Our food is washed away, and even the clothes I’ve dyed are ruined. We have nowhere to go,” she said.

Kaloga is one of many residents who face repeated flooding each year, largely driven by blocked waterways and poorly maintained drainage systems. She pointed to the growing issue of indiscriminate waste dumping, which clogs natural channels and worsens flooding during downpours.

“The stream used to be clean. We used to bathe in it, wash our utensils, it flowed normally, but today, the dumping of waste has blocked it, and now it’s causing havoc,” she explained

While relocation may seem like a practical solution to some, for Kaloga and others, it’s not that simple. This place, she says, is home.

“All we need is support to improve our living conditions. Relocation is not an option. This is our home, where we raised our families here. And for us Serahules, being separated from family means being forgotten,” she said.

The dire situation has not gone unnoticed. The West. Africa Coastal Areas Resilience Investment Project 2 (WACA ResIP2) is currently conducting feasibility studies aimed at strengthening the resilience of vulnerable communities, such as Kotu. Backed by international partners, the WACA program was launched to address coastal erosion and flooding by protecting the ecological and economic assets of West Africa’s coastal areas.

Abdoulie Sey, Communication Officer for the WACA project, acknowledged the challenges but stressed that any interventions must be grounded in research and evidence.

“From our end, it’s too soon to speak definitively about relocation or compensation,” Sey said. “These are sensitive issues that must be based on scientific studies. The feasibility study will guide our work when scientists come, they’ll assess whether the stream can be restored and what realistic options exist for residents.”

As the studies near completion, residents like Kaloga remain in limbo, caught between the fear of yet another devastating rainy season and the uncertainty of what lies ahead.

For now, her message remains clear: “We need support not just to survive the rains, but to live in dignity.”

Shortage of Modern Farming Equipment Affects Local Rice Farmer in Kotu

By Dawda Baldeh

For thirty years, Marie Gibba has tilled the fields along the Kotu stream using traditional rice farming methods, but age and a lack of modern equipment are making the harvest harder to bring home.

“I rely on my hands to plough the field and clear the weeds. It’s painful because we lack equipment,” she said.

She stated that she has made numerous attempts to request agricultural equipment from the Ministry of Agriculture, but these efforts have been unsuccessful.

“The ministry has shown no interest in assisting us. We don’t require much; all we need is a small tractor to help us plow the fields,” she added.

“Even if they can’t provide it for free, they can bring it, and we will pay for the services.”

She cultivates a small plot of land for rice, and in some seasons, she enjoys a bountiful harvest.

“When the harvest is good, I sometimes have over ten bags, which my family can rely on for the entire season without purchasing rice,” she noted.

However, this seasonal yield is quickly declining due to the lack of modern farming tools and climate change.

Highlighting the economic advantages of supporting locally grown rice, Gibba appealed for assistance for farmers like herself.

Among the obstacles she continues to face is the intrusion of birds and other animals into her fields.

She expressed despair regarding government support, citing her unsuccessful attempts to seek help from the ministry of agriculture.

“The government claims to prioritise agriculture, but they are not. If farmers do not receive support, there is no way for our agricultural sector to improve. It will eventually perish,” she cautioned.

Despite the ongoing challenges, the seasoned farmer remains dedicated to growing her own food.

“This is the best rice you can consume if you want to live healthily,” she added.

Regarding the current price increase in the country, Mrs. Gibba pointed out that the lack of modern farming tools forces people like her to resort to purchasing rice during the dry season.

“Rice is expensive, but for me, we usually buy it in the dry season,” she said.

Omar Johm: The Two-Footed Star Who Terrorises Opponents

By Muhammed Lamin Drammeh

Omar Johm is the kind of player who makes you believe in the magic of football. With a ball at his feet, the attacking midfielder glides past defenders with effortless grace, striking with either foot like it’s second nature. His journey from the lively streets of London Corner in Serekunda to becoming the top scorer in Gambia’s Second Division is a story of innate talent, relentless determination, and a community that never stopped cheering him on.

Growing up in London Corner, football was everywhere for Johm. “It’s always been around me, from playing mini target goals on the streets, to school teams, to nawettan,” he says with a grin. “It’s part of who I am.” The neighbourhood saw something special in him early on. “They believed in me before I fully believed in myself,” he admits, their support pushing him to train harder and dream bigger.

Beating the Odds

The road wasn’t easy. Like many kids in The Gambia, Johm faced pushback from his family, who wanted him to focus on school rather than football. Add to that the lack of proper football pitches, boots, or even kits, and you get a sense of the grind. “We made it work with what we had,” he says, his voice steady with pride. Discipline kept him going, and eventually, his family came around, outfitting him with boots, covering the cost of gym sessions, and showing up to cheer at his games.

Stealing the Show at Gambia Ports Authority

Johm’s big break came with Gambia Ports Authority (GPA), where he went from warming the bench to running the show. In the 2023/24 season, he bagged 13 goals and was named player of the year. This season, he outdid himself, scoring 18 goals and dishing out 7 assists in 29 matches, even with a CHAN call-up and a training stint in Turkey pulling him away for five games. “I just try to do the extra work. I train more, rest well, and trust in Allah,” he tells The Fatu Network, quick to share credit with his coaches and teammates.

Fans call him the “conductor of the orchestra,” a nickname that makes him laugh. “That’s too kind,” he chuckles. His secret weapon is being two-footed. “I can play left, right, or through the middle. It keeps defenders guessing,” he explains. Coach Baboucarr Coker’s sharp eye for detail has been a game-changer, too. “He’s one of the best in the country,” Johm says. “Every day with him feels like school.”

Moments That Define a Season

Some games leave a lasting impression, and for Johm, scoring against Wallidan was one of those moments. “They’re a big club with history,” he notes. “To score against them felt like we were on the right track.” His goals helped GPA clinch the Second Division title, earning promotion to the top flight after three long years. “It was a blessing,” he says. “We set that goal from the start, and it was all about teamwork.” He gives a shout-out to teammates like Ansumana Jawara, who provided 11 assists, and Abdallalah Jatta, who had 13, both of whom set him up time and again.

Bouncing Back Stronger

Setbacks have only made Johm tougher. Being the only second-division player called up for the CHAN team was a huge honour, even if he didn’t make the final 18. “I was fit and ready, but it was still a privilege,” he says, thanking the Gambia Football Federation for the nod. Last season’s heartbreak, missing promotion by a single win, hit hard. “That one really hurt,” he admits. But it lit a fire under GPA. “This season, we didn’t take any chances,” he says. “It made us stronger and more united.”

Dreaming Big

Johm’s got his eyes on the big leagues. Inspired by Vinícius Júnior’s flair and Mohamed Salah’s grit, he wants to play abroad, break records, and lead Gambia to AFCON or even World Cup glory. “I want to help Gambia do big things,” he says, his voice full of fire. As GPA gears up for the First Division, Johm’s already challenging himself to top his own record as the club’s all-time top scorer. “I’m always competing with myself,” he says with a shrug. “Let’s see what Allah has planned.”

