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Opinion: It’s Time We Talk About Our Traditions

By: Seringe ST Touray

The Introduction

The second most feared title in today’s Gambian society is the title of “Njeke.” The Njeke acts as the maid of honor, culturally, serving as a wedding bride’s companion or confidant. She supports the bride emotionally and practically, assisting with wedding preparations and rituals, and representing her in key interactions. The most feared title is “Yai,” meaning ‘mother,’ or ‘mother of the night.’ The bearer of this title guides the bride through the cultural traditions, provides advice on marital responsibilities, and ensures emotional and ceremonial support throughout the wedding process.

On the surface, these roles and responsibilities seem justifiable. Look closer, and you’ll find the unspoken practices of how culture is monetized to bankroll a perfectly prevalent and discriminatory caste system unfolding before our eyes. The social hierarchy comprises the Freeborn (Géer) ruling class, Artisans (Ñeeño), who are traditionally skilled workers (such as Griots, Blacksmiths, and Leatherworkers), servile groups (Jaams), who serve the Freeborn often as laborers or in domestic roles, and, in some cases, religious leaders who hold a respected and separate status.

To add to an already problematic system, the infusion of money has dragged culture to new depths, where many are compelled socially and emotionally to empty their savings to give to a distant relative they’ve never heard of, only to sleep in the dark because they can’t afford electricity. Class-based pride, flamboyance, and an essentially ‘showing off’ attitude have taken our society by storm, with almost every participant silently complaining about the absurd system behind closed doors, yet putting on pretend smiles as they answer the call of their true gods – namely, the cultures and traditions they despise but won’t denounce publicly. To many, the misfortune of being named a Njeke or a Yai seems like a call to a higher cultural power, but one which brings devastating financial consequences.

The Vicious Cycle

The culture of monetary contributions in some of our local traditional weddings creates a cycle of obligation rather than choice, where giving money is an unwritten yet socially enforceable contract. When extended family sends money for a wedding, they expect the same or more when their own children marry. Over time, and historically, inflation and economic downturns make monetary contributions harder to reciprocate, turning this tradition into a burden. This mirrors how banks traditionally lend money with the expectation of interest, knowing the repayment value will potentially exceed the loan. Both systems benefit from changing monetary value favouring the lender while disadvantaging the borrower. This is not to say that all participants are unwilling. In many cases, families will, while expressively dreading every moment among their own trusted inner circle within the extended family, harness their last savings to pour into the tension-filled culture over their own family obligations, from children’s school fees, utility bills, medical bills, and general comfort.

The pressure to contribute financially to wedding ceremonies, especially for those holding the titles of Njeke or Yai, can be devastating. The expectation of financial generosity often forces them to dip into savings meant for other life necessities, creating a cycle of stress and emotional strain as they try to meet these cultural obligations.

The Collector

The bookkeeper, or better known as “The Collector,” manages contributions from guests. They record financial gifts given by attendees, typically announced publicly, sometimes with a loud speaker during the ceremony, along with the names of those who gave money. The official opinion is that this practice is rooted in the culture of transparency, accountability, and acknowledgement. Unofficially – it segregates those that have, and those that have less in a spectacularly classist display. These announcements create intense competition, resulting in pressure. Gifts and contributions to the extended family are largely seen as mandatory regardless of one’s financial situation, forcing people to participate in a culture where their own significance is determined by their financial worth. To some, this is seen as counterproductive to celebrating love, but rather to appease culture. In fact, some families reject their daughter’s choice of partner if her partner’s financial situation doesn’t accommodate such lavish cultural displays – unapologetically choosing waste over affection.

The role of the Njeke or Yai in this environment is especially precarious, as they are expected to maintain appearances and uphold tradition, often at the cost of their own financial well-being. The pressure to contribute financial gifts places them in a difficult position, especially when their own financial resources are limited.

The Extravagance

Disclaimer: this part may be considered sensitive, as it’s grounded in a religious context. In exploring the culture of lavish spending on wedding ceremonies in an economy that cries itself to sleep, I reflected on what motivates people in The Gambia – culture, or religion. The clever ones will say that since religion is a way of life, our culture is a byproduct of our religion. The problem is – this could not be further from the truth. According to a 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom by the United States Department of State, about 96% of our population are Muslims, mainly Sunni, with about 3% Christians, mainly Roman Catholics. Both religious scriptures condemn the attitude of lavish spending and senseless extravagance as a whole.

The Quran, for example, unequivocally teaches that extravagance for the sake of status or self-indulgence is harmful. Surah Al-Isra (17:26-27) (Sahih International) teaches, “And give the relative his right, and also the poor and the traveler, and do not spend wastefully. Indeed, the wasteful are brothers of the devils, and ever has Satan been to his Lord ungrateful.” The verse, linking wasteful spending to negative traits, is similar to Christian teachings against the pursuit of earthly wealth and status. However, without much knowledge or background on Christianity, regrettably, I leave that to a more informed audience to contextualize better. Here’s the point overall – a society that prides itself on religious doctrines has now largely allowed itself, much like with politics, to be governed by materialism.

The financial pressures linked to traditional roles like Njeke and Yai contribute to this materialistic mindset, as these titles are often associated with extravagant expectations that require substantial monetary contributions. The prioritization of material wealth in these cultural and religious contexts has put immense financial strain on those expected to fulfill these roles.

The Conclusion

This prioritization of materialistic culture over faith-based morality or morality as a whole is reminiscent of how many people engage in acts of social contribution, but only for the praise and recognition. It’s reasonable to believe that the titles ‘Njeke’ and ‘Yai,’ originally intended as harmless practices for support, transparency, accountability, and acknowledgment, have over time become increasingly defined by status and materialism, much like many of our most significant institutions.

In fact, over the course of writing this opinion piece, I spoke to many people who directly or indirectly participated in the culture of flamboyance, specifically pertaining to marriage, and all agreed that the material focus on our cultures is an insidious threat. Yet, when you tell them it’s morally wrong to prioritize materialism, what do they say? ‘Everyone else does it…’ or ‘kum nehut bokut’ – a Wollof phrase meaning ‘those who oppose the system do so because they’re not part of it,’ a condemnatory statement that conveniently overlooks the moral aspect. And my personal favourite: ‘You can’t do everything right.’ Unfortunately, I have to give this one to them – much as it pains me to admit it!

The ironic karma in all of this, though, is that no matter how much effort you put in appeasing certain culture, you can never truly satisfy it. Instead, such culture will judge you for even trying, focus on your lows instead of your highs, and whisper about your misfortunes, if any. A more reliable path to happiness is pragmatism, and for the religious, both pragmatism and faith. The most unproductive path to happiness is worrying about what everyone else will think, or say.

Safeguarding the National Interest: Transparency at a Crossroads for FAR Ltd. and PetroNor—Governance and Accountability in The Gambia’s Oil and Gas Sector

By: Ousman F. M’Bai
Financial Crime, Regulation & International Asset Recovery Lawyer/UK
Founder: ProffMaXX (Gambia) Ltd (Ground Water Drilling, Exploration & Production)

After the Raid: FAR Ltd.’s Sudden Exit from The Gambia

FAR Limited
Chairman’s Review: Annual Report: 31 December 2023.

The Gambia Blocks A2 and A5

‘The Company has successfully negotiated with The Gambia Government for an extension to the permit term of Blocks A2 and A5 for an additional 12 months, a substantial reduction in the permit statutory costs, and no obligation for expenditure on the licence for a 12 month period commencing on 1 April 2023.

The Company undertook a remarketing of Blocks A2 and A5, with the substantially lower fixed permit statutory cost structure. The marketing efforts were unsuccessful, and after year end, the Company has surrendered Blocks A2 and A5 and closed its office in The Gambia’.

This passage confirms that FAR Ltd. made a sudden, unannounced exit from The Gambia, relinquishing its rights to licence blocks A2 and A5. Their abrupt departure, like a vessel leaving port under cover of night, left The Gambia facing more than just financial loss—it was a blow that reverberated across the nation.

When FAR Ltd., a relatively obscure company with no significant hydrocarbon experience, first acquired 100% of The Gambia’s A2 and A5 licence blocks, few raised concerns. The nation, like many others, was captivated by the prospect of an oil and gas discovery similar to the SNE Sangomar field. FAR Ltd.’s tenuous association with that field was enough to roll out the red carpet. However, the goodwill of The Gambia’s government was not reciprocated. As time would reveal, FAR Ltd. merely used The Gambia as a bargaining tool for its own financial advantage, ultimately sacrificing the country’s economic interest by declaring that the A2 and A5 blocks were not extensions of the SNE Sangomar oil and gas field. With this simple yet devastating assertion, The Gambia was denied its rightful stake in a shared reservoir within the A2 block of the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin, which straddles the maritime boundaries of both countries, as indicated by 3D seismic data.

Like any shrewd operator, FAR Ltd. shielded itself from potential legal repercussions by securing a release agreement from The Gambia’s government. This agreement allowed FAR Ltd. to scuttle away without facing penalties, fees, or any liability for the licence blocks it had surrendered. It is difficult to comprehend how such an agreement could have been made, considering the national interest at stake. The arrangement reflects a troubling exploitation of The Gambia, potentially facilitated by enablers who ensured FAR Ltd.’s preferential treatment. This situation underscores FAR Ltd.’s troubling impact on The Gambia. The exploitative traits embodied by figures like Tippu Tip continue to resonate in modern Africa, just as they did one hundred and fifty years ago.

Background: FAR Ltd. and The Gambia

FAR Ltd. arrived in The Gambia in 2016, at a time when the country was experiencing political instability. It was granted licences for the A2 and A5 blocks, believed to be hydrocarbon-bearing, with the A2 mapped on 3D seismic data as a contiguous extension of the SNE Sangomar field. At the time, FAR Ltd. held a 13% stake in the Sangomar field, alongside joint venture partners Woodside Energy and Petrosen.

Despite these associations, FAR Ltd. lacked both the capital and operational capacity required to advance exploration efforts independently. Consequently, it brought in Petronas under a joint arrangement to fund the exploration work.

Despite lacking experience as an operator, FAR Ltd. proceeded to drill its first well, Samo, in the A5 block in 2018, claiming to have found only oil shows. In 2021, it claimed to have drilled a second well, Bambo, in the A2 block, again asserting that oil was not found in the primary well, though it did identify oil that was deemed commercially non-viable in the secondary sidetrack. These ambiguous results and FAR Ltd.’s inexperience raised serious concerns about the credibility of its findings.

In the lead-up to the Bambo drilling, FAR Ltd. was embroiled in negotiations with Woodside Energy over a default notice issued due to FAR Ltd.’s non-payment of its capital call on its SNE Sangomar stake. The notice put FAR Ltd. at risk of losing its entire stake without compensation. Against this backdrop of uncertainty, FAR Ltd. sold its stake in the SNE Sangomar field to Woodside Energy for $126 million in 2020, with full payment received in July 2021. This sum was in addition to a guaranteed future payment of $55 million, payable by 2027. However, despite being aware of the 3D seismic data indicating that the SNE Sangomar reservoirs extended into The Gambia’s A2 block, it appears that neither Woodside Energy, Petronas, nor Petrosen conducted any due diligence to validate FAR Ltd.’s drilling results in The Gambia. Perhaps the timing was strategic: by concluding the deal before FAR Ltd.’s drilling activities in The Gambia, Woodside Energy may have aimed to absolve itself of any due diligence responsibility.

A year after the deal, Petronas quietly divested its stake in The Gambia, selling it back to FAR Ltd. before exiting the country. FAR Ltd. reacquired a full interest in the blocks and secured a 12-month permit extension from The Gambia’s government, with terms that were remarkably beneficial, including reduced statutory costs and no expenditure obligations for the period starting in April 2023.

In what resembles an attempt to accelerate financial gains, FAR Ltd. appears unwilling to wait until the maturity date of the $55m payment in 2027. Instead, the company has engaged Gneiss Energy Limited, a UK-based corporate finance advisory firm specialising in the energy sector, to help market and sell the contingent $55m payment owed by Woodside Energy. This raises the question: what’s the rush?

Specifics of the Local Legal Environment in The Gambia and How It Has Played a Role in Oil and Gas Sector

The local legal environment in The Gambia is small and concentrated within a 25 – kilometre radius. The legal profession operates as a fused system, meaning there is no distinction between the roles of barristers (advocates) and solicitors (transactional lawyers). While many law firms are referred to as ‘chambers,’ most are sole practices focused primarily on general local law matters. In instances where a practice has more than two members, with the exception of a few, the additional members are often family, either parental or otherwise. These firms generally lack the necessary legal research facilities and IT infrastructure to meet the demands of international clients, particularly in complex oil and gas transactions.

