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Opinion: It’s Time We Talk About Our Traditions

By: Seringe ST Touray

The Introduction

The second most feared title in today’s Gambian society is the title of “Njeke.” The Njeke acts as the maid of honor, culturally, serving as a wedding bride’s companion or confidant. She supports the bride emotionally and practically, assisting with wedding preparations and rituals, and representing her in key interactions. The most feared title is “Yai,” meaning ‘mother,’ or ‘mother of the night.’ The bearer of this title guides the bride through the cultural traditions, provides advice on marital responsibilities, and ensures emotional and ceremonial support throughout the wedding process.

On the surface, these roles and responsibilities seem justifiable. Look closer, and you’ll find the unspoken practices of how culture is monetized to bankroll a perfectly prevalent and discriminatory caste system unfolding before our eyes. The social hierarchy comprises the Freeborn (Géer) ruling class, Artisans (Ñeeño), who are traditionally skilled workers (such as Griots, Blacksmiths, and Leatherworkers), servile groups (Jaams), who serve the Freeborn often as laborers or in domestic roles, and, in some cases, religious leaders who hold a respected and separate status.

To add to an already problematic system, the infusion of money has dragged culture to new depths, where many are compelled socially and emotionally to empty their savings to give to a distant relative they’ve never heard of, only to sleep in the dark because they can’t afford electricity. Class-based pride, flamboyance, and an essentially ‘showing off’ attitude have taken our society by storm, with almost every participant silently complaining about the absurd system behind closed doors, yet putting on pretend smiles as they answer the call of their true gods – namely, the cultures and traditions they despise but won’t denounce publicly. To many, the misfortune of being named a Njeke or a Yai seems like a call to a higher cultural power, but one which brings devastating financial consequences.

The Vicious Cycle

The culture of monetary contributions in some of our local traditional weddings creates a cycle of obligation rather than choice, where giving money is an unwritten yet socially enforceable contract. When extended family sends money for a wedding, they expect the same or more when their own children marry. Over time, and historically, inflation and economic downturns make monetary contributions harder to reciprocate, turning this tradition into a burden. This mirrors how banks traditionally lend money with the expectation of interest, knowing the repayment value will potentially exceed the loan. Both systems benefit from changing monetary value favouring the lender while disadvantaging the borrower. This is not to say that all participants are unwilling. In many cases, families will, while expressively dreading every moment among their own trusted inner circle within the extended family, harness their last savings to pour into the tension-filled culture over their own family obligations, from children’s school fees, utility bills, medical bills, and general comfort.

The pressure to contribute financially to wedding ceremonies, especially for those holding the titles of Njeke or Yai, can be devastating. The expectation of financial generosity often forces them to dip into savings meant for other life necessities, creating a cycle of stress and emotional strain as they try to meet these cultural obligations.

The Collector

The bookkeeper, or better known as “The Collector,” manages contributions from guests. They record financial gifts given by attendees, typically announced publicly, sometimes with a loud speaker during the ceremony, along with the names of those who gave money. The official opinion is that this practice is rooted in the culture of transparency, accountability, and acknowledgement. Unofficially – it segregates those that have, and those that have less in a spectacularly classist display. These announcements create intense competition, resulting in pressure. Gifts and contributions to the extended family are largely seen as mandatory regardless of one’s financial situation, forcing people to participate in a culture where their own significance is determined by their financial worth. To some, this is seen as counterproductive to celebrating love, but rather to appease culture. In fact, some families reject their daughter’s choice of partner if her partner’s financial situation doesn’t accommodate such lavish cultural displays – unapologetically choosing waste over affection.

The role of the Njeke or Yai in this environment is especially precarious, as they are expected to maintain appearances and uphold tradition, often at the cost of their own financial well-being. The pressure to contribute financial gifts places them in a difficult position, especially when their own financial resources are limited.

The Extravagance

Disclaimer: this part may be considered sensitive, as it’s grounded in a religious context. In exploring the culture of lavish spending on wedding ceremonies in an economy that cries itself to sleep, I reflected on what motivates people in The Gambia – culture, or religion. The clever ones will say that since religion is a way of life, our culture is a byproduct of our religion. The problem is – this could not be further from the truth. According to a 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom by the United States Department of State, about 96% of our population are Muslims, mainly Sunni, with about 3% Christians, mainly Roman Catholics. Both religious scriptures condemn the attitude of lavish spending and senseless extravagance as a whole.

The Quran, for example, unequivocally teaches that extravagance for the sake of status or self-indulgence is harmful. Surah Al-Isra (17:26-27) (Sahih International) teaches, “And give the relative his right, and also the poor and the traveler, and do not spend wastefully. Indeed, the wasteful are brothers of the devils, and ever has Satan been to his Lord ungrateful.” The verse, linking wasteful spending to negative traits, is similar to Christian teachings against the pursuit of earthly wealth and status. However, without much knowledge or background on Christianity, regrettably, I leave that to a more informed audience to contextualize better. Here’s the point overall – a society that prides itself on religious doctrines has now largely allowed itself, much like with politics, to be governed by materialism.

The financial pressures linked to traditional roles like Njeke and Yai contribute to this materialistic mindset, as these titles are often associated with extravagant expectations that require substantial monetary contributions. The prioritization of material wealth in these cultural and religious contexts has put immense financial strain on those expected to fulfill these roles.

The Conclusion

This prioritization of materialistic culture over faith-based morality or morality as a whole is reminiscent of how many people engage in acts of social contribution, but only for the praise and recognition. It’s reasonable to believe that the titles ‘Njeke’ and ‘Yai,’ originally intended as harmless practices for support, transparency, accountability, and acknowledgment, have over time become increasingly defined by status and materialism, much like many of our most significant institutions.

In fact, over the course of writing this opinion piece, I spoke to many people who directly or indirectly participated in the culture of flamboyance, specifically pertaining to marriage, and all agreed that the material focus on our cultures is an insidious threat. Yet, when you tell them it’s morally wrong to prioritize materialism, what do they say? ‘Everyone else does it…’ or ‘kum nehut bokut’ – a Wollof phrase meaning ‘those who oppose the system do so because they’re not part of it,’ a condemnatory statement that conveniently overlooks the moral aspect. And my personal favourite: ‘You can’t do everything right.’ Unfortunately, I have to give this one to them – much as it pains me to admit it!

The ironic karma in all of this, though, is that no matter how much effort you put in appeasing certain culture, you can never truly satisfy it. Instead, such culture will judge you for even trying, focus on your lows instead of your highs, and whisper about your misfortunes, if any. A more reliable path to happiness is pragmatism, and for the religious, both pragmatism and faith. The most unproductive path to happiness is worrying about what everyone else will think, or say.

Safeguarding the National Interest: Transparency at a Crossroads for FAR Ltd. and PetroNor—Governance and Accountability in The Gambia’s Oil and Gas Sector

By: Ousman F. M’Bai
Financial Crime, Regulation & International Asset Recovery Lawyer/UK
Founder: ProffMaXX (Gambia) Ltd (Ground Water Drilling, Exploration & Production)

After the Raid: FAR Ltd.’s Sudden Exit from The Gambia

FAR Limited
Chairman’s Review: Annual Report: 31 December 2023.

The Gambia Blocks A2 and A5

‘The Company has successfully negotiated with The Gambia Government for an extension to the permit term of Blocks A2 and A5 for an additional 12 months, a substantial reduction in the permit statutory costs, and no obligation for expenditure on the licence for a 12 month period commencing on 1 April 2023.

The Company undertook a remarketing of Blocks A2 and A5, with the substantially lower fixed permit statutory cost structure. The marketing efforts were unsuccessful, and after year end, the Company has surrendered Blocks A2 and A5 and closed its office in The Gambia’.

This passage confirms that FAR Ltd. made a sudden, unannounced exit from The Gambia, relinquishing its rights to licence blocks A2 and A5. Their abrupt departure, like a vessel leaving port under cover of night, left The Gambia facing more than just financial loss—it was a blow that reverberated across the nation.

When FAR Ltd., a relatively obscure company with no significant hydrocarbon experience, first acquired 100% of The Gambia’s A2 and A5 licence blocks, few raised concerns. The nation, like many others, was captivated by the prospect of an oil and gas discovery similar to the SNE Sangomar field. FAR Ltd.’s tenuous association with that field was enough to roll out the red carpet. However, the goodwill of The Gambia’s government was not reciprocated. As time would reveal, FAR Ltd. merely used The Gambia as a bargaining tool for its own financial advantage, ultimately sacrificing the country’s economic interest by declaring that the A2 and A5 blocks were not extensions of the SNE Sangomar oil and gas field. With this simple yet devastating assertion, The Gambia was denied its rightful stake in a shared reservoir within the A2 block of the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin, which straddles the maritime boundaries of both countries, as indicated by 3D seismic data.

Like any shrewd operator, FAR Ltd. shielded itself from potential legal repercussions by securing a release agreement from The Gambia’s government. This agreement allowed FAR Ltd. to scuttle away without facing penalties, fees, or any liability for the licence blocks it had surrendered. It is difficult to comprehend how such an agreement could have been made, considering the national interest at stake. The arrangement reflects a troubling exploitation of The Gambia, potentially facilitated by enablers who ensured FAR Ltd.’s preferential treatment. This situation underscores FAR Ltd.’s troubling impact on The Gambia. The exploitative traits embodied by figures like Tippu Tip continue to resonate in modern Africa, just as they did one hundred and fifty years ago.

Background: FAR Ltd. and The Gambia

FAR Ltd. arrived in The Gambia in 2016, at a time when the country was experiencing political instability. It was granted licences for the A2 and A5 blocks, believed to be hydrocarbon-bearing, with the A2 mapped on 3D seismic data as a contiguous extension of the SNE Sangomar field. At the time, FAR Ltd. held a 13% stake in the Sangomar field, alongside joint venture partners Woodside Energy and Petrosen.

Despite these associations, FAR Ltd. lacked both the capital and operational capacity required to advance exploration efforts independently. Consequently, it brought in Petronas under a joint arrangement to fund the exploration work.

Despite lacking experience as an operator, FAR Ltd. proceeded to drill its first well, Samo, in the A5 block in 2018, claiming to have found only oil shows. In 2021, it claimed to have drilled a second well, Bambo, in the A2 block, again asserting that oil was not found in the primary well, though it did identify oil that was deemed commercially non-viable in the secondary sidetrack. These ambiguous results and FAR Ltd.’s inexperience raised serious concerns about the credibility of its findings.

In the lead-up to the Bambo drilling, FAR Ltd. was embroiled in negotiations with Woodside Energy over a default notice issued due to FAR Ltd.’s non-payment of its capital call on its SNE Sangomar stake. The notice put FAR Ltd. at risk of losing its entire stake without compensation. Against this backdrop of uncertainty, FAR Ltd. sold its stake in the SNE Sangomar field to Woodside Energy for $126 million in 2020, with full payment received in July 2021. This sum was in addition to a guaranteed future payment of $55 million, payable by 2027. However, despite being aware of the 3D seismic data indicating that the SNE Sangomar reservoirs extended into The Gambia’s A2 block, it appears that neither Woodside Energy, Petronas, nor Petrosen conducted any due diligence to validate FAR Ltd.’s drilling results in The Gambia. Perhaps the timing was strategic: by concluding the deal before FAR Ltd.’s drilling activities in The Gambia, Woodside Energy may have aimed to absolve itself of any due diligence responsibility.

A year after the deal, Petronas quietly divested its stake in The Gambia, selling it back to FAR Ltd. before exiting the country. FAR Ltd. reacquired a full interest in the blocks and secured a 12-month permit extension from The Gambia’s government, with terms that were remarkably beneficial, including reduced statutory costs and no expenditure obligations for the period starting in April 2023.

In what resembles an attempt to accelerate financial gains, FAR Ltd. appears unwilling to wait until the maturity date of the $55m payment in 2027. Instead, the company has engaged Gneiss Energy Limited, a UK-based corporate finance advisory firm specialising in the energy sector, to help market and sell the contingent $55m payment owed by Woodside Energy. This raises the question: what’s the rush?

Specifics of the Local Legal Environment in The Gambia and How It Has Played a Role in Oil and Gas Sector

The local legal environment in The Gambia is small and concentrated within a 25 – kilometre radius. The legal profession operates as a fused system, meaning there is no distinction between the roles of barristers (advocates) and solicitors (transactional lawyers). While many law firms are referred to as ‘chambers,’ most are sole practices focused primarily on general local law matters. In instances where a practice has more than two members, with the exception of a few, the additional members are often family, either parental or otherwise. These firms generally lack the necessary legal research facilities and IT infrastructure to meet the demands of international clients, particularly in complex oil and gas transactions.

There are only a few ‘firms’ that seem to have made significant breakthroughs in this sector, and these are generally practices with some connection to foreign firms.

Overall, the local legal environment lacks the specialised technical expertise required to handle complex transactions, particularly in oil and gas. As a result, there is a heavy reliance on foreign advisory firms, mainly based in the UK, for technical assistance.

However, even when foreign expertise is brought in, its effectiveness is often undermined by entrenched practices within the local legal system. These practices include conflicts of interest and a failure to differentiate between confidentiality, legal privilege, and regulatory disclosure requirements. At the heart of this issue is the imbalance created by well remunerated law firms, pitted against a timid, unimaginative, and underpaid civil service, too willing to sacrifice national interests without due consideration.

These issues have caused significant harm to the success of foreign direct investment in The Gambia, and in many cases, have stunted the country’s development objectives.

The Key Players: Amie Bensouda & Co LLP

One of the leading legal practices in The Gambia is Amie Bensouda & Co LLP, founded in 1995 by Ms. Amie Bensouda as a sole practice. Around 2007, her son, Aziz Bensouda, joined the firm, later becoming a partner. To this day, it remains a small family-run practice supported by a network of professionals across government, banking, accounting, insurance and media sector giving it unparalleled local reach.

While Ms. Bensouda’s legal skills have been central to her practice’s success, her extensive network within The Gambia’s public institutions has also played a significant role. Entering the legal field in the early 1980s, she held key positions within the Ministry of Justice, including heading the Civil and Company Law Division, which brought her into close contact with influential figures across government. She later served as Solicitor-General and briefly held the position of Attorney General in 1994, during the transition period following the military coup led by Yahya Jammeh.

Evidence presented at The Gambia’s Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) revealed that Ms. Bensouda drafted the decree that legitimised Jammeh’s seizure of power. She justified her actions as a damage control effort to prevent further destabilisation by what she described as a dangerously erratic Jammeh.

Her appointment as Lead Counsel to the Janneh Commission—a body established to investigate President Jammeh’s illicitly acquired wealth —was noted by many ethical observers with interest. During her tenure, questions arose regarding the process for disposing of Jammeh’s seized assets. A professional disagreement emerged with the Secretary to the Commission, a respected financial expert, who reportedly raised concerns over the asset disposal approach in a memo. The then Attorney General, Mr Ba Tambedou, subsequently removed the Secretary from his position. According to public reports, assets valued at up to $1 billion were disposed of by the Commission at significantly reduced amounts, a process that drew criticism from various quarters for perceived issues with transparency and fairness, impacting the national treasury. While the role of Lead Counsel did not confer authority over asset disposal, which remained the Commission’s responsibility, these developments underscore the importance of clear, accountable processes in such high-stakes matters.

Ms. Bensouda’s brother, Habid Drammeh, also held several influential positions, including Minister of the Interior in 2017, Secretary General of The Gambia Civil Service between February and September 2018, Director General of The Gambia Tourism Authority in the early 2000s, and Director General of the Gambia Transport Service Commission.

When FAR Ltd. arrived in The Gambia, Ms. Bensouda was already retained as local counsel for several parastatals and the country’s largest local authority. In a close-knit society like The Gambia, where social structures are informal, her deep connections and prominent status provided her with significant access to the corridors of power, aligning her with the classic definition of a domestic PEP. It is therefore unsurprising that FAR Ltd. retained her son, Aziz Bensouda, as local counsel. Aziz’s practice benefits from extensive familial and established professional networks, which may make it challenging to assess his independent legal expertise.

Profile of the Pseudo Uncle and Nephew – The Two Cousins

Fafa Sanyang, currently The Gambia’s Ambassador to the UAE, served as Minister of Energy and Petroleum from 10 April 2017 until 4 May 2022, when he was replaced by Abdou Jobe. The current officeholder is Nani Juwara. Sanyang (not worthy of the title Mr.) is reportedly a cousin of Jerreh Barrow (unrelated to President Adama Barrow), the Director General of The Gambia Petroleum Commission. Both Sanyang and Barrow benefitted from government-sponsored opportunities to advance their studies in specialised fields in preparation for their public service roles. However, their tenures have been marked by colossal incompetence, resulting in disastrous consequences for The Gambia’s energy and petroleum sectors.

Sanyang holds a bachelor’s degree in geology from the University of Sierra Leone (1989), a master’s degree in marine management from Dalhousie University, Canada (1997), and another master’s degree in engineering geology from the University of Leeds. He also claims to be a fellow of the Geological Society of London, though the relevance of this credential remains questionable. According to his Wikipedia page, Sanyang oversaw a $165 million deal between the National Water and Electricity Company (NAWEC) and Sinohydro Corporation in April 2017. However, details of this deal are conspicuously absent from public records.

Sanyang ensured that his cousin, Jerreh Barrow, received prestigious scholarships, and his career progression within the departments Sanyang headed was virtually guaranteed as he steadily climbed the ranks. Jerreh Barrow claims to hold a master’s degree in applied geophysics from Chiang Mai University (2008) and a bachelor’s degree in geology from the University of Ghana, Legon (2004). He has held various positions within The Gambia’s Geology Department, including Deputy Director, before being appointed Commissioner of Petroleum in 2015, a position he continues to hold. While his role in 2015 carried less authority, the situation changed dramatically under his cousin’s leadership at the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. Sanyang’s tenure as Minister set in motion a series of actions culminating in the enactment of the Petroleum Commission Act of 2021. This legislation created a near-fiefdom, centralising significant power in the hands of the Commissioner and granting him unrestrained authority over all matters related to petroleum, oil, and gas exploration, development, and production.

Under this new framework, the Commissioner has emerged as a central figure and power broker, reducing the ministry and other related departments to mere rubber- stamping functions. Although Jerreh Barrow was not directly appointed to succeed his uncle as Minister, the institutional structure was manipulated to ensure that he retained significant influence. In essence, the Commissioner’s office holds the central authority, allowing Barrow and his uncle to shape the narrative surrounding the country’s oil and gas prospects. This consolidation of power has set The Gambia on a path to failure, as placing such authority in incompetent hands inevitably jeopardises the national interest.

From Partial Stake to Full Control: FAR Ltd.’s Acquisition of Blocks A2 and A5

At the time of FAR Ltd.’s arrival in The Gambia, the country’s oil and gas prospects were largely shaped by the actions and omissions of key individuals in positions of authority. Among these influential actors were the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice at the time Ba Tambedou, as well as the Petroleum Negotiation Committee, which became involved later. From the outset, nepotism was a notable structural flaw. The emergence of a troubling family connection—a domestic PEP mother and son and a pseudo uncle- nephew (or cousins)—further complicated matters. Central to these concerns was FAR Ltd.’s acquisition of The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks, licences previously held by Erin Energy.

FAR Ltd.’s arrival coincided with Erin Energy’s liquidity crisis, which led to Erin selling 80% of its licence to FAR Ltd. for $13 million. Of this, $5 million was paid in cash, with the remainder structured as costs to be incurred by FAR Ltd. A key issue arose regarding the remaining 20% interest held by Erin Energy. Some internal discussions among stakeholders reportedly touched upon concerns that a perceived defect in the Model Licence Agreement might limit the government’s ability to acquire the remaining interest. Subsequent negotiations, involving various government offices, ultimately led to FAR Ltd. acquiring this 20% share for $4 million—a sum viewed by some as significantly below the interest’s potential value. Observers have since questioned whether the legal advice surrounding this transaction received sufficient scrutiny and whether alternative interpretations were considered by relevant governmental offices, including the Attorney-General and Ministry of Justice.

In 2017, the Africa Legal Support Facility (ALSF) engaged Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner (BCLP), Johnny West of Open Oil as a consultant, and local counsel—including Aziz Bensouda—to review the legal and fiscal frameworks governing petroleum projects. The objective was to renegotiate petroleum licences with international oil companies, but this arrangement raised serious concerns about a potential conflict of interest, given Bensouda’s dual role as counsel for FAR (Gambia Ltd), whose parent company FAR Ltd. had a history of seeking to amend contracts in its favour.

From the moment FAR Ltd. was granted the licences for A2 and A5 blocks, its poor financial standing and lack of expertise in exploration quickly became apparent. This raises serious concerns about the rigour with which The Gambia’s Petroleum Commission, as the regulator, vetted FAR Ltd. against internationally established investment criteria for oil and gas licence acquisition. While FAR Ltd.’s marketing pitch may have invoked optimism about its potential to deliver for The Gambia, this did not justify the reckless disregard for caution that followed.

The Petroleum Commission, under its powers set out in the 2021 Act, plays a pivotal role before any licence is granted. It is required to liaise with the Petroleum Negotiating Committee and the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, presenting all relevant facts about any application. The Negotiating Committee, chaired by none other than the Commissioner of Petroleum, Jerreh Barrow, is composed of representatives from key institutions, including the Ministry of Finance, Gambia Revenue Authority, GIEPA, PURA and The Gambia Maritime Authority. Any concerns regarding licences or the general operation of oil and gas exploration must be reported to the Ministry of Petroleum, with legal advice sought first from the Commission’s in-house counsel and, if necessary, from the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice.

Additionally, the Commission is tasked with overseeing all exploration rights, including scheduling regular supervision and review meetings to assess licensees’ fulfilment of obligations. Such reviews must be thoroughly documented, with detailed agendas and accurate records of discussions and decisions.

Drilling Operations and Data Transparency: FAR Ltd.’s Denial of Verification Access

An effective and well-managed Petroleum Commission would maintain a vigilant interest in FAR Ltd.’s drilling activities, particularly following the unsuccessful Samo well. However, FAR Ltd. operated with little meaningful independent oversight or supervision. During the drilling of the Bambo well, although a small number of officials from the Ministry of Petroleum were allowed on the drill ship, they were denied access to crucial verification points, including data generated during drilling. The licensing regime granted FAR Ltd. ownership and custody rights over all drilling logs and data, which significantly undermined The Gambia’s ability to verify the accuracy of the drilling information in real-time. FAR Ltd.’s brazen refusal to allow verification of its drilling data has jeopardised the national interest.

The drilling reports submitted by FAR Ltd. were alarmingly inadequate and lacked detail, being accessible only to Jerreh Barrow and the Minister of Energy and Petroleum, Abdou Jobe. These reports contained no well logs, pressure data, seismic information or crucially well coordinates (i.e. the precise location of the wells drilled). Moreover, FAR Ltd. promptly plugged the wells after drilling, making any further independent examination impossible. To make matters worse, FAR Ltd. unilaterally designated the Bambo well and its side-track as a ‘tight hole,’ refusing to make any public disclosures about it. This raises serious concerns about FAR Ltd.’s operational competence and integrity. Following the surrender of its licence, the rights to the data reverted to The Gambia; however, none of the limited data left behind has met integrity parameter tests, further casting doubt on its reliability. FAR Ltd.’s claim that the SNE Sangomar field does not extend into The Gambia’s A2 block must be investigated and should be legally challenged by any future Gambian government if Woodside Energy and Petrosen fail to establish the truth sooner.

Examining Conflicts of Interest: An In-Depth Analysis

Upholding ethical and legal standards in the oil and gas sector is critical, particularly given the enormous financial stakes involved. Conflicts of interest, in all their forms, incentivise corruption and place national interests at significant risk. They can potentially arise from unrestrained hiring of the children of domestic PEPs, when legal practitioners represent both private corporations and public bodies, or when family members hold key government positions, potentially overseeing one another. Such situations raise serious concerns about compromised loyalty, improper influence, and personal gain.

A relevant example of the risks associated with conflicts of interest in the oil and gas industry is the Halliburton scandal in Nigeria. Halliburton and its subsidiary KBR were found to have bribed Nigerian officials to secure multi-billion-dollar contracts for constructing liquefied natural gas facilities. The improper relationships between corporations and government officials in this case resulted in significant financial harm and compromised Nigeria’s national interests. Halliburton was eventually fined $1.5 billion, underscoring the severe legal consequences of international scrutiny when conflicts of interest and corruption are uncovered.

FAR Ltd., Local Counsel and The Petroleum Commission: What’s at Stake?

FAR Ltd.’s business strategy in the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin aimed to maximise returns with minimal investment. To achieve this, the company deployed key personnel from its Senior management team to both Senegal and The Gambia. While Cath Norman ingratiated herself within the corridors of power in Senegal, Rolf Stork operated in The Gambia as a facilitator, coordinating interactions between the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and the Petroleum Commission, all the while being strategically guided by local counsel on local law matters. Both individuals demonstrated remarkable agility and stealth. Cath Norman succeeded in forging a close relationship with the then President of Senegal, Macky Sall, while Rolf Stork played a facilitative role in The Gambia, liaising with the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and the Petroleum Commission.

Although Stork did not have direct access to former President Yahya Jammeh or current President Adama Barrow, he developed working relationships with notable figures such as Jerreh Barrow, Fafa Sanyang, and the Bensoudas. These interactions proved advantageous for FAR Ltd. In Senegal, Cath Norman secured a $126 million cash payment for FAR Ltd. from Woodside Energy, while in The Gambia, Rolf Stork negotiated a licence extension before FAR Ltd.’s eventual exit from the country without incurring penalties or liabilities.