Leading by Example

Off the field, Johm’s all about discipline and heart. “Discipline comes before talent or hard work,” he says, and it shows in how tight he is with his teammates. “We’re friends off the pitch, and that makes us better on it.” GPA’s upbeat vibe, thanks to the club’s supportive management, keeps the squad flying high. Before big games, Johm calls his mom for her prayers. “That’s how I find peace,” he says. He sums himself up in three words: “Humble. Focused. Relentless.” His guiding mantra? “Stay disciplined, stay humble.”

Pushing Gambian Football Forward

Johm knows Gambian football has untapped potential. “We need a professional league and better connections with scouts and agents,” he says. “There’s so much talent here, but we’re not always seen.” He wants to inspire the next generation to aim higher than he has. “Gambia’s still young in football,” he says. “There are records waiting to be broken.”

Building a Legacy

Already GPA’s all-time top scorer, Johm’s dreaming of a legacy that lasts. “I want my grandkids to see my name on Wikipedia and say, ‘That’s Grandpa — I’m following his path,’” he says, flashing a smile. As he preps for the First Division, Omar Johm is proof that talent, hard work, and a supportive community can take you far as a two-footed star ready to carve his name into Gambian football history.

Gambinos Stars Africa Announces Bubacarr Sillah’s Transfer to Slovak Club MŠK Žilina

By: The Fatu Network News Desk

Gambinos Stars Africa has officially announced the transfer of young midfielder Bubacarr Sillah to Slovak top division club MŠK Žilina. The move was confirmed in a press release issued by the Mandinari-based academy on July 25th, which included remarks from Sillah, coaching staff, and the academy’s leadership.

Born and raised in Mandinari village in The Gambia’s West Coast Region, Sillah becomes the second player from the community to join a European professional football club, following the path of Basirou Badjie. According to the academy, Sillah’s new club, MŠK Žilina, finished last season as runners-up in the Slovak league and secured a place in the UEFA Europa Conference League. He will also be eligible to play for the club’s U19 team, which recently qualified for the UEFA Youth League.

“This is a historic moment not only for Bubacarr, but also for the people of Mandinari,” said Albert Martens, President of Gambinos Stars Africa, in the press release. “His journey from a small village in The Gambia to one of the top clubs in Slovakia shows what is possible when talent meets hard work and opportunity. We are proud of Bubacarr and wish him every success in Europe.”

Head Coach Arnaud Outters also shared his reflections in the statement, saying, “I’ve had the pleasure to work closely with Bubacarr over the past years, and his progress has been exceptional. He is a player with great technical ability, strong character, and the hunger to learn every single day. Seeing him move to MŠK Žilina is a reward for his dedication and a clear validation of our academy’s mission to develop players not just for the local level, but for the highest stages of the game.”

In his own comments shared in the same press release, Sillah described the transfer as a major step in his life. “I feel blessed and proud to be taking this step in my football career,” he said. “Coming from Mandinari, this move means a lot to me and my family. I want to thank Gambinos Stars Africa, my coaches and teammates for shaping me as a player and a person for many years. The academy has given me everything — guidance, opportunity, and belief.”

He also acknowledged the support of his management team. “I want to thank my agency 4FC for their support and for making this transfer possible. Now it’s time to work hard and prove myself in Europe.”

Gambinos Stars Africa described the transfer as further confirmation of its development model, which combines football, education, and personal growth. The academy is a partner of Red and Gold Football, a joint venture between FC Bayern München and Los Angeles Football Club, and aims to train young players in line with European standards.

GALA Accuses Gambia Football Federation of Corruption and Project Failures in Formal Petition

By: The Fatu Network News Desk

Gambia Against Looted Assets (GALA) has filed a formal petition with the National Sports Council, alleging widespread corruption, mismanagement, and a failure to deliver on key infrastructure projects by the Gambia Football Federation (GFF). The petition, dated July 23, 2025, outlines what GALA describes as a pattern of “neglect, opacity, and unaccountable leadership” that has undermined the development of Gambian football over the past decade.

“We are writing to bring to your attention the reasons behind our crusade against the Gambia Football Federation,” the group states in the letter. “As ardent supporters and advocates for fair play and transparency in sports, we have noticed several concerning issues.”

GALA accuses the GFF of receiving approximately $11 million from FIFA and CAF between 2014 and 2024, yet failing to provide a transparent account of how these funds were used. “Despite these substantial funds, there is a lack of accountability and transparency in the utilisation of these resources,” the group asserts. “Many of these projects remain incomplete, and contractors are rarely held accountable or taken to court for breaching contracts.”

The petition singles out a number of infrastructure projects which GALA claims were either abandoned or poorly executed:

  • Jarra Soma Project: GALA says the site lacks basic amenities like seating benches, dressing rooms, and pavilions, despite funding reportedly earmarked since 2015.

  • Gunjur Project: Initiated in 2018, the project is described as “unfinished and unusable,” disappointing local players and fans.

  • Bakau Project: Although a perimeter fence was completed, GALA states that the pavilion is unfinished, and the grass pitch is maintained by the diaspora rather than the GFF. The lack of water and electricity is also highlighted.

  • Banjul Project: GALA reports that while the fence is in place, the artificial turf is “unplayable,” and the floodlights have remained non-functional due to what it claims were “sub-standard products.”

  • Serrekunda West Project: GALA describes this as “one of the worst projects ever undertaken by the GFF,” noting that only industrial lights were installed—unsuitable for football.

  • Serrekunda East Project: The group states that only floodlights were installed and never used, while the rest of the upgrades were funded locally through ticket sales and sponsors.

  • Manjai Project: Reportedly left in a dilapidated state.

  • Brikama Project: GALA alleges poor quality of floodlights, dressing rooms, pavilion, and toilets, with only the artificial pitch completed.

  • Busumbala Project: Referred to as an “elephant project,” the site is said to have seen no improvements in over six years and remains overgrown.

  • Goal Project / National Technical Training Center (NTTC): The petition raises concerns about a D44 million renovation and questions the continued role of GFF 1st Vice President Bakary K. Jammeh as project manager, calling it a “conflict of interest.”

  • Biri Biri Football Project: GALA claims no improvements have been made to the pitch or pavilion since funding was reportedly allocated.

Beyond infrastructure, GALA alleges that funds allocated to clubs, referees, and associations are often misused or withheld. “League winners, both male and female, struggle to receive their payments,” the group notes, and “clubs’ transport refunds go unpaid, leading to the demise of many rural clubs.”

The petition also references a 2020 COVID-19 relief fund of $1.5 million from FIFA, claiming that “these funds were misappropriated” and offered “little benefit” to intended recipients. Similarly, referees are said to be entitled to $50,000 in annual support but face “difficulties in receiving their payments,” despite deductions being made for a Referees’ Welfare Committee.

In the case of women’s football, GALA claims that the GFF only organises programmes “under FIFA pressure” and that the $500,000 COVID-19 relief funds earmarked for women’s football in 2020 brought “no tangible benefits.” It also alleges that the Women’s Football Association receives $125,000 per year from FIFA, yet “female football remains neglected and demoralised.”

Other associations, including the Coaches Association, Players Association, and Schools Football Association, are also reportedly suffering from underfunding and exclusion. According to GALA, the Players Association was marginalised after the 2022 GFF elections, while the Schools Football Association has not held any competitions since 2021.