There are only a few ‘firms’ that seem to have made significant breakthroughs in this sector, and these are generally practices with some connection to foreign firms.

Overall, the local legal environment lacks the specialised technical expertise required to handle complex transactions, particularly in oil and gas. As a result, there is a heavy reliance on foreign advisory firms, mainly based in the UK, for technical assistance.

However, even when foreign expertise is brought in, its effectiveness is often undermined by entrenched practices within the local legal system. These practices include conflicts of interest and a failure to differentiate between confidentiality, legal privilege, and regulatory disclosure requirements. At the heart of this issue is the imbalance created by well remunerated law firms, pitted against a timid, unimaginative, and underpaid civil service, too willing to sacrifice national interests without due consideration.

These issues have caused significant harm to the success of foreign direct investment in The Gambia, and in many cases, have stunted the country’s development objectives.

The Key Players: Amie Bensouda & Co LLP

One of the leading legal practices in The Gambia is Amie Bensouda & Co LLP, founded in 1995 by Ms. Amie Bensouda as a sole practice. Around 2007, her son, Aziz Bensouda, joined the firm, later becoming a partner. To this day, it remains a small family-run practice supported by a network of professionals across government, banking, accounting, insurance and media sector giving it unparalleled local reach.

While Ms. Bensouda’s legal skills have been central to her practice’s success, her extensive network within The Gambia’s public institutions has also played a significant role. Entering the legal field in the early 1980s, she held key positions within the Ministry of Justice, including heading the Civil and Company Law Division, which brought her into close contact with influential figures across government. She later served as Solicitor-General and briefly held the position of Attorney General in 1994, during the transition period following the military coup led by Yahya Jammeh.

Evidence presented at The Gambia’s Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) revealed that Ms. Bensouda drafted the decree that legitimised Jammeh’s seizure of power. She justified her actions as a damage control effort to prevent further destabilisation by what she described as a dangerously erratic Jammeh.

Her appointment as Lead Counsel to the Janneh Commission—a body established to investigate President Jammeh’s illicitly acquired wealth —was noted by many ethical observers with interest. During her tenure, questions arose regarding the process for disposing of Jammeh’s seized assets. A professional disagreement emerged with the Secretary to the Commission, a respected financial expert, who reportedly raised concerns over the asset disposal approach in a memo. The then Attorney General, Mr Ba Tambedou, subsequently removed the Secretary from his position. According to public reports, assets valued at up to $1 billion were disposed of by the Commission at significantly reduced amounts, a process that drew criticism from various quarters for perceived issues with transparency and fairness, impacting the national treasury. While the role of Lead Counsel did not confer authority over asset disposal, which remained the Commission’s responsibility, these developments underscore the importance of clear, accountable processes in such high-stakes matters.

Ms. Bensouda’s brother, Habid Drammeh, also held several influential positions, including Minister of the Interior in 2017, Secretary General of The Gambia Civil Service between February and September 2018, Director General of The Gambia Tourism Authority in the early 2000s, and Director General of the Gambia Transport Service Commission.

When FAR Ltd. arrived in The Gambia, Ms. Bensouda was already retained as local counsel for several parastatals and the country’s largest local authority. In a close-knit society like The Gambia, where social structures are informal, her deep connections and prominent status provided her with significant access to the corridors of power, aligning her with the classic definition of a domestic PEP. It is therefore unsurprising that FAR Ltd. retained her son, Aziz Bensouda, as local counsel. Aziz’s practice benefits from extensive familial and established professional networks, which may make it challenging to assess his independent legal expertise.

Profile of the Pseudo Uncle and Nephew – The Two Cousins

Fafa Sanyang, currently The Gambia’s Ambassador to the UAE, served as Minister of Energy and Petroleum from 10 April 2017 until 4 May 2022, when he was replaced by Abdou Jobe. The current officeholder is Nani Juwara. Sanyang (not worthy of the title Mr.) is reportedly a cousin of Jerreh Barrow (unrelated to President Adama Barrow), the Director General of The Gambia Petroleum Commission. Both Sanyang and Barrow benefitted from government-sponsored opportunities to advance their studies in specialised fields in preparation for their public service roles. However, their tenures have been marked by colossal incompetence, resulting in disastrous consequences for The Gambia’s energy and petroleum sectors.

Sanyang holds a bachelor’s degree in geology from the University of Sierra Leone (1989), a master’s degree in marine management from Dalhousie University, Canada (1997), and another master’s degree in engineering geology from the University of Leeds. He also claims to be a fellow of the Geological Society of London, though the relevance of this credential remains questionable. According to his Wikipedia page, Sanyang oversaw a $165 million deal between the National Water and Electricity Company (NAWEC) and Sinohydro Corporation in April 2017. However, details of this deal are conspicuously absent from public records.

Sanyang ensured that his cousin, Jerreh Barrow, received prestigious scholarships, and his career progression within the departments Sanyang headed was virtually guaranteed as he steadily climbed the ranks. Jerreh Barrow claims to hold a master’s degree in applied geophysics from Chiang Mai University (2008) and a bachelor’s degree in geology from the University of Ghana, Legon (2004). He has held various positions within The Gambia’s Geology Department, including Deputy Director, before being appointed Commissioner of Petroleum in 2015, a position he continues to hold. While his role in 2015 carried less authority, the situation changed dramatically under his cousin’s leadership at the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. Sanyang’s tenure as Minister set in motion a series of actions culminating in the enactment of the Petroleum Commission Act of 2021. This legislation created a near-fiefdom, centralising significant power in the hands of the Commissioner and granting him unrestrained authority over all matters related to petroleum, oil, and gas exploration, development, and production.

Under this new framework, the Commissioner has emerged as a central figure and power broker, reducing the ministry and other related departments to mere rubber- stamping functions. Although Jerreh Barrow was not directly appointed to succeed his uncle as Minister, the institutional structure was manipulated to ensure that he retained significant influence. In essence, the Commissioner’s office holds the central authority, allowing Barrow and his uncle to shape the narrative surrounding the country’s oil and gas prospects. This consolidation of power has set The Gambia on a path to failure, as placing such authority in incompetent hands inevitably jeopardises the national interest.

From Partial Stake to Full Control: FAR Ltd.’s Acquisition of Blocks A2 and A5

At the time of FAR Ltd.’s arrival in The Gambia, the country’s oil and gas prospects were largely shaped by the actions and omissions of key individuals in positions of authority. Among these influential actors were the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice at the time Ba Tambedou, as well as the Petroleum Negotiation Committee, which became involved later. From the outset, nepotism was a notable structural flaw. The emergence of a troubling family connection—a domestic PEP mother and son and a pseudo uncle- nephew (or cousins)—further complicated matters. Central to these concerns was FAR Ltd.’s acquisition of The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks, licences previously held by Erin Energy.

FAR Ltd.’s arrival coincided with Erin Energy’s liquidity crisis, which led to Erin selling 80% of its licence to FAR Ltd. for $13 million. Of this, $5 million was paid in cash, with the remainder structured as costs to be incurred by FAR Ltd. A key issue arose regarding the remaining 20% interest held by Erin Energy. Some internal discussions among stakeholders reportedly touched upon concerns that a perceived defect in the Model Licence Agreement might limit the government’s ability to acquire the remaining interest. Subsequent negotiations, involving various government offices, ultimately led to FAR Ltd. acquiring this 20% share for $4 million—a sum viewed by some as significantly below the interest’s potential value. Observers have since questioned whether the legal advice surrounding this transaction received sufficient scrutiny and whether alternative interpretations were considered by relevant governmental offices, including the Attorney-General and Ministry of Justice.

In 2017, the Africa Legal Support Facility (ALSF) engaged Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner (BCLP), Johnny West of Open Oil as a consultant, and local counsel—including Aziz Bensouda—to review the legal and fiscal frameworks governing petroleum projects. The objective was to renegotiate petroleum licences with international oil companies, but this arrangement raised serious concerns about a potential conflict of interest, given Bensouda’s dual role as counsel for FAR (Gambia Ltd), whose parent company FAR Ltd. had a history of seeking to amend contracts in its favour.

From the moment FAR Ltd. was granted the licences for A2 and A5 blocks, its poor financial standing and lack of expertise in exploration quickly became apparent. This raises serious concerns about the rigour with which The Gambia’s Petroleum Commission, as the regulator, vetted FAR Ltd. against internationally established investment criteria for oil and gas licence acquisition. While FAR Ltd.’s marketing pitch may have invoked optimism about its potential to deliver for The Gambia, this did not justify the reckless disregard for caution that followed.

The Petroleum Commission, under its powers set out in the 2021 Act, plays a pivotal role before any licence is granted. It is required to liaise with the Petroleum Negotiating Committee and the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, presenting all relevant facts about any application. The Negotiating Committee, chaired by none other than the Commissioner of Petroleum, Jerreh Barrow, is composed of representatives from key institutions, including the Ministry of Finance, Gambia Revenue Authority, GIEPA, PURA and The Gambia Maritime Authority. Any concerns regarding licences or the general operation of oil and gas exploration must be reported to the Ministry of Petroleum, with legal advice sought first from the Commission’s in-house counsel and, if necessary, from the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice.

Additionally, the Commission is tasked with overseeing all exploration rights, including scheduling regular supervision and review meetings to assess licensees’ fulfilment of obligations. Such reviews must be thoroughly documented, with detailed agendas and accurate records of discussions and decisions.

Drilling Operations and Data Transparency: FAR Ltd.’s Denial of Verification Access

An effective and well-managed Petroleum Commission would maintain a vigilant interest in FAR Ltd.’s drilling activities, particularly following the unsuccessful Samo well. However, FAR Ltd. operated with little meaningful independent oversight or supervision. During the drilling of the Bambo well, although a small number of officials from the Ministry of Petroleum were allowed on the drill ship, they were denied access to crucial verification points, including data generated during drilling. The licensing regime granted FAR Ltd. ownership and custody rights over all drilling logs and data, which significantly undermined The Gambia’s ability to verify the accuracy of the drilling information in real-time. FAR Ltd.’s brazen refusal to allow verification of its drilling data has jeopardised the national interest.

The drilling reports submitted by FAR Ltd. were alarmingly inadequate and lacked detail, being accessible only to Jerreh Barrow and the Minister of Energy and Petroleum, Abdou Jobe. These reports contained no well logs, pressure data, seismic information or crucially well coordinates (i.e. the precise location of the wells drilled). Moreover, FAR Ltd. promptly plugged the wells after drilling, making any further independent examination impossible. To make matters worse, FAR Ltd. unilaterally designated the Bambo well and its side-track as a ‘tight hole,’ refusing to make any public disclosures about it. This raises serious concerns about FAR Ltd.’s operational competence and integrity. Following the surrender of its licence, the rights to the data reverted to The Gambia; however, none of the limited data left behind has met integrity parameter tests, further casting doubt on its reliability. FAR Ltd.’s claim that the SNE Sangomar field does not extend into The Gambia’s A2 block must be investigated and should be legally challenged by any future Gambian government if Woodside Energy and Petrosen fail to establish the truth sooner.

Examining Conflicts of Interest: An In-Depth Analysis

Upholding ethical and legal standards in the oil and gas sector is critical, particularly given the enormous financial stakes involved. Conflicts of interest, in all their forms, incentivise corruption and place national interests at significant risk. They can potentially arise from unrestrained hiring of the children of domestic PEPs, when legal practitioners represent both private corporations and public bodies, or when family members hold key government positions, potentially overseeing one another. Such situations raise serious concerns about compromised loyalty, improper influence, and personal gain.

A relevant example of the risks associated with conflicts of interest in the oil and gas industry is the Halliburton scandal in Nigeria. Halliburton and its subsidiary KBR were found to have bribed Nigerian officials to secure multi-billion-dollar contracts for constructing liquefied natural gas facilities. The improper relationships between corporations and government officials in this case resulted in significant financial harm and compromised Nigeria’s national interests. Halliburton was eventually fined $1.5 billion, underscoring the severe legal consequences of international scrutiny when conflicts of interest and corruption are uncovered.

FAR Ltd., Local Counsel and The Petroleum Commission: What’s at Stake?