The nature of these relationships, particularly involving Jerreh Barrow, Fafa Sanyang, and Aziz Bensouda, raises concerns about whether the national interest was adequately protected during these negotiations. However, there is no suggestion that any of these individuals engaged in unlawful conduct.

Local counsel’s role included registering FAR Ltd.’s subsidiary, FAR (Gambia) Ltd., and negotiating 100% licensing rights in the A2 and A5 blocks. Counsel also facilitated the farm-out of the licence in a joint venture arrangement with Petronas. While these actions appear procedurally correct, questions arise regarding the transparency of financial transactions, particularly as none of the payments were routed through Gambian financial institutions. The absence of such transactions from the public record raises issues of transparency, though there is no evidence of illegal activity.

The Petroleum Commission and the Ministry of Energy held regular meetings with FAR Gambia Ltd., during which the company had legal representation. However, government representation was notably absent, prompting concerns about whether FAR Ltd.’s performance was properly assessed, particularly in light of its failed drilling operations.

After FAR Ltd.’s second failed well, Bambo, the company dismantled most of its operations in The Gambia, leaving Rolf Stork as its primary representative. This sudden operational shift, coupled with the introduction of a new team unfamiliar with previous activities, warrants closer examination whether it was done to conceal information.

Implications for Governance and Accountability – How FAR Ltd Misled The Gambia – Removal of Well Commitments & Penalties

Despite FAR Ltd.’s underperformance in the A2 and A5 blocks, the company requested a two-year licence extension from 1 October 2022, seeking relief from its contractual obligation to drill one well per year. A penalty clause requiring FAR Ltd. to pay $22 million in case of default was included. FAR Ltd. argued for the extension and a waiver of the penalty, claiming that it had drilled two wells—the Bambo well and its side-track—and promised to submit a technical geoscience review.

Though FAR Ltd. did not deliver the geoscience review, hopeless Jerreh Barrow recommended granting the extension and waiving the $22 million penalty. This recommendation was supported by the Petroleum Negotiation Committee and approved by the Minister of Petroleum. While there is no evidence to suggest improper conduct, the lack of independent verification of the side-track well and the failure to obtain critical data raises concerns about the thoroughness of the decision-making process.

Following the extension, FAR Ltd. took a 12-month pause before initiating negotiations to surrender its licence, citing difficulties in securing a joint venture partner. The company requested a waiver of the $4 million statutory cost and proposed no further technical work during the period. Once again, Jerreh Barrow presented FAR Ltd.’s case, asserting that the company had spent over $100 million in The Gambia. However, FAR Ltd. had previously indicated in investor presentations that its joint venture partner, Petronas, funded much of its operational costs. This discrepancy should have warranted further scrutiny, although there is no suggestion that Jerreh Barrow acted improperly.

The drowsy Petroleum Negotiation Committee failed to demand detailed financial records before endorsing the recommendation, and Petroleum Minister Jobe, asleep at the wheel, granted FAR Ltd. a release from its obligations. The lack of public disclosure surrounding these negotiations raises concerns about transparency. However, there is no conclusive evidence of unlawful conduct by any of the parties involved.

The Gambia, a small nation in severe economic distress, makes it difficult to justify how any citizen could agree to waive such substantial costs for FAR Ltd. given that the company received $126 million in payments, with the potential for millions more in the future. By sacrificing the national interest, the state has been deprived of significant financial benefits, especially considering its exclusion from the shared Senegal/Gambia sub-basin reservoirs a direct result of FAR Ltd.’s incompetent drilling programme.

To fully grasp the scale of the financial loss, one must consider the situation in reverse: had The Gambia terminated FAR Ltd.’s licence, the company would have sued for billions, citing the potential value of the undiscovered oil in these blocks. FAR Ltd. would never have waived such a claim without compensation. The actions and decisions of those involved in these negotiations represent a profound betrayal of the trust of the Gambian people.

The PetroNor A4 Licence Block Saga – A Repeat of Past Mistakes?

The handling of the A4 block appears to echo some of the same concerns raised in the FAR Ltd. case, as much of the earlier mentioned assistance provided by the ALSF is being nullified due to a repeat of the same incompetence and reckless disregard for safeguarding the national interest in the A4 block. Following the poorly negotiated settlement in the arbitration case between The Gambia and African Petroleum (now PetroNor), overseen by Fafa Sanyang, Lamin Camara, and Ba Tambedou, the implications for The Gambia could not be worse.

In this settlement, PetroNor was granted 100% of the rights to the highly valuable A4 block, with a significantly reduced signature bonus of $4 million and a 30-year lease over the block in the event of a discovery. To put this in perspective, BP paid a $10 million signature bonus for the A1 block alone. Moreover, PetroNor was exempted from paying the signature bonus for the first 12 months, and this waiver has been extended multiple times as PetroNor has consistently failed to make the payment and has done next to nothing with the block.

The result of this settlement, combined with the Petroleum Commission’s lack of enforcement rigor, has left the nation shackled, much like Tippu Tip did to our forebears. Consequently, The Gambia is being deprived of the opportunity to advance its oil and gas exploration potential, as credible and genuinely interested companies are being kept out of the market. The A4 block, located adjacent to BP’s former A1 block, which has yielded excellent seismic data, remains a highly competitive prospect. The degree of incompetence and negligence displayed by Gambians in safeguarding the national interest is truly heart-breaking.

Conclusion: Safeguarding the National Interest

The recurring theme of opacity in the handling of oil and gas transactions presents challenges to governance and accountability in The Gambia. FAR Ltd.’s operations, and the subsequent management of its exit, have raised valid concerns about whether national interests were adequately protected. While no allegations of illegal activity have been substantiated, the processes involved in these transactions highlight the need for improved oversight and transparency.
As noted in a recent Financial Times article, How Culpable Are External Lawyers in Corporate Wrongdoing?, Professor Elise Maizel argued that law firms can play a pivotal role in corporate governance. Although corporations in many jurisdictions are being held to higher standards of accountability, law firms often maintain plausible detachment regarding their clients’ conduct. A similar argument can be made regarding the need for greater responsibility in The Gambia’s energy sector.
Moving forward, it is critical that independent oversight bodies, strict codes of conduct, and full public disclosure be implemented to safeguard The Gambia’s natural resources. Without transparency, the nation risks further losses. It is vital that all parties involved in these negotiations act in the best interests of The Gambia, ensuring that its valuable resources are managed responsibly for the benefit of its people. Cry, beloved Gambia—how much longer must you suffer at the hands of your own people?

Editor’s Note

On 30 October 2024, the Fatu Network sent a detailed list of questions related to issues raised in this article to the following individuals: Fafa Sanyang, Jerreh Barrow, Lamin Camara, Abdoulie Jobe, Kanni Touray, Nani Juwara, Rolf Stork, Ba Tambedou, Dawda Jallow, Ms Amie Bensouda, and Aziz Bensouda. None provided comprehensive answers to the specific questions. Jerreh Barrow submitted a written critique and offered a sit-down interview, while Aziz Bensouda provided a written response jointly with his mother, Ms. Bensouda. Their response is in part summarised as follows:

The statements provided by Ms Bensouda and her firm clarify that she has never represented or advised the Government of The Gambia in matters related to FAR Ltd. or the A2 and A5 licenses. Ms Bensouda’s firm’s involvement has been solely as counsel for FAR Ltd. Her firm’s work is limited to Gambian local matters and does not extend to financial or technical advice. Moreover, they are not familiar with any ‘Master License Agreement’ nor its purported ‘defectiveness.’ For inquiries on waivers, extensions, or commercial decisions, reference should be made to the Petroleum Commission or FAR Ltd. The Government of The Gambian government had engaged international legal and financial experts, ensuring that all actions align with global industry standards, with records accessible from the Ministry of Petroleum and Petroleum Commission.

The Shadow Over West Africa Oil & Gas: A Deep Dive into FAR Ltd, Woodside Energy, Petronas, and Petrosen’s Accountability in The Gambia

By: Ousman F. M’Bai

Financial Crime, Regulation & International Asset Recovery Lawyer/UK;
Founder: ProffMaXX (Gambia) Ltd (Ground Water Drilling, Exploration & Production)

FAR Ltd: Jeopardising The Gambia’s Oil & Gas Prospects

FAR Ltd.’s handling of The Gambia’s oil and gas prospects in the Senegal/Gambia shared sub-basin has raised serious concerns about its operational competence and judgement that may have negatively impacted the nation’s resource future. Yet, the response from The Gambia’s government and other entities involved has been astonishingly muted. It begs the question: why has there been no investigation into how this debacle was allowed to unfold?

Despite FAR Ltd.’s troubling conduct, it continues to hold its 100% licence stake in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks, with seemingly no repercussions. The Gambia’s government, along with the governments of Senegal, Woodside Energy, and Petronas, have all remained conspicuously silent. The inertia surrounding the matter signals more than mere oversight; it points seemingly to a potential systemic lack of scrutiny and accountability.

The Gambia’s Missed Opportunity and Senegal’s Tainted Windfall

The Gambia’s government, having effectively surrendered the country’s economic sovereignty to Senegal, maintains the position that there are no oil and gas resources in The Gambia. Remarkably, the Petroleum Minister recently issued a communiqué downplaying the nation’s oil and gas potential, reinforcing the false narrative that no significant resources exist within the country. This conclusion—potentially influenced by FAR Ltd.’s poor performance and Senegal’s control over the country’s unsophisticated elites overlooks a crucial fact: the issue is not whether oil is directly found in The Gambia, but rather The Gambia’s undeniable right to a fair share of the resources from the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin, which straddles the maritime boundaries of both countries.

Meanwhile, Senegal and its state-owned oil corporation Petrosen, together with Woodside Energy, celebrate what they claim is a monumental discovery. They proudly assert that this will contribute to Senegal’s sustainable development and provide lucrative returns for investors, notably Woodside Energy. However, they appear to omit critical discussion of how they stand to gain significantly from FAR Ltd.’s controversial claim that the SNE Sangomar oil and gas field does not extend into The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks. The ethical implication of this omission raises significant concerns and questions about transparency in the management of shared resources. At the core of this issue is the exclusion of The Gambia from its rightful share of the sub-basin’s resources. There can be no valid explanation for this mistreatment and exploitation of The Gambia, especially given that Senegal has resource-sharing agreements with both Mauritania to the north of the MSGBC basin and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

3D Seismic Data and FAR Ltd.’s Dubious Findings

Woodside Energy, Petrosen, and Petronas, through its Gambian subsidiary PC(Gambia) Ltd, all possessed clear 3D seismic data indicating that The Gambia’s A2 block is a contiguous extension of the prolific SNE Sangomar field. Yet rather than critically evaluating FAR Ltd.’s findings, these entities accepted without question the conclusions from FAR Ltd.’s failed drilling programme— raising concerns about the adequacy of due diligence.

From the outset, FAR Ltd lacked both the capital and technical expertise necessary for successful exploration. When it entered The Gambia in 2016, the country’s institutions were in disarray. FAR Ltd secured 100% stakes in the A2 and A5 blocks through a deal that has not been fully disclosed, raising concerns about transparency and potential exploitation of weak governance. A strategy often associated with problematic investment practices is to identify a gateway to the heart of government decision- making, then appoint the son, daughter or relative of that individual to represent the so- called investor’s interest.

Facing an inability to meet its obligations, FAR Ltd brought in Petronas as a joint venture partner through its subsidiary PC(Gambia) Ltd. However, Petronas’s presence in The Gambia has been equally shrouded in mystery. It has made no public disclosures, offered no transparency, and failed to release any transactional accounts or information regarding its operations in the country. FAR Ltd.’s assertions are the only source of information on this partnership.

FAR Ltd.’s Inadequate Drilling Programmes

FAR Ltd.’s amateurish approach to drilling was evident in the failure of its first well, Samo, in the A5 block, based on less accurate 2D seismic data or none. Unsurprisingly, FAR’s Chief Geologist admitted they had “drilled low.” Nonetheless, the company reported encountering two structures but failed to disclose any details regarding their relationship to the SNE Sangomar reservoirs. For its second well, Bambo, FAR Ltd concealed significant issues, including a major accident during drilling. Both the primary and secondary wells missed their targets, leading FAR Ltd to wrongly conclude that the Bambo and Soloo prospects were commercially non-viable. This conclusion ignored

clear evidence from 3D seismic data showing that the SNE Sangomar field extends into The Gambia’s A2 block. And FAR Ltd.’s own findings that both prospects have easy access to the prolific source kitchen that feeds oil into the SNE Sangomar field.

FAR Ltd.’s Financial Collapse and The Senegal Deal

Adding to the intrigue, in June 2020, FAR Ltd defaulted on a capital call for its joint venture stake in the SNE Sangomar field. In response, it was forced to sell its 13% stake to Woodside Energy for $126 million in July 2021. This transaction, structured to guarantee FAR Ltd future payments up to $55 million, raises serious questions. It appears that Woodside Energy and Petrosen conducted no meaningful due diligence before finalising this deal, preferring instead to validate FAR Ltd.’s dubious findings and dismiss The Gambia’s rightful claim to a stake in the SNE Sangomar field located inside the Senegal/Gambia sub basin.

Despite repeated requests for clarification from Woodside Energy, Petrosen, and Petronas on their role in this saga, no substantive responses have been provided. Woodside Energy’s reply, in particular, ignored the crux of the matter, deflecting to its pre-emption of FAR’s sale in the Rufisque, Sangomar, and Sangomar Deep (RSSD) joint venture. It made no mention of the default notice served on FAR Ltd, nor did it acknowledge the implications of FAR Ltd.’s actions in The Gambia. The strategic silence on these matters is telling.

FAR Ltd.’s poor financial standing left it ill-prepared to meet its obligations regarding development, production, and royalty payments under its licence, had it confirmed that the SNE Sangomar field extended into The Gambia’s A2 block. Such a finding would have compelled Woodside Energy and Petrosen to acknowledge The Gambia’s shared stake. FAR Ltd.’s ineptitude has effectively made The Gambia the sacrificial lamb.

The Case of Petronas and Lack of Transparency

In August 2022, barely a year after Woodside’s acquisition of FAR Ltd.’s stake, Petronas surrendered its interest in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks back to FAR Ltd for an undisclosed amount. This move raises disturbing questions about the nature of the transaction, the nature of the relationship between Petronas and FAR Ltd and the potential denial of The Gambia its rightful share of the sub-basin’s resources. Petronas has yet to respond to inquiries on whether its actions comply with local and international regulations.

In an era where corporate transparency and accountability are paramount, the actions of Woodside Energy, Petronas, Petrosen, and FAR Ltd stand as an affront to ethical standards. The ongoing denial of The Gambia’s rights to its resources condemns millions of Gambians to perpetual poverty while benefiting a select few. This level of corporate governance raises serious ethical concerns that must be met with international outrage.

Environmental Risks Posed by the FPSO Vessel Near The Gambia’s Territorial Waters

Amidst all of this, The Gambia’s entire maritime coast and ecosystem is exposed to a significant risk of serious pollution from oil spills and leaks due to the presence of the FPSO Leopold Sedar Senghor in close proximity to its territorial waters. An FPSO (Floating, Production, Storage, and Offloading) vessel is a modified oil tanker, redesigned for use at sea as a facility for oil and gas production, processing, storage, and offloading. These vessels are directly connected to production wells deep below the seabed by numerous interlinked pipes, often spanning hundreds of kilometres. The multipurpose function of the vessel, combined with the extensive network of pipes, increases the risk of accidents through leaks and spillage. However, there is no evidence of any coordinated collaboration between The Gambia’s government, the government of Senegal, and Woodside Energy to implement proactive emergency safeguarding measures in the event of an accident.

Paralleling Precedent: The Mozambique Tuna Bonds Case

In the recent landmark corruption case in the High Court Commercial Division in London, the Mozambique “Tuna Bonds” case, Justice Robin Knowles described the scale of the scandal as “nothing short of a tragedy.” He criticised the defendants for focusing solely on their own financial gain, rather than on assisting Mozambique in making the most of its resources.

The parallel with The Gambia is clear. Just as Mozambique was exploited, The Gambia’s vulnerabilities as a small, weak state are being exploited by external entities and internal enablers. The international community must not allow this injustice to persist.

Conclusion: FAR Ltd, Woodside Energy, and The Gambia’s Future

The Gambia’s rightful share of the oil and gas resources in the Senegal/Gambia sub- basin has been sacrificed due to FAR Ltd.’s incompetence and the complacency, if not the lack of action from companies like Woodside Energy, Petrosen, and Petronas. FAR Ltd.’s reacquisition of 100% of The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks has put the nation in a perilous position, effectively holding the country hostage with a gun to its head.

Gambians must not remain silent in the face of this corporate exploitation. The ethical and legal failings of those involved must be addressed, and those who have sought to profit from The Gambia’s resources at its expense must be held accountable.

Woodside Energy, now holding 82% of the RSSD, has the power to right this wrong. However, their willingness to engage meaningfully with the reality of The Gambia’s situation will serve as a true measure of their commitment to justice, transparency, and the right to development. The world is watching.

Editor’s Note: On 28.08.24 The Fatu Network wrote to Woodside Energy, Petrosen and Petronas seeking clarifications and their response to the issues raised in this expose. To date, Petronas and Petrosen have not responded. Woodside Energy provided the following response attributable to a Woodside Energy spokesperson:

‘In December 2020 Woodside exercised pre-emption rights to acquire FAR Senegal’s participating interest in the Rufisque, Sangomar and Sangomar Deep (RSSD) joint venture. The transaction completed in 2021 and in no way related to any of FAR’s assets in The Gambia. Further details can be found in the announcement released to the Australian Securities Exchange at the time of the transaction.’

The Fatu Network wrote to FAR Ltd on 5.08.24 and they have not responded to date.

Whither The Gambia? – The Saga of a Small Nation and its Missing Oil and Gas Resources

By: Ousman F. M’Bai

Financial Crime, Regulation & International Asset Recovery Lawyer/UK
Founder: ProffMaxx (Gambia) Ltd (Ground Water Drilling Exploration & Production)

The MSGBC

The MSGBC basin has been one of the world’s most prolific regions for oil and gas discoveries, until the recent unprecedented oil discovery in Guyana surpassed it. The basin is estimated to hold about two billion barrels of oil and 25 trillion cubic feet of gas. Located onshore and offshore on the Atlantic coast of West Africa, specifically between Mauritania and Guinea Conakry, MSGBC is an acronym for the countries that comprise the onshore part of this geological province with interconnected maritime boundaries: Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Guinea Conakry.

The basin covers a total land mass of about 340,000 km² and an estimated offshore area of 100,000 km² with water depths between 2000 meters and 4000 meters. This offshore area spans over the AGC (Agence de Gestion et de Coopération entre le Sénégal et la Guinée-Bissau), a joint maritime zone between Senegal and Guinea Bissau.

The basin is not a single continuous span but consists of three major connected subbasins:

  1. Mauritania Offshore Basin: This basin stretches from the north of Mauritania down to the Senegal River in the southern border between Senegal and Mauritania.
  2. Northern or Senegal/Gambia Subbasin: Located between the Senegal River and the River Gambia. The specific area of the subbasin relevant to this article is between the River Gambia and River Saloum.
  3. Southern Senegal/Guinea Bissau Subbasin: Extending south from the river Gambia through the Casamance region into Guinea Bissau.

Geology of the MSGBC Basin

The basin developed in complex stages over millions of years, beginning with the opening of the North Atlantic and the splitting of North America from Eurasia and Africa during the late Permian to Early Triassic period. This process continued into the late Jurassic when the breakup of Africa from South America began, culminating in the opening of the Atlantic, which was completed in the Albian period. Marine deposits began forming in the early Jurassic in Morocco, advancing southward as the sea encroached on the land, reaching the southernmost edge of the basin in the late Jurassic. The rock formation after the split is identified as ranging from the middle Jurassic to the Holocene, consisting of a carbonate-rock unit with varying thicknesses between 2,300 meters and 3,200 meters in the three subbasins.

During the Albian, carbonate rock deposits continued to form progressively in the middle offshore part of the basin, known as the Northern or Senegal/Gambia basin, creating an elevated gradient. This feature is unique to this subbasin and is absent in the northern part of the Mauritania subbasin and the southern part of the Casamance subbasin, which are mostly characterized by deep-water sediments with shallow areas.

Cenomanian rocks, represented by thick marine shales sandwiched between marine sandstones, were deposited after the opening of the Atlantic. Widespread Turonian or Cretaceous rocks, commonly black shales often positive as hydrocarbon source rocks, range in thickness from 50 to 150 meters.

There is a mild westward sloping Mesozoic and Cenozoic platform, with a paleo shelf-edge trend between 35 to 100 km wide in the northwest, which balloons out to the west. It parallels the 2000-meter bathymetric contour before extending south across the Dome Flore offshore Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry. To the west of the paleo shelf-edge, in water depths greater than 2000 meters, sedimentary thickness exceeds 12,000 meters, and the formation is characterized by a curved fault plane that dips near the surface towards the edge of the Jurassic to lower Cretaceous platform.

Hydrocarbon Source Rocks in the Basin

The total petroleum system of the basin is made up of three parts. The first part, lying on the Palaeozoic platform deep below sea level, is the lower Palaeozoic. Above this is the Mesozoic-Cenozoic platform, which supports the second part of the sub-salt system, consisting of Triassic and Jurassic source rocks. These rocks are potentially hydrocarbon-bearing, but they are so deep below the seabed that they are difficult to reach, and there has not been any exploration for oil or gas in this system. The third part is the Cretaceous-Tertiary system. These source rocks are confirmed to be hydrocarbon-bearing, and it is where most of the oil discoveries have been made. The Cretaceous-Tertiary system is subdivided into three zones: the lower Cretaceous, the upper Cretaceous, and the Tertiary. The lower Cretaceous is dominated by Aptian and Albian source rocks, the upper Cretaceous features Cenomanian and Turonian source rocks, and the Tertiary is characterized by Senonian-Maastrichtian sandstones.

Discoveries in the Mauritania/Senegal Subbasin

In 2015, Kosmos Energy using 3D seismic data made the largest global discovery of gas in the tortue-1 field which straddles the Mauritania and Senegal maritime boundary. Located at 120km offshore in water depth of 2,850m, the prospect has a projected recoverable gas resource of 15 trillion cubic feet. Further appraisal drilling in the area discovered the Guembeul-1 and Ahmeyim-2 wells in 2016 and the whole complex is now renamed The Greater Tortue Ahmeyim-1(GTA-1). In 2018, Senegal and Mauritania signed an inter-governmental co-operation agreement on an equal split of 50/50 of resource and revenue to develop to production this cross-border gas prospect. The project was given a unique status in 2021 as the GTA ‘National project of strategic importance’. The development is led by BP as operator, Petrosen (Societes des Petroles du Senegal (the Senegal State oil corporation)) SMH (Mauritienne des Hydrocarbon) and Kosmos Energy.

The unprecedented scale of this discovery intensified exploration further offshore in the deeper edges of the MSGBC basin with BP leading its joint venture partner Kosmos Energy. Their efforts paid off massively with the discovery of the Yakaar- Teranga gas field at water depth of 8,364 in northern Senegal. With an estimated 25 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas explorable to 2053, it was flagged as the world’s largest discovery in 2017. These discoveries are a lifeline to Senegal and Mauritania and if the revenue to be generated from them are managed efficiently, it will propel their economic growth for years to come.

Discoveries in the Southern Senegal/Guinea Bissau Subbasin

Guinea Bissau has recently experienced potentially transformative drilling explorations in its 11 offshore blocks within the subbasin. Newly acquired 3D seismic data has identified significant amounts of oil in the shallow reservoirs atop the salt-induced Flore Dome and Gea Dome. These structures are in a vast expanse of water in the Atlantic between latitudes 10.7◦N and 12.5◦N, known as the joint maritime zone between Senegal and Guinea Bissau.

The demarcation of these territorial waters followed a protracted disagreement between the two countries, with Senegal, aware of the natural resource potential of the area, insisting on a perpendicular delimitation of their maritime boundary. The dispute was amicably resolved with the establishment of the Agence de Gestion et de Coopération entre le Sénégal et la Guinée-Bissau (AGC). The AGC’s primary objective is to facilitate collaboration between the two countries in sharing resources to develop the oil and gas prospects in the area.

Recent developments in Guinea Bissau have revealed an underhand deal between the former President of Senegal, Mr. Sall, and his Bissau counterpart, Mr. Embalo, which has caused outrage among Bissau-Guineans concerning the prospective revenue split between the two countries at production. More details on this will follow.

Discoveries in Senegal – The Gambia subbasin – FAN-1, SNE & Sangomar Field

The discovery of the SNE-1 Sangomar field has ignited debate about its exact geographic boundary and whether it extends into The Gambia’s maritime area. These debates intensified in June 2024 when Senegal produced its first oil barrel from a well in the field, making it the newest oil-producing nation in Africa. This journey began in 1960, when the Senghor Government prioritised promoting investment in oil and gas exploration. Although Senegal’s first oil well in DiamNadio in 1960 was not commercially viable, it spurred successive governments to introduce policies attracting foreign investment. Significant reforms began under President Abdou Diouf and continued more vigorously under his successor, Abdoulie Wade. Wade succeeded in creating a stable and predictable environment for multinational investors, a policy continued by his successor, Macky Sall.