Regarding the national team, GALA questions the GFF’s claim of sole responsibility, stating: “The GFF’s claim of exclusive support is contradicted by the significant backing provided by the Ministry of Youth and Sports and the Gambian Government since 2017.”

The petition also notes that the GFF president receives a $20,000 yearly allowance from CAF and claims that CAF also provides $300,000 annually for infrastructure development. GALA suggests that funds intended for local reinvestment following The Gambia’s participation in AFCON tournaments have not been properly accounted for.

Crucially, the petition raises the issue of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between the GFF and mini stadium custodians. GALA insists that the GFF does not own these stadiums and only accesses FIFA funds through partnerships, which “must be publicly clarified.”

“When the GFF requests funds from FIFA, it does so on behalf of the country, not individual representatives,” GALA writes. “As such, there should be no exceptions for the GFF in terms of being held accountable for the proper management of funds designated for the benefit of the people of The Gambia.”

GALA concludes by calling for an urgent and transparent investigation into the GFF: “We respectfully request a thorough investigation into GFF based on the concerns raised above… within a timeframe of two (2) months effective today.”

The petition was copied to the National Assembly Select Committee on Sports, the Clerk of the National Assembly, FIFA, CAF, the Minister of Youth and Sports, the Office of the Inspector General of Police, and the GFF.

Two Young Women from Kombo East Defy Gender Norms in Men’s Football Refereeing

By Alieu Jallow

Two young women from Kombo East are reshaping the narrative of women in Gambian football refereeing. Amie Jabang and Amie Touray have stepped into the country’s men’s second division league, a space where few women have dared to go. At just 25 years old, Jabang has earned the respect of players, coaches and fans alike, becoming a symbol of courage and inspiration for many young girls across the country.

Their path into officiating has been far from easy. From confronting gender-based stereotypes to managing the intense pressure of high-stakes matches, both Jabang and Touray have had to prove themselves time and again. Yet their consistency, discipline and professionalism on the pitch have won admiration and helped them gain ground in a male-dominated field.

For Jabang, the experience carries deep personal meaning. Football has been a part of her life since childhood. She began officiating in U-15 intermediate tournaments, moved on to third division matches involving both male and female teams, and was eventually promoted to the second division. Reflecting on her journey, she said:

“In 2019, I got promoted from the third division to the second division. People always associate football with men, but I told myself I would prove otherwise through hard work and determination. I faced harassment and, at times, even cried, but I stayed focused. I wanted to make my mum proud because she believed in me, even when my dad didn’t support my dream of being a referee.”

Jabang has officiated matches across the country, including the recent YONNA Islamic Microfinance Tournament final at the Brikama Box Bar Mini Stadium. She encourages aspiring female referees to remain focused despite the obstacles, saying, “My message to young ladies is: be resilient and ignore the noise. Whatever a man can do, we can too.”

Amie Touray, who hopes to earn promotion to the second division this year, also traces her motivation back to her school years, where her love for sports took root. Despite enduring social stigma and discrimination, she remains focused on her long-term goal of earning a CAF badge and representing The Gambia internationally. “I want to see myself wearing a CAF badge, going abroad to officiate games, and coming back home to make my mum proud,” she shared.

Their presence in men’s football is gradually shifting long-held perceptions. Matchday scenes that were once met with scepticism now often end in praise, with players and spectators commending their fairness and authority on the field.

As The Gambia works toward greater inclusivity in sports, the stories of Touray and Jabang are helping to open doors for other young women who share the same passion for football. Their journeys are a powerful reminder that with resilience and purpose, even the most enduring barriers can be broken.

Dippa Kunda Alkalo Attributes Kotu Stream Blockage to Unregulated Tie & Dye Waste and Illegal Settlements

By: Dawda Baldeh

The representative of the Alkalo of Dippa Kunda, Surahata Sohna, has identified unregulated waste disposal from tie and dye activities and the rise of illegal settlements as major causes of the blockage of the Kotu stream, which has led to frequent flooding in the area.

“Encroachment, illegal settlements, and the indiscriminate disposal of waste from tie and dye are among the factors causing the environmental crisis we are experiencing,” he stated, while speaking at a training session for journalists on environmental reporting in Katong. The session was funded by the West Africa Coastal Areas Resilience Investment Project (WACA ResIP2) and organised by the Gambia Press Union.

Mr. Sohna urged the government to support the establishment of a dedicated factory where locals can carry out their manufacturing activities in a regulated environment. He recalled how the area was pristine several decades ago, when the stream was clean and used for fishing and other purposes. “Previously, the stream was very clean, and you could see the fish swimming. It was a pleasant location, but now it has turned into a nightmare for residents,” he lamented.

While acknowledging the importance of tie and dye to the local economy, he warned that the environmental consequences can no longer be ignored. “The waste produced by tie and dye is harming our trees, degrading our water quality, and making life difficult,” he added. He also highlighted the growing problem of illegal settlements along the stream, which he said have severely disrupted water flow and worsened flooding. “People frequently settle illegally along the stream, which has impacted the water flow,” he emphasised.

Meanwhile, Isatou Keita, President of the Gambia Press Union, commended the WACA project for funding the training and urged journalists to report accurately on environmental issues to raise public awareness, particularly concerning the Kotu stream, where a major restoration effort is underway. She underscored the critical role journalists play in influencing environmental policy through their coverage.

WACA project officials also emphasised the importance of training media professionals on environmental issues, noting that their initiative focuses on restoring and improving the Kotu stream, which stretches across eleven kilometres and passes through several communities. They expressed optimism that the project, once completed, will significantly enhance the region’s environmental quality and improve the lives of residents.

China’s $2.2B Bet in Portugal Signals New EU Strategy

Written by: Seringe ST Touray
Editor-in-Chief, The Fatu Network

In the southern Portuguese town of Sines, once known mainly as the birthplace of explorer Vasco da Gama, a new kind of global navigation is taking place. Chinese battery maker CALB has begun building a €2 billion lithium battery plant there, with backing from the Portuguese government and plans to create 1,800 jobs. It is not just a win for Portugal’s economy. It is a sign of how Europe is quietly rethinking its strategy, trying to position itself between two increasingly tense superpowers – the United States and China.

This plant is not an acquisition. CALB is not buying an old facility or a struggling European company. It is building something brand new, from the ground up. That in itself says a lot. Chinese companies are now turning away from the high-profile buyouts that once raised red flags across Europe. Instead, they are putting their money into long-term projects that come with local partnerships, job creation, and government incentives.

“This is not just a factory,” CALB President Liu Jingyu said in February at the project launch. “It is a symbol of cooperation and a shared future between China and Europe.” Her remarks were made just weeks before the United States announced new tariffs targeting Chinese electric vehicles and clean energy tech, a move that only deepened the divide between Washington and Beijing.

In that context, Portugal’s embrace of this project is revealing. Prime Minister Luís Montenegro called it a “historic investment” and “a fundamental step for the future of Sines and Portugal’s energy transition.” His government has made it clear that green technology and foreign investment are both top priorities, and CALB’s arrival ticks both boxes.

Pedro Reis, Portugal’s Minister of Economy, also welcomed the move. Speaking to local press, he said the plant “positions Portugal as a serious player in Europe’s energy and manufacturing sectors.” He also stressed how job creation, tax revenue, and clean-tech output are too important to ignore, especially when many countries worldwide are endeavoring to secure industrial relevance.