FAR Ltd.’s business strategy in the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin aimed to maximise returns with minimal investment. To achieve this, the company deployed key personnel from its Senior management team to both Senegal and The Gambia. While Cath Norman ingratiated herself within the corridors of power in Senegal, Rolf Stork operated in The Gambia as a facilitator, coordinating interactions between the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and the Petroleum Commission, all the while being strategically guided by local counsel on local law matters. Both individuals demonstrated remarkable agility and stealth. Cath Norman succeeded in forging a close relationship with the then President of Senegal, Macky Sall, while Rolf Stork played a facilitative role in The Gambia, liaising with the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and the Petroleum Commission.

Although Stork did not have direct access to former President Yahya Jammeh or current President Adama Barrow, he developed working relationships with notable figures such as Jerreh Barrow, Fafa Sanyang, and the Bensoudas. These interactions proved advantageous for FAR Ltd. In Senegal, Cath Norman secured a $126 million cash payment for FAR Ltd. from Woodside Energy, while in The Gambia, Rolf Stork negotiated a licence extension before FAR Ltd.’s eventual exit from the country without incurring penalties or liabilities.

The nature of these relationships, particularly involving Jerreh Barrow, Fafa Sanyang, and Aziz Bensouda, raises concerns about whether the national interest was adequately protected during these negotiations. However, there is no suggestion that any of these individuals engaged in unlawful conduct.

Local counsel’s role included registering FAR Ltd.’s subsidiary, FAR (Gambia) Ltd., and negotiating 100% licensing rights in the A2 and A5 blocks. Counsel also facilitated the farm-out of the licence in a joint venture arrangement with Petronas. While these actions appear procedurally correct, questions arise regarding the transparency of financial transactions, particularly as none of the payments were routed through Gambian financial institutions. The absence of such transactions from the public record raises issues of transparency, though there is no evidence of illegal activity.

The Petroleum Commission and the Ministry of Energy held regular meetings with FAR Gambia Ltd., during which the company had legal representation. However, government representation was notably absent, prompting concerns about whether FAR Ltd.’s performance was properly assessed, particularly in light of its failed drilling operations.

After FAR Ltd.’s second failed well, Bambo, the company dismantled most of its operations in The Gambia, leaving Rolf Stork as its primary representative. This sudden operational shift, coupled with the introduction of a new team unfamiliar with previous activities, warrants closer examination whether it was done to conceal information.

Implications for Governance and Accountability – How FAR Ltd Misled The Gambia – Removal of Well Commitments & Penalties

Despite FAR Ltd.’s underperformance in the A2 and A5 blocks, the company requested a two-year licence extension from 1 October 2022, seeking relief from its contractual obligation to drill one well per year. A penalty clause requiring FAR Ltd. to pay $22 million in case of default was included. FAR Ltd. argued for the extension and a waiver of the penalty, claiming that it had drilled two wells—the Bambo well and its side-track—and promised to submit a technical geoscience review.

Though FAR Ltd. did not deliver the geoscience review, hopeless Jerreh Barrow recommended granting the extension and waiving the $22 million penalty. This recommendation was supported by the Petroleum Negotiation Committee and approved by the Minister of Petroleum. While there is no evidence to suggest improper conduct, the lack of independent verification of the side-track well and the failure to obtain critical data raises concerns about the thoroughness of the decision-making process.

Following the extension, FAR Ltd. took a 12-month pause before initiating negotiations to surrender its licence, citing difficulties in securing a joint venture partner. The company requested a waiver of the $4 million statutory cost and proposed no further technical work during the period. Once again, Jerreh Barrow presented FAR Ltd.’s case, asserting that the company had spent over $100 million in The Gambia. However, FAR Ltd. had previously indicated in investor presentations that its joint venture partner, Petronas, funded much of its operational costs. This discrepancy should have warranted further scrutiny, although there is no suggestion that Jerreh Barrow acted improperly.

The drowsy Petroleum Negotiation Committee failed to demand detailed financial records before endorsing the recommendation, and Petroleum Minister Jobe, asleep at the wheel, granted FAR Ltd. a release from its obligations. The lack of public disclosure surrounding these negotiations raises concerns about transparency. However, there is no conclusive evidence of unlawful conduct by any of the parties involved.

The Gambia, a small nation in severe economic distress, makes it difficult to justify how any citizen could agree to waive such substantial costs for FAR Ltd. given that the company received $126 million in payments, with the potential for millions more in the future. By sacrificing the national interest, the state has been deprived of significant financial benefits, especially considering its exclusion from the shared Senegal/Gambia sub-basin reservoirs a direct result of FAR Ltd.’s incompetent drilling programme.

To fully grasp the scale of the financial loss, one must consider the situation in reverse: had The Gambia terminated FAR Ltd.’s licence, the company would have sued for billions, citing the potential value of the undiscovered oil in these blocks. FAR Ltd. would never have waived such a claim without compensation. The actions and decisions of those involved in these negotiations represent a profound betrayal of the trust of the Gambian people.

The PetroNor A4 Licence Block Saga – A Repeat of Past Mistakes?

The handling of the A4 block appears to echo some of the same concerns raised in the FAR Ltd. case, as much of the earlier mentioned assistance provided by the ALSF is being nullified due to a repeat of the same incompetence and reckless disregard for safeguarding the national interest in the A4 block. Following the poorly negotiated settlement in the arbitration case between The Gambia and African Petroleum (now PetroNor), overseen by Fafa Sanyang, Lamin Camara, and Ba Tambedou, the implications for The Gambia could not be worse.

In this settlement, PetroNor was granted 100% of the rights to the highly valuable A4 block, with a significantly reduced signature bonus of $4 million and a 30-year lease over the block in the event of a discovery. To put this in perspective, BP paid a $10 million signature bonus for the A1 block alone. Moreover, PetroNor was exempted from paying the signature bonus for the first 12 months, and this waiver has been extended multiple times as PetroNor has consistently failed to make the payment and has done next to nothing with the block.

The result of this settlement, combined with the Petroleum Commission’s lack of enforcement rigor, has left the nation shackled, much like Tippu Tip did to our forebears. Consequently, The Gambia is being deprived of the opportunity to advance its oil and gas exploration potential, as credible and genuinely interested companies are being kept out of the market. The A4 block, located adjacent to BP’s former A1 block, which has yielded excellent seismic data, remains a highly competitive prospect. The degree of incompetence and negligence displayed by Gambians in safeguarding the national interest is truly heart-breaking.

Conclusion: Safeguarding the National Interest

The recurring theme of opacity in the handling of oil and gas transactions presents challenges to governance and accountability in The Gambia. FAR Ltd.’s operations, and the subsequent management of its exit, have raised valid concerns about whether national interests were adequately protected. While no allegations of illegal activity have been substantiated, the processes involved in these transactions highlight the need for improved oversight and transparency.
As noted in a recent Financial Times article, How Culpable Are External Lawyers in Corporate Wrongdoing?, Professor Elise Maizel argued that law firms can play a pivotal role in corporate governance. Although corporations in many jurisdictions are being held to higher standards of accountability, law firms often maintain plausible detachment regarding their clients’ conduct. A similar argument can be made regarding the need for greater responsibility in The Gambia’s energy sector.
Moving forward, it is critical that independent oversight bodies, strict codes of conduct, and full public disclosure be implemented to safeguard The Gambia’s natural resources. Without transparency, the nation risks further losses. It is vital that all parties involved in these negotiations act in the best interests of The Gambia, ensuring that its valuable resources are managed responsibly for the benefit of its people. Cry, beloved Gambia—how much longer must you suffer at the hands of your own people?

Editor’s Note

On 30 October 2024, the Fatu Network sent a detailed list of questions related to issues raised in this article to the following individuals: Fafa Sanyang, Jerreh Barrow, Lamin Camara, Abdoulie Jobe, Kanni Touray, Nani Juwara, Rolf Stork, Ba Tambedou, Dawda Jallow, Ms Amie Bensouda, and Aziz Bensouda. None provided comprehensive answers to the specific questions. Jerreh Barrow submitted a written critique and offered a sit-down interview, while Aziz Bensouda provided a written response jointly with his mother, Ms. Bensouda. Their response is in part summarised as follows:

The statements provided by Ms Bensouda and her firm clarify that she has never represented or advised the Government of The Gambia in matters related to FAR Ltd. or the A2 and A5 licenses. Ms Bensouda’s firm’s involvement has been solely as counsel for FAR Ltd. Her firm’s work is limited to Gambian local matters and does not extend to financial or technical advice. Moreover, they are not familiar with any ‘Master License Agreement’ nor its purported ‘defectiveness.’ For inquiries on waivers, extensions, or commercial decisions, reference should be made to the Petroleum Commission or FAR Ltd. The Government of The Gambian government had engaged international legal and financial experts, ensuring that all actions align with global industry standards, with records accessible from the Ministry of Petroleum and Petroleum Commission.

The Shadow Over West Africa Oil & Gas: A Deep Dive into FAR Ltd, Woodside Energy, Petronas, and Petrosen’s Accountability in The Gambia

By: Ousman F. M’Bai

Financial Crime, Regulation & International Asset Recovery Lawyer/UK;
Founder: ProffMaXX (Gambia) Ltd (Ground Water Drilling, Exploration & Production)

FAR Ltd: Jeopardising The Gambia’s Oil & Gas Prospects

FAR Ltd.’s handling of The Gambia’s oil and gas prospects in the Senegal/Gambia shared sub-basin has raised serious concerns about its operational competence and judgement that may have negatively impacted the nation’s resource future. Yet, the response from The Gambia’s government and other entities involved has been astonishingly muted. It begs the question: why has there been no investigation into how this debacle was allowed to unfold?

Despite FAR Ltd.’s troubling conduct, it continues to hold its 100% licence stake in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks, with seemingly no repercussions. The Gambia’s government, along with the governments of Senegal, Woodside Energy, and Petronas, have all remained conspicuously silent. The inertia surrounding the matter signals more than mere oversight; it points seemingly to a potential systemic lack of scrutiny and accountability.

The Gambia’s Missed Opportunity and Senegal’s Tainted Windfall

The Gambia’s government, having effectively surrendered the country’s economic sovereignty to Senegal, maintains the position that there are no oil and gas resources in The Gambia. Remarkably, the Petroleum Minister recently issued a communiqué downplaying the nation’s oil and gas potential, reinforcing the false narrative that no significant resources exist within the country. This conclusion—potentially influenced by FAR Ltd.’s poor performance and Senegal’s control over the country’s unsophisticated elites overlooks a crucial fact: the issue is not whether oil is directly found in The Gambia, but rather The Gambia’s undeniable right to a fair share of the resources from the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin, which straddles the maritime boundaries of both countries.

Meanwhile, Senegal and its state-owned oil corporation Petrosen, together with Woodside Energy, celebrate what they claim is a monumental discovery. They proudly assert that this will contribute to Senegal’s sustainable development and provide lucrative returns for investors, notably Woodside Energy. However, they appear to omit critical discussion of how they stand to gain significantly from FAR Ltd.’s controversial claim that the SNE Sangomar oil and gas field does not extend into The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks. The ethical implication of this omission raises significant concerns and questions about transparency in the management of shared resources. At the core of this issue is the exclusion of The Gambia from its rightful share of the sub-basin’s resources. There can be no valid explanation for this mistreatment and exploitation of The Gambia, especially given that Senegal has resource-sharing agreements with both Mauritania to the north of the MSGBC basin and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

3D Seismic Data and FAR Ltd.’s Dubious Findings

Woodside Energy, Petrosen, and Petronas, through its Gambian subsidiary PC(Gambia) Ltd, all possessed clear 3D seismic data indicating that The Gambia’s A2 block is a contiguous extension of the prolific SNE Sangomar field. Yet rather than critically evaluating FAR Ltd.’s findings, these entities accepted without question the conclusions from FAR Ltd.’s failed drilling programme— raising concerns about the adequacy of due diligence.

From the outset, FAR Ltd lacked both the capital and technical expertise necessary for successful exploration. When it entered The Gambia in 2016, the country’s institutions were in disarray. FAR Ltd secured 100% stakes in the A2 and A5 blocks through a deal that has not been fully disclosed, raising concerns about transparency and potential exploitation of weak governance. A strategy often associated with problematic investment practices is to identify a gateway to the heart of government decision- making, then appoint the son, daughter or relative of that individual to represent the so- called investor’s interest.