FAR Ltd, an Australian company focused on African oil and gas exploration, acquired licenses for three contiguous Senegalese blocks (Rufisque, Sangomar, and Sangomar Deep) in 2006. Incorporated in Western Australia in 1984 as First Australia Resources NL, it became FAR Ltd in 2010. These blocks cover 7,500 km² in the productive MSGBC basin, located in the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin.

The blocks contain four prospects. On the paleo shelf-edge trend running between the mouths of the Saloum and Gambia rivers, about 50 km offshore, are SNE-North-1 and SNE-1 (Sangomar Offshore). The SNE-1, renamed Sangomar Field Development Phase 1 (SNE-1 Sangomar) by President Macky Sall, is contiguous with the northern edge of The Gambia’s A2 block. The deeper water prospects are Sangomar Deep FAN-1 and FAN South-1.

In 2013, FAR Ltd made a strategic decision to buy the licenses, previously held by Hunt Ltd, including modern 3D seismic data covering targeted 2,050 km² of the blocks. FAR Ltd enhanced the data, identifying hydrocarbon layers in the FAN-1 and SNE-1 fields and mapping four initial drillable prospects, followed by another seven. However, as a small venture capital company, FAR Ltd lacked the capital and expertise to drill offshore wells, prompting it to seek joint venture partners. FAR Ltd farmed out 85% of its license interest to Cairn Energy (operator, 40%), ConocoPhillips (35%), and Petrosen (10%).

At the time, FAR Ltd.’s Managing Director Cath Norman said:

“We are very pleased to have secured leading independent Cairn Energy as a farm in partner and Operator in our Senegal Project. With this agreement FAR has secured a highly experienced Operator to drill and fund it through the first exploration well to be drilled off the Senegalese coast for some years.

Cairn Energy funded most of the exploration costs and paid FAR Ltd.’s past costs, running into millions of dollars. The first well, FAN-1, was successful, revealing a gross oil-bearing interval of 500 meters with potential recoverable oil resources of 2.5 billion barrels. Cath Norman, FAR Ltd.’s Managing Director, highlighted the drilling risks and uncertainties about source rock capacity:

‘One of the key risks out here is that the presence of source was unknown. We know in this part of West Africa the source rocks turn on and off. And whether they exist out here to have the capacity to be filling the billion-barrel traps that we had mapped was a complete unknown to us. So, seeing a 500-meter oil interval is a great start’.

The SNE-1 Sangomar field, with a footprint of 400 km², was forecast to have a recoverable oil resource of 641 million barrels, the biggest discovery in Senegal’s history. FAR Ltd was awarded the Breakthrough Company of 2016 by the Oil and Gas Council Africa. The field also contained significant gas reserves. Cath Norman, describing the drilling team’s encounter with the field in one of her representations said:

‘Field was in fact larger. It was not until we drilled the 4th well that we stepped out of the gas cap and managed to intercept some of the secondary reservoirs in the oil leg. We are now four times the size of the field when we originally mapped it.’

Ms. Norman described the field’s geology: a carbonate platform with extensive oil reservoirs in stack formation. The deeper S500 series reservoir is in the lower Cretaceous, while the upper S400 series reservoir is in the upper Cretaceous, topped by a gas cap. Connectivity tests confirmed good inter-well connectivity in both reservoirs. Indeed, Ms. Norman touched on this when she said in a presentation:

‘Connectivity is the last piece of the puzzle we need to resolve. Our field is really a field of two primary reservoir families. There is a deep reservoir unit which we call our 500 series. It’s made up of thick and blocky sand. They are lovely and young and clean with great porosity.’

She continued:

‘The upside is that the cream on the cake is proving a lot more of the connectivity of the thin sand that sits above the 500 series. We call that our 400 series and the focus of our next two wells will be which our JV are committed drilling in Nov to flow test some of those upper sands and also running interference tests which involves setting gauges, setting up the wells to be listening wells and then drilling a pulsing well and then looking at how those pulses proliferate across the thin sand. We will get a measure of connectivity of how continuous they are across the field’.

In fact, those connectivity tests were done, and Cairn Energy confirmed in one of its Appraisal Reports in 2018 that there was good correlation of the gross reservoir packages. It reported that connectivity in the S400 upper reservoirs was demonstrated by interference tests in a clearly preferred orientation and that the DST in the S500 lower reservoir confirmed expected good inter-well connectivity.

Ms. Norman has confirmed this because in the concluding part of her presentation she said:

‘Each well we drilled in the appraisal programme confirmed that we have 100meter gross oil column across all of the wells. We have the same high quality 32-degree oil quality across all the field, and we have good correlation between all of our principal reservoir units’.

FAR Ltd.’s success in Senegal was largely due to its joint venture partners, particularly Cairn Energy, ConocoPhillips, Petrosen, and later Woodside Energy. The type of drill rig used also played a significant role. Norman noted the difference in performance between the 5th generation semi-sub vessel and the 7th generation drill ship, which reduced non-productive rig time significantly. This is what she said:

‘When we drilled our first two exploration wells, we had a fifth-generation semi subcontracted for the drilling at $650,000 a day. That is just the rig rate not the total spread. When we drilled four appraisal wells some 18 months later, we contracted a rigg for $330,000 a day. It was a seventh-generation drill ship and performed immensely better than the semi-sub we had on our first drilling mission. We are just in the process of tendering for a rig now for our drilling programme in Nov. Looks likely we will be able to secure the equivalent of a seventh-generation drill ship for under $200,000 a day. Cost of drilling has come down by two-thirds. What is actually more important to us is the efficiency of the drilling. When we drill our first appraisal well, we had 70% non-productivity rig time. Which is abysmal. We had out 10% non-rig time for the four other appraisals well we drilled. And on one of the well, we had 3% non-productivity rig time. So, our JV is moving ahead very quickly now to secure rigs for continuing with appraisal and getting on with development drilling’.

FAR Ltd.’s entire operational focus was in the SNE-1 Sangomar field and the company given its long presence in Senegal from 2006 had developed deep connections and working relations at the highest level within the government, the office of the President of Senegal who at the time was Mr Macky Sall.

Today, there are more than twenty-three successfully drilled wells in the SNE-1 Sangomar field, and the first oil barrel was produced in June 2024. The revenue split is 82% for Woodside Energy and 18% for Petrosen. FAR Ltd.’s previous 15% stake in the field will be discussed later.

Oils and Gas Exploration in The Gambia

The Gambia’s foray into oil and gas exploration can best be described as sporadic. Between 1965, when it gained independence from Britain, and 1994, the country saw limited exploration activities. During the First Republic under Sir Dawda Jawara (1970- 1994) and the early years of the Second Republic under Yaya Jammeh, exploration efforts were scattered and intermittent. Some companies were involved in early exploration in the 1950s, but these were limited in scope and consisted mainly of initial studies. The country’s first oil well was drilled by Chevron in 1979, but it was not successful. This lethargy for oil exploration may have been shaped partly by Britain’s limited economic view of the country. During the colonial period, Britain saw The Gambia as an insignificant peanut-producing territory within its larger colonial empire. Britain showed little interest or enthusiasm for the economic development of the country beyond maintaining the lucrative supply line of raw peanuts to the UK.

Britain was circumspect about The Gambia’s viability as a state given its small size, being a narrow strip of land within Senegal with a tiny coastline on the Atlantic Ocean to the west. When the movement for independence began to gather unstoppable momentum, there were diplomatic discussions within the United Nations about whether merging with Senegal might be a better prospect for the country. However, this plan never advanced beyond discussions, and The Gambia was left to map its own path when Britain departed in 1965. The country had already been affected by British colonialism; before colonization, The Gambia was a much larger territory, with its northern border deep inside Sine Saloum near Kaolack, Senegal. British traders preferred to stay close to the banks of the River Gambia (no more than 30km wide at its broadest). As a result, Britain abandoned much of the territory to the French, who expanded further into The Gambia in 1850, reducing it to its current size.

For much of the 60s and 70s, while Senegal was busy exploring its oil and gas prospects both onshore and offshore, the government of Sir Dawda Jawara in The Gambia remained largely indifferent to the vast natural resources in and around the country. This lack of curiosity and ambition was evident when, in 1975, The Gambia agreed to its northern and southern maritime boundaries with Senegal along parallel equidistance lines running 200 meters east to west from the territorial sea baseline to the outer edge of the continental shelf. By that time, Senegal had a far better understanding of its offshore natural resources and readily agreed to the deal. The Gambia effectively shot itself in the foot, closing the door to an unimaginable National Wealth Fund from oil and gas that could have transformed the country’s socioeconomic development for generations if managed properly. A much wiser agreement would have been a perpendicular line on either side of the maritime boundary with common zones of mutual control with Senegal. All the SNE-1 Sangomar acreage would have been in this zone, rendering much of the discussion in this paper irrelevant. This approach is exactly what Senegal agreed upon with its southern neighbour, Guinea Bissau, maximizing its current oil and gas prospects in the AGC.

The Jammeh Era

Much of the credit for the limited progress The Gambia has made in oil and gas exploration goes to the government of Yahya Jammeh, who, for the first time in the nation’s history, established a Ministry of Petroleum in 2002. His government included policies for oil and gas exploration and development in its National Development Plan. The National Energy and Petroleum Act 2004 was passed into law, although it was largely based on legislation from Ghana.

Oil and gas exploration licences were made available for six separate blocks offshore The Gambia. Erin Energy was one of the first companies to acquire a licence for one of the blocks. However, there was a problematic period when several of the licenses were traded among insiders, with little benefit to the country. A case in point is the licenses in blocks A1 and A4 granted to African Petroleum Ltd, a company then majority-owned by Mr. Frank Timis. Mr. Timis, a Romanian-Australian billionaire, is a controversial figure in the oil and gas scene in West Africa. His activities in the subregion were negatively highlighted in a 2019 independent investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and BBC Africa Eye. Although oil was reportedly discovered offshore in 2003, Mr. Jammeh publicly criticised what he considered to be an insultingly low production sharing percentage offered by the exploration companies at the time. He declared that he would rather leave the oil in the ground than agree to an unfair sharing agreement. Jammeh’s intransigent conduct in this regard betrayed his intelligence. He failed to realise the importance of opening dialogue with Senegal for joint exploration and production in Sangomar, especially at a time when Senegal had made significant progress. Unwittingly, he too failed The Gambia.

Since then, there had been limited activity in oil and gas exploration until after 2016, when Jammeh was forced to leave office following his loss in the general election to Adama Barrow. Jammeh initially refused to hand over power but eventually went into exile.

Enter FAR Ltd – The Gambia

FAR Ltd entered The Gambia during a tumultuous period in the nation’s history, marked by elevated uncertainty and disarray as a new government struggled to assert control after two decades of brutal dictatorship. Government institutions were either not fully functional or non-existent, and there was no effective regulatory environment for oil and gas exploration. FAR Ltd quickly established a subsidiary, FAR (Gambia) Ltd, and acquired the 100% interest held by Erin Energy in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks. These blocks are located south of the SNE-1 Sangomar field offshore Senegal, covering 2,682 km² within the MSGBC basin, specifically the Senegal/Gambia subbasin, about 50 kilometres offshore in water depths ranging from 50 to 1,200 meters. FAR Ltd forecasted a recoverable oil resource of one billion barrels in the blocks on an unrisked best estimate of 100%.

The license deal, giving FAR Ltd 100% working interest in blocks A2 and A5, effectively meant The Gambia owned none of its oil and gas resources upon discovery. All rights to explore, drill, produce, and sell resources from the blocks belonged to FAR Ltd and other licence holders. The Gambia had imprudently hinged its hopes on royalties’ payment at production. This arrangement, despite any savings The Gambia might have made from associated expenses, was to say the least, disadvantageous. Even Senegal had the foresight to retain an 18% interest in its blocks.

The exact terms of FAR Ltd.’s original licence have never been publicly disclosed. What is known is that FAR Ltd often referred to a minimum term of drilling one exploration well a year. Details about performance-related clauses, supervision, frequency of reviews, and dispute resolution mechanisms remain unknown. These elements are crucial in properly drafted commercial agreements but are often watered down or omitted in the African context.

FAR (Gambia) Ltd operated with a small team, including an Australian Asset Manager, reportedly based in The Gambia for some time. FAR Ltd would have had a good idea of working practices in The Gambia. The team was housed in the same building as the Ministry of Petroleum. Cath Norman from FAR Ltd highlighted that this proximity facilitated better and easier cooperation with the government.

Just before FAR (Gambia) Ltd.’s contractual drilling commitments in The Gambia were due, FAR Ltd claimed financial difficulties, as it had done in Senegal. Fortunately, Petronas, a major Southeast Asian oil and gas company, agreed to farm-in, initially taking a 40% interest in the A2 and A5 block licenses, later revised to a 50% split. FAR Ltd was the operator under the licenses, despite lacking prior experience in the MSGBC basin. Petronas had the option to assume the role of operator, though the terms and conditions were never made public.

To facilitate the deal, Petronas established a subsidiary in The Gambia, PC (Gambia) Ltd. Exploration and drilling activities were purportedly channelled through these two Gambian-registered subsidiaries in whose names the licence blocks were held. Board memberships and financial details of these companies have not been publicly disclosed. Notably, the lawyer retained by FAR Ltd for its subsidiary, FAR (Gambia) Ltd, shares chambers with their mother, a domestic PEP who has represented several parastatals and the country’s largest local authority. A former Attorney General, she also has family ties to high-ranking government positions, including a brother who served as Minister of the Interior and head of the Gambia Civil Service.

Samo-1 FAR Ltd.’s first well in The Gambia

The SAMO-1 well is located slightly off-centre within the A5 block on the PSET shelf edge trend. The reservoir sand for SAMO was deposited over 100 million years ago by ancient rivers that likely once occupied the area where the River Gambia currently flows. The SAMO-1 reservoirs were formed adjacent to where these rivers reached the coast. FAR Ltd forecasted a pre-drill estimate of 825 million barrels of recoverable oil on a 2P basis for this prospect.

In preparation for drilling, FAR Ltd claimed to have contracted a Stena DrillMax sixth-generation drillship and Exceed Ltd, a drilling management company based in Aberdeen, Scotland, to operate the drillship and drill the well. However, in a 2018 appraisal, Cairn Energy reported that no 3D seismic data was available for this prospect, suggesting that FAR Ltd relied on less accurate 2D data or none at all for its assessments. In an interview with Gavin Collery, Ms. Norman of FAR Ltd stated that 3D seismic data was available, but her remarks seemed to conflate the SAMO-1 well with the Bambo well, which is known to have undergone 3D mapping.

Lacking the necessary expertise and financial resources, FAR Ltd required Petronas to fund the project. Ms. Norman acknowledged this in a 2017 interview with Mr. Collery, stating, “It’s always best practice and prudent to bring a partner in when you have got a large equity position both to ratify your technical evaluation but also to share the cost.”

Later, in a presentation, Ms. Norman added, “FAR will continue to operate both licenses through the exploration phase, including the drilling of Samo-1, although Petronas will have the right to become the operator in the development phase.”

Despite these assertions, the actual drilling of the SAMO-1 well remains unclear. FAR Ltd was initially expected to handle the drilling, but this is complicated by a statement from FAR Ltd.’s Asset Manager, Mr. Rolf Stork, who remarked, “Petronas carried FAR drilled one well, SAMO-1. We drilled it as an operator. Big undertaking for a small company like FAR.”

Ms. Norman further clarified Petronas’ supervisory role in the joint venture, stating, “Petronas brought in as partners JV. 40% each. Petronas carried us through the drilling of the exploration well.” However, the specifics of Petronas’ involvement beyond funding remain ambiguous, with no public disclosure from Petronas or PC (Gambia) Ltd regarding their activities in The Gambia.

The SAMO-1 well, reportedly drilled to a depth of 3,200 meters into the seabed, did not yield oil. FAR Ltd claimed to have continued collecting extensive logging data to evaluate other prospects. Initially believed to be an extension of the SNE-1 Sangomar field, post-drill evaluations revealed that SAMO-1 was not connected. Mr. Peter Nicholls, FAR Ltd.’s chief geologist and exploration manager, explained, “We came in structurally a bit lower… two structures instead of one big field. There was oil in the system, but it was not able to be trapped.”

FAR Ltd suggested that the oil might have migrated to the Bambo well in the A2 block. Mr. Nicholls noted, “The interesting thing about this Bambo prospect is that if you follow the migration path, where the oil from SAMO-1 is likely to end up is overlying that feature, potentially 300 million barrels or more.”

FAR Ltd.’s objective after the failed SAMO-1 prospect was to trace the oil’s migration path to an accumulation zone. Success depended on the accuracy of structural maps, predictions of sand characteristics in accumulation zones, identified fault lines, formations, shale types, and effective drilling. With modern drilling techniques and geophysical mapping, the role of luck is reduced, yet the question remains: why and how did FAR Ltd fail The Gambia?

The second well – Bambo-1 (side track-1) & Soloo

In 2020, FAR Ltd moved on to its next drilling prospects, the Soloo and Bambo wells. These are located to the north of the A2 block, nearly side by side on an elevated gradient of the PSET shelf trend, part of the SNE-1 Sangomar field extending into the A2 block. The available 3D seismic data predrill confirmed the geological formation as a continuous extension of the SNE-1 Sangomar field into The Gambia. FAR Ltd.’s Exploration Manager and chief geologist Mr. Nicholls noted:

“You could see that Soloo could well be an extension of the SNE. As a matter of fact, it’s very much mapped as an extension of SNE into The Gambia, and that is Woodside and other JV Partners in SNE will see that SNE does extend into The Gambia. So that’s not a contentious issue. It’s the way it’s seen and mapped as extending into our block.”

In a predrill presentation, Ms. Norman commented on the Bambo well:

“You can see clearly that the Sangomar oil fields extend south into The Gambia. In fact, the location of the Bambo-1 well is 500 meters from the border to the south, drilling into the extension of the Sangomar field that we call the Soloo prospect.”

The predrill forecast estimated recoverable oil from the Bambo-1 well at a billion barrels. FAR Ltd planned to drill through three prospects: Soloo upper, Bambo upper, and Soloo deep, categorized as the S390, S400, and S500 series, respectively. The Soloo upper in the S390 series had the highest chance of success at 36%. The predrill seismic data indicated that all three prospects were within the same depth and level as the primary reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar field.

FAR Ltd again acted as the operator, reassembled the same drill team from the failed SAMO-1 prospect, and contracted the same Stena IceMax Drill ship (not the seventh generation vessel used by Cairn Energy in the SNE-1 Sangomar field). FAR Ltd reported that the drill rig was operational offshore Mexico, and this was advantageous as it meant FAR Ltd would not be using a cold stack rig. However, there was no disclosed verifiable evidence that this rig was service worthy and fit for purpose. FAR Ltd.’s headquarters was reportedly in Banjul, The Gambia, but the operational base was in fact in Dakar, Senegal, where supply boats delivered all necessary pipes and goods for the drill vessel.

In November 2021, FAR Ltd finalised well locations and commenced drilling soon after. In December 2021, FAR Ltd reported that the wells, particularly Soloo Deep, did not contain commercially viable quantities of oil or gas.

A subsequent press release stated:

“Bambo-1 was initially drilled to a depth of 3216m MDBRT (Meters drilled below the rotary table), and wireline logging was completed. The Bambo-1 well was then plugged, and the Bambo-1 ST1 (side-track) well drilled to a depth of 3317m MDBRT, after which wireline logging was undertaken.

The drilling and logging data from the main well and the side-track well indicated that several target intervals had oil shows, confirming a prolific oil source in the area. Initial interpretation of cuttings and wireline logging suggested these zones had oil in poor-quality reservoirs and in traps that might have been breached, leaving residual oil. Rocks and fluid samples were recovered from several intervals in the Bambo well, and laboratory analysis in 2022 will provide additional data about the oil potential identified in the Bambo well.

The Soloo prospect objectives in the Bambo-1 well, which represented the potential southern extension of the Sangomar field in A2, indicated some oil shows but no significant oil volumes. However, oil shows in the Bambo prospect reservoir, encountered in both the Bambo-1 and Bambo-1 ST1 wells, highlighted up-dip potential to the south in the A2 Block, mapped as the new Panthera prospect. Other reservoirs in the Bambo drilling campaign show oil potential, opening additional exploration opportunities in both the A2 and A5 Blocks.

The well and side-track have been plugged and abandoned as planned for this type of exploration drilling.”

The press release emphasised that the Soloo and Bambo-1 prospects were not
extensions of the SNE-1 Sangomar field. It did not clearly disclose that drilling had not
gone as planned. The drill rig had an accident at 3216 meters below the seabed, forcing
FAR Ltd to halt operation before reaching the target depth of 3450 meters MDBRT. They
then planned a side-track well, Bambo-1 ST1, which also fell short of the target zone.
FAR Ltd and its JV partner Petronas designated the well a ‘tight hole’ and released
minimal information during drilling.

The cause of the accident was unclear, and FAR Ltd did not provide details. Ms. Norman, FAR Ltd.’s Managing Director, commented:

“FAR is pleased with the experienced drilling team and contractors who quickly adjusted the Bambo-1 drilling program to suit the geological setting and best meet the drilling program’s objectives. FAR is well-placed to achieve these objectives through the side-tracked well and drilling through the undrilled Soloo Deep prospect. We are encouraged by the presence of oil in potential reservoirs and look forward to completing the well in the coming weeks.”

FAR Ltd.’s drilling programme appeared unfocused, attempting to drill through three separate reservoirs in a stacked formation—a technique not tried in the successful SNE-1 Sangomar field. This ambitious approach led to challenges, including a sudden loss of fluid mid-drilling, necessitating diversion through an unplanned side-track well.

Curiously, FAR Ltd made no reference to Petronas having any role in this drilling, unlike the SAMO-1 well. Instead, the company pointed to an unidentified drilling team and contractors. Several plausible reasons for this drilling failure include the inexperience of the crew, inaccuracies in the geophysical survey data, errors in seismic data interpretation, or an ill-equipped drill rig. However, given the geophysical team’s successful track record in the SNE-1 Sangomar field, it is unlikely they were the issue. The limited information available about the drilling crew suggests that FAR Ltd.’s inexperience as an operator was the main problem. The company failed to effectively coordinate the drill crew, drill rig, and geophysical team to overcome the complex drilling challenges.

FAR Ltd.’s finding of no commercially viable oil and gas in the Bambo-1 and Soloo wells contradicts the predrill 3D seismic data showing these wells as connected to the successful SNE-1 Sangomar field reservoirs. Ms. Norman stated predrill:

“The outcome of that process is that we have a net billion barrels of oil potential in our two blocks offshore Gambia. Following the risk audit of FAR’s evaluation of the potentials, we have confirmed a P50 un-risked 1.1 billion barrels of potential in The Gambia. We have always expected our acreage to be highly prospective because it is contiguous with our acreage in Senegal. We have drilled 11 wells offshore Senegal, 8 on the same trend that extends into The Gambia, and 8 into the same reservoirs that will be our primary reservoirs in The Gambia.”
(Emphasis underlined by author)

The 3D seismic data indicated that all the successful wells in Senegal’s SNE-1 Sangomar field were in the same primary reservoirs (S400 and S500 series) as the wells in The Gambia. The Gambian prospects were charged with oil, as proven by Cairn Energy and admitted by FAR Ltd, confirming that all wells in the S400 and S500 reservoir series are connected.

This raises the question: what separates the Soloo and Bambo-1 prospects from the SNE-1 Sangomar field? Is there a risk that FAR Ltd.’s finding—that its SNE-1 Sangomar field does not extend into The Gambia’s A2 block—is based on its failed drilling programme?

The Bambo and Soloo prospects have multiple reservoir targets, with two main reservoirs in the S400 series being hydrocarbon-bearing in the SNE-1 Sangomar wells. FAR Ltd has not identified at least to the public in the Gambia which reservoirs in the Bambo and Soloo prospects do not contain commercially viable oil or which targets may have been missed due to drilling failure.

A troubling coincidence is that the prolific SNE-1 Sangomar S400 and S500 series reservoirs suddenly do not contain commercially viable oil at the boundary line where the field extends into The Gambia. FAR Ltd claimed that the reservoir for the Bambo-1 well was poor and unable to trap oil due to seal breaches, the same reason given for the failed SAMO-1 well.

The geophysical features of the PSET shelf edge in the SNE-1 Sangomar field and the A2 and A5 blocks are nearly identical, formed over the same period and close in time and space. The reservoirs in the A2 and A5 blocks are good, but the seals, made of black/grey shales, are reportedly underdeveloped according to Far Ltd. If true, this suggests that the oil in The Gambian prospects has migrated into an unidentified accumulation zone.

FAR Ltd does not dispute this, but it raises the question: does FAR Ltd have a duty to consider and determine the phenomenon of oil migration from The Gambia?

The Source Kitchen & the phenomenon of oil migration in the MSGBC – Senegal/Gambia subbasin

The hydrocarbon source ‘kitchen’ that feeds all the reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar field lies deep below the seafloor of the basin, migrating up the slopes of the PSET trend in a westerly direction into the reservoirs.