The factory will produce lithium-ion cells for electric vehicles and energy storage systems. It will supply automakers and grid operators across Europe. Construction is already underway, with production expected to start in 2026.

CALB’s decision to build in Portugal is not an isolated case. Across the continent, Chinese companies are shifting from buying to building. In Hungary, Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL), the world’s largest battery manufacturer, is building what is expected to become one of Europe’s biggest battery plants. In Slovakia and Serbia, new greenfield investments are popping up with the support of local authorities. These projects are strategic. They give Chinese firms access to the European market without triggering the backlash that came with previous takeovers of ports, airports, or energy companies.

Bloomberg recently reported that China is “pivoting to higher-value investments” in parts of Europe that are seen as more welcoming. That includes Portugal, where the government has shown a willingness to work with Beijing.

For Europe, the situation is complicated. On one hand, there is pressure from the United States to take a tougher stance on Chinese trade practices. On the other, there is an urgent need to accelerate the green transition, which requires massive investment in batteries, solar panels, and electric vehicles. Europe cannot afford to go it alone. And for now, Chinese capital is filling some of the gaps.

At the same time, Europe is trying to protect its core interests. By encouraging Chinese firms to build rather than buy, countries like Portugal are gaining some control over how foreign investments fit into their national goals. A new factory in Sines, backed by local labour and policy incentives, is far less controversial than a Chinese state-owned company buying a major European port.

That is why CALB’s plant matters. It reflects a broader strategy – not just by China, but by European governments trying to balance their need for investment with the reality of geopolitical tensions.

The jobs and tax revenues are immediate benefits. But the long-term gain is political. Portugal gets to show that it can attract top-tier global projects while upholding European values. China, in turn, avoids some of the predictable headlines in Western press that tend to portray Chinese investments in sensitive sectors as threats.

As global power dynamics shift, smaller countries like Portugal are playing an increasingly important role. They are not just hosting factories. They are shaping the future of international trade, one project at a time.

In the end, this is not only about batteries. It is about strategy. Europe is not turning its back on the United States, but it is making room to act in its own interest. With Washington focused on tariffs and rivalry, and Beijing looking to expand widely, places like Sines are becoming test cases for a new kind of global cooperation – one built not on headlines, but on construction sites and factory floors.

Mpox Case Detected in The Gambia, Health Ministry Urges Vigilance But Says ‘No Cause for Alarm’

By: The Fatu Network News Desk

The Ministry of Health has confirmed the detection of a Mpox case in The Gambia, marking the first recorded case of the disease in the country in 2025. In a press release issued on July 22nd, the Ministry announced that the case was discovered through routine surveillance on July 18th. Officials say the patient is in stable condition and responding to treatment, while active steps are underway to prevent any potential spread.

“The detection of a single case in a country where Mpox is not presently in circulation constitutes an outbreak, requiring immediate response,” the Ministry said, noting that contact tracing, case searches, and community engagement are already in motion.

“There is no cause for alarm,” the Ministry reassured, adding that health workers across the country have been trained and are prepared to handle the situation. A sequencing process is currently underway to determine the specific subtype of the virus detected.

Mpox, formerly known as monkeypox, is a viral disease that can be transmitted both from animals to humans and between people. Transmission occurs through close contact, including direct skin-to-skin contact, respiratory secretions, and bodily fluids. Infection can also result from touching contaminated objects such as clothing, bedding, or surfaces that have not been disinfected.

In an advisory issued as part of the July 22nd release, the Ministry detailed the symptoms and prevention steps: “Mpox symptoms include rashes, fever, headache, muscle ache, back pain, low energy, and swollen lymph nodes (groins). The rashes appear as blisters or sores and usually occur on the face, palms of the hands, soles of the feet, groin, and genital or anal areas.”

Members of the public are being urged to take precautions if they suspect they may have been exposed or are experiencing symptoms. The Ministry advised:

  1. “Suspects should immediately visit the nearest health centre for investigation. Early detection of the disease helps manage the symptoms and prevent potential further transmission.”

  2. “Suspects should avoid contact (self-isolate) with other people until they have sought medical attention, to prevent the virus from spreading.”

  3. “Notify health workers of suspected cases in the community so that they can be tested and supported and the outbreak can be stopped from spreading.”

  4. “Adhere to the advice of health workers at all times.”

On July 24th, the Ministry issued a follow-up message further clarifying the disease’s presentation: “Mpox is a contagious disease that manifest with fever, headache, joint pain and the appearance of itchy rashes all over the body.”

The Ministry thanked the public for past cooperation during outbreaks and appealed for continued vigilance: “We rely on your continued support to prevent this outbreak from spreading further. Please bear with us as we implement comprehensive response measures, including enhancing surveillance in communities, health facilities, and points of entry.”

In response to the broader rise in Mpox cases across the continent, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention and the World Health Organization (WHO) had already declared the disease a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security and a Public Health Emergency of International Concern as far back as August 2024.

The Ministry concluded by reassuring the public that it is closely monitoring developments and will share updates as needed. For information or assistance, citizens are encouraged to call the Ministry’s toll-free line at 1025.

Phone Call Sparks GLMA’s Role in Cattle Sale, DG Tells Assembly Panel

By Mama A. Touray

The Director General of the Gambia Livestock Marketing Agency (GLMA) has told lawmakers that his agency was drawn into the valuation and tagging of former President Yahya Jammeh’s cattle based on a phone call, not a formal request from the Janneh Commission.

Mr Darboe made the disclosure on Wednesday while testifying before the National Assembly’s Special Select Committee probing the sale of former President Yahya Jammeh’s assets identified by the Janneh Commission.

Outlining how GLMA became involved, Mr Darboe said the then Director of Technical and Field Services, Ebrima Cham, had a conversation with Ebrima Jallow of the Attorney General’s Chambers regarding a court order — a discussion that ultimately led to GLMA’s participation in the livestock valuation.

“We have not seen any letter with regards to conducting inventory on valuation and tagging,” he stated. “From the records, Ebrima Cham, the then Director of Technical and Field Services, now Board Chair of GLMA, had a conversation with one Ebrima Jallow. That’s when the valuation and tagging came about, and we found the information about the valuation in our 2017 annual report.”

Mr Darboe added that five GLMA staff members participated in the tagging and valuation exercise, despite the absence of a directive from the Janneh Commission.

“We did not receive any report as far as our files are concerned,” he said. “But I understood that it was categorised into small, large, medium, and they bought paint and used a long stick to categorise the animals because they were so aggressive. For example, if they are identifying a small animal, they put a particular colour on the livestock.”

Regarding the criteria used, Mr Darboe said the team assessed age, weight, and body mass index in kilograms.

Responding to a question on cattle market value, he said, “A 200 kilo will be more than D100,000. But I cannot recall how much it cost in 2017 because then I was not in the country.”

The committee also heard that GLMA does not currently employ a veterinarian, and that no formal report was prepared by the agency on the sale.

“We did not have any report on the number,” Mr Darboe said. “Cham stated that the Janneh Commission was with the reports, but GLMA was there only to guide them on how to go about the process. The valuing and tagging were for five days, and GLMA did not provide a report.”