Facing an inability to meet its obligations, FAR Ltd brought in Petronas as a joint venture partner through its subsidiary PC(Gambia) Ltd. However, Petronas’s presence in The Gambia has been equally shrouded in mystery. It has made no public disclosures, offered no transparency, and failed to release any transactional accounts or information regarding its operations in the country. FAR Ltd.’s assertions are the only source of information on this partnership.

FAR Ltd.’s Inadequate Drilling Programmes

FAR Ltd.’s amateurish approach to drilling was evident in the failure of its first well, Samo, in the A5 block, based on less accurate 2D seismic data or none. Unsurprisingly, FAR’s Chief Geologist admitted they had “drilled low.” Nonetheless, the company reported encountering two structures but failed to disclose any details regarding their relationship to the SNE Sangomar reservoirs. For its second well, Bambo, FAR Ltd concealed significant issues, including a major accident during drilling. Both the primary and secondary wells missed their targets, leading FAR Ltd to wrongly conclude that the Bambo and Soloo prospects were commercially non-viable. This conclusion ignored

clear evidence from 3D seismic data showing that the SNE Sangomar field extends into The Gambia’s A2 block. And FAR Ltd.’s own findings that both prospects have easy access to the prolific source kitchen that feeds oil into the SNE Sangomar field.

FAR Ltd.’s Financial Collapse and The Senegal Deal

Adding to the intrigue, in June 2020, FAR Ltd defaulted on a capital call for its joint venture stake in the SNE Sangomar field. In response, it was forced to sell its 13% stake to Woodside Energy for $126 million in July 2021. This transaction, structured to guarantee FAR Ltd future payments up to $55 million, raises serious questions. It appears that Woodside Energy and Petrosen conducted no meaningful due diligence before finalising this deal, preferring instead to validate FAR Ltd.’s dubious findings and dismiss The Gambia’s rightful claim to a stake in the SNE Sangomar field located inside the Senegal/Gambia sub basin.

Despite repeated requests for clarification from Woodside Energy, Petrosen, and Petronas on their role in this saga, no substantive responses have been provided. Woodside Energy’s reply, in particular, ignored the crux of the matter, deflecting to its pre-emption of FAR’s sale in the Rufisque, Sangomar, and Sangomar Deep (RSSD) joint venture. It made no mention of the default notice served on FAR Ltd, nor did it acknowledge the implications of FAR Ltd.’s actions in The Gambia. The strategic silence on these matters is telling.

FAR Ltd.’s poor financial standing left it ill-prepared to meet its obligations regarding development, production, and royalty payments under its licence, had it confirmed that the SNE Sangomar field extended into The Gambia’s A2 block. Such a finding would have compelled Woodside Energy and Petrosen to acknowledge The Gambia’s shared stake. FAR Ltd.’s ineptitude has effectively made The Gambia the sacrificial lamb.

The Case of Petronas and Lack of Transparency

In August 2022, barely a year after Woodside’s acquisition of FAR Ltd.’s stake, Petronas surrendered its interest in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks back to FAR Ltd for an undisclosed amount. This move raises disturbing questions about the nature of the transaction, the nature of the relationship between Petronas and FAR Ltd and the potential denial of The Gambia its rightful share of the sub-basin’s resources. Petronas has yet to respond to inquiries on whether its actions comply with local and international regulations.

In an era where corporate transparency and accountability are paramount, the actions of Woodside Energy, Petronas, Petrosen, and FAR Ltd stand as an affront to ethical standards. The ongoing denial of The Gambia’s rights to its resources condemns millions of Gambians to perpetual poverty while benefiting a select few. This level of corporate governance raises serious ethical concerns that must be met with international outrage.

Environmental Risks Posed by the FPSO Vessel Near The Gambia’s Territorial Waters

Amidst all of this, The Gambia’s entire maritime coast and ecosystem is exposed to a significant risk of serious pollution from oil spills and leaks due to the presence of the FPSO Leopold Sedar Senghor in close proximity to its territorial waters. An FPSO (Floating, Production, Storage, and Offloading) vessel is a modified oil tanker, redesigned for use at sea as a facility for oil and gas production, processing, storage, and offloading. These vessels are directly connected to production wells deep below the seabed by numerous interlinked pipes, often spanning hundreds of kilometres. The multipurpose function of the vessel, combined with the extensive network of pipes, increases the risk of accidents through leaks and spillage. However, there is no evidence of any coordinated collaboration between The Gambia’s government, the government of Senegal, and Woodside Energy to implement proactive emergency safeguarding measures in the event of an accident.

Paralleling Precedent: The Mozambique Tuna Bonds Case

In the recent landmark corruption case in the High Court Commercial Division in London, the Mozambique “Tuna Bonds” case, Justice Robin Knowles described the scale of the scandal as “nothing short of a tragedy.” He criticised the defendants for focusing solely on their own financial gain, rather than on assisting Mozambique in making the most of its resources.

The parallel with The Gambia is clear. Just as Mozambique was exploited, The Gambia’s vulnerabilities as a small, weak state are being exploited by external entities and internal enablers. The international community must not allow this injustice to persist.

Conclusion: FAR Ltd, Woodside Energy, and The Gambia’s Future

The Gambia’s rightful share of the oil and gas resources in the Senegal/Gambia sub- basin has been sacrificed due to FAR Ltd.’s incompetence and the complacency, if not the lack of action from companies like Woodside Energy, Petrosen, and Petronas. FAR Ltd.’s reacquisition of 100% of The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks has put the nation in a perilous position, effectively holding the country hostage with a gun to its head.

Gambians must not remain silent in the face of this corporate exploitation. The ethical and legal failings of those involved must be addressed, and those who have sought to profit from The Gambia’s resources at its expense must be held accountable.

Woodside Energy, now holding 82% of the RSSD, has the power to right this wrong. However, their willingness to engage meaningfully with the reality of The Gambia’s situation will serve as a true measure of their commitment to justice, transparency, and the right to development. The world is watching.

Editor’s Note: On 28.08.24 The Fatu Network wrote to Woodside Energy, Petrosen and Petronas seeking clarifications and their response to the issues raised in this expose. To date, Petronas and Petrosen have not responded. Woodside Energy provided the following response attributable to a Woodside Energy spokesperson:

‘In December 2020 Woodside exercised pre-emption rights to acquire FAR Senegal’s participating interest in the Rufisque, Sangomar and Sangomar Deep (RSSD) joint venture. The transaction completed in 2021 and in no way related to any of FAR’s assets in The Gambia. Further details can be found in the announcement released to the Australian Securities Exchange at the time of the transaction.’

The Fatu Network wrote to FAR Ltd on 5.08.24 and they have not responded to date.

Whither The Gambia? – The Saga of a Small Nation and its Missing Oil and Gas Resources

By: Ousman F. M’Bai

Financial Crime, Regulation & International Asset Recovery Lawyer/UK
Founder: ProffMaxx (Gambia) Ltd (Ground Water Drilling Exploration & Production)

The MSGBC

The MSGBC basin has been one of the world’s most prolific regions for oil and gas discoveries, until the recent unprecedented oil discovery in Guyana surpassed it. The basin is estimated to hold about two billion barrels of oil and 25 trillion cubic feet of gas. Located onshore and offshore on the Atlantic coast of West Africa, specifically between Mauritania and Guinea Conakry, MSGBC is an acronym for the countries that comprise the onshore part of this geological province with interconnected maritime boundaries: Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Guinea Conakry.

The basin covers a total land mass of about 340,000 km² and an estimated offshore area of 100,000 km² with water depths between 2000 meters and 4000 meters. This offshore area spans over the AGC (Agence de Gestion et de Coopération entre le Sénégal et la Guinée-Bissau), a joint maritime zone between Senegal and Guinea Bissau.

The basin is not a single continuous span but consists of three major connected subbasins:

  1. Mauritania Offshore Basin: This basin stretches from the north of Mauritania down to the Senegal River in the southern border between Senegal and Mauritania.
  2. Northern or Senegal/Gambia Subbasin: Located between the Senegal River and the River Gambia. The specific area of the subbasin relevant to this article is between the River Gambia and River Saloum.
  3. Southern Senegal/Guinea Bissau Subbasin: Extending south from the river Gambia through the Casamance region into Guinea Bissau.

Geology of the MSGBC Basin

The basin developed in complex stages over millions of years, beginning with the opening of the North Atlantic and the splitting of North America from Eurasia and Africa during the late Permian to Early Triassic period. This process continued into the late Jurassic when the breakup of Africa from South America began, culminating in the opening of the Atlantic, which was completed in the Albian period. Marine deposits began forming in the early Jurassic in Morocco, advancing southward as the sea encroached on the land, reaching the southernmost edge of the basin in the late Jurassic. The rock formation after the split is identified as ranging from the middle Jurassic to the Holocene, consisting of a carbonate-rock unit with varying thicknesses between 2,300 meters and 3,200 meters in the three subbasins.

During the Albian, carbonate rock deposits continued to form progressively in the middle offshore part of the basin, known as the Northern or Senegal/Gambia basin, creating an elevated gradient. This feature is unique to this subbasin and is absent in the northern part of the Mauritania subbasin and the southern part of the Casamance subbasin, which are mostly characterized by deep-water sediments with shallow areas.

Cenomanian rocks, represented by thick marine shales sandwiched between marine sandstones, were deposited after the opening of the Atlantic. Widespread Turonian or Cretaceous rocks, commonly black shales often positive as hydrocarbon source rocks, range in thickness from 50 to 150 meters.

There is a mild westward sloping Mesozoic and Cenozoic platform, with a paleo shelf-edge trend between 35 to 100 km wide in the northwest, which balloons out to the west. It parallels the 2000-meter bathymetric contour before extending south across the Dome Flore offshore Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry. To the west of the paleo shelf-edge, in water depths greater than 2000 meters, sedimentary thickness exceeds 12,000 meters, and the formation is characterized by a curved fault plane that dips near the surface towards the edge of the Jurassic to lower Cretaceous platform.

Hydrocarbon Source Rocks in the Basin

The total petroleum system of the basin is made up of three parts. The first part, lying on the Palaeozoic platform deep below sea level, is the lower Palaeozoic. Above this is the Mesozoic-Cenozoic platform, which supports the second part of the sub-salt system, consisting of Triassic and Jurassic source rocks. These rocks are potentially hydrocarbon-bearing, but they are so deep below the seabed that they are difficult to reach, and there has not been any exploration for oil or gas in this system. The third part is the Cretaceous-Tertiary system. These source rocks are confirmed to be hydrocarbon-bearing, and it is where most of the oil discoveries have been made. The Cretaceous-Tertiary system is subdivided into three zones: the lower Cretaceous, the upper Cretaceous, and the Tertiary. The lower Cretaceous is dominated by Aptian and Albian source rocks, the upper Cretaceous features Cenomanian and Turonian source rocks, and the Tertiary is characterized by Senonian-Maastrichtian sandstones.

Discoveries in the Mauritania/Senegal Subbasin

In 2015, Kosmos Energy using 3D seismic data made the largest global discovery of gas in the tortue-1 field which straddles the Mauritania and Senegal maritime boundary. Located at 120km offshore in water depth of 2,850m, the prospect has a projected recoverable gas resource of 15 trillion cubic feet. Further appraisal drilling in the area discovered the Guembeul-1 and Ahmeyim-2 wells in 2016 and the whole complex is now renamed The Greater Tortue Ahmeyim-1(GTA-1). In 2018, Senegal and Mauritania signed an inter-governmental co-operation agreement on an equal split of 50/50 of resource and revenue to develop to production this cross-border gas prospect. The project was given a unique status in 2021 as the GTA ‘National project of strategic importance’. The development is led by BP as operator, Petrosen (Societes des Petroles du Senegal (the Senegal State oil corporation)) SMH (Mauritienne des Hydrocarbon) and Kosmos Energy.

The unprecedented scale of this discovery intensified exploration further offshore in the deeper edges of the MSGBC basin with BP leading its joint venture partner Kosmos Energy. Their efforts paid off massively with the discovery of the Yakaar- Teranga gas field at water depth of 8,364 in northern Senegal. With an estimated 25 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas explorable to 2053, it was flagged as the world’s largest discovery in 2017. These discoveries are a lifeline to Senegal and Mauritania and if the revenue to be generated from them are managed efficiently, it will propel their economic growth for years to come.

Discoveries in the Southern Senegal/Guinea Bissau Subbasin

Guinea Bissau has recently experienced potentially transformative drilling explorations in its 11 offshore blocks within the subbasin. Newly acquired 3D seismic data has identified significant amounts of oil in the shallow reservoirs atop the salt-induced Flore Dome and Gea Dome. These structures are in a vast expanse of water in the Atlantic between latitudes 10.7◦N and 12.5◦N, known as the joint maritime zone between Senegal and Guinea Bissau.