The Soloo and Bambo prospects have easy access to this source kitchen, similar to other reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar field. FAR Ltd.’s Ms Norman underscored this point in one of its presentations:

“I would like to walk you through what the exploration opportunity looks like for FAR. Starting with the Sangomar oil field, which is a known oil field sitting on the shelf edge of a carbonate platform being fed by oil generated in the source kitchen deep out to the west. You can see on the bottom left of the seismic line that I’m showing you is right through the Sangomar oil field, and I’m going to step through to the south to show you the prospects further to the south in the Gambia. The first, of course, are Soloo and Bambo that we’ll be drilling with the Bambo 1 well just to the north of our blocks in A2. You can see that they have easy access to the source kitchen and that source kitchen is very prolific to generate enough oil to house 5 billion barrels of oil just in place just to the north in Sangomar, which means we have a really rich source rock that’s capable of generating a lot of oil in this region. As we step further to the south, we have the Jobo prospect at about 280 million barrels, the Jato prospect at about 130 million barrels, and then Malo, a very large prospect out to the east at about 265 million barrels. All on a P50 best estimate basis. So, lots of follow-ups in our A2 and A5 blocks. We are not just about drilling Bambo this year.” [Emphasis underlined by author]

The migration path of oil into an accumulation zone or reservoir is directed by hydrostatic pressure exerted by gravity on the source kitchen. Often, the migration path follows natural fault lines within hydrocarbon formations. When these fault lines remain active and overlap with a trap, the trap becomes the main accumulation zone. The oil remains trapped in the accumulation zone if the reservoir is made of good porous sandstone or limestone and has mature seals to prevent further migration or degradation by water.

Apart from gravitational pressure, other key factors determining the migration path of oil into an accumulation zone or reservoir include buoyancy, the geothermal gradient of the hydrocarbon formation, the size of the fault lines, and the porosity and permeability of the reservoir sandstone. Primary migration and accumulation of oil may have started millions of years ago but can continue as long as the source kitchen releases oil and the fault lines are active, allowing secondary migration into other reservoirs.

The viscosity of the oil in the SNE-1 Sangomar field, at 32◦, makes it a light fluid, similar to the residual oil in The Gambian prospects. Therefore, it would migrate at a much faster velocity over long distances under normal geothermal conditions. Since The Gambia’s A2 block is physically contiguous with the SNE-1 Sangomar field, as shown by 3D seismic data, the migration of a large volume of oil from there into the SNE-1 Sangomar field would be quick and effortless.

The SNE-1 Sangomar field is at the centre of a geographic phenomenon in the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin, part of the MSGBC basin. It contains giant reservoirs or accumulation zones into which oil is fed from the source kitchen. It also serves as the most likely trap zone for oil migrating along the PSET shelf from different directions, particularly from The Gambia.

The acreage of the SNE-1 Sangomar field is unusually extensive. It sits on a depression on the PSET and has a lower gradient compared to the Soloo, Bambo, and SAMO-1 prospects in The Gambia. It supports two known separate gigantic oil reservoirs in stacked formation, the lower and upper reservoirs, with a substantial gas cap. These reservoirs are in lateral formation, separated by thick layers of ancient rock. The secondary migration paths into these reservoirs are confirmed to be through separate stratigraphic fault lines from the source kitchen in a west-to-east direction.

Basin modelling from FAR Ltd.’s exploration in the A2 and A5 blocks identified a secondary migration path running the length of the PSET from south to north, from SAMO-1 towards Bambo-1. The SNE-1 Sangomar field lies north on this migration path. If the oil in the SAMO-1 well could not be trapped due to a lack of mature seals (though it has a good reservoir) and its migration path is charted towards the Bambo and Soloo prospects as FAR Ltd has acknowledged, then those two are not the accumulation zones, as they are reported not to have oil in commercially viable quantities.

The oil must have migrated further into an alternative trap, and the most probable location of that trap, in terms of time, distance, and space, is the extensive SNE-1 Sangomar reservoirs.

The substantial gas cap on the SNE-1 Sangomar field is further evidence of the secondary migration of an enormous volume of oil into these reservoirs, particularly the S400 series. The gas cap resulted from thermal regeneration, where increased temperatures in the hydrocarbon formation caused chemical reactions that converted oil into gas. What remains in the reservoir is the current volume of oil that has not been heated into gas.

Oil reservoirs maintain equilibrium through hydrostatic pressure. When this pressure is disrupted at any point, the fluid will naturally flow toward areas of lower pressure. The giant S400 and S500 series reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar field have had 23 wells drilled in them, and there could be even more. Numerous pressure tests conducted by FAR Ltd, and its JV partners confirmed the connectivity of the wells in those reservoirs. Therefore, the historic pressure within the reservoirs was disturbed well before it was determined whether the SNE-1 Sangomar field extended into The Gambia.

For obvious reasons, FAR Ltd. seems to focus its efforts on identifying a separate accumulation zone (however unlikely) for the prospects in The Gambia. Despite these efforts, the company has made little progress in pinpointing a distinct migration path and accumulation zone for the billion barrels of oil it once predicted in its Gambian blocks. It has been seven years since the drilling of the SAMO-1 well and three years since the drilling of Soloo and Bambo-1, along with the Bambo-1 sidetrack-1. Yet, FAR Ltd. has not provided any substantial updates on the extensive research it claims to be conducting on the logging data from these unsuccessful wells. Instead, the company is now shifting its focus to the Panthera, Jato, and Malo prospects within the A2 block, which are located in the same area and gradient as the Bambo well, in close proximity to the SNE-1 Sangomar field.

The question must be asked: Is it necessary for there to be a separate oil accumulation zone in The Gambia if geophysical analysis confirms that oil migrates or migrated from the Gambian prospects into the SNE-1 Sangomar field or across the maritime boundary into Senegal? If this is the case, what potential difficulties would FAR Ltd have encountered in navigating the contractual and political challenges that might have arisen, given that, before selling its stake in 2020, it partly owned the SNE-1 Sangomar field?

Specifically, this points to several issues:

  1. FAR Ltd.’s contractual relations with its joint venture partners in the SNE-1 Sangomar field.
  2. Its contractual relations with the Gambian government regarding the A2 and A5 blocks. This points to FAR Ltd.’s obligation under specific clauses dealing with development and production of the oil and the payment of royalties to The Gambia.
  3. The potential contentious issue of shared stakes between The Gambia and Senegal.

How might these factors have impacted the oil production revenue-sharing agreement and the production schedule of the joint venture partners in the SNE-1 Sangomar field if The Gambia were to assert its right to a share of the oil and gas? Woodside Energy and Senegal would clearly want to avoid any delays in their production schedule from the SNE-1 Sangomar field. It seems FAR Ltd was caught between a rock and a hard place!

The Law – Conflict – Natural Resources along/near to Maritime boundaries

Both The Gambia and Senegal are signatories to the United Nations International Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The convention does not specify how states should share or exploit natural resources between their maritime boundaries, nor does it address the migration of natural resources, such as oil, from one country into an accumulation zone across maritime boundaries. It encourages nation-states to adopt principles of equitable dealing, good faith negotiations, and respect for sovereignty in bilateral and multilateral agreements. These concepts often carry legal nuances that are challenging for courts and judges to apply consistently.

Natural resources below the seabed between countries are of strategic importance and require active cooperation between states to harness their value. However, the absence of international law detailing how ownership rights over these resources should be determined has led to “safari justice” in some parts of the world, where might prevails and weaker countries struggle to protect their interests. Another aspect of this issue is related to the jurisdiction of maritime boundaries. It is commonly assumed that strict adherence to surface maritime boundaries automatically determines ownership rights of resources deep below the seabed, which can lead to significant injustice. Oil and gas, for instance, are migratory substances that can cross maritime boundaries due to gravitational pressure differences. The Senegal/Gambia sub-basin of the MSGBC is exclusively shared by the two countries, and equitable principles suggest that its sub-seabed resources particularly in the area between The Gambia and Saloum rivers should be jointly shared. This should not be contingent on proving oil migration from Gambian wells to the SNE-1 Sangomar field. The aggressive stance of the Macky Sall government and the oil companies in the SNE Sangomar exemplifies the excesses of unchecked capitalism. At a deeper level, it also questions Sall’s moral value as a Senegambian.

The same principles of equitable dealing and good faith negotiations apply in private international investment agreements. Investors must perform their license obligations in good faith, which has both substantive and procedural perspectives. Substantively, it involves the host state’s obligations to the investor and vice versa. Procedurally, it refers to arbitration proceedings for dispute resolution. Good faith encompasses fairness, honesty, loyalty, and transparency, essential for maintaining justice in international investment law. It requires parties to comply with their obligations competently and with mutual trust and cooperation.

When there is a perceived conflict of interest or lack of transparency or competence in the performance of a license obligation by an investor, the state’s interests are vulnerable. Aside from FAR Ltd.’s failure to find a separate oil and gas accumulation zone in its Gambian blocks, was it within its competence to determine for the Gambian government whether the missing oil from the failed wells may have migrated into the SNE-1 Sangomar field? FAR Ltd had already charted the likely migration path of oil from SAMO-1 well to Bambo-1 well. Why stop there? If the hypothesis is valid that oil migrated from the Gambian prospects into the SNE-1 Sangomar reservoirs, how does that reflect on FAR Ltd.’s performance if the Gambian government lacks clarity on this issue? It is the responsibility of the Attorney-General (with assistance from external counsel if necessary) to advise the government on whether the investor has performed its obligations competently and in good faith.

This task is easier with the active participation of the government through a relevant regulatory authority, as demonstrated by Petrosen in Senegal during the development of their prospects. In contrast, the government of The Gambia was unable to take similar action. It had both hands tied behind its back, having given away 100% of its interest in both blocks. Unfortunately, the government could not rely on its Attorney General, Ministry of Petroleum, GNPC, or Petroleum Commission to intervene, for reasons apparent to most Gambians. Independent legal and geotechnical advice was urgently needed. Furthermore, the involvement of FAR (Gambia) Ltd.’s lawyer creates a potential significant conflict of interest, even in the absence of any clear indication of wrongdoing.

The Political Agenda – Senegambia

The legal framework for oil and gas exploration in The Gambia is complex, and the political landscape further complicates matters. FAR Ltd.’s performance in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks has not improved the situation. FAR Ltd has effectively put a nail in The Gambia’s oil and gas exploration prospects by finding that the SNE-1 Sangomar field does not extend into The Gambia without fully addressing the potential migration of oil from The Gambia into the SNE-1 Sangomar field. This outcome benefits Senegal, where former President Macky Sall negotiated an extremely poor production sharing agreement, allowing Woodside Energy to retain 82% of the revenue while Petrosen, Senegal’s state oil corporation, received only 18%. Mr. Sall would likely have preferred to avoid any reduction in Senegal’s share, and FAR Ltd.’s findings reinforced this by negating The Gambia’s claim to exploration and production rights, unlike in Mauritania to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

Senegal, under Macky Sall, adopted a silent but sophisticated policy of economically merging The Gambia with Senegal (a feat that could not be achieved politically during the Senegambia Confederation) by supporting a new regime in The Gambia that aligned with Senegal’s strategic interests. In 2016, this opportunity arose when former Gambian dictator Yahya Jammeh reneged on his promise to hand over power after losing the general election. Adama Barrow, the declared winner, fled to Senegal, and Macky Sall spearheaded diplomatic efforts in West Africa and the EU to force Jammeh out. He succeeded, and Jammeh fled into exile to Equatorial Guinea. Barrow was sworn in as President of The Gambia in Dakar, Senegal, and was escorted into the country by Senegalese security personnel. Since 2016, Barrow’s close protection officers and guards at the State House have been Senegalese soldiers and security agents. Barrow regards Sall as an elder brother, advisor, guardian, and protector against coups. The relationship between the two is more accurately described as subservient—anything Macky wanted for Senegal from The Gambia, Macky got. Their relationship, shaped by their differing levels of sophistication and experience in state affairs, appears to reflect an exercise of undue influence. One is a geologist with extensive senior government experience, while the other, despite being a successful estate agent and skilled money manager, is a high school dropout with no prior government experience. Many of Barrow’s government’s decisions since 2016 have effectively surrendered The Gambia’s economic sovereignty and security to Senegal—a gift that eluded Senegal since the two nations were divided by colonial history.

It is unsurprising that Barrow and his government have not made a single pronouncement regarding the country’s oil and gas prospects within its maritime boundary with Senegal. Even if he wanted to, achieving success would be difficult. Sall was notoriously corrupt and engaged in underhand deals. In 2021, Guinea Bissau’s president, Umaro Sissoko Embalo, signed a secret oil and gas sharing agreement with Sall, without informing his cabinet or parliament. The deal, unfavourable to Guinea Bissau, allocated only about 30% of revenue to the country. Armando Lona, editor-in-chief of O Democrata, criticized the agreement as illegal since it lacked parliamentary approval and accused the president of secrecy regarding national resources. The Guinea Bissau parliament revoked the agreement, and Sall sacked his energy minister, Amadou Hott, who did not dispute the agreement when challenged in a media interview.

Given Sall’s history, it is plausible that he has managed to silence Barrow and his government regarding oil and gas matters near their maritime borders. The opposition, parliament, and civil society in The Gambia have been silent on the subject, reflecting a lack of curiosity and ambition to safeguard national interests, reminiscent of the Jawara government during the First Republic.

There is a sense in The Gambia that discussing joint exploration, production, and revenue sharing of natural resources with Senegal is taboo, especially now that Senegal has started oil production. The commonly cited phrase, “The Gambia and Senegal are two heads of the same body,” discourages open discussion on the topic. Consequently, the government of The Gambia has failed, unlike Mauritania and Guinea Bissau, to foster intergovernmental dialogue about shared natural resources across maritime boundaries with Senegal.

As a result, Senegal is the sole beneficiary of a vast oil and gas field in the shared Senegal/Gambia sub-basin. Under normal circumstances, applying principles of equity, these resources should be shared, regardless of the discovered accumulation zone being on the Senegalese side. The Gambia’s failure to protect its share of the resources can be attributed to its weak institutions at every level. Since 2021, Mr. Jerreh Barrow has served as the sole Commissioner of The Gambia Petroleum Commission. The Commission is the authority responsible for overseeing resource exploitation, including monitoring and ensuring compliance with national policies and regulations for petroleum activities. A concerning clause in the model Production Sharing Agreement (PEPLA) stipulates a Signature Bonus to be determined by the Licensee at the time of bidding, in addition to a further $2 million payment required upon the Commissioner’s approval of the first Development and Production Plan. This payment structure also applies to any subsequent amendments or new development plans. Additionally, production bonuses of $10 million are to be paid at various stages of development. The clause links the payment of substantial bonuses to the Commissioner’s approval, which could raise concerns about potential conflicts of interest or corruption. A more robust anti-corruption measure might involve requiring approval from a board or committee rather than an individual, thereby enhancing transparency and accountability.

The Gambia National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), responsible for encouraging petroleum operations, has abandoned initiatives to cooperate with oil and gas exploration companies as JV partners, unlike Petrosen in Senegal. The GNPC has been mired in corruption, limiting its activities to storage and distribution of petroleum products. A recent government task force, led by the Minister of Finance, found that despite having expensive computers and software, GNPC staff preferred manual entries, making record-keeping and transaction tracing difficult. Reports indicate that over $20 million has been misappropriated at the GNPC, which is just the tip of the iceberg.

BP (British Petroleum) exits The Gambia’s – A1 Block

It is therefore not surprising that BP exited The Gambia in August 2021 by surrendering its license in the A1 block. This block, along with the A4, had a chequered history. In 2006, African Petroleum acquired a 100% working interest in these blocks from Buried Hill Ltd. The licences were extended thrice, as it appeared the company was unable to fulfil its drilling obligations. When negotiations to extend the license failed, the government of The Gambia terminated the licenses for the blocks in 2017.

African Petroleum denied the termination, asserting that the government had not enacted the proper termination procedure and that its licenses remained in force until this was done. This led to an expensive and protracted arbitration proceeding lodged by African Petroleum at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) against The Gambia.

The Government of The Gambia secured the services of Cherie Blair KC, wife of former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. They secured the services of Cherie Blair KC, wife of former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. At the time, Mrs. Blair, though well-respected for her advocacy in human rights and administrative law, did not have experience in international oil and gas arbitration proceedings. The case was led admirably by a legendary Gambian US-based attorney who provided distinguished service but without a decisive victory through no fault of his but the weakness of the Gambia’s case.

While proceedings were ongoing, the government of The Gambia, in an unprecedented act of disregard for the arbitration process, opened bidding on the A1 block and sold it to BP in April 2019 before the matter was concluded. The case was eventually settled with The Gambia surrendering the A4 block back to African Petroleum in September 2020. There has never been a public disclosure of the full details of the settlement and the legal costs incurred by The Gambia in the case.

It was partly through this case that certain individuals in The Gambia who prioritise personal gain over national development opened a secret passage (disguised under the name of the Tony Blair Institute) between Tony Blair, former UK Prime Minister, and the office of the President of The Gambia. On April 18, 2018, Mr. Blair hosted President Barrow at a discussion panel held at the famous Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs. Mr. Blair is known within closed circles in The Gambia to have quietly jetted in and out of the country during the period leading to BP’s exit from The Gambia. What most Gambians do not know is that behind many seemingly charitable foundations operating in The Gambia are consulting businesses for profit. Cherie Blair KC heads Omnia Strategy, an advisory firm that has picked up a phenomenal workload in the short time it has been operating, largely from developing countries.

BP’s exit from the A1 block rendered the minor result in the arbitration case a Pyrrhic victory. At the time, the Gambia Ministry of Petroleum issued a press release indicating that BP had informed the government its decision to exit was due to a change in its corporate strategy towards low carbon energy. While this might be true, BP itself did not comment on the issue. The circumstances surrounding BP’s exit from The Gambia raise serious questions about the true underlying reasons for its decision.

BP had already acquired 2D and 3D seismic data for the block and completed an environmental impact assessment at substantial cost. It had modelled two prospects in its block located very near the SNE-1 Sangomar field. The Eland prospect had a resource estimate of 936 million barrels of oil (MBO) in-place and 344 MBO recoverable with a total risk of 24%. The Oribi prospect had a resource estimate of 1,180 MBO in-place and 350 MBO recoverable with a total risk of 10%. All that remained was to drill a well, yet BP chose to pay the Gambian government a settlement of $30 million to walk away.

It would be interesting to know the composition of the negotiation team, including the legal personnel on both sides, for this settlement. It remains unclear what factors determined the $30 million settlement and how it was utilised by the Gambian government, as no public disclosure has been made.

BP is a giant in oil and gas exploration around the world, possessing the requisite expertise in exploration and production. It also has a strong due diligence unit that is highly sensitive to corrupt practices in the industry. This sensitivity reflects the UK government’s recently amended legislation on Bribery and Corruption, which covers the activities of UK-listed companies wherever they occur in the world.

BP’s decision to abandon The Gambia came in the aftermath of FAR Ltd.’s failed drilling of the SAMO-1 well, which is adjacent to and on the same trend as BP’s former A1 block. When FAR Ltd drilled SAMO-1, it reported finding no oil accumulation zone but did find traces of oil that may have migrated. FAR Ltd further indicated that the oil migration path from the SAMO well charts towards the Bambo and Soloo wells, which were mapped to be in the same two primary reservoirs as the eight others, and now twenty-three, wells that FAR Ltd and its joint venture partner Woodside Energy have drilled in the SNE-1 Sangomar field. The Bambo and Soloo prospects are even closer to BP’s previously held A1 block than the SAMO-1 prospect.

If BP had any concerns, it did not share them publicly. However, there is no doubt that its decision must have been based on extraordinarily strong reasons that were not in its interest as an investor.

FAR Ltd Laughing all the way to the bank

– Far sold stake in SNE-1 Sangomar
– Full detail of deals.
– Petronas sold back shares to FAR and left JV.
– FAR license exemption in The Gambia

It appears FAR Ltd. has emerged as the winner in the murky affairs surrounding The Gambia’s missing oil and gas. In June 2020, FAR Ltd. was in a dire financial state, having defaulted on its development cash call for the SNE-1 Sangomar field, putting its entire 13% stake in the joint venture at risk. The default clause read:

“Under the JOA default provisions, if a defaulting party has not fulfilled its financial obligations within six months from the date of notification of the default, it will forfeit its participating interest without compensation. Unpaid amounts accrue interest at the LIBOR rate + 2%.”

FAR Ltd. embarked on cost-cutting measures, including making several staff redundant and requiring all senior executives and non-executive directors to accept a 20% salary or fee reduction effective 1 July 2020.

In this abysmal financial context, FAR Ltd. embarked on its now-failed Bambo-1 well and side-track well, which it claimed were not extensions of the SNE-1 Sangomar field. Throughout the pre-drilling preparation, FAR Ltd. was in talks with Woodside Energy, which had issued the default notice and to whom FAR would have had to forfeit its stake if it did not pay up. At that time, Woodside Energy held about 69% of the stake in the SNE-1 Sangomar field.

In July 2021, three months before drilling the Bambo-1 well, FAR Ltd. was forced to sell its entire interest in the Senegal RSSD Project to Woodside Energy to avoid forfeiture without compensation. The transaction was approved at a general meeting of its shareholders on 28 April 2021. FAR Ltd. received a cash payment of US$126 million from Woodside Energy on 7 July 2021. Additionally, FAR Ltd. stands to receive future payments leveraged on the total volume of oil produced from the SNE-1 Sangomar field until 2027.

According to a notice FAR Ltd. issued to its shareholders on 12 June 2024:

“The contingent payment of up to US$55 million is payable in the future based on
various factors relating to the sale of oil from the RSSD Project.

The contingent payment comprises 45% of entitlement barrels (being the share of oil
relating to FAR’s 13.67% RSSD Project exploitation area interest) sold over the previous
calendar year multiplied by the excess (if any) of the crude oil price per barrel (capped
at US$70) and US$58.

The contingent payment terminates on the earliest of 31 December 2027, three years
from the first oil being sold (excluding any periods of zero production), and a total
contingent payment of US$55 million being reached.”

This deal raises very serious and disturbing questions:

  1. FAR Ltd.’s entire stake in the SNE-1 Sangomar was 15%. This has been revised down to 13% but there is no disclosure of what happens to remaining 2%.
  2. Was this deal disclosed pre-drilling of the Bambo-1 well to the Gambian public and the government of The Gambia?
  3. Given FAR’s stakes in the SNE-1 Sangomar field and in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks through its subsidiary FAR (Gambia) Ltd., and its role as the operator during drilling in the Gambian prospects, what measures, if any, were put in place to protect The Gambia against potential conflicts of interest from FAR Ltd especially in the context of question 4 below on migration of oil? PC Gambia (Petronas) could not properly perform this role as FAR Ltd.’s joint venture partner in The Gambia?
  4. Even if the primary reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar have not extended into The Gambia, does this transaction meet the transparency expected in international investment agreements in oil and gas if oil migrates or has migrated from The Gambia into the SNE-1 Sangomar field?
  5. What due diligence did Woodside Energy and Petrosen carry out to validate FAR Ltd.’s finding that the SNE-1 Sangomar did not extend into The Gambia’s A2 block and to rule out any possibility of oil migrating from the underdeveloped reservoirs in the Gambian prospects into the SNE-1 Sangomar field?

In August 2022, FAR Ltd. reacquired 100% ownership of blocks A2 and A5 when PC (Gambia) Ltd., the subsidiary of Petronas that previously held the other 50% stake in the blocks, conveniently returned them to FAR Ltd. It is difficult to see the business case for Petronas’s involvement in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks and the justification it provided to its shareholders for taking such an enormous loss willingly.

In the meantime, FAR Ltd. has renegotiated a two-year extension to its exploration licence with the government of The Gambia, exempting it from the yearly commitment to drill a well and all other consequential taxes, fees, and expenses payable to the government.

FAR Ltd. reported that this would enable the company to consider options for delivering value while minimising its expenditure over the two-year extension period. The company aims to capitalise on the exploration data acquired from the two unsuccessful wells already drilled, without significantly drawing down existing capital.

This negotiation with the government of The Gambia would have been heavily influenced by legal advice from members of the same family or connected individuals acting on behalf of both the government and FAR Ltd. It is difficult to justify exempting FAR Ltd. from its contracted drilling obligations and all taxes and expenses payment to the government of The Gambia for the next two years, especially after having received US$127 million plus potential future millions.

There is no official gazette or publication indicating that parliamentary assent has been granted to exempt FAR Ltd. from its tax liabilities to the government of The Gambia. It would be a surprise if there had been. The government of The Gambian remains cash strapped and unable to meet basic needs for hospitals, schools, police, and infrastructure. With this arrangement, FAR Ltd. is arguably recouping every penny it claimed to have spent in The Gambia through its subsidiary under its so-called corporate social responsibility.

In the meantime, FAR Ltd. has outlined its plan for prospects Panthera, Jatto, and Malo in its A2 block, each of which it claims (as it did with the other unsuccessful prospects) contain multiple potential oil-bearing reservoir targets. However, any exploration on these prospects is conditional on FAR Ltd. finding a suitable joint venture partner to fund the cost. Thus, the extension granted to FAR Ltd. is likely to be longer if it cannot find a joint venture partner with deep pockets and one should add relevant expertise. This situation places The Gambia in a precarious position.

Given that the Gambian wells were found not to contain significant oil and gas reserves, it could be argued that FAR Ltd. strategically avoided the costs and risks associated with further exploration and development. However, this outcome also meant it evaded the possibility of discovering and developing untapped resources, which would have required them to pay royalties to the government of The Gambia. The real issue lies in the decision of the government of The Gambia to sign away 100% working interest in its exploration blocks without thoroughly exhausting all possibilities. This decision leaves The Gambia with nothing to show for its potential resources—a short-sighted move that is difficult to justify.