Pressed on whether it was standard practice to participate in activities without compiling documentation, Mr Darboe replied, “For now, we prepare reports on any activity we took part in. I don’t know why, then they did not prepare a report for a five-day activity.”

He also confirmed to the committee that GLMA did not take part in the actual sale of the cattle.

Protesters Jeer NSC Director as GALA Delivers Damning Petition Against GFF at Westfield

By Muhammed Lamin Drammeh

Under the sun at the busy Westfield, where a large number of protesters gathered, a restless crowd of football faithful erupted in a torrent of boos as Mahmoud Lamin Jawla, Acting Executive Director of the National Sports Council (NSC), arrived at around 2:50 PM to collect a petition from the Gambians Against Looted Assets (GALA). The protesters, their voices raw from hours of chanting at the bustling urban crossroads, had waited over an hour past their 1:30 PM permit’s expiration, and their cries of “Shame on you! Shame on you!” sliced through the din, a raw outpouring of fury over the decay of Gambian football.

The 11-page petition, handed over by GALA’s spokesperson Omar Camara amid the clamour, was a searing indictment of the Gambia Football Federation (GFF). Signed with the weight of a nation’s hopes, it accused the federation of corruption, financial mismanagement, and squandering $11 million from FIFA and CAF between 2014 and 2024, leaving promised football fields in ruins and grassroots dreams unfulfilled. For the players, coaches, and activists clutching placards in the heart of Westfield, this was a fight for the soul of their sport.

Unfinished Fields, Shattered Dreams

The petition lays bare a litany of broken promises. It calls the Jarra Soma project “a stark reminder of neglect and unfulfilled promises since 2015,” bereft of seating, dressing rooms, or pavilions. In Gunjur, a 2018 initiative “remains unfinished and unusable, causing frustration among the youth and football enthusiasts.” Bakau’s mini-stadium has a perimeter fence, but its pavilion is incomplete, and the grass pitch, sustained by diaspora efforts, wilts under an erratic water supply. Banjul’s field, meant to gleam with floodlights and artificial turf, is marred by non-functional lights and a pitch “deemed unplayable” after two replacements since 2022.

The Serrekunda West project, funded by FIFA, is branded “one of the worst projects ever undertaken by the GFF,” with industrial floodlights unfit for football and no pavilion or proper pitch. Similar tales of neglect haunt Manjai, Brikama, Busumbala, and the National Technical Training Centre, where a D44 million renovation, reportedly overseen by GFF’s 1st Vice President, Bakary K. Jammeh, sparks “concerns about a conflict of interest.”

“These fields were meant to grow talent, not gather weeds,” said Fatou Camara, a local football fan among the protesters, her voice thick with emotion as she stood amidst the Westfield throng. “The GFF is robbing our youth of their future.”

Funds Vanished, Stakeholders Sidelined

Beyond infrastructure, the petition accuses the GFF of diverting funds intended for grassroots development, stating that “direct funds from FIFA for club support are often diverted to irrelevant expenditures.” First-division clubs owed 200,000 annually, and second-division clubs owed 150,000, face chronic payment delays. Referees, entitled to 50,000 yearly, “face difficulties in receiving their payments,” while women’s football, allocated 125,000 annually, “remains neglected and demoralised.” A 1.5 million FIFA COVID-19 relief fund in 2020 was “misappropriated, with little benefit realised for the intended recipients.”

The Players Association, Coaches Association, and Schools Football Association languish in neglect, with the petition noting that “the Schools Football Association has not held any competitions since 2021, demotivating both the association and players.” It also questions the GFF’s handling of 300,000 in annual CAF funds for infrastructure, asserting that “funds received from CAF for national team participation in AFCON tournaments have not been reinvested locally.”

“The GFF frequently emphasises its accountability to stakeholders, but we firmly believe that it also has a responsibility to the communities that provide access to funds from FIFA through the utilisation of their parks,” the petition declares, demanding transparency for the Gambian public.

A Cry for Justice at Westfield

As Jawla clutched the petition and retreated through the jeering crowd, the pulse of Westfield protesters seemed to beat in unison with GALA’s call for change. The petition urges the NSC to launch “a thorough investigation into GFF based on the concerns raised,” which it believes “indicate significant mismanagement of funds intended for the benefit of the Gambian populace.” It demands action to “address the embezzlement and mismanagement of funds” and ensure “future investments are utilised effectively for the development of football in The Gambia.”

As dusk settled over Westfield’s chaotic sprawl, the protesters dispersed, their chants fading but their resolve unshaken. GALA’s petition has lit a fire under Gambian football, and with the NSC now in the spotlight, the nation waits to see if justice will kick off a new era for the sport.

GLMA Failure to Secure Jammeh’s 400 Cows Led to Major Economic Loss, NA Committee Finds

By Mama A. Touray

The Gambia Livestock Marketing Agency (GLMA) failed to act on a High Court order to secure former President Yahya Jammeh’s cattle, resulting in the loss of 400 cows and significant economic damage.

The revelation came during a hearing before the National Assembly’s Special Committee investigating the disposal of Jammeh’s assets identified by the Janneh Commission. Committee Chair Abdoulie Ceesay accused GLMA’s leadership of negligence, stating their inaction directly caused the loss.

“Your failure to implement the High Court order led to an economic loss of 400 cows owned by former President Jammeh,” Ceesay told GLMA Director General Momodou L. Darboe.

The hearing was delayed after Darboe initially failed to appear before the committee, citing an oversight in reviewing official correspondence. When pressed, Darboe acknowledged GLMA’s awareness of the 2017 court order but defended the agency’s inaction, claiming the Ministry of Agriculture did not provide clear instructions.

“On June 2, 2018, we received a letter from the Ministry of Agriculture, signed by Ebrima Sankareh, instructing us to take custody of the livestock,” Darboe testified. “We responded through Ebrima Cham, expressing willingness but requested the modalities for implementation because the court order was not attached.”

GLMA Director General Momodou L. Darboe.

Darboe, who assumed office in 2022, insisted he had never seen the original court order. “The order was clear—if they had seen it, they would have acted. But without it, implementation was impossible,” he said.

Committee members challenged Darboe’s explanation, presenting evidence that a soldier had slaughtered the 400 cows in Kanilai—a loss they argued could have been prevented had GLMA secured the livestock.

Lead counsel confronted Darboe: “The slaughter of these cows is a direct consequence of GLMA’s failure to comply with the court order.”

Darboe initially denied responsibility but later conceded. “I was not aware of the consequences,” he said. “But yes, the consequences could have been avoided.”

The committee’s investigation highlights broader concerns over accountability in the management of seized assets linked to Jammeh’s regime. Lawmakers emphasized that GLMA’s inaction—whether due to bureaucratic delays or miscommunication—cost the state valuable resources.

“You were aware of the court order, yet you did nothing,” said committee member Omar Jammeh. “This is unacceptable.”

Editor’s Column #006
Lieutenant General CDS Mamat O. Cham

Written by: Seringe S.T. Touray
Editor-in-Chief, The Fatu Network

If there’s one man in The Gambia quietly but firmly reshaping how we see the military, it’s Lieutenant General Mamat Omar Cham. Since taking the helm as Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in October 2023, Cham has not only led the Gambia Armed Forces (GAF) with calm authority, he has also taken deliberate steps to distance the institution from its haunted past. And yes, I’m talking about the legacy of Jammeh, who once turned the army into a tool of fear and political repression.