The demarcation of these territorial waters followed a protracted disagreement between the two countries, with Senegal, aware of the natural resource potential of the area, insisting on a perpendicular delimitation of their maritime boundary. The dispute was amicably resolved with the establishment of the Agence de Gestion et de Coopération entre le Sénégal et la Guinée-Bissau (AGC). The AGC’s primary objective is to facilitate collaboration between the two countries in sharing resources to develop the oil and gas prospects in the area.

Recent developments in Guinea Bissau have revealed an underhand deal between the former President of Senegal, Mr. Sall, and his Bissau counterpart, Mr. Embalo, which has caused outrage among Bissau-Guineans concerning the prospective revenue split between the two countries at production. More details on this will follow.

Discoveries in Senegal – The Gambia subbasin – FAN-1, SNE & Sangomar Field

The discovery of the SNE-1 Sangomar field has ignited debate about its exact geographic boundary and whether it extends into The Gambia’s maritime area. These debates intensified in June 2024 when Senegal produced its first oil barrel from a well in the field, making it the newest oil-producing nation in Africa. This journey began in 1960, when the Senghor Government prioritised promoting investment in oil and gas exploration. Although Senegal’s first oil well in DiamNadio in 1960 was not commercially viable, it spurred successive governments to introduce policies attracting foreign investment. Significant reforms began under President Abdou Diouf and continued more vigorously under his successor, Abdoulie Wade. Wade succeeded in creating a stable and predictable environment for multinational investors, a policy continued by his successor, Macky Sall.

FAR Ltd, an Australian company focused on African oil and gas exploration, acquired licenses for three contiguous Senegalese blocks (Rufisque, Sangomar, and Sangomar Deep) in 2006. Incorporated in Western Australia in 1984 as First Australia Resources NL, it became FAR Ltd in 2010. These blocks cover 7,500 km² in the productive MSGBC basin, located in the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin.

The blocks contain four prospects. On the paleo shelf-edge trend running between the mouths of the Saloum and Gambia rivers, about 50 km offshore, are SNE-North-1 and SNE-1 (Sangomar Offshore). The SNE-1, renamed Sangomar Field Development Phase 1 (SNE-1 Sangomar) by President Macky Sall, is contiguous with the northern edge of The Gambia’s A2 block. The deeper water prospects are Sangomar Deep FAN-1 and FAN South-1.

In 2013, FAR Ltd made a strategic decision to buy the licenses, previously held by Hunt Ltd, including modern 3D seismic data covering targeted 2,050 km² of the blocks. FAR Ltd enhanced the data, identifying hydrocarbon layers in the FAN-1 and SNE-1 fields and mapping four initial drillable prospects, followed by another seven. However, as a small venture capital company, FAR Ltd lacked the capital and expertise to drill offshore wells, prompting it to seek joint venture partners. FAR Ltd farmed out 85% of its license interest to Cairn Energy (operator, 40%), ConocoPhillips (35%), and Petrosen (10%).

At the time, FAR Ltd.’s Managing Director Cath Norman said:

“We are very pleased to have secured leading independent Cairn Energy as a farm in partner and Operator in our Senegal Project. With this agreement FAR has secured a highly experienced Operator to drill and fund it through the first exploration well to be drilled off the Senegalese coast for some years.

Cairn Energy funded most of the exploration costs and paid FAR Ltd.’s past costs, running into millions of dollars. The first well, FAN-1, was successful, revealing a gross oil-bearing interval of 500 meters with potential recoverable oil resources of 2.5 billion barrels. Cath Norman, FAR Ltd.’s Managing Director, highlighted the drilling risks and uncertainties about source rock capacity:

‘One of the key risks out here is that the presence of source was unknown. We know in this part of West Africa the source rocks turn on and off. And whether they exist out here to have the capacity to be filling the billion-barrel traps that we had mapped was a complete unknown to us. So, seeing a 500-meter oil interval is a great start’.

The SNE-1 Sangomar field, with a footprint of 400 km², was forecast to have a recoverable oil resource of 641 million barrels, the biggest discovery in Senegal’s history. FAR Ltd was awarded the Breakthrough Company of 2016 by the Oil and Gas Council Africa. The field also contained significant gas reserves. Cath Norman, describing the drilling team’s encounter with the field in one of her representations said:

‘Field was in fact larger. It was not until we drilled the 4th well that we stepped out of the gas cap and managed to intercept some of the secondary reservoirs in the oil leg. We are now four times the size of the field when we originally mapped it.’

Ms. Norman described the field’s geology: a carbonate platform with extensive oil reservoirs in stack formation. The deeper S500 series reservoir is in the lower Cretaceous, while the upper S400 series reservoir is in the upper Cretaceous, topped by a gas cap. Connectivity tests confirmed good inter-well connectivity in both reservoirs. Indeed, Ms. Norman touched on this when she said in a presentation:

‘Connectivity is the last piece of the puzzle we need to resolve. Our field is really a field of two primary reservoir families. There is a deep reservoir unit which we call our 500 series. It’s made up of thick and blocky sand. They are lovely and young and clean with great porosity.’

She continued:

‘The upside is that the cream on the cake is proving a lot more of the connectivity of the thin sand that sits above the 500 series. We call that our 400 series and the focus of our next two wells will be which our JV are committed drilling in Nov to flow test some of those upper sands and also running interference tests which involves setting gauges, setting up the wells to be listening wells and then drilling a pulsing well and then looking at how those pulses proliferate across the thin sand. We will get a measure of connectivity of how continuous they are across the field’.

In fact, those connectivity tests were done, and Cairn Energy confirmed in one of its Appraisal Reports in 2018 that there was good correlation of the gross reservoir packages. It reported that connectivity in the S400 upper reservoirs was demonstrated by interference tests in a clearly preferred orientation and that the DST in the S500 lower reservoir confirmed expected good inter-well connectivity.

Ms. Norman has confirmed this because in the concluding part of her presentation she said:

‘Each well we drilled in the appraisal programme confirmed that we have 100meter gross oil column across all of the wells. We have the same high quality 32-degree oil quality across all the field, and we have good correlation between all of our principal reservoir units’.

FAR Ltd.’s success in Senegal was largely due to its joint venture partners, particularly Cairn Energy, ConocoPhillips, Petrosen, and later Woodside Energy. The type of drill rig used also played a significant role. Norman noted the difference in performance between the 5th generation semi-sub vessel and the 7th generation drill ship, which reduced non-productive rig time significantly. This is what she said:

‘When we drilled our first two exploration wells, we had a fifth-generation semi subcontracted for the drilling at $650,000 a day. That is just the rig rate not the total spread. When we drilled four appraisal wells some 18 months later, we contracted a rigg for $330,000 a day. It was a seventh-generation drill ship and performed immensely better than the semi-sub we had on our first drilling mission. We are just in the process of tendering for a rig now for our drilling programme in Nov. Looks likely we will be able to secure the equivalent of a seventh-generation drill ship for under $200,000 a day. Cost of drilling has come down by two-thirds. What is actually more important to us is the efficiency of the drilling. When we drill our first appraisal well, we had 70% non-productivity rig time. Which is abysmal. We had out 10% non-rig time for the four other appraisals well we drilled. And on one of the well, we had 3% non-productivity rig time. So, our JV is moving ahead very quickly now to secure rigs for continuing with appraisal and getting on with development drilling’.

FAR Ltd.’s entire operational focus was in the SNE-1 Sangomar field and the company given its long presence in Senegal from 2006 had developed deep connections and working relations at the highest level within the government, the office of the President of Senegal who at the time was Mr Macky Sall.

Today, there are more than twenty-three successfully drilled wells in the SNE-1 Sangomar field, and the first oil barrel was produced in June 2024. The revenue split is 82% for Woodside Energy and 18% for Petrosen. FAR Ltd.’s previous 15% stake in the field will be discussed later.

Oils and Gas Exploration in The Gambia

The Gambia’s foray into oil and gas exploration can best be described as sporadic. Between 1965, when it gained independence from Britain, and 1994, the country saw limited exploration activities. During the First Republic under Sir Dawda Jawara (1970- 1994) and the early years of the Second Republic under Yaya Jammeh, exploration efforts were scattered and intermittent. Some companies were involved in early exploration in the 1950s, but these were limited in scope and consisted mainly of initial studies. The country’s first oil well was drilled by Chevron in 1979, but it was not successful. This lethargy for oil exploration may have been shaped partly by Britain’s limited economic view of the country. During the colonial period, Britain saw The Gambia as an insignificant peanut-producing territory within its larger colonial empire. Britain showed little interest or enthusiasm for the economic development of the country beyond maintaining the lucrative supply line of raw peanuts to the UK.

Britain was circumspect about The Gambia’s viability as a state given its small size, being a narrow strip of land within Senegal with a tiny coastline on the Atlantic Ocean to the west. When the movement for independence began to gather unstoppable momentum, there were diplomatic discussions within the United Nations about whether merging with Senegal might be a better prospect for the country. However, this plan never advanced beyond discussions, and The Gambia was left to map its own path when Britain departed in 1965. The country had already been affected by British colonialism; before colonization, The Gambia was a much larger territory, with its northern border deep inside Sine Saloum near Kaolack, Senegal. British traders preferred to stay close to the banks of the River Gambia (no more than 30km wide at its broadest). As a result, Britain abandoned much of the territory to the French, who expanded further into The Gambia in 1850, reducing it to its current size.

For much of the 60s and 70s, while Senegal was busy exploring its oil and gas prospects both onshore and offshore, the government of Sir Dawda Jawara in The Gambia remained largely indifferent to the vast natural resources in and around the country. This lack of curiosity and ambition was evident when, in 1975, The Gambia agreed to its northern and southern maritime boundaries with Senegal along parallel equidistance lines running 200 meters east to west from the territorial sea baseline to the outer edge of the continental shelf. By that time, Senegal had a far better understanding of its offshore natural resources and readily agreed to the deal. The Gambia effectively shot itself in the foot, closing the door to an unimaginable National Wealth Fund from oil and gas that could have transformed the country’s socioeconomic development for generations if managed properly. A much wiser agreement would have been a perpendicular line on either side of the maritime boundary with common zones of mutual control with Senegal. All the SNE-1 Sangomar acreage would have been in this zone, rendering much of the discussion in this paper irrelevant. This approach is exactly what Senegal agreed upon with its southern neighbour, Guinea Bissau, maximizing its current oil and gas prospects in the AGC.

The Jammeh Era

Much of the credit for the limited progress The Gambia has made in oil and gas exploration goes to the government of Yahya Jammeh, who, for the first time in the nation’s history, established a Ministry of Petroleum in 2002. His government included policies for oil and gas exploration and development in its National Development Plan. The National Energy and Petroleum Act 2004 was passed into law, although it was largely based on legislation from Ghana.

Oil and gas exploration licences were made available for six separate blocks offshore The Gambia. Erin Energy was one of the first companies to acquire a licence for one of the blocks. However, there was a problematic period when several of the licenses were traded among insiders, with little benefit to the country. A case in point is the licenses in blocks A1 and A4 granted to African Petroleum Ltd, a company then majority-owned by Mr. Frank Timis. Mr. Timis, a Romanian-Australian billionaire, is a controversial figure in the oil and gas scene in West Africa. His activities in the subregion were negatively highlighted in a 2019 independent investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and BBC Africa Eye. Although oil was reportedly discovered offshore in 2003, Mr. Jammeh publicly criticised what he considered to be an insultingly low production sharing percentage offered by the exploration companies at the time. He declared that he would rather leave the oil in the ground than agree to an unfair sharing agreement. Jammeh’s intransigent conduct in this regard betrayed his intelligence. He failed to realise the importance of opening dialogue with Senegal for joint exploration and production in Sangomar, especially at a time when Senegal had made significant progress. Unwittingly, he too failed The Gambia.

Since then, there had been limited activity in oil and gas exploration until after 2016, when Jammeh was forced to leave office following his loss in the general election to Adama Barrow. Jammeh initially refused to hand over power but eventually went into exile.