FAR Ltd. would likely point to the extensive cautionary exemption statement in its presentations, which it would claim absolves it of any liability for inaccuracies in its geophysical data.

Senegal/Gambia Relations

On 24 March 2024, Senegal elected a new president, Mr. Bassirou Diomaye Faye, after Macky Sall was forced by popular pressure to step down at the end of his final term. The new government, with Prime Minister Ousman Sonko at the helm, has vowed to follow and apply principles of honesty in governance. In his inaugural visit to The Gambia, the first since his election, President Faye extended an open arm of cooperation, solidarity, and respect to the government of The Gambia. This reflects his new foreign policy, which places a bold emphasis on unity and solidarity within Africa. He emphasised that the bond between the two countries will be strengthened and that nothing will change from what has already been established. It is hoped that this new government will reflect the level of honesty in governance it has spoken about in its actions, bringing transparency to all matters relating to dialogue, exploration, and production of the shared natural resources between the two countries. However, a recent high-level intergovernmental meeting between the two countries, attended by President Faye, Prime Minister Sonko, and The Gambian Vice President Jallow, focused on key areas of strategic importance but notably omitted the most sensitive topic: oil and gas. This omission raises concerns about future developments.

The curse of oil and gas in African Countries

Oil and gas have been a curse for almost all producing Sub-Saharan African countries. These nations are endowed with vast natural resources that could have propelled them into the league of developed countries. However, they have failed due to sheer mismanagement and chronic corruption. This is what sets them apart from successfully managed countries like Norway, Qatar, and the UAE, which have similar vast resources. Senegal could turn a new and refreshing chapter in resource management in Africa by emulating the successes of Norway—eliminating corruption, strengthening efficient institutions, and setting up a responsibly managed Sovereign Wealth Fund. It will need to act quickly to register any success because the era of oil and gas is rapidly ending as the world transitions to renewable energy. For The Gambia, the curse has struck even before oil and gas are discovered!

Conclusion

The results from FAR Ltd.’s exploration drilling in the SAMO-1, Bambo-1, and Soloo Deep prospects have confirmed the presence of oil. In the cases of SAMO-1 and BAMBO-1, although the reservoirs were of excellent quality, they were unable to trap the oil due to underdeveloped seals. The oil in these prospects likely migrated to an accumulation zone, which remains unidentified. The most likely location of this accumulation zone is in the SNE-1 Sangomar field. However, FAR Ltd.’s inability to identify the accumulation zone or confirm the migration path of the oil leading to speculation about oil migrating to the SNE-1 Sangomar field is due to several factors: its lack of technical expertise and funds, approach to exploration, drilling, and the accuracy of its geophysical survey data.

This failure is not FAR Ltd.’s alone. The government of The Gambia’s policy on oil and gas exploration has also failed at the level of execution. There is a serious lack of transparency in the relationship between Gambians, the government of The Gambia and FAR Ltd. This relationship appears to operate beyond confidentiality and into the realm of secrecy. Given the country’s weak institutions and the lack of proper regulatory oversight on oil and gas exploration, a vacuum is created where important decisions on matters of national interest are made by connected individuals behind closed doors. The national interest is put at risk when the performance of relevant stakeholders cannot be measured or when failures are not sanctioned.

With Senegal progressing at speed with oil production, there is an urgency for the government of The Gambia to expedite its oil and gas exploration with vigour. The exploration should be competently executed to achieve the purpose of finding an accumulation zone in The Gambia or at the very least establish the migration path of the oil from The Gambia to an established accumulation zone across the maritime boundary with Senegal, anywhere within the subbasin. The resources deep under the seabed in the Senegal/Gambia subbasin, in particular the SNE-1 Sangomar field should not be claimed by Senegal alone. It is overly simplistic to rely solely on surface maritime boundaries as the criterion for determining whether a country should share the natural resources below the seabed with its immediate neighbour. Similarly, it should not be necessary to provide evidence of oil and gas migration from The Gambia to the SNE-1 Sangomar field to justify such sharing. The government of The Gambia should initiate proactive inter-governmental dialogue with Senegal for greater clarity and understanding of the hydrocarbon and geophysical formation across their maritime boundaries. They must agree a protocol for joint resource and revenue sharing on exploration and production of oil and gas in the Senegal/Gambia subbasin of the MSGBC.

Successive governments since independence have failed The Gambia on all the indices of development. It is the smallest country in mainland Africa and potentially by far the easiest to develop if it had the right leadership and progressive orientated people. But despite its manageable size and potential natural resources, The Gambia has suffered the misfortune of having extremely poor leadership and an unenterprising population. The wealthy and so-called intellectuals and professionals have become the biggest enablers of the forces both internally and externally that undermine the economic and political sovereignty of the nation. All of these, give weight to previously held reservations that The Gambia cannot be a viable state. The saga of the exploration of oil and gas on The Gambia’s maritime coast and many other recent developments in the nation’s history should open frank discussion by the people about the future of the country. The Gambia is on the cusp of becoming a failed state (if not already) and there is not a flicker of light shining through this long dark tunnel that it has any chance left to its own accord to save itself. Developing a country requires a collective national effort. If this cannot be achieved, an appealing alternative for The Gambia, given Senegal’s new and dynamic leadership committed to justice, might be to consider full integration with Senegal. This would, in a way, correct the injustice of the Berlin Conference, where the two brotherly nations were divided without their consent. But Senegal, wary of its ‘tainted’ oil and gas lottery win, might shut the door on The Gambia. In that case, The Gambia risks drifting into the wilderness and becoming a basket case – an unsettling prospect. The only way to avoid this fate is for The Gambia to build strong institutions and demand its fair share of the resources in the Senegal-Gambia sub-basin. The Gambia must be resolute in this pursuit. For The Gambia, for Justice, for Development!

Reference Material

  1. Assessment of the Undiscovered Oil and Gas of the Senegal Province, Mauritania,
    Senegal, The Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau, Northwest Africa
    By Michael E. Brownfield and Ronald R. Charpentier
  2. The SNE Discovery Offshore Senegal – Moving a Frontier Basin to Emergent
    Eric Hathon, Exploration Director, Cairn Energy PLC 12th June 2018
  3. Lithostratigraphy and Characterisation of Paleocene Limestones for Optimal
    Exploitation (Senegal, West Africa): Comparative Study of the Bandia and Popenguine
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    PRODUCTION) BLOCK A5
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    OE 25 June 2020 FAR signs Gambia JOAs with Petronas. Seeks drilling partners.
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    Gambia/Senegal 4th June 1975
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    February 26, 2018
  24. Petronas’ petroleum stake acquisition gets Gambia nod by Fatou Touray Kerr Fatou –
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  25. Offshore Engineer: Far Signs Gambia JOAs with Petronas. Seeks Drilling Partners
    Jun 25, 2020
  26. Offshore Mag: Multiple oil shows from Bambo well offshore The Gambia
    Dec. 23, 2021
  27. The drillship Stena IceMAX has finished drilling and formation evaluation operations for
    FAR’s deepwater Bambo-1ST1 side-track well offshore The Gambia.
    CSN: Bambo-1 well drilling commences offshore The Gambia
    December 8, 2021
  28. Petroleum Africa: Bamboo-1 Well Offshore The Gambia Nears Total Depth
    Monday, December 6, 2021
  29. Status and Prospect of Drilling Fluid Loss and Lost Circulation Control Technology in
    Fractured Formation
  30. Jingbin Yang,1 Jinsheng Sun,1,2, * Yingrui Bai,1 Kaihe Lv,1 Guodong Zhang,1 and
    Yuhong Li3
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    By Ben Sayers and Richard Cooke; TGSPublished at: December 12, 2018
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    Fred Akanni, Editor August 7, 2017.
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    By E. Hathon1, Publisher: European Association of Geoscientists & Engineers
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  35. EIK: FAR The Gambia signs new joint operation agreement with PC The Gambia:
    Published 27th June 2020.
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    capping stacks can be used to stop spills when the blowout preventer fails.
    January 14, 2014, By Antony Matson, Mauricio Madrid
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  38. Oil and Gas: Drilling Technologies – www.oil-gasportal.com
  39. The Design of Geological Exploration with Side Track Drilling by Stanislav V. Varushkin,
    Zhanna A. Khakimova – PERM Journal of Petroleum and Mining Engineering.
    Volume/Tom 18 N0. 1 2018.
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    By Julia Payne, November 10, 2017
  41. AOW: Technical Aspects of The Gambia A1. Overview of Tenure Over the A1 Block. –
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Editor’s Note: On August 5, 2024, The Fatu Network reached out to FAR Ltd, inviting them to respond to the claims presented in this exposé. As of the time of publication, FAR Ltd has not provided a response.

This article was updated on 25.10.24 to correct the following points:
  • The African Legal Support Facility (ALSF) did not provide support to the Government of The Gambia in its arbitration proceedings with African Petroleum.
  • Mr Jerreh Barrow is not related to President Adama Barrow.
The Lawyer for FAR Ltd (Gambia) Ltd has denied on behalf of his mother that she was the local counsel for the Government of The Gambia on Energy, Oil and Gas.

REBUTTAL (Verbatim): By: Jerreh Barrow, Jambanjelly

It was with keen interest I read through Mr. M’bai’s featured article (The Saga of a Small Nation and its Missing Oil and Gas Resources) on the Fatu Network. Given the importance of some of the issues raised to the Gambian public, it is necessary to set the record straight. However, because this article will end up being too long if I try to address all the problematic parts, I will therefore focus on the most serious errors and misrepresentations. In my view, the crux of his suggestions, which needed to be addressed, centered around the question:

SHOULD THE GAMBIA AND SENEGAL SHARE RESOURCES IN THE SANGOMAR-FIELD?

The author said, YES. I would however implore each and every reader to answer this question objectively, but only after reading the following:

According to the author: “Because The Gambia and Senegal share the same sub-basin, then they should share the oil and gas found in the SNE-1 Sangomar field” and that “Senegal is the sole beneficiary of a vast oil and gas field in the shared Senegal/Gambia sub-basin.”

He also said: “Under normal circumstances, applying principles of equity, these resources should be shared, regardless of the discovered accumulation zone being on the Senegalese side.”

And that: “It should not be necessary to provide evidence of oil and gas migration from The Gambia to the SNE-1 Sangomar field to justify such sharing.”

From the first quote above, the main (geological?) justification Mr. M’bai gave for the claim is that both Gambia and Senegal are located in the same ‘sub-basin’ and therefore should share the ‘oil and gas resources found in Sangomar.’ I noted that he has also given Mauritania-Senegal as a ‘precedent’ for joint field development. What he did not understand though is that, in addition to sharing the MSGBC and/or any sub-basin, there are other criteria (principally geological) that must be met by those resources to be the subject of joint field development or sharing.

Geological Criteria for Cross-border Resource Sharing

The international practice of cross-border joint resource development has well-established geological criteria. The primary condition essential for even contemplation of ‘resource sharing’ is ‘common reservoir,’ which is different from ‘common sub-basin.’ Once a common reservoir is established, the presence of hydrocarbons on both sides of the internationally recognized boundary, the type and other characteristics of hydrocarbon if it exists, among others are investigated. A geological sub-basin basically is a subdivision of a basin and comprises a structurally separate unit of a basin. It may include reservoirs, seals, source rocks. A ‘Reservoir’ on the other hand, is a single sedimentary rock unit such as sandstones, limestones capable of holding and discharging fluids in this instance, hydrocarbons. There could be many reservoirs in a sub-basin.

An analogy to the ‘sub-basin’ – ‘resource sharing’ notion being suggested by the author would be equating a basin to a country, a sub-basin to a region, and a reservoir to a farm/land. To suggest that if we share a sub-basin, then we should share the resources in that ‘sub-basin’ would be equivalent to suggesting that two settlements in a region, say West Coast Region, should share the lands in their respective settlements simply because they are in the same West Coast Region. We know ownership of land is attained by well-established criteria, not simply by residing in a locality. Another analogy would be that the North Atlantic being a geographic subdivision of the Atlantic Ocean. If the author’s reasoning is anything to go by, then it would be conceivable that because the Gambia and the USA share the North Atlantic Ocean, then the Gambia should share the fish in US waters. I don’t think that is how natural resource sharing works. I’m not saying such established rules are fair, all I’m saying is that is the accepted and operated norm.

The author further stated: “It should not be necessary to provide evidence of oil and gas migration from The Gambia to the SNE-1 Sangomar field to justify such sharing,” implying there need not be any geological basis for such sharing, but he has also noted that:

“The exploration should be competently executed to achieve the purpose of finding an accumulation zone in The Gambia or at the very least establish the migration path of the oil from The Gambia to an established accumulation zone across the maritime boundary with Senegal, anywhere within the subbasin.”

The author made numerous references to “Senegal/Gambia sub-basin,” apparently coined to implant in the reader’s mind a picture to support his theory. For the record, the most common nomenclature used in geoscience circles for the subdivisions of the MSGBC is not “Senegal/Gambia” but rather “Northern sub-basins” starting from the Gambia River all the way to Senegal River and Casamance sub-basin, from the Gambia River to the south.

As to why the Gambian wells have not yet found oil, I have to state here that oil and gas are natural resources and like all natural resources, they are finite and unevenly distributed. Meaning they are found in certain locations and not in other locations, and at any such location, their boundaries start somewhere and end somewhere. A simple analogy will be different minerals such as gold are found in different parts of the world or even different parts of the same country. To bring this closer to home in the Gambia, the mineral sands are mainly found along the coast. Laterites are mainly exposed in the eastern parts of the country, kaolinite mainly in Kundam area, plastic clays are found in riverine areas etc. This is just how geology has decided!

Precedents for Cross-border Resource Sharing

The reader also referenced the Senegal-Mauritania joint field development as a precedent to support the claim. There are differences between that and the Gambia-Senegal situation as explained in Figure 1 on the two maps and explanations that follow.

Figure 1: Two maps, to the left a Mauritania-Senegal maritime border map, marked by the white dotted line, and to the Right, Senegal-Gambia border marked by the black line.

Senegal-Mauritania Map:

  1. From the left map, you will notice that the Greater Tortue Oil field (marked by a small oblique dotted black line with a yellow irregular polygon), is located right on the established internationally agreed and accepted Mauritania-Senegal northern border. Neither on the Senegalese side nor on the Mauritanian side of the maritime boundary.
  2. Note on the Mauritanian side of the border, Tortue-1 well was drilled in 2015 and it made a discovery, then in 2016, Guembeul-1 was drilled on the Senegalese side, which was also a discovery. In 2016 Ahmeyim-1 was drilled on Mauritanian side, it was a discovery, and GTA-1 was subsequently drilled on the Senegalese side in 2019 and it made a discovery. Information collected such as reservoir properties confirmed that these resources are located/hosted in the same reservoir (note, I do not say sub-basin). Also note to the north of the GTA is another field called Greater BirAllah, which is indeed located in the same subbasin as the GTA, but not on connected reservoirs. This is located within Mauritania’s maritime boundary, and since no connected reservoirs have been established has not been a subject of any joint field development.

Gambia-Senegal Map Now let us look at the Senegal-Gambia Map on the right. To the north were the SNE wells (numerous drilled between 2016-2018), all of them encountered significant oil. Then to the south of the border on the Gambian side, in 2018 Samo-1 was drilled and it was an unsuccessful well (not a failure though, in exploration jargon unsuccessful wells do not equate to a failure). Then in 2021, the Bambo-1 well was drilled very close to the border to test the extent of the Sangomar field and it was unsuccessful (not a failure). The desire to find oil on the conjugate reservoirs on the Gambian side of the border partly explains the reason FAR’s efforts were directed towards establishing the extension of the Sangomar field.

Let me hasten to add that I am not suggesting that none of the reservoirs in Senegal extends into The Gambia or that those that may extend are not oil bearing in the Gambia. No, far from that. On the contrary, the reason why Gambia continues to search/explore for oil is because there are strong indications that some of the reservoirs in the Gambian jurisdiction are oil-bearing, whether they are extensions of reservoirs in Senegal or not. The reason being that the Mauritania-Senegal-Guinea-Bissau (“MSGB”) Basin lies approximately at depths ranging from 50 to 1,500 metres (Figure 1).

From 1,504km² of modern 3D seismic data acquired in Blocks A2, prospects and leads similar to the “shelf edge” plays FAR has successfully mapped [three] prospects and leads (Figure 2).

A2 Update Reservoirs on the Carbonate Shelf edge are highly compartmentalized. This is one of the reasons over 10 appraisal wells were drilled in the Sangomar field.

Legal Basis for Resource Ownership

According to the author:

  1. The absence of international law detailing how ownership rights over these resources should be determined has led to “safari justice” in some parts of the world, where might prevails and weaker countries struggle to protect their interests. Another aspect of this issue is related to the jurisdiction of maritime boundaries.
  2. “It is commonly assumed that strict adherence to surface maritime boundaries automatically determines ownership rights of resources deep below the seabed, which can lead to significant injustice.”
  3. “Under normal circumstances, applying principles of equity, these resources should be shared, regardless of the discovered accumulation zone being on the Senegalese side.”

He seems to suggest in point 1 above that there is no international law on ownership rights over resources in this maritime zone. However, there is the Law of the Sea, which provides the comprehensive legal framework for the governance of the world’s oceans and, as indicated by the author, both The Gambia and Senegal are signatories to this convention.

Article 56 of the Law of the Sea, speaking about “Rights, jurisdiction and duties in the exclusive economic zone” (where these resources are located) states that, “States have sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.”

To end this particular subject and from the above, it is clear that his conclusions are defective in many different dimensions. Neither a geological basis, nor a precedent or legal ground for such a claim has been provided.

WHAT FAR’S ACQUISITION OF 100% INTEREST IN A2 AND A5 MEANS!

On this theme, the author’s wrong understanding of the concepts of ‘working interest’ and ‘revenue share’, referring to FAR’s interest in the Gambia, noted that:

“The license deal, giving FAR Ltd 100% working interest in blocks A2 and A5, effectively meant The Gambia owned none of its oil and gas resources upon discovery. All rights to explore, drill, produce, and sell resources from the blocks belonged to FAR Ltd and other licence holders. The Gambia had imprudently hinged its hopes on royalties’ payment at production. This arrangement, despite any savings The Gambia might have made from associated expenses, was to say the least, disadvantageous. Even Senegal had the foresight to retain an 18% interest in its blocks.”

It is important to explain the difference between the concepts of ‘working interest’ and ‘revenue shares’. First and foremost, holding 100% working interest in an oil and gas licence does not equal owning 100% of the revenues, as insinuated by the author. On the contrary, working interest in oil and gas agreements represents the share of investment that a company contributes towards the fulfillment of the work obligations. The percentage that the company/government takes, referred to as government/company’s take, is determined by the application of the fiscal regime (royalty is not the only revenue stream for government). The fiscal regime is a package of tools (see below) at government’s disposal deployable for capturing ‘economic rent’. It is worth mentioning that the Gambian licensing regime is not a PSA, as purported by the author, but rather a ‘Royalty-Tax regime’. These are two different mechanisms for capturing economic rent.

Equating working interest to revenue share is an oversimplification of a rather intricate calculation of revenues that takes into account the cumulative resource expenses, operating cost, royalty (including the rate), transfer pricing rules, thin capitalization, double taxation, signature and other bonuses etc. See below in Figure 2, a comparison of the different government takes for different projects in the region. This is a result comparing the Government’s take in various oil and gas licences in the region, including the Gambia, Senegal and Guinea. You can see that Government’s take in most of these projects is over 60%, contrary to the author’s misrepresentation. The Petrosen 18% participating interest is part of government’s take but not the total government take.

Figure 2: A chart showing the Government’s take in a number of Oil and Gas projects in the region including the Gambia and Senegal.

In frontier exploration such as the Gambia, and many other places in the world, governments will almost always only hold a minority working interest, which is often a ‘carried interest’, because they don’t want to contribute/put tax-payer’s hard-earned monies into a highly risky business as oil exploration. This is what prevails in Ghana, Nigeria, Namibia and Norway (during the early days of its exploration journey). Article 10 part 14 of Ghana’s Petroleum Exploration Act states that, “A petroleum agreement shall contain a term that the Corporation shall (a) hold an initial participating carried interest of at least fifteen per cent for exploration and development…” Such arrangements may change as the basin matures, and with dwindling risk, States become bolder in asserting control. Again, remember it does not represent government’s take! Refer to Article 18.1 of the A2 and A5 licences, which gave the government right to take up to 15% participating interest in these licences at development and production. Basically, what that means is that FAR will bear all of the exploration cost, which at the time of their exit is over $100 million, but if they find commercially viable oil, government can immediately get up to 15% interest. Meaning it will be responsible for funding 15% of the cost of development and production. But government’s entitlement to the revenues, as I said, will in addition include taxes such as Corporate Income Tax, royalty (often representing the largest chunk of government’s take), additional profit payments and bonus.

FAR Farming-out to Petronas

Executive Summary This benchmarking study compares the terms prevailing in Gambia’s three signed contracts, for blocks A1 (BP), A2 and A5 (FAR and Petronas), with terms prevailing in other oil projects selected for their similarities.

But it is important to understand the limitations of a fiscal benchmarking exercise. Projections at this high level cannot embrace nuance of interpretation, which requires extensive analysis across a dozen jurisdictions. Also, fiscal regimes are compared under one notional set of economics. They need to be tested against different market conditions. Specifically, in the Gambian case:

  • Prospectivity: GoTG must obtain the best view of prospectivity, and test different prospectivity scenarios: what results look like for both government and investor look very different depending on whether the field is 100 million, or 1 billion barrels of oil.
  • Project economics: A similar approach must be adopted for costs, including those associated with water depth: the apparent difference in signed GoTG agreements for example is largely due to lower royalties in the deeper water A1 and A4 blocks, an industry norm to make such projects more attractive to investors.
  • Senegal: The Senegalese analogue should be studied in more depth, to determine the position of companies operating there with regard to extending into Gambia.

Figure 1: “Government take” (AETR) results for GoTG’s two signed agreements, based on the PEPLA, relative to projects from Senegal (3 projects), Mauritania, Liberia, Guinea, Ghana and Guyana. Detail in body of report.

Figure 1 shows “government take” results for the Gambian contracts versus a selection of other projects, mainly along the West African continental shelf. What these results mean, and how these projects were selected, is discussed below.

Sharing of risk and reward is a common and normal practice in a highly risky and capital intensive venture like the Petroleum business. I wrote on this topic in 2017 and to avoid repetition, readers are referred to The Point newspaper article of 14th April, 2017, titled: GAMBIA’S PETROLEUM SITUATION: Erin-FAR DEAL: https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/article/gambias-petroleum-situation-erin-far-deal

TRANSPARENCY

The author had on numerous instances decried the lack of transparency around the governance of the sector. In particular he concluded that:

  1. “There is a serious lack of transparency in the relationship between Gambians, the government of The Gambia and FAR Ltd. This relationship appears to operate beyond confidentiality and into the realm of secrecy.”

And

  1. “It is difficult to justify exempting FAR Ltd. from its contracted drilling obligations and all taxes and expenses payment to the government of The Gambia for the next two years, especially after having received US$127 million plus potential future millions. There is no official gazette or publication indicating that parliamentary assent has been granted to exempt FAR Ltd. from its tax liabilities to the government of The Gambia.”
  2. Comments: The relationship between the Gambians, the government and FAR is primarily prescribed in the A2 and A5 licences, premised on Petroleum Act 2004 and many other legislations such as NEMA, IVAT etc. For example, the NEMA sets out the environmental obligations during the execution of these licences. The IVAT prescribed the fiscal obligations.

    With respect to the specific obligations of FAR, these are all summarized in the A2 and A5 licences, which are all public documents. Readers are referred to the following:

    1. Gazette No. 41, of 31st July, 2023, where A2 & A5 licences, Petronor licences, Deeds of Amendments of the A2, A4 and A5 licences were publicized.
    2. Gazette No. 65 of 20th October 2023, and No. 35 of 24th June 2024 on the annual public report on Petroleum operations by the Petroleum Commission since its establishment.
    3. Numerous local and international newspaper publications, press statements etc. regarding the licensing round, outcomes and BP’s exit.

See below under the heading BP LICENCES the other publications, and National Assembly updates on the sector.

FAR Drilling

According to the Author:

  1. “In a 2018 appraisal, Cairn Energy reported that no 3D seismic data was available for this prospect, suggesting that FAR Ltd relied on less accurate 2D data or none at all for its assessments”
  2. “Since The Gambia’s A2 block is physically contiguous with the SNE-1 Sangomar field, as shown by 3D seismic data, the migration of a large volume of oil from there into the SNE-1 Sangomar field would be quick and effortless.”
  3. “In 2020, FAR Ltd moved on to its next drilling prospects, the Soloo and Bambo wells. These are located to the north of the A2 block, nearly side by side on an elevated gradient of the PSET shelf trend, part of the SNE-1 Sangomar field extending into the A2 block. The available 3D seismic data predrill confirmed the geological formation as a continuous extension of the SNE-1 Sangomar field into The Gambia”

Comments: First, I seriously doubt Cairn was accurately quoted in the first item, because Cairn understands that in the year 2018, no company would drill a deep offshore well on 2D data. This is because the cost of acquiring 3D is so insignificant compared to the cost of drilling, no sensible person would drill on 2D in the year 2018. The second point is that in the first quote, he says no 3D and in the second he said there is, which squarely contradicts each other. The truth is that both wells were drilled using 3D. Cairn was probably referring to the Jammah-1 well which was drilled in 1979 (40 years ago) on 2D. He also says the well is located in the A5 block, which is not the case, as can be seen in the maps he showed.