Under Jammeh, the military was used to intimidate political opponents, suppress protests, and enforce loyalty to the regime, often with brutal consequences. The public viewed the armed forces with suspicion and fear. Uniformed men didn’t inspire pride, they raised red flags.

CDS Cham inherited that burden. But instead of being weighed down by it, he’s been working steadily to lift it.

A Career Soldier with a Mission

Mamat O. Cham isn’t a name that emerged out of nowhere. He climbed the ranks with discipline and distinction, serving previously as Deputy Chief of Defence Staff before President Barrow appointed him to the top job. Today, he commands an estimated 6,000 service members across the army, navy, and air force, overseeing national security at a time when the idea of stability is more fragile than we’d like to admit.

His mandate is clear: professionalise the armed forces, rebuild public confidence, and safeguard the nation’s territorial integrity. But perhaps more than that, he’s also trying to redefine what it means to wear the Gambian uniform.

He doesn’t do this with big slogans or flashy campaigns. He does it by showing up, speaking directly to troops in Parkaliba or Basse, and insisting on values like discipline, respect, and readiness.

And when he speaks, it’s not empty rhetoric.

“We are a professional army. We are not part of politics. We are not part of any party. We are here for the nation,” he reminded officers during a recent field visit. It’s a simple message, but in today’s Gambia, it’s one that matters a lot.

Taking a Hard Line on Crime

One of Cham’s most public positions has been his firm stance against armed violence and robberies, a concern that’s been growing in urban centres. And he’s not mincing his words.

“To armed robbers, I say this, if you are armed and attacking people, you are attacking the state,” he said. “And when you attack the state, the state has every right to defend itself. Our soldiers will not hesitate to neutralise you.”

To some, it may sound harsh. But to others, especially victims of crime, it’s a necessary tone. Too many Gambians have lost their sense of safety. What Cham is offering is clarity, and a return to order.

“We will not allow criminals to think they can do what they want. This country has laws. And we, the military, will support the police to enforce those laws. We are not here to fold our arms while people live in fear,” he added.

It’s that kind of directness that has earned him quiet respect across the security sector, even among civilians who might otherwise be sceptical of the military’s role in public safety.

A Human Face Behind the Rank

What’s most surprising about Cham isn’t his sharp uniform or commanding voice, it’s how approachable and humble he is. He approaches every check‑in as a conversation, not an inspection, and he treats troops like people, not cogs. Officers describe him as calm, respectful, and genuinely interested in their wellbeing. He doesn’t lead from a pedestal, he leads from the ground up. Small gestures like remembering someone’s name or asking about their family don’t show up in press releases, but they stick. They humanise the institution, and that humility is rare in uniforms these days.

Budget Woes and Institutional Failures

It’d be easy to blame Cham if things aren’t perfect, but sometimes the real problem isn’t the man in charge, it’s the system above him. We’ve seen serious budget shortfalls across government, affecting institutions far beyond the military. Take the Ministry of Health, for example. Just recently, one of its offices in Kanifing South was reportedly locked out by the landlord over nearly D750,000 in unpaid rent, despite the ministry saying half-year rent had been paid on time. If the health sector can’t pay rent, what chance does the military have to modernise training, upkeep equipment, or maintain infrastructure?

Then there’s the Independence Stadium in Bakau. After millions of dollars spent on upgrades, CAF still refuses full approval. They warned Gambia as far back as 2019 that our main stadium didn’t meet standards, citing an unsafe pitch, lack of fixed seating, no scoreboard, and poor medical facilities. In 2022, we were banned from hosting national matches. We only recently got a temporary green light for two fixtures in April 2025, and CAF still demands more work before full clearance. So yes, money was spent, but leadership failed us, again.

These are not minor hiccups, they’re red flags that ripple across institutions, the military included. Cham might be the CDS, but he can’t push funds that don’t exist, he can’t accelerate government processes that are broken, and he certainly can’t compensate for corruption draining the system. Where there is rampant corruption at the top, the consequences are heavy, and civilians feel the toll.

The ECOMIG Question

But for all the progress, there’s still an elephant in the room, and its name is ECOMIG.

Let’s be honest. The continued presence of ECOWAS troops in The Gambia, nearly a decade after Jammeh’s departure, raises questions that the government doesn’t seem eager to answer. At what point does a peacekeeping mission start to look like a vote of no confidence in our own military?

On paper, ECOMIG is here to maintain peace and stability. But on the ground, it sometimes feels like their presence overshadows our own forces. It sends a quiet but heavy message, that we are not yet ready to stand on our own.

And that’s a problem.

Can a sovereign country really claim to be stable if it doesn’t even trust its own army to secure its borders?

CDS Cham has never publicly criticised ECOMIG. That’s not his lane. But through his actions, rebuilding neglected outposts, inspecting regional deployments, and reinforcing command structures, he is quietly laying the groundwork for independence.

He’s saying, without saying it, we are capable.

Standing Apart from the Rot

One more thing that deserves attention is Cham’s reputation for integrity. In a government where corruption headlines have become far too common, Cham stands apart.

There are no reports of him enriching himself, no whispers of dirty contracts, no photo-ops with shady dealers. He simply does his job. And in this country, that alone feels like a breath of fresh air.

His clean distance from the scandals of the Barrow administration is not just admirable, it’s essential. The armed forces must be seen as above the political fray. Cham knows this. He acts accordingly.

A New Kind of Leader

Lieutenant General Mamat O. Cham may not seek the limelight, but his leadership is exactly what this country needs right now. He doesn’t talk too much, but when he does, it’s with purpose. He doesn’t demand respect, he earns it. And in doing so, he’s quietly restoring faith in one of the most critical institutions in our democracy. For that, he deserves our attention, and our gratitude.

From a Simple Dream to Reality: How Chef Ya Mai Carves Out a Niche in the Hospitality Sector

Written by: Dawda Baldeh

In a world where many showcase their culinary creations to attract customers, one young Gambian woman is quietly making her mark. Chef Ya Mai Sey, founder of Jarra’s Restaurant and Catering Services, is carving out a niche for herself in The Gambia’s hospitality sector. What began as a modest idea has now blossomed into a thriving business, celebrating its tenth anniversary this year.

Ya Mai launched her business on July 28, 2015, at the age of 19, after earning a certificate from the Gambia Tourism and Hospitality Institute (GTHI). Following a brief stint working in hotels and restaurants, she took the leap to start her own venture in a small space in the capital, Banjul. “The start was challenging and felt impossible,” she reflected. “The area was extremely small. It was just a kitchen with no chairs or space for guests.”

Despite the cramped conditions, she remained committed to her vision. In 2017, she returned to GTHI to pursue a diploma and, by the end of that same year, expanded her space to include a dining area to accommodate her growing number of clients. “Eventually, I secured contracts with several government agencies and departments to provide them with food,” she shared with The Fatu Network.

Today, Ya Mai aspires to take her catering services to other parts of the country. “I aim to expand to other areas of the country. Our services are well-regarded, and we emphasize quality. We are among the top caterers in the nation,” she asserted confidently. Her journey is a powerful example of perseverance and resilience, inspiring others to chase their dreams regardless of the odds.