Enter FAR Ltd – The Gambia

FAR Ltd entered The Gambia during a tumultuous period in the nation’s history, marked by elevated uncertainty and disarray as a new government struggled to assert control after two decades of brutal dictatorship. Government institutions were either not fully functional or non-existent, and there was no effective regulatory environment for oil and gas exploration. FAR Ltd quickly established a subsidiary, FAR (Gambia) Ltd, and acquired the 100% interest held by Erin Energy in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks. These blocks are located south of the SNE-1 Sangomar field offshore Senegal, covering 2,682 km² within the MSGBC basin, specifically the Senegal/Gambia subbasin, about 50 kilometres offshore in water depths ranging from 50 to 1,200 meters. FAR Ltd forecasted a recoverable oil resource of one billion barrels in the blocks on an unrisked best estimate of 100%.

The license deal, giving FAR Ltd 100% working interest in blocks A2 and A5, effectively meant The Gambia owned none of its oil and gas resources upon discovery. All rights to explore, drill, produce, and sell resources from the blocks belonged to FAR Ltd and other licence holders. The Gambia had imprudently hinged its hopes on royalties’ payment at production. This arrangement, despite any savings The Gambia might have made from associated expenses, was to say the least, disadvantageous. Even Senegal had the foresight to retain an 18% interest in its blocks.

The exact terms of FAR Ltd.’s original licence have never been publicly disclosed. What is known is that FAR Ltd often referred to a minimum term of drilling one exploration well a year. Details about performance-related clauses, supervision, frequency of reviews, and dispute resolution mechanisms remain unknown. These elements are crucial in properly drafted commercial agreements but are often watered down or omitted in the African context.

FAR (Gambia) Ltd operated with a small team, including an Australian Asset Manager, reportedly based in The Gambia for some time. FAR Ltd would have had a good idea of working practices in The Gambia. The team was housed in the same building as the Ministry of Petroleum. Cath Norman from FAR Ltd highlighted that this proximity facilitated better and easier cooperation with the government.

Just before FAR (Gambia) Ltd.’s contractual drilling commitments in The Gambia were due, FAR Ltd claimed financial difficulties, as it had done in Senegal. Fortunately, Petronas, a major Southeast Asian oil and gas company, agreed to farm-in, initially taking a 40% interest in the A2 and A5 block licenses, later revised to a 50% split. FAR Ltd was the operator under the licenses, despite lacking prior experience in the MSGBC basin. Petronas had the option to assume the role of operator, though the terms and conditions were never made public.

To facilitate the deal, Petronas established a subsidiary in The Gambia, PC (Gambia) Ltd. Exploration and drilling activities were purportedly channelled through these two Gambian-registered subsidiaries in whose names the licence blocks were held. Board memberships and financial details of these companies have not been publicly disclosed. Notably, the lawyer retained by FAR Ltd for its subsidiary, FAR (Gambia) Ltd, shares chambers with their mother, a domestic PEP who has represented several parastatals and the country’s largest local authority. A former Attorney General, she also has family ties to high-ranking government positions, including a brother who served as Minister of the Interior and head of the Gambia Civil Service.

Samo-1 FAR Ltd.’s first well in The Gambia

The SAMO-1 well is located slightly off-centre within the A5 block on the PSET shelf edge trend. The reservoir sand for SAMO was deposited over 100 million years ago by ancient rivers that likely once occupied the area where the River Gambia currently flows. The SAMO-1 reservoirs were formed adjacent to where these rivers reached the coast. FAR Ltd forecasted a pre-drill estimate of 825 million barrels of recoverable oil on a 2P basis for this prospect.

In preparation for drilling, FAR Ltd claimed to have contracted a Stena DrillMax sixth-generation drillship and Exceed Ltd, a drilling management company based in Aberdeen, Scotland, to operate the drillship and drill the well. However, in a 2018 appraisal, Cairn Energy reported that no 3D seismic data was available for this prospect, suggesting that FAR Ltd relied on less accurate 2D data or none at all for its assessments. In an interview with Gavin Collery, Ms. Norman of FAR Ltd stated that 3D seismic data was available, but her remarks seemed to conflate the SAMO-1 well with the Bambo well, which is known to have undergone 3D mapping.

Lacking the necessary expertise and financial resources, FAR Ltd required Petronas to fund the project. Ms. Norman acknowledged this in a 2017 interview with Mr. Collery, stating, “It’s always best practice and prudent to bring a partner in when you have got a large equity position both to ratify your technical evaluation but also to share the cost.”

Later, in a presentation, Ms. Norman added, “FAR will continue to operate both licenses through the exploration phase, including the drilling of Samo-1, although Petronas will have the right to become the operator in the development phase.”

Despite these assertions, the actual drilling of the SAMO-1 well remains unclear. FAR Ltd was initially expected to handle the drilling, but this is complicated by a statement from FAR Ltd.’s Asset Manager, Mr. Rolf Stork, who remarked, “Petronas carried FAR drilled one well, SAMO-1. We drilled it as an operator. Big undertaking for a small company like FAR.”

Ms. Norman further clarified Petronas’ supervisory role in the joint venture, stating, “Petronas brought in as partners JV. 40% each. Petronas carried us through the drilling of the exploration well.” However, the specifics of Petronas’ involvement beyond funding remain ambiguous, with no public disclosure from Petronas or PC (Gambia) Ltd regarding their activities in The Gambia.

The SAMO-1 well, reportedly drilled to a depth of 3,200 meters into the seabed, did not yield oil. FAR Ltd claimed to have continued collecting extensive logging data to evaluate other prospects. Initially believed to be an extension of the SNE-1 Sangomar field, post-drill evaluations revealed that SAMO-1 was not connected. Mr. Peter Nicholls, FAR Ltd.’s chief geologist and exploration manager, explained, “We came in structurally a bit lower… two structures instead of one big field. There was oil in the system, but it was not able to be trapped.”

FAR Ltd suggested that the oil might have migrated to the Bambo well in the A2 block. Mr. Nicholls noted, “The interesting thing about this Bambo prospect is that if you follow the migration path, where the oil from SAMO-1 is likely to end up is overlying that feature, potentially 300 million barrels or more.”

FAR Ltd.’s objective after the failed SAMO-1 prospect was to trace the oil’s migration path to an accumulation zone. Success depended on the accuracy of structural maps, predictions of sand characteristics in accumulation zones, identified fault lines, formations, shale types, and effective drilling. With modern drilling techniques and geophysical mapping, the role of luck is reduced, yet the question remains: why and how did FAR Ltd fail The Gambia?

The second well – Bambo-1 (side track-1) & Soloo

In 2020, FAR Ltd moved on to its next drilling prospects, the Soloo and Bambo wells. These are located to the north of the A2 block, nearly side by side on an elevated gradient of the PSET shelf trend, part of the SNE-1 Sangomar field extending into the A2 block. The available 3D seismic data predrill confirmed the geological formation as a continuous extension of the SNE-1 Sangomar field into The Gambia. FAR Ltd.’s Exploration Manager and chief geologist Mr. Nicholls noted:

“You could see that Soloo could well be an extension of the SNE. As a matter of fact, it’s very much mapped as an extension of SNE into The Gambia, and that is Woodside and other JV Partners in SNE will see that SNE does extend into The Gambia. So that’s not a contentious issue. It’s the way it’s seen and mapped as extending into our block.”

In a predrill presentation, Ms. Norman commented on the Bambo well:

“You can see clearly that the Sangomar oil fields extend south into The Gambia. In fact, the location of the Bambo-1 well is 500 meters from the border to the south, drilling into the extension of the Sangomar field that we call the Soloo prospect.”

The predrill forecast estimated recoverable oil from the Bambo-1 well at a billion barrels. FAR Ltd planned to drill through three prospects: Soloo upper, Bambo upper, and Soloo deep, categorized as the S390, S400, and S500 series, respectively. The Soloo upper in the S390 series had the highest chance of success at 36%. The predrill seismic data indicated that all three prospects were within the same depth and level as the primary reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar field.

FAR Ltd again acted as the operator, reassembled the same drill team from the failed SAMO-1 prospect, and contracted the same Stena IceMax Drill ship (not the seventh generation vessel used by Cairn Energy in the SNE-1 Sangomar field). FAR Ltd reported that the drill rig was operational offshore Mexico, and this was advantageous as it meant FAR Ltd would not be using a cold stack rig. However, there was no disclosed verifiable evidence that this rig was service worthy and fit for purpose. FAR Ltd.’s headquarters was reportedly in Banjul, The Gambia, but the operational base was in fact in Dakar, Senegal, where supply boats delivered all necessary pipes and goods for the drill vessel.

In November 2021, FAR Ltd finalised well locations and commenced drilling soon after. In December 2021, FAR Ltd reported that the wells, particularly Soloo Deep, did not contain commercially viable quantities of oil or gas.

A subsequent press release stated:

“Bambo-1 was initially drilled to a depth of 3216m MDBRT (Meters drilled below the rotary table), and wireline logging was completed. The Bambo-1 well was then plugged, and the Bambo-1 ST1 (side-track) well drilled to a depth of 3317m MDBRT, after which wireline logging was undertaken.

The drilling and logging data from the main well and the side-track well indicated that several target intervals had oil shows, confirming a prolific oil source in the area. Initial interpretation of cuttings and wireline logging suggested these zones had oil in poor-quality reservoirs and in traps that might have been breached, leaving residual oil. Rocks and fluid samples were recovered from several intervals in the Bambo well, and laboratory analysis in 2022 will provide additional data about the oil potential identified in the Bambo well.

The Soloo prospect objectives in the Bambo-1 well, which represented the potential southern extension of the Sangomar field in A2, indicated some oil shows but no significant oil volumes. However, oil shows in the Bambo prospect reservoir, encountered in both the Bambo-1 and Bambo-1 ST1 wells, highlighted up-dip potential to the south in the A2 Block, mapped as the new Panthera prospect. Other reservoirs in the Bambo drilling campaign show oil potential, opening additional exploration opportunities in both the A2 and A5 Blocks.

The well and side-track have been plugged and abandoned as planned for this type of exploration drilling.”

The press release emphasised that the Soloo and Bambo-1 prospects were not
extensions of the SNE-1 Sangomar field. It did not clearly disclose that drilling had not
gone as planned. The drill rig had an accident at 3216 meters below the seabed, forcing
FAR Ltd to halt operation before reaching the target depth of 3450 meters MDBRT. They
then planned a side-track well, Bambo-1 ST1, which also fell short of the target zone.
FAR Ltd and its JV partner Petronas designated the well a ‘tight hole’ and released
minimal information during drilling.

The cause of the accident was unclear, and FAR Ltd did not provide details. Ms. Norman, FAR Ltd.’s Managing Director, commented:

“FAR is pleased with the experienced drilling team and contractors who quickly adjusted the Bambo-1 drilling program to suit the geological setting and best meet the drilling program’s objectives. FAR is well-placed to achieve these objectives through the side-tracked well and drilling through the undrilled Soloo Deep prospect. We are encouraged by the presence of oil in potential reservoirs and look forward to completing the well in the coming weeks.”

FAR Ltd.’s drilling programme appeared unfocused, attempting to drill through three separate reservoirs in a stacked formation—a technique not tried in the successful SNE-1 Sangomar field. This ambitious approach led to challenges, including a sudden loss of fluid mid-drilling, necessitating diversion through an unplanned side-track well.

Curiously, FAR Ltd made no reference to Petronas having any role in this drilling, unlike the SAMO-1 well. Instead, the company pointed to an unidentified drilling team and contractors. Several plausible reasons for this drilling failure include the inexperience of the crew, inaccuracies in the geophysical survey data, errors in seismic data interpretation, or an ill-equipped drill rig. However, given the geophysical team’s successful track record in the SNE-1 Sangomar field, it is unlikely they were the issue. The limited information available about the drilling crew suggests that FAR Ltd.’s inexperience as an operator was the main problem. The company failed to effectively coordinate the drill crew, drill rig, and geophysical team to overcome the complex drilling challenges.

FAR Ltd.’s finding of no commercially viable oil and gas in the Bambo-1 and Soloo wells contradicts the predrill 3D seismic data showing these wells as connected to the successful SNE-1 Sangomar field reservoirs. Ms. Norman stated predrill:

“The outcome of that process is that we have a net billion barrels of oil potential in our two blocks offshore Gambia. Following the risk audit of FAR’s evaluation of the potentials, we have confirmed a P50 un-risked 1.1 billion barrels of potential in The Gambia. We have always expected our acreage to be highly prospective because it is contiguous with our acreage in Senegal. We have drilled 11 wells offshore Senegal, 8 on the same trend that extends into The Gambia, and 8 into the same reservoirs that will be our primary reservoirs in The Gambia.”
(Emphasis underlined by author)

The 3D seismic data indicated that all the successful wells in Senegal’s SNE-1 Sangomar field were in the same primary reservoirs (S400 and S500 series) as the wells in The Gambia. The Gambian prospects were charged with oil, as proven by Cairn Energy and admitted by FAR Ltd, confirming that all wells in the S400 and S500 reservoir series are connected.