He further stated that:

  1. “FAR Ltd further indicated that the oil migration path from the SAMO well charts towards the Bambo and Soloo wells, which were mapped to be in the same two primary reservoirs as the eight others, and now twenty-three, wells that FAR Ltd and its joint venture partner Woodside Energy have drilled in the SNE-1 Sangomar field. The Bambo and Soloo prospects are even closer to BP’s previously held A1 block than the SAMO-1 prospect.”
  2. “The results from FAR Ltd.’s exploration drilling in the SAMO-1, Bambo-1, and Soloo Deep prospects have confirmed the presence of oil.”
  3. “In 2020, FAR Ltd moved on to its next drilling prospects, the Soloo and Bambo wells.”

In 1, 2 and 3, the author in one sentence refers to ‘Soloo well’ in another ‘Soloo Prospects’, ‘Samo well’ and ‘Samo-1 prospect’, ‘Samo-1, Bambo-1, and Soloo Deep prospects’. What he does not understand is that there is a difference between a ‘well’ and a ‘prospect’. Samo-1 and Bambo-1 are wells and the names are simple labels. The ‘Samo prospect’ has a geological connotation, referring to the aggregate of target reservoirs. Furthermore, there is no ‘Soloo well’ contrary to the quotes in 2 & 4. The real issue that needs to be understood here is that deep water oil exploration is such a technologically challenging, financially risky and knowledge intensive activity that only a serious and committed investor will spend many years and over $100M to undertake in a frontier environment.

BP Licence
The author asked:

  1. “It would be interesting to know the composition of the negotiation team, including the legal personnel on both sides, for this settlement. It remains unclear what factors determined the $30 million settlement and how it was utilized by the Gambian government, as no public disclosure has been made.”

Comments:
I refer readers to the Ministry’s press release of the 18th of April 2018, updating the general public on the results of the evaluation and listing the companies involved in the licensing round. When BP was granted the licence, publications were made in local newspapers. For example, on the 2nd of May 2019, The Standard newspaper published an article titled “Gambia, BP Sign Oil Exploration Deal.” There was also a press statement regarding BP’s exit made by the government’s spokesperson, which was featured in local newspapers, including The Point in its article of the 12th of August 2021 titled “Gov’t Gets Back D1.5B from BP.”

Furthermore, the BP licence, containing the terms and conditions of the grant, was published in the Gazette as a public notice on Gazette Number 20 of 27th March 2020 (GN. No 59/2020). Subsequently, see the October 28th, 2021, Standard newspaper publication titled “Gambia Opens Mini Licensing for Block A1,” as well as Gazette Number 55 Vol. 138 of 8th December 2021 (GN. No 185/2021).

Also, refer to the press release issued around August 2021, which listed those who supported the Government in the BP negotiation, including the African Legal Support Facility, Addleshaw Goddard, DLA Pipers, and Open Oil. Having worked with individuals from these entities for years, I can attest to their competence, and a simple web search will provide information on these organizations. Furthermore, the African Legal Support Facility has published information about its support for The Gambia’s Petroleum Sector. The BP negotiations ended very well for The Gambia and on terms consistent with the agreement. I also refer readers to BP’s public statements of February 12 and August 4, 2020, on its policy shift that resulted in its exit from The Gambia.

In addition, during numerous National Assembly sessions, the NAMS and, by extension, the public were informed about developments surrounding exploration activities. For instance, during the fourth session (12th November–22nd December 2020), in response to Question No. 209/2020 by Hon. Alh Mbow of Upper Saloum, the Hon. Minister updated on the FAR-PETRONAS licence, the Petronor agreement, and the BP licence situation.

Similarly, during the second ordinary session of the 2021 legislature, in response to Question 4 by Hon. Alhagie Mbow – Upper Saloum Constituency, the Honourable Minister provided specifics on the funds received from 2017 to 2021 and where these funds were deposited. Likewise, in 2022, during the fourth legislative session, in response to Question No. 0176/2022 from the member for Bakau, the Hon. Minister elaborated on FAR’s acquisition and its extension. In 2023, answers to Questions 141/2023, 143/2023, and 144/2023 gave an overview of FAR’s tenure. These submissions also included details of the funds received.

Equally, during the recent third ordinary session of the 2024 legislative session, information about the situations concerning FAR, Petronor, and BP was provided. I believe these are public records!


African Petroleum Matter
Similar misrepresentations are found in the article regarding the African Petroleum arbitration and the subsequent settlement agreement. The fact, backed by records, is that African Petroleum initiated arbitration against The Gambia in 2017. At some point, given the very good job done by the lawyers representing The Gambia, the company, through partners, persistently requested an out-of-court settlement. This request was accepted in 2020 after strategic considerations, and the negotiations ended on terms very favorable to The Gambia.

A press briefing was held in September 2020, where the details of the agreement terms were given, including the payments made to the government. It is also worth stating that the African Legal Support Facility did not fund The Gambia’s costs for this arbitration, as claimed by the author. Instead, these costs were reimbursed by African Petroleum as part of the settlement. Referring to the legislative updates, this matter, as mentioned above, is in the public domain.


FAR’s Gambian Operations
In questioning and attempting to discredit FAR’s records and efforts in The Gambia, the author suspected that one of the reasons for FAR’s failure could be attributed to the use of a 6th-generation drillship, Stena Drillmax. This is despite quoting Cath Norman as saying that the discoveries in Senegal were made with a 5th-generation vessel.

A careful reading of Cath’s statement shows that she was highlighting the comparison of speed and cost regarding the use of the 7th generation, not necessarily questioning operational capability. A simple internet search on Stena DrillMax and IceMax, used in The Gambia in 2018 and 2021 respectively, will demonstrate the operational capability of these vessels.

The author also noted:
“Given FAR’s stakes in the SNE-1 Sangomar field and in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks through its subsidiary FAR (Gambia) Ltd., and its role as the operator during drilling in the Gambian prospects, what measures, if any, were put in place to protect The Gambia against potential conflicts of interest from FAR Ltd., especially in the context of migration of oil? PC Gambia (Petronas) could not properly perform this role as FAR Ltd.’s joint venture partner in The Gambia.”

The insinuation that FAR (plus Petronas) somehow invested over a hundred million dollars in exploration in The Gambia during the tenure of their licenses as part of a scheme, with the objective of “not finding” oil but conniving with Senegal, lacks evidence.

Conclusion
There are good records on how the Petroleum Sector has been governed, and these are available to anyone interested in the matter.

 

RESPONSE TO MR. BARROW’S REBUTTAL (Verbatim)

By: Ousman F. M’Bai

Should The Gambia and Senegal Share Resources in the Sangomar Field?

The article does not suggest that shared sub-basin resources automatically lead to joint ownership by states. Instead, as Mr M’Bai argued, the matter involves two key points:

  1. The presence of shared reservoirs in the s400 and s500 series, as shown in the article under the subheading The Second Well – Bambo-1 (Side Track-1) & Soloo, and in Map 18, which illustrates the reservoir series extending into The Gambia.
  2. Even if shared reservoirs were not present, as FAR Ltd. erroneously reported, the migration of oil from Gambian prospects is a critical factor. See the section on oil migration in the article.

In summary, if shared reservoirs exist, oil migration is less relevant. However, both points remain vital in understanding resource claims.

Common Nomenclature for Subdivisions of the MSGBC

On the first page of the article, the common nomenclature is explicitly acknowledged. However, using the term “Northern Sub-basin” without further qualification is overly abstract and fails to clearly identify the location. The article provides a more accurate and comprehensive geographical context for the sub-basin, supported by Maps 1 and 2.

Precedents for Cross-Border Resource Sharing

The difference between the Mauritania-Senegal maritime boundary map and the Senegal-Gambia map is that the former is more natural and accurate. In contrast, the latter seems deliberately drawn to restrict the SNE Sangomar fields within Senegal’s territorial waters. In the article Oil Does Not Care About Boundaries by a geology expert, GeoExpro Magazine, this boundary is criticised as unreliable. Mr M’Bai echoed this criticism in his analysis, particularly in the discussion above Map 19.

Legal Basis for Resource Ownership

The article does not dispute the existence of international laws governing resource ownership. What is the law question. Rather, it focuses on HOW these laws should be applied, particularly concerning:

  1. The exploitation of natural resources across maritime boundaries.
  2. The migration of resources like oil and gas between these boundaries.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) underscores principles such as equitable dealing, good faith negotiations, and respect for sovereignty, as discussed under the subheading The Law – Conflict Over Natural Resources Along Maritime Boundaries.

FAR’s Acquisition of 100% Interest in Blocks A2 and A5

At no point does Mr M’Bai equate working interest with revenue sharing. Instead, the article correctly outlines the implications of FAR Ltd.’s acquisition of 100% interest in Blocks A2 and A5, highlighting the consequences of The Gambia’s short-sighted approach. FAR capitalised on this without making significant discoveries, leaving The Gambia with little benefit. The AETR chart referenced applies only at the point of production and provides no immediate consolation. The consequences are further explored in the section FAR Laughing All the Way to the Bank.

FAR Farming Out to Petronas

While it is true that sharing risk and reward is common in capital-intensive ventures, the lack of financial transparency in the FAR-Petronas relationship in The Gambia remains deeply concerning.

Transparency

The core argument remains that the relationship between FAR Ltd. and The Gambia was marked by secrecy. Examples include the concealment of the drilling accident and the sale of its stake in the SNE Sangomar field to Woodside Energy. In response to your specific points:

  1. Gazette Nos. 41 and 65 relate to events occurring long after FAR Ltd. had surrendered its licence and exited The Gambia. Informing Gambians after FAR’s departure is moot.
  2. Your comments on the FAR drilling are misplaced. The article distinguishes between the SAMO well in Block A5 and the Bambo well in Block A2, and the reliance on 2D seismic data is discussed under SAMO Well. You appear to confuse SAMO with Jammah-1, a mistake similar to Cath Norman’s conflation of SAMO with Bambo in her interview with Gavin Colery.

Moreover, FAR did not spend $100 million of its own funds in The Gambia. No transactional evidence has been provided to substantiate this claim.

BP Licence

Mr M’Bai’s central argument concerning the BP negotiations is unchanged:

  1. The composition of the Gambian and BP negotiation teams has not been disclosed.
  2. While you refer to international legal practitioners, the local Gambian firm retained remains unnamed.
  3. A press release from August 2021 is referenced, but you do not specify the source or provide sufficient detail.
  4. The public has never been informed of the factors determining the $30 million settlement, leaving doubts about the outcome.

African Petroleum Matter

You claim that the settlement details were disclosed in a September 2020 press release, but:

  1. The specific press release is unidentified.
  2. The local Gambian firm involved remains undisclosed.
  3. If arbitration costs were reimbursed, evidence of such reimbursement has not been publicly provided.
  4. The settlement was among the weakest achieved, a topic to be explored in greater detail in my next article.

FAR’s Gambian Operations

Your comments here fail to grasp the severity of FAR Ltd.’s actions and their impact on The Gambia. You repeat the unsubstantiated claim that FAR spent over $100 million on exploration without providing any documentary proof. FAR’s financial and operational incompetence casts doubt on the accuracy of its finding that the s400 and s500 reservoirs do not extend into The Gambia. The Petroleum Commission did not independently verify this, and neither Woodside Energy, Petronas, nor Petrosen conducted due diligence, despite standing to gain from exclusive ownership of the sub-basin’s resources. For further details, see the GeoExpro Magazine article Oil Does Not Care About Boundaries.

I trust this addresses the points raised in your note. Given this, I do not accept that the premises of our article are unclear to the extent that an interview with you is necessary to address the written questions we previously sent. I would, however, appreciate it if you could use your best endeavours to provide a written response to those questions.

Press Update: Formal Letters Dispatched to Senegalese Authorities Regarding Gambia-Senegal Hydrocarbon Concerns

0

By: Seringe S.T. Touray

Mr. Ousman F. M’Bai has today dispatched formal letters to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Senegal, raising urgent and unresolved matters relating to the governance of offshore petroleum resources in the MSGBC Basin.

The letters draw attention to the unilateral and surreptitious redrawing of The Gambia’s A2 block boundary in the 2023 Demarcation Regulation—an act that excluded the most prospective area of the block, including the location of the Bambo-1 well. The timing of this adjustment coincides with Senegal’s recent announcement to revise its maritime code (shipping included), raising serious concerns of tacit territorial compromise and the silent erosion of Gambian sovereignty over potentially shared reservoirs.

Of particular note, the correspondence highlights the deeply troubling conduct of FAR Ltd, Petronas, and Woodside Energy in what appears to have been a coordinated and shady transfer of geological and commercial interests. These transboundary dealings, executed without proper disclosure to or consultation with the people of Gambia, raise questions of ethical, regulatory, and possibly fraudulent behavior that warrant urgent scrutiny.

Mr. M’Bai calls for the urgent initiation of unitisation talks relating to the shared Sangomar reservoir. The call follows mounting evidence suggesting that a portion of the Sangomar field, currently operated by Woodside Energy, extends into The Gambia’s A2 block.

These letters, now a matter of public record, highlight potential violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and regional norms of cooperation. They call for immediate bilateral engagement to avoid the risk of silent resource appropriation and to restore trust and transparency in the MSGBC Basin.

Mr. M’Bai expresses hope that the new leadership in Senegal, which professes to stand on the ethos of Justice, Equity, and Righteousness (Jub, Jubal, Jubanti), will uphold those principles to manifest good governance and regional solidarity by responding constructively to these concerns.

We now await formal acknowledgment and response from the Senegalese Government.

Further updates will follow.


Editorial Commentary: Silence is Not Neutrality

On 28 August 2024, we wrote to Petrosen, Senegal’s national oil company and an 18% stakeholder in the Sangomar field, seeking clarity on its role in validating FAR Ltd.’s conclusions that denied the extension of the Sangomar reservoir into The Gambia’s A2 block. Our questions pertaining to internal reviews, due diligence, and the fairness of the processes have gone unanswered.

This silence cannot be viewed in isolation. It follows a similar pattern to Woodside Energy’s deflection, Petronas and FAR Ltd.’s retreat from public scrutiny. In a matter as critical as transboundary hydrocarbon equity, failure to respond to legitimate questions is not mere oversight; it becomes complicity.

The burden of accountability is especially high for Petrosen, a state-owned enterprise that operates not merely for profit, but in trust for the people of Senegal and the region. Its refusal to engage openly and transparently with a neighboring state—one with whom it shares both history and resources—is deeply troubling and raises serious concerns about the integrity of the process that has, in effect, excluded The Gambia from its rightful claim in a shared reservoir.

We remain committed to uncovering the full truth and reiterate our call for independent, regional oversight and open dialogue between all stakeholders. The MSGBC Basin must not become a theatre of silent deals and hidden gains. If trust is to be restored, silence must end and answers must begin.

Here we publish for all to see a copy of the letter sent to Petrosen on 28.08.24.


Inquiry Regarding Petrosen’s Role in the Validation of FAR Ltd’s Findings on the Gambia’s A2 Block

Dear Sir,

The Fatu Network recently published a lead article titled: Whither The Gambia? The Saga of a Small Nation and its Missing Oil and Gas Resources. We are working on a follow-up article to be released soon. We are conducting research into the developments within the MSGBC Basin, particularly focusing on the SNE Sangomar field and the associated blocks in The Gambia.

As you are aware, 3D seismic data and geological assessments initially suggested that the SNE Sangomar field was contiguous with and extended into The Gambia’s A2 block. However, despite these indications, FAR Ltd. concluded that the Bambo and Soloo prospects in the A2 block were not extensions of the SNE Sangomar field. Following this, Woodside Energy completed a significant transaction with FAR Ltd., acquiring its 13% stake in the SNE Sangomar field.

Given Petrosen’s vital role as a joint venture partner in the SNE Sangomar field, I would like to understand more about Petrosen’s involvement in the review and validation of these findings. Specifically:

  1. Validation of FAR Ltd’s Findings: What role did Petrosen play in the review or validation of FAR Ltd’s findings? Was there any internal or independent due diligence process carried out by Petrosen to confirm or contest FAR Ltd’s conclusions about the Gambia’s A2 block?

  2. Review Prior to Woodside Energy’s Transaction: Before the completion of Woodside Energy’s transaction with FAR Ltd., did Petrosen conduct any review or express any concerns regarding the findings that the Gambia’s A2 block was not an extension of the SNE Sangomar field? If so, what were the results of that review?

  3. Implications for the Gambia’s Stake: Given the significance of these findings for regional resource-sharing agreements, what is Petrosen’s position on the potential extension of the SNE Sangomar field into the Gambia’s blocks? How does Petrosen view the fairness of the process that led to these conclusions?

  4. Concerns of Collusion: What assurances can Petrosen provide that there was no collusion or undue influence involved in the conclusions regarding the Gambia’s blocks? Was there transparency in how these findings were communicated and validated among the joint venture partners?

I appreciate your time and attention to these questions. Transparency and fairness are paramount in managing the MSGBC Basin’s resources, and your insights would be invaluable in understanding the processes involved.
I look forward to your response and am available for further discussion if necessary.

Attachments:
Letter to PETROSEN French Translation (Official letterhead; Signed)

Best regards,
Seringe ST Touray
Editor-in-Chief
Fatu Network


Note at the Bottom of the Commentary:
Petrosen’s failure to respond to these urgent inquiries has prompted Mr. M’Bai to escalate the matter to ministerial level.

Persons with Disabilities Voice Frustration Over Delayed Implementation of Disability Bill

Written by: Alieu Jallow

Persons living with disabilities in The Gambia have voiced serious concerns over what they describe as the government’s ongoing lack of commitment to addressing their needs, particularly the slow implementation of the Persons with Disabilities Bill, which was passed in 2021.

The concerns were raised during a two-day training on promoting and protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. The event, organized by the National Human Rights Commission in partnership with the National Disaster Management Agency, focused on the inclusion of persons with disabilities in disaster risk management policies and emergency interventions.

Speaking in a side interview with The Fatu Network, Ansumana Sanno, a representative of the Gambia Association of the Disabled, highlighted the dangers posed by open gutters in the Kanifing area, especially along the Westfield to Jimpex stretch.

“Those open gutters have caused many of our people to fall and get injured. As a teacher for the blind, there was an instance where we had to nurse serious wounds after blind students fell. We understand the importance of drainage, but this is a serious safety hazard for persons with disabilities. We are calling on the authorities to act by covering them or finding safer alternatives,” he said.

Bakary Njie, Secretary of the Gambia Organisation of the Visually Impaired for the West Coast Region, also expressed frustration, describing mobility as a major challenge. He noted that most drivers ignore traffic rules when it comes to persons with disabilities.

“I am low vision, but while serving as the Minister for Persons with Disabilities at the Gambia College, I was once nearly hit by a car while crossing a zebra crossing with a colleague who is totally blind. I was supporting her, but drivers don’t slow down or give us space. We’re always at the mercy of others,” he said.

Mr. Njie urged the government to fully implement the Disability Bill, saying the lack of political will has kept daily challenges unresolved.

“My call to the government is to ensure full implementation of the Persons with Disabilities Act. It contains strong provisions that protect persons with disabilities. If those are put into action, many of the challenges we face daily would be addressed. But without the political will, these problems will continue,” he added.

The 2021 Disability Bill was considered a milestone for disability rights in The Gambia, with promises of improved access, mobility, safety, and inclusion. But nearly four years later, persons with disabilities say little has changed on the ground.

Tracing the Fate of Ex-President Yahya Jammeh’s Seized Lands

By Binta Jarju

Years after the fall of former President Yahya Jammeh, the full extent and fate of the vast real estate empire he amassed during his 22-year rule remain concealed from the Gambian public.

The Janneh Commission found that Jammeh allegedly stole over $360 million (approximately GMD 18 billion) from state coffers. This staggering wealth funded a life of opulence ranging from luxury vehicles and private aircraft to palatial estates across The Gambia and abroad.

Hundreds of properties, including urban plots, agricultural estates, and protected reserves, are linked to Jammeh. Some of these landed properties have been disposed of. However, there has been no full public disclosure of how these assets were disposed of, who acquired them, or what sums were realized.

The secrecy surrounding the sale and transfer of Jammeh’s assets has reignited public frustration, especially in light of recent investigation revelations that point to a more extensive and complex empire than initially believed.

An Empire of Properties Across The Gambia

The Janneh Commission identified 281 properties attributed to Jammeh, stretching across all regions of The Gambia. These include 17 properties in the West Coast Region, 43 properties in Kanifing Municipality,10 islands, 8 forest parks, 10 hills, 26 wetlands and wildlife reserves.

The properties ranged from high-end commercial buildings in urban centres like Banjul to vast agricultural estates and protected lands in rural communities. Many were acquired through coercion, executive orders, or under the guise of public interest.

In 2019, the government adopted the Janneh Commission’s recommendations to dispose of these assets via public auction. The stated goal was to recover misappropriated funds and restore public trust.

However, six years on, there has been no comprehensive public report on how many properties were sold, to whom, or under what conditions. The Ministry of Justice has submitted only a partial list of 45 properties to the National Assembly.

Among the known buyers, Jah Oil Company acquired several prime properties, including a Kairaba Avenue location for GMD 41 million ($574,000). Balaton Company Ltd/Corendon Hotels purchased the Royal Atlantic Hotel, previously linked to Kanilai Family Farms, for over GMD 110 million ($1.5M), while the Central Bank of The Gambia bought the Futurelec Building for GMD 100 million ($1.3M).

Despite these high-profile transactions, there is no official breakdown of total revenue or how proceeds were allocated.

Audit Gaps and Missing Documents

Although the Ministry of Justice claims all sales were audited by the National Audit Office (NAO), no audit report dedicated to Jammeh’s seized assets has been made public as of May 2025.

A 2020 NAO audit of general government accounts raised serious concerns, noting that over GMD 706 million ($14 million) in proceeds lacked basic supporting documents such as bidding records, advertisements, valuation reports, or proof of due process. These gaps remain unresolved, sparking public suspicion of mismanagement or cover-ups.

Civil Society Calls for Accountability

Organisations like Gambia Participates have been vocal in demanding full transparency in the asset disposal process. They argue that concealing buyer identities and financial records undermines the Commission’s work and erodes public trust in the government’s anti-corruption efforts.

The group also points to international norms, including Principle 5 of the Global Forum on Asset Recovery (GFAR), which states that recovered assets must be used to benefit victims of corruption. So far, no comprehensive compensation mechanism has been established for affected individuals or communities.

The fate of Jammeh’s seized lands is a critical test of The Gambia’s democratic transition and commitment to justice. While some efforts have been made to recover and reallocate assets, the lack of transparency, documentation, and community inclusion remains deeply troubling.

Until the government provides a full public account of all seized properties, buyers, sale conditions, and fund utilisation, the wound of Jammeh’s legacy remains open.

“These assets and what happens to them impact the future of young people economically, socially, and politically. If they’re not involved, more looting will happen, more opportunities will be lost. That’s why I was pleased to see groups like GALA take a stand. That kind of civic engagement must continue,” said Madi Jobarteh, a renowned civil society advocate.

Lamin Bojang, who works in land investment and management, shared his observations on how the redistribution unfolded. According to him, the process strayed far from the transparency that Gambians were promised.

“The buyers included government officials, party militants, politicians, business elites even people connected to the commission,” Bojang said. “This wasn’t a fair process. It became a rat race, an opportunity for a few to enrich themselves while shifting the blame solely on Jammeh.”

Bojang explained that while the Janneh Commission and the courts set the legal framework for the disposals, critical institutions like the Department of Physical Planning were bypassed in property valuations and approvals. Instead, he said, the same agency responsible for sales handled most of the process, raising red flags.

“The public was not consulted at all. That led to mistrust and suspicion. And when you look at who ended up with the lands, you understand why those doubts still linger.”

He warned that shutting the public out of such important processes breeds resentment, especially in communities directly affected by Jammeh’s land acquisitions and those expecting restitution.

From Hope to Disappointment

The seizure of Jammeh’s land brought hopes to communities whose land was seized; however, the disposal of the lands only brings disappointment to some.

In Kanilai, Jammeh’s home village, vast farmlands were among the seized properties. While residents hoped these would be converted into public schools or health centres, many now lie abandoned.

“We were told the land would serve the community,” said a youth activist from Foni who preferred to remain anonymous. “But nothing has changed except that we now fear new owners we don’t even know.”

Communities in the West Coast region voiced similar frustrations, claiming they were left out of decisions regarding land use, despite promises of inclusivity.

In Demban, a quiet farming village nestled in Foni, the past continues to cast a long shadow over the land. Musa Camara stands on a plot his family has farmed for generations, land that was once temporarily handed over to Yahya Jammeh for agricultural use but now finds itself caught in the aftermath of asset recovery.

“They told him he could farm on it, that’s how Jammeh got the land,” Ebrima explains. “It was our grandparents’ land. He didn’t buy it. He was simply allowed to use it.”

After Jammeh’s fall from power, the Janneh Commission identified the plot as one of over 280 properties tied to the former president and slated for seizure. But no distinction was made between the lands Jammeh owned and the lands he merely used. Camara’s family received no communication, no notice and certainly no documentation that their land was now returned to them.

“We are still farming on the land. It hasn’t been sold,” he says. “But no one from the government has contacted us since Jammeh left. And we’ve never received any document returning the land to our family.”