In 2019, Ya Mai and her team participated in the West Africa Chefs Competition, where she earned the title of Best Pastry Chef of the Year—a major milestone in her professional journey. Despite this recognition, she revealed that her age remains a barrier to securing larger contracts. “Sometimes people are willing to offer me substantial contracts, but when I inform them that I’m under 30, they seem to hesitate, doubting my ability to manage such contracts,” she explained. “This has posed a challenge for me, but I am determined to overcome it.”

Financial limitations have also been an obstacle. When large contracts come in, she sometimes has to outsource items she cannot afford to purchase outright. Nonetheless, her determination remains strong. She is currently preparing to compete in a chef competition later this year in Ghana, adding another milestone to her growing list of accomplishments.

With a staff of fifteen and ambitions to grow further, Chef Ya Mai’s story stands as a beacon of hope and motivation. Her success underscores the importance of belief, hard work, and community support in empowering young women to make meaningful contributions in their fields.

Farmers in NBR and CRR Embrace Organic Farming to Reclaim Soil and Safeguard Health

Written by: Alieu Jallow

Smallholder farmers in the North Bank and Central River Regions of The Gambia are calling for a nationwide shift from artificial fertilisers to natural compost, citing negative impacts on soil health and crop yield. The call was made during a three-day capacity-building training organised by ActionAid International The Gambia (AAITG) under the SAPOF Project, which aims to promote agroecology and climate resilience among small-scale farmers.

The training, which focused on compost manufacturing, attracted dozens of rural farmers, including persons with disabilities, who are eager to adopt more sustainable farming practices in the face of climate-related challenges and declining soil fertility. Farmers expressed concern that the continued use of synthetic fertilisers has led to poor harvests and deteriorating soil conditions, threatening food security and rural livelihoods.

Ndella Dampha, a gardener from Conteh Kunda Niggie and a beneficiary of the training, shared her personal experience with The Fatu Network.

“NPK fertilisers push the crops to grow fast, but the yield is disappointing. After some time, the leaves turn yellow, fruits shrink, and sometimes rot in the soil. But with compost, my crops are greener, healthier, and pest-free. This year, I harvested 20 bags of onions compared to just 10 in previous years,” she explained.

Sheriff Secka, a person living with a disability and also a participant, echoed similar concerns. He noted that overreliance on artificial fertilisers had exhausted the soil in their village garden, which has not produced a bumper harvest in years.

“We’ve cultivated that garden for long, but artificial fertilisers have done more harm than good. Now that we have acquired compost-making skills, we ask the government to support us with materials, especially a tricycle to transport our compost. Despite our disabilities, we still farm to survive,” he said.

Tata Suko from Niamina Misera in the Central River Region also conducted a comparative experiment using both artificial and organic fertilisers.

“The results are clear. The compost-fed crops are healthier and yield more. The government should support us by building compost pits in our women’s garden so rain doesn’t wash away our hard work,” she appealed.

This growing shift in perspective among rural farmers underscores the importance of integrating traditional, sustainable farming practices into national agricultural policies. According to ActionAid, the training forms part of a broader agenda to build the resilience of smallholder farmers amid climate threats, unsustainable land use, and food insecurity.

As climate change continues to pressure agricultural communities, these farmers are advocating for a return to nature—proving that agroecology is not only possible but essential for sustainability, food security, and health.

Organic Composting Takes Root Across Rural Gambia in Bid to Cut Chemical Use

By Alieu Jallow

A community-led campaign to phase out chemical fertilisers is gaining momentum in rural Gambia, with hundreds of women farmers now producing their own organic compost to grow healthier crops and protect the environment.

The initiative, led by ActionAid International The Gambia and funded by the European Union, is helping households in Central River and North Bank regions adopt sustainable farming practices through locally-led composting techniques. It has reached more than 720 participants so far, many of whom have become trainers themselves.

In Sare Birom, Balangarr, Misera, and Medina Sering Mass, women are turning waste into organic fertiliser—driven by practical training sessions that blend traditional farming knowledge with modern environmental science. For many, the impact has been life-changing.

“Before this training, I used to think waste had no value. Now, it feeds my crops, and I even earn money selling compost to neighbours,” said Fatou Sowe, a lead compost trainer in Nyagen.

In Misera, where chemical fertilisers have now been phased out, farmers report improved produce quality and more sustainable soil health. “After receiving training in Pakalinding and Wassu… our produce is now healthier and of much better quality,” said Penda Jallow, who leads a team of 31 women compost producers.

The results are measurable. One gardener in Kerr Ardo, Yasine Sowe, reported tripling her onion yield after switching to organic fertiliser.

“Before, I used to harvest only two bags of onions from 11 beds… This year, I harvested six bags from the same space,” she said.

Elsewhere, communities such as Toroba, Illiasa, and Njufen report similar successes, with over 5,800 kilograms of compost documented across 15 villages in a recent monitoring visit.

Inclusion has been a key focus of the programme. People with disabilities, though unable to take part in compost production directly, are involved in marketing and advocacy roles.

“We’re capable of raising awareness, marketing, and selling it. Others can handle the production while we focus on getting it to market,” said Ebrima Bah, a participant from Soma.

The monitoring team behind the project has recommended further support, including tools, protective gear, and expanded training for youth and persons with disabilities. There are also calls for better market links for organic products and policy reforms to restrict harmful chemical fertilisers.

What began as a pilot effort is now being seen as a model for climate-friendly farming in The Gambia. And with community trainers leading the charge, villagers say they are no longer dependent on expensive chemical inputs—and are building a healthier future from the ground up.

Yusupha Darboe: Iron Defender Rising Above Slim Odds to Chase European Dreams

By: Muhammed Lamin Drammeh

In The Gambia, where talent overflows on Nawettan pitches but professional dreams often fade due to limited opportunities, Yusupha Darboe, a Kandonku-born defender from Sukuta, dares to defy the odds. With the intelligence to pursue any career, he chose the grueling path of football, battling personal loss and fierce rivals to earn national call-ups. With his eyes set on Europe’s grandest stages, his journey embodies Gambian hope.

Born in Kandonku, Foni, Yusupha’s childhood was a blend of discipline and passion: mornings in school, afternoons at the Daara studying the Qur’an, and evenings chasing a ball with friends. “I’m from a village,” he recalls. “In my early life, I’d go to school early in the morning, and when I closed from school, I’d go to Daara to learn the Qur’an. Then in the evening, I’d play with my mates.”

Moving to Sukuta as a young boy sparked his football journey. “Almost every player in the country started at the Nawettan,” he says of his days with Nema Youths FC in Sukuta’s fierce zonal competitions.
“My experience in the zonals gave me the desire and passion to pursue football as my career.” In Sukuta, where “the park is full to capacity” and fans demand “maximum effort every game” or hurl “motherly insults,” Yusupha forged a “beast mentality.” He laughs, “You have to give max every game to win their hearts.”