This raises the question: what separates the Soloo and Bambo-1 prospects from the SNE-1 Sangomar field? Is there a risk that FAR Ltd.’s finding—that its SNE-1 Sangomar field does not extend into The Gambia’s A2 block—is based on its failed drilling programme?

The Bambo and Soloo prospects have multiple reservoir targets, with two main reservoirs in the S400 series being hydrocarbon-bearing in the SNE-1 Sangomar wells. FAR Ltd has not identified at least to the public in the Gambia which reservoirs in the Bambo and Soloo prospects do not contain commercially viable oil or which targets may have been missed due to drilling failure.

A troubling coincidence is that the prolific SNE-1 Sangomar S400 and S500 series reservoirs suddenly do not contain commercially viable oil at the boundary line where the field extends into The Gambia. FAR Ltd claimed that the reservoir for the Bambo-1 well was poor and unable to trap oil due to seal breaches, the same reason given for the failed SAMO-1 well.

The geophysical features of the PSET shelf edge in the SNE-1 Sangomar field and the A2 and A5 blocks are nearly identical, formed over the same period and close in time and space. The reservoirs in the A2 and A5 blocks are good, but the seals, made of black/grey shales, are reportedly underdeveloped according to Far Ltd. If true, this suggests that the oil in The Gambian prospects has migrated into an unidentified accumulation zone.

FAR Ltd does not dispute this, but it raises the question: does FAR Ltd have a duty to consider and determine the phenomenon of oil migration from The Gambia?

The Source Kitchen & the phenomenon of oil migration in the MSGBC – Senegal/Gambia subbasin

The hydrocarbon source ‘kitchen’ that feeds all the reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar field lies deep below the seafloor of the basin, migrating up the slopes of the PSET trend in a westerly direction into the reservoirs.

The Soloo and Bambo prospects have easy access to this source kitchen, similar to other reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar field. FAR Ltd.’s Ms Norman underscored this point in one of its presentations:

“I would like to walk you through what the exploration opportunity looks like for FAR. Starting with the Sangomar oil field, which is a known oil field sitting on the shelf edge of a carbonate platform being fed by oil generated in the source kitchen deep out to the west. You can see on the bottom left of the seismic line that I’m showing you is right through the Sangomar oil field, and I’m going to step through to the south to show you the prospects further to the south in the Gambia. The first, of course, are Soloo and Bambo that we’ll be drilling with the Bambo 1 well just to the north of our blocks in A2. You can see that they have easy access to the source kitchen and that source kitchen is very prolific to generate enough oil to house 5 billion barrels of oil just in place just to the north in Sangomar, which means we have a really rich source rock that’s capable of generating a lot of oil in this region. As we step further to the south, we have the Jobo prospect at about 280 million barrels, the Jato prospect at about 130 million barrels, and then Malo, a very large prospect out to the east at about 265 million barrels. All on a P50 best estimate basis. So, lots of follow-ups in our A2 and A5 blocks. We are not just about drilling Bambo this year.” [Emphasis underlined by author]

The migration path of oil into an accumulation zone or reservoir is directed by hydrostatic pressure exerted by gravity on the source kitchen. Often, the migration path follows natural fault lines within hydrocarbon formations. When these fault lines remain active and overlap with a trap, the trap becomes the main accumulation zone. The oil remains trapped in the accumulation zone if the reservoir is made of good porous sandstone or limestone and has mature seals to prevent further migration or degradation by water.

Apart from gravitational pressure, other key factors determining the migration path of oil into an accumulation zone or reservoir include buoyancy, the geothermal gradient of the hydrocarbon formation, the size of the fault lines, and the porosity and permeability of the reservoir sandstone. Primary migration and accumulation of oil may have started millions of years ago but can continue as long as the source kitchen releases oil and the fault lines are active, allowing secondary migration into other reservoirs.

The viscosity of the oil in the SNE-1 Sangomar field, at 32◦, makes it a light fluid, similar to the residual oil in The Gambian prospects. Therefore, it would migrate at a much faster velocity over long distances under normal geothermal conditions. Since The Gambia’s A2 block is physically contiguous with the SNE-1 Sangomar field, as shown by 3D seismic data, the migration of a large volume of oil from there into the SNE-1 Sangomar field would be quick and effortless.

The SNE-1 Sangomar field is at the centre of a geographic phenomenon in the Senegal/Gambia sub-basin, part of the MSGBC basin. It contains giant reservoirs or accumulation zones into which oil is fed from the source kitchen. It also serves as the most likely trap zone for oil migrating along the PSET shelf from different directions, particularly from The Gambia.

The acreage of the SNE-1 Sangomar field is unusually extensive. It sits on a depression on the PSET and has a lower gradient compared to the Soloo, Bambo, and SAMO-1 prospects in The Gambia. It supports two known separate gigantic oil reservoirs in stacked formation, the lower and upper reservoirs, with a substantial gas cap. These reservoirs are in lateral formation, separated by thick layers of ancient rock. The secondary migration paths into these reservoirs are confirmed to be through separate stratigraphic fault lines from the source kitchen in a west-to-east direction.

Basin modelling from FAR Ltd.’s exploration in the A2 and A5 blocks identified a secondary migration path running the length of the PSET from south to north, from SAMO-1 towards Bambo-1. The SNE-1 Sangomar field lies north on this migration path. If the oil in the SAMO-1 well could not be trapped due to a lack of mature seals (though it has a good reservoir) and its migration path is charted towards the Bambo and Soloo prospects as FAR Ltd has acknowledged, then those two are not the accumulation zones, as they are reported not to have oil in commercially viable quantities.

The oil must have migrated further into an alternative trap, and the most probable location of that trap, in terms of time, distance, and space, is the extensive SNE-1 Sangomar reservoirs.

The substantial gas cap on the SNE-1 Sangomar field is further evidence of the secondary migration of an enormous volume of oil into these reservoirs, particularly the S400 series. The gas cap resulted from thermal regeneration, where increased temperatures in the hydrocarbon formation caused chemical reactions that converted oil into gas. What remains in the reservoir is the current volume of oil that has not been heated into gas.

Oil reservoirs maintain equilibrium through hydrostatic pressure. When this pressure is disrupted at any point, the fluid will naturally flow toward areas of lower pressure. The giant S400 and S500 series reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar field have had 23 wells drilled in them, and there could be even more. Numerous pressure tests conducted by FAR Ltd, and its JV partners confirmed the connectivity of the wells in those reservoirs. Therefore, the historic pressure within the reservoirs was disturbed well before it was determined whether the SNE-1 Sangomar field extended into The Gambia.

For obvious reasons, FAR Ltd. seems to focus its efforts on identifying a separate accumulation zone (however unlikely) for the prospects in The Gambia. Despite these efforts, the company has made little progress in pinpointing a distinct migration path and accumulation zone for the billion barrels of oil it once predicted in its Gambian blocks. It has been seven years since the drilling of the SAMO-1 well and three years since the drilling of Soloo and Bambo-1, along with the Bambo-1 sidetrack-1. Yet, FAR Ltd. has not provided any substantial updates on the extensive research it claims to be conducting on the logging data from these unsuccessful wells. Instead, the company is now shifting its focus to the Panthera, Jato, and Malo prospects within the A2 block, which are located in the same area and gradient as the Bambo well, in close proximity to the SNE-1 Sangomar field.

The question must be asked: Is it necessary for there to be a separate oil accumulation zone in The Gambia if geophysical analysis confirms that oil migrates or migrated from the Gambian prospects into the SNE-1 Sangomar field or across the maritime boundary into Senegal? If this is the case, what potential difficulties would FAR Ltd have encountered in navigating the contractual and political challenges that might have arisen, given that, before selling its stake in 2020, it partly owned the SNE-1 Sangomar field?

Specifically, this points to several issues:

  1. FAR Ltd.’s contractual relations with its joint venture partners in the SNE-1 Sangomar field.
  2. Its contractual relations with the Gambian government regarding the A2 and A5 blocks. This points to FAR Ltd.’s obligation under specific clauses dealing with development and production of the oil and the payment of royalties to The Gambia.
  3. The potential contentious issue of shared stakes between The Gambia and Senegal.

How might these factors have impacted the oil production revenue-sharing agreement and the production schedule of the joint venture partners in the SNE-1 Sangomar field if The Gambia were to assert its right to a share of the oil and gas? Woodside Energy and Senegal would clearly want to avoid any delays in their production schedule from the SNE-1 Sangomar field. It seems FAR Ltd was caught between a rock and a hard place!

The Law – Conflict – Natural Resources along/near to Maritime boundaries

Both The Gambia and Senegal are signatories to the United Nations International Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The convention does not specify how states should share or exploit natural resources between their maritime boundaries, nor does it address the migration of natural resources, such as oil, from one country into an accumulation zone across maritime boundaries. It encourages nation-states to adopt principles of equitable dealing, good faith negotiations, and respect for sovereignty in bilateral and multilateral agreements. These concepts often carry legal nuances that are challenging for courts and judges to apply consistently.

Natural resources below the seabed between countries are of strategic importance and require active cooperation between states to harness their value. However, the absence of international law detailing how ownership rights over these resources should be determined has led to “safari justice” in some parts of the world, where might prevails and weaker countries struggle to protect their interests. Another aspect of this issue is related to the jurisdiction of maritime boundaries. It is commonly assumed that strict adherence to surface maritime boundaries automatically determines ownership rights of resources deep below the seabed, which can lead to significant injustice. Oil and gas, for instance, are migratory substances that can cross maritime boundaries due to gravitational pressure differences. The Senegal/Gambia sub-basin of the MSGBC is exclusively shared by the two countries, and equitable principles suggest that its sub-seabed resources particularly in the area between The Gambia and Saloum rivers should be jointly shared. This should not be contingent on proving oil migration from Gambian wells to the SNE-1 Sangomar field. The aggressive stance of the Macky Sall government and the oil companies in the SNE Sangomar exemplifies the excesses of unchecked capitalism. At a deeper level, it also questions Sall’s moral value as a Senegambian.

The same principles of equitable dealing and good faith negotiations apply in private international investment agreements. Investors must perform their license obligations in good faith, which has both substantive and procedural perspectives. Substantively, it involves the host state’s obligations to the investor and vice versa. Procedurally, it refers to arbitration proceedings for dispute resolution. Good faith encompasses fairness, honesty, loyalty, and transparency, essential for maintaining justice in international investment law. It requires parties to comply with their obligations competently and with mutual trust and cooperation.

When there is a perceived conflict of interest or lack of transparency or competence in the performance of a license obligation by an investor, the state’s interests are vulnerable. Aside from FAR Ltd.’s failure to find a separate oil and gas accumulation zone in its Gambian blocks, was it within its competence to determine for the Gambian government whether the missing oil from the failed wells may have migrated into the SNE-1 Sangomar field? FAR Ltd had already charted the likely migration path of oil from SAMO-1 well to Bambo-1 well. Why stop there? If the hypothesis is valid that oil migrated from the Gambian prospects into the SNE-1 Sangomar reservoirs, how does that reflect on FAR Ltd.’s performance if the Gambian government lacks clarity on this issue? It is the responsibility of the Attorney-General (with assistance from external counsel if necessary) to advise the government on whether the investor has performed its obligations competently and in good faith.

This task is easier with the active participation of the government through a relevant regulatory authority, as demonstrated by Petrosen in Senegal during the development of their prospects. In contrast, the government of The Gambia was unable to take similar action. It had both hands tied behind its back, having given away 100% of its interest in both blocks. Unfortunately, the government could not rely on its Attorney General, Ministry of Petroleum, GNPC, or Petroleum Commission to intervene, for reasons apparent to most Gambians. Independent legal and geotechnical advice was urgently needed. Furthermore, the involvement of FAR (Gambia) Ltd.’s lawyer creates a potential significant conflict of interest, even in the absence of any clear indication of wrongdoing.