The family’s continued use of the land rests on fragile ground. Despite decades of cultivation, they live in fear that the government could reclaim it at any time without compensation or recognition of their history on it.

“That could be something I fear in the future,” Ebrima admits. “Because I don’t have any proof from the government that the land is now ours again.”

Ebrima believes the state failed to investigate the circumstances under which Jammeh acquired each property, especially in communities like Demban, where traditional land agreements were often verbal and undocumented.

“If the government had really investigated how Jammeh got each piece of land, they would know ours was never sold to him. He was just using it.”

As a message to his peers, Ebrima urges young people across The Gambia to understand their land rights before it’s too late.

“Let’s talk to our parents. Know where our lands are, document them, draw boundaries because if we don’t, land conflicts will come.”

From One Looting to Another

Many of the critics argued that the disposal of Jammeh’s seized and forfeited assets is from one looting to another.

“What Jammeh stole, the government has re-looted. We are talking about abuse of office, lack of accountability, and a total disregard for the rule of law,” Madi Jobarteh said.

He said that after the Commission submitted its report, the government’s role was to ensure the proper and transparent disposal of those assets. He argued that the process of disposal has not been transparent or accountable.

For him, the Janneh Commission was never meant to dispose of assets, only to identify them and make recommendations.

“They were tasked with tracing the corruption trail and naming the assets involved. If they sold any, even that wasn’t done transparently. But really, the sale and management of those assets was the government’s job, and it failed miserably.”

He argued that there is a need for the recovery of all stolen assets and ensuring that proceeds go to victims and communities who have suffered. Some assets may need to be returned to the rightful owners. Others should be invested in national development.

“That’s where real reconciliation, stability, and development begin.”

Right-holders in NBR Voice Frustration Over Service Delivery Failures

By Alieu Jallow

Residents of the North Bank Region (NBR) have raised serious concerns over the inadequate delivery of essential services by key public institutions during a two-day technical advisory interface held at the Governor’s Office in Kerewan.

The dialogue, supported by ActionAid International, The Gambia, aimed to bridge the gap between duty bearers and right-holders by offering a platform for open discussion on governance and development challenges in the region.

Participants voiced grievances on a wide range of issues from access to quality health and education services to youth empowerment, agriculture, and the management of natural resources.

Jainaba Bah, an executive member of the North Bank Sports Association, highlighted the continued neglect of women’s sports in the region. She noted that the NBR 2nd Division Female Football Team plays all its matches in Soma due to a lack of local infrastructure. “This comes at a heavy cost,” she said, raising questions about what plans the council has in place to support the regional team.

In response, Alhagie K. Saho, Vice Chairperson of the Kerewan Area Council, acknowledged the challenges but said efforts are underway to address them. He cited plans to allocate new stalls at the recently acquired market along the Senegambia corridor. He mentioned ongoing discussions about providing incentives for young people to take up community cleaning roles.

On the issue of sports infrastructure, Vice Chair Saho clarified that it is not the council’s direct responsibility to invest in regional football, as this falls under the Ministry of Youth and Sports. However, he referenced the council’s support for the renovation of the Farafenni Mini Stadium. He also admitted that financial constraints continue to limit the council’s ability to fully support local sports initiatives.

Forest degradation was another hot topic during the discussions. Bisenty Mendy of Kasewe accused some forestry officers of colluding with illegal loggers, claiming that reports submitted by community members are often ignored.

Regional forest officer Buba Kanteh rejected the allegations, stating that most illegal logging is carried out by villagers with insider connections, often without the knowledge of the forestry office. He emphasised that forest parks are managed by Village Development Committees, and his department only acts on reports received from local forestry committees.

Concerns over agricultural sustainability also emerged. Youth participant from the Global platform, Ali Nget, questioned the long-term impact of government-led farming projects, which he said often collapse without proper exit strategies or community ownership.

Responding to these concerns, Karamo Minteh, the Regional Agricultural Director, acknowledged some of the challenges and said the Ministry of Agriculture is shifting away from over-reliance on tractor ploughing due to its negative effects on soil health. He noted that the ministry is now introducing lighter and more sustainable farming implements.

Organisers and officials concluded that the interface was a crucial step in promoting accountability and participatory governance. However, they stressed that real progress depends on turning dialogue into concrete action that addresses the needs of the people.

Invincible: Sarah Jarju’s Last-Gasp Heroics Crown Berewuleng FC as GFF Women’s League Champions

By: Muhammed Lamin Drammeh

In a heart-stopping finale that will be etched in Gambian football history, Sarah Jarju’s 90+2-minute curling stunner secured a dramatic 2-1 victory for Berewuleng FC against TMT, clinching their first-ever Gambia Football Federation (GFF) Women’s National League Division One title in style — undefeated in 18 league matches. As the GFF competition department, certain the match was destined for a draw, began whisking the trophy from Brikama to Yundum to crown table-toppers Red Scorpions, Jarju embarked on a mesmerizing solo run, outpacing her marker and unleashing a shot that curled into legend, rewriting the script in the final breath of the season.

“When I saw the gap, I knew it was now or never. My heart said,” Sarah Jarju declared, her words capturing her last-gasp winner.

The match was a rollercoaster of emotions. TMT shocked the favorites in the 62nd minute with a thunderous strike from Laize Emboloco, threatening to derail Berewuleng’s title dreams. Undeterred, Jarju equalized in the 69th minute, showcasing her season-long brilliance. With the clock ticking and Red Scorpions poised to claim the title, Jarju rose to the occasion once more, her last-gasp winner rewriting the script and cementing her status as the season’s standout player.

A Journey of Resilience and Tactical Brilliance

Berewuleng’s triumph is a testament to the vision and grit of head coach Fakebba Saine, who has ushered in a new era for Gambian women’s football. For over a decade, the league was dominated by coaching giants Choro Mbenga of Red Scorpions and Mariama Bom of Police FC, formerly Interior. This season, Saine broke their stranglehold, guiding Berewuleng to a historic title with a blend of discipline, tactical nous, and unyielding belief.

Formed in 2017 to compete in the West Coast Regional Football Association third division qualifiers, Berewuleng’s rise has been meteoric yet hard-fought. “We assembled players within a week and booked a place in the league,” Saine recalled. After struggling in the second division due to an inexperienced squad, the team spent three years building a foundation. Their promotion to the first division in 2021 came with skepticism: five key players departed, and many predicted relegation. Defying the odds, Berewuleng finished third in their debut season, followed by back-to-back second-place finishes in 2023 and 2024. “I told my players we cannot be second-best forever,” Saine said. “Our target this season was to win the league.”

Saine’s focus on defensive solidity was pivotal. After conceding heavily last season, Berewuleng analyzed game footage, tightened their backline, and boasted the league’s best defense in 2025, conceding just six goals in 18 matches. “We identified those games, analyzed them with the players, and it worked,” Saine explained. This defensive resilience, paired with Jarju’s attacking flair, propelled Berewuleng to glory.

Leading with Heart: Managing a Female Team

Managing a women’s team comes with unique challenges, but Saine’s commitment has been unwavering. “It’s all about dedication,” he said. “You don’t have to care about every negative stone thrown at you. Just focus on what you believe in.” Saine fosters strong relationships with players’ parents and guardians, ensuring their support and prioritizing player safety, such as ensuring players reach home before Maghreb prayer after matches in the Kombos. His approach has earned him admiration, with Sarjo Sowe, Berewuleng’s Secretary General, calling him “a genius” and “a father figure” to the squad. “The way he manages these players is incredible,” Sowe said. “As a community, we are proud of this feat.”

A Community United in Triumph

Berewuleng’s victory is more than a sporting achievement; it’s a unifying force for the community. “Winning the league means a lot to us,” Sowe emphasized. “The whole community united for the cause.” Since its inception in 2017, Berewuleng FC has been a community-driven project, culminating in two trophies: the second division title and now the 2025 first division crown. The community’s support was unwavering throughout the season, fueling the team’s remarkable journey.

Looking Ahead: Continental Ambitions

With the league title secured, Berewuleng is now setting its sights on the continental stage. The club will equally shift their focus to the FF Cup and on preparing for CAF women’s competitions as Gambia’s representatives. Under Saine’s leadership and with Jarju’s star power, Berewuleng is poised to make waves beyond Gambia’s borders.

Sarah Jarju’s heroics and Fakebba Saine’s tactical masterclass have not only crowned Berewuleng as champions but also heralded a new chapter in Gambian women’s football. This is a story of resilience, belief, and a community united — a triumph that will inspire generations to come.

Kudang Refutes Idol Worship Allegations, Upholds Historical Sites at Cultural Festival

By Dawda Baldeh

Residents of Kudang in the Niamina East Constituency have rejected allegations of idol worship and strongly defended their historical sites during the ongoing centuries-old cultural festival (Munkutuwo), where a locally baked rice dish is served to honour their heritage.

This festival, deeply rooted in the community for centuries, has received both widespread praise and criticism. The community boasts four historical sites located in the east, west, north, and partly in the south-north, which are believed to hold important secrets for the village.

These sites include Namasita, Masing Kolong, and Berebatosisa. Elders denied the claims of idol worship as they responded to questions from reporters. In the morning, women gathered under trees to prepare the Munko (baked rice), to pray for a bountiful rainy season.

“This is a tradition we inherited from our ancestors. It’s beyond imagination. When the rains are near, we hold this Munkutuwo to pray for a fruitful rainy season,” stated Nyara Fanneh, an elderly woman.

Mrs. Fanneh, a cultural leader in the community, described the ‘Munkutuwo festival’ as a distinctive tradition unique to Kudang.

“Whenever we celebrate the Munkutuwo festival, we experience a bountiful harvest in our farms and rice fields,” she remarked. “We also pray for peace in the country. We are farmers and we believe in this.”

For individuals like her, this occasion serves as a time to celebrate, reflect on their ancestral heritage, and preserve it for future generations.

After the morning activities, the village leaders visited the sacred sites to commemorate the event.

Futa Camara, the village’s adopted father, emphasised that the celebration highlights the significance of cultural preservation. “This is not idol worship… it’s a reverence for our culture. These sites serve as protectors for us,” he clarified.

Mr. Camara further noted that the sites were passed down from their ancestors and provide protection and fortune to the community and anyone seeking their blessings.

“To seek blessings from this place, you must come with someone from Marena Kunda. Anything you request by the grace of Allah will be granted. It depends on your intentions, but this is pure and has nothing to do with idol worship,” he added.

Kemeseng Marena, a youth mobilizer in the village, expressed the desire to preserve this culture for future generations.

“These sites are more than mere locations; they protect us and bring significant prosperity to the community. When this event approaches, we are alerted through the sites because they communicate with us,” he told reporters.

The community firmly believes that these inherited spiritual sites hold the village’s secrets.

“I was born into this tradition, and it is our strength, secret, and identity,” he remarked.

Known as a place where prayers are answered, Namasita is also thought to possess spiritual powers that can harm anyone who fails to honour a promise made after their issue is resolved.

“Once you make a promise to fulfil after your problem is solved, you must do so once you are satisfied. If you choose to disregard it, you will face consequences. A ram will appear in your dream to warn you three times, and if you don’t fulfil it, you will die,” warned Futa Camara, the village’s paternal figure.

Each secret site is under the custody of different families in Kudang.

The festival offers a truly immersive cultural experience, featuring a wide array of traditional events and performances that are a treat for both participants and spectators.

A Region on Pause: High Court Freezes Football in URR in Legal Showdown

By Muhammed Lamin Drammeh

In a landmark ruling that has sent shockwaves through the Gambian football community, the High Court of The Gambia has ordered a suspension of all football activities in the Upper River Region (URR), affecting competitions organised by the Upper River Region Football Association (URRFA). The ruling, handed down on June 25, follows a fierce legal dispute involving four local clubs: Kuteh Jonbul FC, Niomuta United FC, Briffu FC, and Tabanding FC. The court’s verdict halts not only the URRFA’s Third Division League and its upcoming elective congress but also underscores deeper concerns over governance, fairness, and adherence to the rule of law within the realm of Gambian sports. 

The Spark of the Dispute

The saga began in September 2024, when the four clubs participated in a capacity-building training program organised by the district sports committee and led by Team Restore Confidence (TRC). Spearheaded by TRC chairman Sadibou Kamaso, the day-long workshop in Basse, aimed to equip club administrators with critical skills in governance, management, and operational strategies. Kamaso emphasised the importance of such training for fostering sustainable leadership and grassroots football development, urging participants to apply their newfound knowledge to elevate their clubs.

However, the URRFA viewed the clubs’ participation as an act of defiance. The association had explicitly warned the clubs against attending the training, alleging it violated their regulations. In response, the URRFA expelled the four clubs from the Third Division League and barred them from all football activities under its jurisdiction. The clubs, stunned by what they deemed an unjust and heavy-handed punishment, argued that their participation was lawful and aimed at advancing football development in the region.

The Legal Battle Unfolds

The civil suit, filed on 21 March 2025 and led by counsel J. Jobarteh, challenges the “validity and lawfulness” of the expulsion. The aggrieved clubs demanded reinstatement into the Third Division League and a declaration that a URRFA constitutional clause barring access to ordinary courts is “null and void”. They further sought an interlocutory injunction to suspend both the ongoing Third Division League and the URRFA’s elective congress, which is scheduled for 4 May 2025, until the matter is resolved.

The URRFA, represented by counsel A. Fatty, responded on 13 May with a motion to stay the proceedings. The association argues that the clubs failed to exhaust internal dispute resolution mechanisms, as outlined in Articles 17.3 to 17.5 of the URRFA Constitution, as well as in the statutes of the Gambia Football Federation (GFF) and FIFA.

Citing the option to appeal to the URRFA General Assembly or escalate the matter to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) under FIFA, the URRFA maintains that the High Court lacked jurisdiction. It warned that allowing the case to proceed would set a “dangerous precedent” for football governance both regionally and internationally.

The Court’s Ruling: A Game-Changer

In a meticulously reasoned ruling, Justice Coker navigated the complex interplay between the clubs’ right to seek justice and the URRFA’s insistence on internal remedies. The court granted the clubs’ request for an interlocutory injunction, restraining the URRFA from continuing the Third Division League for the 2024/2025 season or holding its elective congress until the substantive suit is resolved. Simultaneously, the court upheld the URRFA’s motion to stay the proceedings, directing both parties to pursue internal dispute resolution mechanisms as outlined in the URRFA Constitution.

The ruling highlighted a critical point: the “res”, the continuation of the league and the elective congress, must be preserved to prevent irreparable harm while the dispute is resolved. With the league season set to conclude on June 30, 2025, the court noted that the timeline had lost relevance, but the broader implications for fairness and governance in Gambian football remain at stake.

The court also addressed a preliminary issue raised by the clubs’ counsel, who accused the URRFA of “approbating and reprobating” by challenging the court’s jurisdiction while simultaneously seeking its intervention. While acknowledging this argument, Justice Coker emphasised that the court’s role was to ensure justice without prejudicing the substantive claims, which include allegations that the URRFA violated its own constitutional procedures for suspensions and expulsions.

A Region on Pause

The High Court’s decision has put football in the URR in a state of uncertainty, leaving fans, players, and administrators grappling with unpredictable outcomes. The Third Division League, a vital platform for grassroots talent, is currently suspended, and the elections for the leadership of the URRFA are on hold. For the four clubs involved, the ruling presents a bittersweet victory: while their expulsion is still being examined, their potential reinstatement depends on the results of internal negotiations or further legal actions.

The case has sparked heated debates across the region. Supporters of the clubs argue that the URRFA’s actions reflect an abuse of power and a resistance to progressive training initiatives. “These clubs were trying to improve themselves for the good of football,” said one local fan, who requested anonymity. “Expelling them without a fair hearing is unfair and kills the spirit of the game.” Meanwhile, URRFA defenders insist that the clubs’ defiance of directives warranted disciplinary action and that internal mechanisms should resolve such disputes to maintain order in football governance.

The Road Ahead

The case is adjourned until October 14, 2025, at 10:30 a.m., when the court will review the progress of the internal dispute resolution process. Both parties are now tasked with engaging in good-faith negotiations under the URRFA’s constitutional framework, with the possibility of escalating the matter to FIFA’s Court of Arbitration for Sport if internal remedies fail.

This legal standoff raises broader questions about the balance between autonomy and accountability in sports governance. As the URRFA and the clubs prepare for their next moves, the eyes of Gambian football fans remain fixed on Basse, where the future of the region’s beloved sport hangs in the balance.

For now, the pitch is silent, but the battle in the courtroom is just heating up.

National Assembly Committees Target Ministers Sanyang and Jobe in Russian Oil Investigation Fallout

Written by: Seringe S.T. Touray

The National Assembly has moved decisively against alleged obstruction of the $30 million Russian oil scandal investigation, with lawmakers Thursday authorizing censure proceedings targeting two cabinet ministers.

The scandal involves allegations of irregular petroleum transactions worth US $30 million, initially flagged by the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) for suspicious activity. The investigation began last July when Lower Saloum National Assembly Member (NAM) Sainey Jawara tabled a motion to establish a commission to probe the alleged illegal importation of approximately 36,935.614 tonnes of petroleum—valued at US $30 million—into The Gambia by three companies: Apogee FZC, a Dubai-based company later registered locally as Apogee Company Limited; Creed Energy Limited, a company registered in The Gambia; and Ultimate Beige Logistics, also registered in The Gambia under the name Ultimate Beige Logistic (Gambia) Company Limited.

National Assembly investigators have assembled evidence suggesting systematic attempts to derail criminal investigations into suspicious petroleum transactions. The committees documented what they described as “serious procedural violations, inconsistencies, and evidence of interference during the investigation, which in turn revealed weaknesses in criminal investigations, institutional accountability, and oversight within the police force.”

Interior Minister Abdoulie Sanyang, who transitioned from his previous role as Inspector General of Police (IGP), now faces allegations from National Assembly committees regarding a potential conflict of interest.

The committee noted that Minister Sanyang “failed to give a full disclosure of his involvement in the matter and gave a ‘contradictory statement'” when he claimed that he was not formally informed of the FIU report’s investigation and only became aware of the report during an informal conversation with Pa Alieu Jawara, the Commissioner of Special Investigation Unit (SIU) of the police. However, evidence showed he minuted the said FIU report to the SIU and also received a call from Minister Abdoulie Jobe informing him that one of their international traders [Aurimas Steiblys] was in police custody.

Meanwhile, Tourism Minister Abdoulie Jobe—previously responsible for petroleum policy—faces allegations from the committee. The committee said Minister Jobe “may have committed misconduct in office” in his role in the purported government policy that allowed owners of the Russian oil Apogee FZC to deposit their product at the Gam Petroleum depot, giving them a monopoly over local oil marketing companies who were forced to switch at a high financial cost from buying directly from their traditional international traders to Apogee.

The committee revealed that this purported government policy did not go through the due consultative process required and there was no evidence of its approval by cabinet, even though Minister Jobe claimed that it was discussed there. Lawmakers also reported that the minister allegedly interfered in the police investigations following the arrest of the principal suspect in the case, Mr Aurimas Steiblys, who was arrested, detained briefly and released without charges before he reportedly absconded.

Beyond the ministerial censures, the committee made sweeping recommendations for sanctions against multiple institutions and individuals. The committee recommended for the immediate suspension of the General manager of Gam Petroleum, Yoro Jallow, and initiation of criminal perjury proceedings against him for “deliberately misleading” the National Assembly. The committee found that Jallow allegedly acted as an agent for Apogee FZC in the sale of the oil, was allegedly not truthful in his testimony, and was allegedly complicit in “institutional failures” and “conflicts of interest” that facilitated “preferential treatment, regulatory evasion, and monopolistic practices” in favour of Apogee FZC.

Rather than pursuing informal disciplinary measures, the National Assembly has opted for the more serious step of formal censure proceedings—a mechanism that carries significant political and potential legal ramifications. Regarding the Interior Minister, the report states: “The National Assembly should initiate proceedings to censure the Minister for Interior, Hon. Abdoulie Sanyang (former Inspector General of the Police), for his alleged role in prematurely halting the police investigation in the report of the Financial Intelligence Unit, and for failing to keep proper command authority in the handling of the investigation.”

For the Tourism Minister, the National Assembly declared: “The National Assembly initiates censure proceedings against the Former Minister of Petroleum, Abdoulie Jobe, who may have committed misconduct in office in his role in the purported policy (MOPE/GOGP/PP/002) as referenced in the letter dated 30th October 2023 and interference into the police investigations.”

National Assembly committees have outlined sweeping changes to petroleum sector oversight, with the report stating: “All purported petroleum policies be reviewed by Cabinet, formalized, and gazetted henceforth before implementation.” The reforms include mandatory competitive processes for import applications, with the report specifying: “That all ullage applications should be subject to competitive review. Any Ministry official found complicit in supporting exclusivity deals must be subjected to administrative disciplinary measures.”

The committee also found that a number of public and private institutions allegedly failed in carrying out their duties and due diligence in the oil saga, including the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, Central Bank of The Gambia, Gambia Revenue Authority, Gambia Ports Authority, Ecobank and Access Bank Gambia. Consequently, the committee recommended for the executive to administratively hold the heads of the police, Gambia Ports Authority (GPA) and the Central Bank to account for their inaction following receipt of intelligence report from the FIU.

The Attorney General has received a 90-day mandate to establish an independent investigation panel focusing on police conduct during the original probe. The report directs: “The Attorney General and Minister for Justice constitute a special panel to further investigate the conduct of Officer Commanding, Mr. Pa Alieu Jawara, in the investigation into the report of the Financial Intelligence Unit” and “The Attorney General and Minister for Justice constitute a special panel independent to investigate the procedure adopted by the police in the investigation of the STR report against Mr. Aurimas and report to the National Assembly within 90 days of the tabling of this report.”

The National Assembly has warned that non-compliance with its directives will trigger progressive sanctions. The report explicitly states: “Failure to comply with these resolutions shall attract consequences, including administrative sanctions, suspension, dismissal, or criminal prosecution as applicable.”

From Risk to Readiness: NDMA Empowers Riverbelt Communities to Hold Back the Floods

Written by: Alieu Jallow

As climate change continues to drive erratic weather and rising waters, the National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) is stepping up efforts to protect vulnerable communities. On Friday, 27th June 2025, the agency launched a three-day capacity-building workshop for volunteers living along the river belt, focusing on sensitization around flood barriers and disaster preparedness.

Held in partnership with the GREAT Institute and supported by the British High Commission, the training is part of a wider project aimed at “Building resilience to climate shocks to reduce internal and irregular migration in The Gambia,” funded to the tune of £150,000.

Delivering the keynote address, NDMA Executive Director Sanna Dahaba emphasized the growing urgency of proactive disaster risk reduction in the face of worsening climate conditions.

“As climate change accelerates and weather patterns grow more unpredictable, the need for preparation has never been more urgent,” Dahaba said. “River rise floods are not just natural events; they are sometimes human-triggered by our own lack of readiness. They destroy farmland, damage homes, displace families, and disrupt livelihoods. But we are not powerless,” he stated.

He highlighted flood barriers as one of the most effective defenses against rising river waters.

“These structures, whether permanent or temporary, act as shields, holding back waters that would otherwise engulf our streets, homes, and hotels. But a flood barrier is only as strong as the community that understands and supports it. Everyone, from children to the elderly, must know how they work, why they matter, and how to act when flood warnings are issued,” he outlined.

Dahaba also raised concerns about climate-induced migration, warning that environmental threats are becoming a major driver of displacement along riverine communities. He urged continuous sensitization efforts, stressing that building resilience goes beyond one-off workshops.

“Awareness is not a one-time event. It’s a continuous process of engagement, trust-building, and shared responsibility. Let us build not just barriers against floods, but bridges of understanding and cooperation,” Dahaba stressed.

The training drew volunteers from flood-prone communities across the river belt, equipping them with practical knowledge and tools to better respond to emergencies.

Olly Touray, a community worker and participant, said the sessions would improve her outreach work.

“The knowledge gained will help me educate others on flood prevention and make our communities safer,” she stated.

Abdoulie Boto Gaye, chairperson of the Sanyang Village Development Committee and managing director of Sanyang Ecotourism Camp, described the training as timely and impactful. He pledged to organize a step-down training in his community in partnership with the NDMA.

“Our Village Development Committee (VDC) will partner with the National Disaster Management Agency to carry out community sensitization at the grassroots level. We plan to hold these sessions at the community ground, where their presence will add great value. With this collaboration, we aim to reach all 14,000 residents of Kombo Sanyang so that everyone is informed, aware, and prepared,” he outlined.

As The Gambia braces for the rainy season, the NDMA’s message is clear: preparedness starts with people. And when communities are informed, equipped, and engaged, they don’t just survive disasters—they help prevent them.

“The System is Polluted”: Mayor Rohey Malick Lowe’s Testimony Reveals Structural Weaknesses in Gambian Local Government

Written by: Seringe S.T. Touray

In a testimony before the Local Government Commission of Inquiry on Wednesday, June 25th, Mayor Rohey Malick Lowe of Banjul City Council (BCC) described various aspects of local government operations in The Gambia, outlining structural issues that have affected governance at the municipal level. The session was led by Patrick Gomez, the commission’s lead counsel.

The testimony addressed gaps between legal frameworks and actual practice in local government administration, detailing how mayors have been operating within constraints despite holding positions of formal authority.

Mayor Lowe’s testimony centered on the practical limitations of mayoral power within local councils. Despite legal provisions establishing hierarchical structures, she testified that the actual operations of councils often differ from statutory requirements.