Gambia’s football scene brims with talent, but professional pathways are scarce, with limited scouts, weak leagues, and little global exposure. Many players fund their own journeys, and sponsorships are rare. Yusupha’s decision to pursue football over other careers, despite his academic credentials, was a bold gamble. At Waa Banjul FC, he emerged as a top defender, inspired by Sergio Ramos. “My phone is full of his videos, which I keep watching to learn from,” he says. His 2022 record transfer to Fortune FC was hard-won. “I called the president to plead with him to join Fortune,” he recalls. “In less than a week, the agreement was made.” Friends joked about the D50,000 transfer fee: “They started texting, ‘Where’s my share?’”

At Fortune, Yusupha shone as a “smart, athletic, reliable” centre-back with “communication, heading, one-v-one defending, comfortable on the ball—a modern-day centre-back.” He cherishes a 2-1 win over rivals Brikama United. “That was one of my most memorable moments,” he says. His three national call-ups—two Under-23, one Under-20—sparked pride. “Being selected to represent your country among hundreds is an achievement in itself.”

His mother’s illness tested him. “Mentally, it was hard,” he says of 5 a.m. training trips after bedside visits. After her passing, he grew stronger. “There was never a moment I felt like giving up.”

Now at Colley Stars on loan, Yusupha sees it as a marketing opportunity to attract scouts—a rare chance in Gambia’s limited system. “At Fortune, I’m a ball-playing defender; at Colley Stars, every game is 50/50,” he says. Unfazed by doubters, he declares, “I don’t have anything to prove in Gambian football.” His dream? “To play in major European leagues,” he says, “and to don the national jersey—an honour beyond measure.” Inspired by Sadio Mané, he aims to uplift Kandonku and Sukuta, where he returns for Eids. “I feel their struggles,” he says, crediting mentor Alagie Nyabally.

To Gambia’s youth, Yusupha advises: “Ignore the naysayers, and know the reason WHY you are doing it.” His mantra—Believe, Work, and Pray—drives him. “Go hard and be ready for anything,” he’d tell his younger self. In a nation where talent outpaces opportunity, Yusupha Darboe’s journey from Kandonku’s fields to Sukuta’s roaring pitches ignites hope for Gambia’s dreamers.

“We Don’t Want GLMA to Be an Obstacle” – Committee Chair Warns After DG Fails to Appear

Written by: Mama A. Touray

The Director General of the Gambia Livestock Marketing Agency (GLMA), Momodou Darboe, failed to appear before the National Assembly’s Special Select Committee on the sale and disposal of assets identified by the Janneh Commission, missing a scheduled statement-taking session.

During the committee proceedings, Chairperson Hon. Abdoulie Ceesay expressed disappointment at the absence, warning: “You should understand that this committee is very serious about what we are doing, and we don’t want the Gambia Livestock Marketing Agency to be an obstacle to the committee’s work.”

In a written apology submitted to the committee, DG Darboe explained that his absence was due to a misunderstanding of the official communication. “This was due to the first letter received from the team with a new date, and I thought it was shifted to 21st July 2025 instead of 17th July 2025, without looking at the content of the letter,” he stated.

He further admitted that he only realised the discrepancy after being contacted by a committee member. “I understand the inconvenience and disappointment this may have caused you and the team. I am committed to ensuring that such errors do not occur in the future,” Darboe added.

Chairperson Ceesay, however, rejected the excuse, pointing out that the committee’s letters clearly indicated different dates. “The dates you were supposed to appear were clearly stated. We expect you to respect the decisions of this committee whenever we send a letter regarding your appearance. We want your cooperation,” he said.

He went on to emphasise the importance of the investigation and the expectation of compliance from all witnesses. “What we are doing is for The Gambia, and you are also working for The Gambia. No one is working for themselves in this task. We are disappointed because we expected you to come and give your testimony, and you failed to do so, which was unacceptable.”

Ceesay added that other witnesses had complied with the process, given their statements, testified, and left without issue. “We expect the same from you,” he told Darboe.

“We want your cooperation, and remember, there are provisions in the law. If you fail to appear for statement-taking again, that is a matter for the committee to decide. As head of an institution operating in this country, no one should have to tell you what your responsibilities are,” he concluded.

DG Darboe was excused from the session and instructed to meet with the investigative team to provide his statement and return tomorrow to testify.

IGP Commends Officers for Crime Reduction Across The Gambia

By: The Fatu Network News Desk

The Inspector General of Police, Seedy Muktar Touray, has commended officers of the Gambia Police Force for what he described as a significant reduction in crime across the country during the past week.

In a statement shared with the media by Police PRO ASP Modou Musa Sisawo, the IGP applauded the collective commitment and professionalism of officers, crediting their efforts for the decline in reported criminal activity in various regions.

“The IGP commends your collective commitment, professionalism, and unwavering dedication which have contributed to a notable reduction in crime across the country during the week under review,” the statement read.

“Statistical reports indicate a significant decline in criminal activities in various regions—a reflection of your hard work and vigilance.”

While acknowledging the progress made, the IGP urged officers to maintain the momentum. “In light of this achievement, the Inspector General encourages all officers to sustain the momentum and redouble efforts to further minimize crime to the barest minimum.”

He concluded with a message of appreciation and unity: “Together, we take pride in this accomplishment. The Inspector General joins all officers in celebrating this milestone and extends heartfelt thanks to each of you for your invaluable service in making The Gambia a safer and better place for all.”

While the statement did not include detailed regional statistics, it described the decline as part of a broader trend of improved public safety across the country.

Only Fully Registered Members Eligible for 2025 GPU Journalism Awards, Union Says

Written by: Dawda Baldeh

The Gambia Press Union (GPU) Awards Committee has unveiled plans for the 2025 National Journalism Awards, announcing that eligibility will be limited to registered members who have fully paid their dues. Non-members and members with outstanding payments will be excluded from consideration.

Speaking at a press conference held on Monday at a local hotel in Kololi, GPU President Isatou Keita said the decision is intended to strengthen the union by promoting active membership. “This year, we will only accept award submissions from individuals who are registered and fully paid members of the GPU,” she declared.

Now in its tenth year, the GPU National Journalism Awards is considered one of the most prestigious events in the country’s media landscape. It brings together journalists, government officials, civil society organisations, activists, and other stakeholders to celebrate excellence in journalism. To mark the 10-year milestone, this year’s edition will consider stories published between January 2024 and July 2025.

Therest Gomez, Vice Chairperson of the Awards Committee, emphasised that the awards are not just about recognition but about inspiring journalistic excellence across the country. “Don’t be in despair and don’t lose hope,” she told reporters, underscoring the committee’s commitment to a merit-based selection process. She added that promotional articles, newsletters, and similar submissions will not be accepted, and noted that qualified judges have been identified to lead the evaluation process.

The awards cover fifteen core categories, with two additional special awards, bringing the total to seventeen. These include Business and Finance, Sports, Environment, Investigative, Health and Medical, Women’s, Children’s, Tourism, Culture, Arts and Entertainment, Agriculture, Politics, Human Rights, Legal Affairs, Photojournalism, Security, and Tax Reporting.

Ms Gomez encouraged eligible journalists to submit their work once the official call for submissions is made. Meanwhile, the union has urged all journalists who are not registered or who have pending dues to regularise their status before submissions open to ensure their eligibility.

The Awards Committee also addressed concerns raised by journalists during the press conference, including issues related to the inclusion of camera operators, the application process, eligibility requirements, and story submissions.

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