“The CEOs and the administration have people behind them. If I say I don’t have powers, please believe me,” Mayor Lowe explained, describing how Chief Executive Officers function in day-to-day operations. This power dynamic has created a system where mayors often assume ceremonial roles, while technical staff control critical decisions.

The mayor described her attempts to engage with the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development: “You write to the ministry complaining about something, and they will tell you directly, ‘Don’t ever write us. The CEO has the authority to write us.’ So there are a lot of frustrations in council.”

This statement indicates how the governance structure has been implemented, with mayors finding themselves excluded from communications with higher authorities. Mayor Lowe’s testimony detailed the impact of these limitations: “If you have a CEO who doesn’t have respect, he will relegate you, and this is the truth.”

A significant portion of the testimony focused on what appeared to be a procedural issue—the non-forwarding of Senior Management Team (SMT) meeting minutes to the mayor. This issue revealed aspects of information flow and accountability within the council.

“Most of my communications with the ministry, I just go talk to them, the permanent secretary, and I come back and sit down. But from this commission I learned that writing is very good,” Mayor Lowe testified, acknowledging her previous reliance on informal communication channels.

She further explained the nature of verbal briefings: “What I would like to establish here is that he will not give us the minutes, but he will explain to us directly what has happened. That is the gap—we don’t have something in writing. What happens is that one person says this and the other one says that.”

This practice of relying on undocumented agreements created situations where accountability became difficult to establish, as Mayor Lowe acknowledged: “There are gentleman agreements, which I’m not trying to say should happen.”

The testimony also addressed financial management and expenditure authority. It detailed a disconnect between legal provisions and practical implementation regarding spending limits and approval processes. Additional testimony revealed further complications in financial procedures, including misunderstandings about basic financial concepts and authorization processes.

Despite legal requirements for councils to establish monetary spending limits that determine what level of authority is required for different expenditure amounts, Mayor Lowe stated that Banjul City Council had not effectively implemented such measures. When questioned about her efforts to establish these financial controls, she testified:

“I have written to say that if their spending amounts to something, let them inform me. I wrote a memo to the CEO. I cannot remember exactly, but it’s more than three times. I cannot remember exactly how much I wrote, but I know that it doesn’t work.”

When asked about appropriate monetary limits above which she should be consulted, the mayor suggested amounts between D200,000 and D300,000: “It might be D200,000 or D300,000. I can’t answer why that is. What I did was make an effort to know what is going on, but it’s supposed to be a mandatory directive. It’s supposed to be a practice that must happen. In the language of the law, it must happen.”

Her testimony regarding the failure to implement financial controls included: “Now you have written several times, the CEO must follow, and it was never followed. Who is at fault? I can’t tell exactly.”

The testimony also revealed issues with delegation and payment authorization. Mayor Lowe acknowledged situations where staff members initiated financial requests using her authority without her direct involvement.

Additionally, the testimony addressed confusion about financial classifications. “We thought that it was an imprest,” she stated, referring to how certain payments were categorized by her team. An imprest system is typically used for small, urgent expenses that cannot wait for normal procurement procedures. However, Mayor Lowe later acknowledged that the issue stemmed from the choice of words, explaining that all payments were generally categorized as imprest, regardless of whether they met the criteria for urgent or emergency expenses. She added that this practice is still ongoing.

The testimony further addressed confusion about advisory roles versus decision-making authority. Mayor Lowe described consulting with the Chief Executive Officer on payment decisions, referring to “advisory input.” However, testimony revealed that “advice from the CEO is not binding.” When asked about rejections of her requests, Mayor Lowe stated that “more of her vouchers were rejected than approved,” although she acknowledged that she did not document these interactions.

Mayor Lowe’s testimony indicated that the problems at Banjul City Council were part of broader operational patterns. In one of her statements, she declared: “What I want to tell you is that the system is polluted. I’m not talking about others—I am specifically talking about my own council. You will not know some of the things that happened, but later I think all those things will be revealed.”

The mayor’s description of the council’s operational challenges included: “When we came into office, we didn’t even have a single page of handover notes, and most of us were new. If you check, probably 90% of what we have done was wrong. We were moving and doing things thinking, ‘Okay, these people were doing it like this, so let us follow them.’ That is how they were doing it, and that is how we were doing it.”

This cycle of inherited practices has created what the mayor described as a gap between legal requirements and operational reality. She acknowledged the guidance that proper legal frameworks could provide: “The law will guide you if you follow it. It’s not perfect—it has so many areas that need to be reviewed to help you in administration on a daily basis—but it’s more perfect than not having or not following regulations.”

The testimony also addressed Mayor Lowe’s knowledge about EU-funded projects within her jurisdiction. Her statement indicated the extent to which mayors have been informed about such activities: “I saw people who passed here before me—witnesses, more than 20 of them—talking about the EU project. I am at the city council, but I don’t know them. I have never met them. I only saw them sitting here before the commission.” This situation represents a gap in local government information sharing, as elected officials remained uninformed about major activities in their jurisdictions.

Throughout her testimony, Mayor Lowe acknowledged shortcomings in her knowledge and expressed a willingness to learn. She stated that the commission had helped her understand the importance of proper documentation and formal procedures. “From this commission I learned a lot, and I realized that writing is very important,” she testified.

She also conveyed appreciation for the commission’s role in shedding light on administrative processes. “What I want to assure you is the respect that I have for this commission and the appreciation that I have for this commission. It seems the commission came specifically for me to learn. I will have nothing to hide, and however difficult it is, I will tell you this is how it happened because I learned a lot,” she said.

In response to questions about her leadership, Mayor Lowe emphasized her approach to responsibility and transparency. “As a leader, you take responsibility. I take the responsibility. I used to sit in my room listening to this commission, and normally I learn a lot. I used to hear things that my council was not doing,” she explained. Reflecting on her role, she added, “I am the one sitting in this position. I don’t want to sit here and be very shameful and later try to make excuses. I would be very ashamed to do that here. I learned a lot, and as I said, what you learn as a leader—when you agree to do something, you need to make it clear.”

Mayor Rohey Malick Lowe’s testimony before the Local Government Commission of Inquiry revealed challenges in legal framework implementation, mayoral authority, and financial controls within Gambian local government. Her statements suggested that governance improvements would require both structural reforms and cultural changes in operations. The commission’s findings may inform future decisions on strengthening local council administration.

Famara Kanyi Becomes First Gambian Journalist Selected for Oxford Climate Journalism Network

By Alieu Jallow

Famara Kanyi, the Gambia Radio and Television Services (GRTS) Regional Correspondent for the North Bank Region, has been selected for the prestigious Oxford Climate Journalism Network (OCJN), becoming the first Gambian-born journalist to join the global fellowship.

Organised by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, the OCJN is a six-month international fellowship designed to equip journalists with the tools, knowledge, and networks necessary to enhance their climate change reporting. Although primarily held online, the program has drawn journalists from across the globe, including Musa Sheriff, a Sierra Leonean journalist based in The Gambia, who participated in a previous cohort.

Kanyi expressed pride and gratitude for the opportunity.

“I’m incredibly proud of this achievement. Being selected for the OCJN fellowship at Oxford is a significant milestone for me, not just professionally but personally as well. It’s a recognition of the hard work I’ve put into environmental journalism, and it motivates me to continue pushing boundaries and telling stories that matter,” he said.

With over 15 years of experience in journalism and development communication, Kanyi has served as a regional correspondent across the North Bank and Lower River regions. He has worked closely with UN agencies, community-based organisations, and civil society groups, focusing on climate change advocacy, policy engagement, and community resilience.

“Throughout my stay in rural Gambia, I have worked with several community-based organisations, NGOs, government, and UN agencies on climate advocacy and environmental sustainability. I have brought the ordeals of many communities bearing the impacts of climate change, pushed forward local mitigation strategies, as well as adaptation mechanisms. Today, I am a proud climate justice advocate and a journalist,” he states.

Kanyi emphasised the importance of representing Gambian environmental journalists on the international stage.

“Our country faces unique environmental challenges, and I see this as a chance to shine a light on those issues on an international platform. I want to bring visibility to the stories that often go unheard and show that even from a small country, impactful journalism can make a difference,” he said.

He added that he hopes the OCJN training will help him grow both technically and intellectually.

“I hope to deepen my understanding of environmental science and policy, improve my storytelling techniques, and learn how to engage audiences more effectively. Ultimately, I want to amplify the voice of my community and contribute to meaningful environmental change through informed and compelling storytelling.” He states

The Oxford Climate Journalism Network is part of a growing global push to improve the quality and depth of climate reporting. Kanyi’s inclusion highlights the increasing relevance of African voices in global climate discourse.

Gambian Student Becomes First Black Valedictorian at Turkish University

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By: The Fatu Network Newsroom

Modou Lamin Cham, a Gambian student, has graduated from Ankara Sosyal Bilimler University (Social Sciences University of Ankara) in Turkey with multiple academic distinctions. Cham completed his Bachelor of Science degree in Economics and received several prestigious honors during his graduation ceremony.

The graduate was named Valedictorian for the Class of 2025 and recognized as the Best Graduating Student in the Economics Department. His academic performance earned him Highest Honors recognition and Summa Cum Laude distinction. Additionally, Cham received the Best International Student Award from the university.

Cham is reported to be the first Black student and first international student to be named Valedictorian in the university’s history. This milestone represents a significant achievement within the institution’s academic community.

Cham has indicated plans to pursue a master’s degree and has expressed that support or sponsorship would be appreciated for his continued education. The achievement represents a notable academic accomplishment for a student from The Gambia studying abroad in Turkey’s higher education system.

Kanifing Municipal Council Selected as Global Finalist in Bloomberg Philanthropies 2025 Mayors Challenge

Written by: The Fatu Network Newsroom

Kanifing Municipal Council (KMC) has been selected as one of 50 global finalists in the 2025 Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayors Challenge, marking a significant achievement for the Gambian municipality in the international arena of urban innovation.

In announcing their selection, KMC expressed pride in the achievement, stating on their official social media: “We are proud to announce that Kanifing Municipal Council (KMC) has been selected as one of 50 global finalists in the prestigious 2025 Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayors Challenge! Selected from over 630 applications across 33 countries, KMC’s innovative proposal stood out for its bold approach to tackling real urban challenges and improving lives.”

The municipality emphasized the significance of the recognition, noting: “This global recognition is a testament to our ongoing commitment to innovation, sustainable development, and delivering better services for the people of Kanifing.”

The selection represents a notable accomplishment, with KMC being chosen from over 630 applications submitted by municipalities across 33 countries. The competition attracted cities from diverse regions, from Boise to Belfast, and from Ansan to Addis Ababa, representing over 80 million residents collectively.

According to Bloomberg Philanthropies, the 50 finalist ideas were selected based on three key criteria: originality, potential for impact, and credible vision for delivery. The submitted proposals aimed to address various urban challenges including increasing public transit ridership, lowering household energy costs, expanding urban green space, improving service response times, strengthening sanitation systems, enhancing youth safety, and safeguarding water supply.

As a finalist, KMC will receive $50,000 to prototype their proposed solution. The municipality will also participate in Bloomberg Philanthropies’ Ideas Camp scheduled for July 2025, where city officials will work alongside experts and fellow finalists to refine and test their concepts.

The competition will advance to a second phase in January 2026, when 25 cities with the most promising ideas will each receive $1 million in funding plus operational assistance to implement their proposals. This represents an expansion from previous Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayors Challenge rounds, which typically selected between 5 to 15 winners.

The 2025 Mayors Challenge reflects diverse regional priorities and challenges. According to the competition data, approximately one-third of U.S. and Canadian applicants focused on housing and shelter solutions, while nearly half of African applicants proposed improvements to waste collection and management systems. In the Asia-Pacific region, one in five applicants concentrated on cleaner water, air, and infrastructure, and 22 percent of European applicants sought poverty reduction or social inclusion enhancements.

KMC joins other notable cities in the finalist list, including major metropolitan areas such as Seoul, Toronto, Barcelona, and Detroit, as well as other African cities like Addis Ababa, Cape Town, and Benin City.

James Anderson, who leads the Government Innovation program at Bloomberg Philanthropies, emphasized the practical nature of municipal innovation, stating that it involves “solving hard problems under pressure, often with imperfect tools and finite resources.” He noted that the selected finalists distinguish themselves by designing solutions that address both implementation complexity and urgent resident needs.

The program’s advisory committee includes Professor Lesley Lokko OBE, Founder and Chair of the African Futures Institute, and Admiral Michael G. Mullen, President & CEO of MGM Consulting, who will work with finalist cities to advance their proposals.

The 2025 Mayors Challenge builds on more than a decade of Bloomberg Philanthropies’ work in supporting urban innovation. Previous competition rounds have provided 38 winning cities with funding and technical assistance to implement their ideas. Through replication support, the program has extended its impact to 337 additional cities globally, reaching over 100 million residents worldwide.

Bloomberg Philanthropies distributed $3.7 billion in 2024 across its focus areas of Arts, Education, Environment, Government Innovation, and Public Health, operating in 700 cities across 150 countries.

The Ideas Camp in July 2025 will serve as a crucial development phase for KMC and other finalists, providing opportunities for peer learning and expert guidance. The final selection of 25 winning cities will be announced in January 2026, with implementation support extending beyond the initial funding through Bloomberg Philanthropies’ expanded Cities Idea Exchange platform.

KMC’s inclusion among the finalists positions the municipality as a recognized participant in global discussions about urban innovation and sustainable development, regardless of the final competition outcome. The achievement demonstrates the municipality’s capacity to develop solutions that meet international standards for innovation and implementation feasibility.

North Bank Governor Calls for Change in Government Attitude Towards Punctuality and Commitment

Written by: Alieu Jallow

The Governor of the North Bank Region, Lamin Saidyhkan, has issued a strong call for an attitudinal shift towards punctuality and accountability among government institutions. His remarks come on the heels of repeated delays and absenteeism by certain departments during the ongoing Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) meeting held in his office in Kerewan.

The meeting, which forms part of the accountability mechanism supported by ActionAid The Gambia through its Local Rights Programme, aims to foster transparency and effective coordination between development partners and regional institutions.

In an exclusive interview with The Fatu Network, Governor Saidyhkan expressed his disappointment at the poor attendance and late arrival of some institutions, warning that such a trend will no longer be tolerated.

“We need to change our mindset, and it starts with being punctual whether at work or even at home. You have to plan, follow through, and take ownership of your responsibilities. That’s the reason we’re assigned to these positions.

“If you look at the first quarter meeting compared to this one, it was clear they didn’t take the first seriously enough. But we’re in these roles for a reason, and we all have Terms of Reference to fulfill. At the end of the day, you’re expected to deliver. The turnout back then was disappointing, so I decided it was time for a shift in approach—a new system altogether. This time, I made it very clear: the meeting starts at the set time, and even being one minute late means you don’t get in. I enforced that without exception. Military officers showed up late—I sent them back. Staff from the Ministry of Public Service showed up late—I also sent them home for lateness. As governor, I will not compromise on punctuality,” he emphasized.

Governor Saidyhkan emphasized that the time has come for a shift in how institutions approach their responsibilities, especially when it comes to time management and service delivery.

“The time has come for a paradigm shift, especially in terms of executing the duties assigned to each institution. I will not shy away from holding any institution accountable for their irresponsible actions,” he warned.

To ensure compliance and performance, the Governor revealed plans to introduce a monitoring and evaluation mechanism aimed at identifying underperforming institutions and personnel.

“Any government department or staff who consistently fall below the minimum standards will be flagged. Their cases will be forwarded to the central government for appropriate action. My office will not entertain complacency. We have a nation to build, and a people to serve,” he stated.

The governor’s strong stance signals a renewed commitment to public sector efficiency in the North Bank Region, particularly as stakeholders work towards better coordination and service delivery at the grassroots level.

Gambia Sets Fertilizer Price at GMD 1,100 Per Bag with GMD 1,875 Government Subsidy

Written by: The Fatu Network Newsroom

The Gambian Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Security announced today that fertilizer will be sold to farmers at GMD 1,100 per bag for the current farming season, with 28,892 metric tons (577,800 bags) available for nationwide distribution.

The government is providing a substantial subsidy of GMD 1,875 per bag to make fertilizer affordable and boost agricultural productivity. The ministry warned that transporting fertilizer across national borders remains illegal and carries strict penalties.

Additionally, agents with outstanding debts to the National Food Security Processing and Marketing Corporation from last year’s fertilizer sales must settle all arrears immediately or face disqualification from the upcoming distribution exercise, with new agents being recruited to ensure timely delivery to farmers.

Photo: Demba Sabally, Minister of Agriculture

Gambia College Students Demand Reliable Internet or Refund of Mandatory ICT Fee

Written by: Dawda Baldeh

Scores of students at The Gambia College are demanding improved internet services or the complete removal of the mandatory D1,000 annual internet fee. Fatima Jabbie, a second-year student at the college, is among those affected by the persistent poor connectivity.

“This year, I decided not to pay, but our student executives said if I don’t, I won’t be cleared by the accounts office or allowed to register my courses,” she said. “It’s unfair to pay D1,000 for nothing, because the purpose of the payment is not being fulfilled.”

Students say the network is so poor that they even struggle to send basic text messages. Bubacarr Jarju, another student, lamented the ongoing frustration they endure on campus due to the unreliable internet. “We are using our personal data to do research. The Wi-Fi connections on campus are poor,” he told The Fatu Network. Like many others, Jarju said the internet cannot adequately serve the college’s student population. “If the school cannot provide us with reliable internet, they should remove the fee so we can buy our own data. It’s not about the amount—it’s the lack of service,” he emphasized.

Despite the seemingly small amount, Mr. Jarju said the school administration does not understand how difficult it is for some students to come up with D1,000. “The administration is only interested in students paying the fee, but not in the service students receive after paying,” he alleged. “Sometimes, students have to leave their classrooms to find internet access elsewhere just to submit their work or conduct research.”

This medium understands that the annual ICT fee is intended to cover internet access and the student portal. However, many students remain frustrated by the consistently poor service. The Gambia College has an estimated enrollment of over 11,000 students across its campuses, meaning that for every 1,000 students, the school collects D1 million in ICT fees. With such a large student base, students argue there is no excuse for the lack of reliable internet service.

Babucarr Gassama, a former student union executive, clarified that their concerns are not about the fee itself. “We are disappointed that the service we’re receiving does not reflect the value of the payment. Students deserve a reliable and strong internet connection to support their academic needs, especially in an age where online research, virtual learning, and access to educational resources are essential,” he said.

Students are now urging the college administration to address the issue and take immediate steps to improve internet infrastructure. Efforts to reach the school administration and the student union for comment were unsuccessful at the time of this report.

GTSC Wins ‘Best Transport Services – West Africa’ Award

Written by: The Fatu Network Editorial

The Gambia Transport Services Company (GTSC) has been awarded “Best Transport Services – West Africa” by African Travel Quarterly, a Ghana-based travel magazine that focuses on travel and tourism issues in West Africa.

The award recognizes GTSC’s role in connecting people and places across West Africa. African Travel Quarterly is described as the first travel magazine in West Africa dedicated solely to travel and tourism matters.

Ikechi Uko, publisher of African Travel Quarterly, stated in a congratulatory message: “As one of the key players in regional road transport, your services have made it easier for travelers, tourism and business people to move across borders with ease. Your commitment to safety, affordability, and regular routes has helped support tourism, regional trade, and cultural exchange across cities and countries.”

GTSC General Manager Seedy Kanyi responded to the award announcement, saying: “The Board, Management, and the entire staff of GTSC are highly elated by this unexpected yet deeply appreciated award. It comes as a pleasant surprise and a powerful reminder that the work we do does not go unnoticed. This recognition is not just a testament to our individual and collective efforts, but also a reflection of our unwavering commitment to excellence in public transport service delivery.”

Kanyi added: “It is truly gratifying to know that stakeholders beyond the borders of The Gambia are observing and appreciating the strides we are making. Such acknowledgment inspires us to aim higher, continue improving, and deliver even greater value to our customers, partners, and the general public.”

According to the press release, the GTSC team has expressed gratitude to African Travel Quarterly and reaffirmed its dedication to providing transport services both locally and across the sub-region.

The award ceremony is scheduled to take place in Accra, Ghana, on Friday, June 27, 2025. The event will bring together tour operators, government officials, and business leaders from Ghana, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and The Gambia.

Senegal Destroys 225 Hectares of Cannabis, Seizes 3,700kg in Major Island Raid

Written by: The Fatu Network Newsroom

A major anti-drug operation in Senegal’s Karone Islands, located in the Casamance region, has led to the destruction of 225 hectares of marijuana (cannabis) cultivation—an area larger than 320 football fields—and the seizure of over 3.7 tons (3,700 kilograms) of marijuana.

The week-long joint operation, conducted from June 14 to 20, involved the army, gendarmerie (military police), and customs officers. It targeted five islands in the area: Hilol, Kouba, Salé Ndiaye, Itouta, and Kaïlo. Authorities arrested 12 individuals, including four Guinean nationals, while screening hundreds of people, vehicles, and motorcycles.

The seized drugs, packed in 453 bags and valued at approximately 373 million CFA francs (approx. 47.4 million Dalasis), were presented to Interior Minister Jean Baptiste Tine in Ziguinchor earlier today. Authorities also collected 409,000 CFA (approx. 52,000 Dalasis) francs in fines during the operation.

North Bank Nutrition Officer Calls for Urgent Action as 17% of Children Under Five Are Stunted

Written by: Alieu Jallow

The Nutrition Field Officer for the North Bank Region, Gibril Sanneh, has issued a strong call for urgent, multi-sectoral, and sustained action to address the rising malnutrition rates in the region. His remarks come in response to findings from the 2019–2020 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), which revealed that 17% of children under five in the North Bank Region are stunted—meaning they suffer from low height for their age due to chronic malnutrition.

Speaking to The Fatu Network in a side interview during the ongoing Technical Advisory Committee meeting held at the Governor’s Office and supported by ActionAid The Gambia, Sanneh warned that the region’s nutrition indicators are deteriorating at an alarming rate.

“As the Nutrition Field Officer serving the North Bank Region West, I wish to bring to your attention the ongoing nutritional challenges that continue to affect the health and development of our population—particularly children under five and women of reproductive age,” he said.

According to the DHS 2019–2020, 18% of children under five are stunted nationally, 12% are underweight, and 5% are wasted. Regionally, the North Bank ranks fourth in stunting at 17%, behind CRR North (Kuntaur) at 25%, URR at 21%, and CRR South (Janjangbureh) at 19%.

Data from April and May 2025, collected through the mother-led MUAC program, show that 3,734 boys and 3,851 girls were found to be well-nourished. However, 62 boys and 72 girls were moderately malnourished, while eight children (both boys and girls) were classified as severely malnourished. Additionally, 38 children are currently undergoing treatment for severe acute malnutrition across 21 facilities in North Bank West.

Sanneh emphasized that these figures call for immediate and coordinated interventions. He urged the government and development partners to:

  1. Scale up nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive programs—especially at the community level—including growth monitoring, micronutrient supplementation, and maternal and child health services.

  2. Strengthen food systems through the promotion of home gardening, climate-smart agriculture, and food fortification to improve access to nutritious foods.

  3. Invest in nutrition education and social and behavior change communication, particularly for adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating mothers, and caregivers of young children.

  4. Increase funding for nutrition programs to enhance early detection and effective management of malnutrition cases.

While commending the ongoing efforts of the government—through NaNA, the Ministry of Health, local authorities, and development partners including UNICEF, the UN system, the World Bank, and civil society organizations—Sanneh stressed that more must be done to tackle the issue.

He concluded with a call to action:

“Together, let us reaffirm our commitment to Zero Hunger and ensure that every child has the right to grow, thrive, and reach their full potential.”

‘Without support, nothing can be achieved’ – Ghancoy 9 Commander Says at EFSTH Medical Equipment Donation

By Dawda Baldeh

The commander of the Ghanaian troops participating in the ECOWAS mission in The Gambia, Lieutenant Colonel Ronne Agbemafle, stated that nothing can be accomplished without mutual support.

He made these statements during the donation of medical equipment by Ghancoy 9 to the Edward Francis Small Teaching Hospital, Ndemban branch in Bakau.

This act of goodwill is part of Ghancoy 9’s ongoing Civil Military Cooperation aimed at alleviating healthcare challenges at the hospital.

“Without assistance, nothing can be achieved. We are not solely here for peacekeeping missions. We are part of a community, and it is essential for us to build a strong relationship with that community,” he remarked.

Lt. Colonel Ronne explained that the mattresses are meant for patient escorts who frequently sleep on mats outside.

“This hospital serves everyone in The Gambia and is doing an exceptional job. This is why we find it important to assist them with this medical equipment,” the Ghancoy 9 Commander told reporters.

He highlighted that enhancing relationships with the communities is vital for facilitating their work.

“We value the efforts this hospital is making,” he added.

Kebba Sanneh, Principal Public Relations Officer at Edward Francis Small Teaching Hospital, stressed the importance of such gestures.

“This is a timely gesture, and on behalf of the hospital, I extend my gratitude to the Ghanaian troops for their support. This is the only main referral hospital in the country, and supporting it equates to supporting everyone,” he explained.

“This facility caters to all. When patients’ conditions become complicated, they come here.”

Mr. Sanneh assured the donors that the items would be used for their intended purpose.

“This will improve service delivery at the hospital,” he added.

The donated equipment includes various medical tools essential for patient treatment.

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