The Political Agenda – Senegambia

The legal framework for oil and gas exploration in The Gambia is complex, and the political landscape further complicates matters. FAR Ltd.’s performance in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks has not improved the situation. FAR Ltd has effectively put a nail in The Gambia’s oil and gas exploration prospects by finding that the SNE-1 Sangomar field does not extend into The Gambia without fully addressing the potential migration of oil from The Gambia into the SNE-1 Sangomar field. This outcome benefits Senegal, where former President Macky Sall negotiated an extremely poor production sharing agreement, allowing Woodside Energy to retain 82% of the revenue while Petrosen, Senegal’s state oil corporation, received only 18%. Mr. Sall would likely have preferred to avoid any reduction in Senegal’s share, and FAR Ltd.’s findings reinforced this by negating The Gambia’s claim to exploration and production rights, unlike in Mauritania to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

Senegal, under Macky Sall, adopted a silent but sophisticated policy of economically merging The Gambia with Senegal (a feat that could not be achieved politically during the Senegambia Confederation) by supporting a new regime in The Gambia that aligned with Senegal’s strategic interests. In 2016, this opportunity arose when former Gambian dictator Yahya Jammeh reneged on his promise to hand over power after losing the general election. Adama Barrow, the declared winner, fled to Senegal, and Macky Sall spearheaded diplomatic efforts in West Africa and the EU to force Jammeh out. He succeeded, and Jammeh fled into exile to Equatorial Guinea. Barrow was sworn in as President of The Gambia in Dakar, Senegal, and was escorted into the country by Senegalese security personnel. Since 2016, Barrow’s close protection officers and guards at the State House have been Senegalese soldiers and security agents. Barrow regards Sall as an elder brother, advisor, guardian, and protector against coups. The relationship between the two is more accurately described as subservient—anything Macky wanted for Senegal from The Gambia, Macky got. Their relationship, shaped by their differing levels of sophistication and experience in state affairs, appears to reflect an exercise of undue influence. One is a geologist with extensive senior government experience, while the other, despite being a successful estate agent and skilled money manager, is a high school dropout with no prior government experience. Many of Barrow’s government’s decisions since 2016 have effectively surrendered The Gambia’s economic sovereignty and security to Senegal—a gift that eluded Senegal since the two nations were divided by colonial history.

It is unsurprising that Barrow and his government have not made a single pronouncement regarding the country’s oil and gas prospects within its maritime boundary with Senegal. Even if he wanted to, achieving success would be difficult. Sall was notoriously corrupt and engaged in underhand deals. In 2021, Guinea Bissau’s president, Umaro Sissoko Embalo, signed a secret oil and gas sharing agreement with Sall, without informing his cabinet or parliament. The deal, unfavourable to Guinea Bissau, allocated only about 30% of revenue to the country. Armando Lona, editor-in-chief of O Democrata, criticized the agreement as illegal since it lacked parliamentary approval and accused the president of secrecy regarding national resources. The Guinea Bissau parliament revoked the agreement, and Sall sacked his energy minister, Amadou Hott, who did not dispute the agreement when challenged in a media interview.

Given Sall’s history, it is plausible that he has managed to silence Barrow and his government regarding oil and gas matters near their maritime borders. The opposition, parliament, and civil society in The Gambia have been silent on the subject, reflecting a lack of curiosity and ambition to safeguard national interests, reminiscent of the Jawara government during the First Republic.

There is a sense in The Gambia that discussing joint exploration, production, and revenue sharing of natural resources with Senegal is taboo, especially now that Senegal has started oil production. The commonly cited phrase, “The Gambia and Senegal are two heads of the same body,” discourages open discussion on the topic. Consequently, the government of The Gambia has failed, unlike Mauritania and Guinea Bissau, to foster intergovernmental dialogue about shared natural resources across maritime boundaries with Senegal.

As a result, Senegal is the sole beneficiary of a vast oil and gas field in the shared Senegal/Gambia sub-basin. Under normal circumstances, applying principles of equity, these resources should be shared, regardless of the discovered accumulation zone being on the Senegalese side. The Gambia’s failure to protect its share of the resources can be attributed to its weak institutions at every level. Since 2021, Mr. Jerreh Barrow has served as the sole Commissioner of The Gambia Petroleum Commission. The Commission is the authority responsible for overseeing resource exploitation, including monitoring and ensuring compliance with national policies and regulations for petroleum activities. A concerning clause in the model Production Sharing Agreement (PEPLA) stipulates a Signature Bonus to be determined by the Licensee at the time of bidding, in addition to a further $2 million payment required upon the Commissioner’s approval of the first Development and Production Plan. This payment structure also applies to any subsequent amendments or new development plans. Additionally, production bonuses of $10 million are to be paid at various stages of development. The clause links the payment of substantial bonuses to the Commissioner’s approval, which could raise concerns about potential conflicts of interest or corruption. A more robust anti-corruption measure might involve requiring approval from a board or committee rather than an individual, thereby enhancing transparency and accountability.

The Gambia National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), responsible for encouraging petroleum operations, has abandoned initiatives to cooperate with oil and gas exploration companies as JV partners, unlike Petrosen in Senegal. The GNPC has been mired in corruption, limiting its activities to storage and distribution of petroleum products. A recent government task force, led by the Minister of Finance, found that despite having expensive computers and software, GNPC staff preferred manual entries, making record-keeping and transaction tracing difficult. Reports indicate that over $20 million has been misappropriated at the GNPC, which is just the tip of the iceberg.

BP (British Petroleum) exits The Gambia’s – A1 Block

It is therefore not surprising that BP exited The Gambia in August 2021 by surrendering its license in the A1 block. This block, along with the A4, had a chequered history. In 2006, African Petroleum acquired a 100% working interest in these blocks from Buried Hill Ltd. The licences were extended thrice, as it appeared the company was unable to fulfil its drilling obligations. When negotiations to extend the license failed, the government of The Gambia terminated the licenses for the blocks in 2017.

African Petroleum denied the termination, asserting that the government had not enacted the proper termination procedure and that its licenses remained in force until this was done. This led to an expensive and protracted arbitration proceeding lodged by African Petroleum at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) against The Gambia.

The Government of The Gambia secured the services of Cherie Blair KC, wife of former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. They secured the services of Cherie Blair KC, wife of former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. At the time, Mrs. Blair, though well-respected for her advocacy in human rights and administrative law, did not have experience in international oil and gas arbitration proceedings. The case was led admirably by a legendary Gambian US-based attorney who provided distinguished service but without a decisive victory through no fault of his but the weakness of the Gambia’s case.

While proceedings were ongoing, the government of The Gambia, in an unprecedented act of disregard for the arbitration process, opened bidding on the A1 block and sold it to BP in April 2019 before the matter was concluded. The case was eventually settled with The Gambia surrendering the A4 block back to African Petroleum in September 2020. There has never been a public disclosure of the full details of the settlement and the legal costs incurred by The Gambia in the case.

It was partly through this case that certain individuals in The Gambia who prioritise personal gain over national development opened a secret passage (disguised under the name of the Tony Blair Institute) between Tony Blair, former UK Prime Minister, and the office of the President of The Gambia. On April 18, 2018, Mr. Blair hosted President Barrow at a discussion panel held at the famous Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs. Mr. Blair is known within closed circles in The Gambia to have quietly jetted in and out of the country during the period leading to BP’s exit from The Gambia. What most Gambians do not know is that behind many seemingly charitable foundations operating in The Gambia are consulting businesses for profit. Cherie Blair KC heads Omnia Strategy, an advisory firm that has picked up a phenomenal workload in the short time it has been operating, largely from developing countries.

BP’s exit from the A1 block rendered the minor result in the arbitration case a Pyrrhic victory. At the time, the Gambia Ministry of Petroleum issued a press release indicating that BP had informed the government its decision to exit was due to a change in its corporate strategy towards low carbon energy. While this might be true, BP itself did not comment on the issue. The circumstances surrounding BP’s exit from The Gambia raise serious questions about the true underlying reasons for its decision.

BP had already acquired 2D and 3D seismic data for the block and completed an environmental impact assessment at substantial cost. It had modelled two prospects in its block located very near the SNE-1 Sangomar field. The Eland prospect had a resource estimate of 936 million barrels of oil (MBO) in-place and 344 MBO recoverable with a total risk of 24%. The Oribi prospect had a resource estimate of 1,180 MBO in-place and 350 MBO recoverable with a total risk of 10%. All that remained was to drill a well, yet BP chose to pay the Gambian government a settlement of $30 million to walk away.

It would be interesting to know the composition of the negotiation team, including the legal personnel on both sides, for this settlement. It remains unclear what factors determined the $30 million settlement and how it was utilised by the Gambian government, as no public disclosure has been made.

BP is a giant in oil and gas exploration around the world, possessing the requisite expertise in exploration and production. It also has a strong due diligence unit that is highly sensitive to corrupt practices in the industry. This sensitivity reflects the UK government’s recently amended legislation on Bribery and Corruption, which covers the activities of UK-listed companies wherever they occur in the world.

BP’s decision to abandon The Gambia came in the aftermath of FAR Ltd.’s failed drilling of the SAMO-1 well, which is adjacent to and on the same trend as BP’s former A1 block. When FAR Ltd drilled SAMO-1, it reported finding no oil accumulation zone but did find traces of oil that may have migrated. FAR Ltd further indicated that the oil migration path from the SAMO well charts towards the Bambo and Soloo wells, which were mapped to be in the same two primary reservoirs as the eight others, and now twenty-three, wells that FAR Ltd and its joint venture partner Woodside Energy have drilled in the SNE-1 Sangomar field. The Bambo and Soloo prospects are even closer to BP’s previously held A1 block than the SAMO-1 prospect.

If BP had any concerns, it did not share them publicly. However, there is no doubt that its decision must have been based on extraordinarily strong reasons that were not in its interest as an investor.

FAR Ltd Laughing all the way to the bank

– Far sold stake in SNE-1 Sangomar
– Full detail of deals.
– Petronas sold back shares to FAR and left JV.
– FAR license exemption in The Gambia

It appears FAR Ltd. has emerged as the winner in the murky affairs surrounding The Gambia’s missing oil and gas. In June 2020, FAR Ltd. was in a dire financial state, having defaulted on its development cash call for the SNE-1 Sangomar field, putting its entire 13% stake in the joint venture at risk. The default clause read:

“Under the JOA default provisions, if a defaulting party has not fulfilled its financial obligations within six months from the date of notification of the default, it will forfeit its participating interest without compensation. Unpaid amounts accrue interest at the LIBOR rate + 2%.”

FAR Ltd. embarked on cost-cutting measures, including making several staff redundant and requiring all senior executives and non-executive directors to accept a 20% salary or fee reduction effective 1 July 2020.

In this abysmal financial context, FAR Ltd. embarked on its now-failed Bambo-1 well and side-track well, which it claimed were not extensions of the SNE-1 Sangomar field. Throughout the pre-drilling preparation, FAR Ltd. was in talks with Woodside Energy, which had issued the default notice and to whom FAR would have had to forfeit its stake if it did not pay up. At that time, Woodside Energy held about 69% of the stake in the SNE-1 Sangomar field.

In July 2021, three months before drilling the Bambo-1 well, FAR Ltd. was forced to sell its entire interest in the Senegal RSSD Project to Woodside Energy to avoid forfeiture without compensation. The transaction was approved at a general meeting of its shareholders on 28 April 2021. FAR Ltd. received a cash payment of US$126 million from Woodside Energy on 7 July 2021. Additionally, FAR Ltd. stands to receive future payments leveraged on the total volume of oil produced from the SNE-1 Sangomar field until 2027.

According to a notice FAR Ltd. issued to its shareholders on 12 June 2024:

“The contingent payment of up to US$55 million is payable in the future based on
various factors relating to the sale of oil from the RSSD Project.

The contingent payment comprises 45% of entitlement barrels (being the share of oil
relating to FAR’s 13.67% RSSD Project exploitation area interest) sold over the previous
calendar year multiplied by the excess (if any) of the crude oil price per barrel (capped
at US$70) and US$58.

The contingent payment terminates on the earliest of 31 December 2027, three years
from the first oil being sold (excluding any periods of zero production), and a total
contingent payment of US$55 million being reached.”

This deal raises very serious and disturbing questions:

  1. FAR Ltd.’s entire stake in the SNE-1 Sangomar was 15%. This has been revised down to 13% but there is no disclosure of what happens to remaining 2%.
  2. Was this deal disclosed pre-drilling of the Bambo-1 well to the Gambian public and the government of The Gambia?
  3. Given FAR’s stakes in the SNE-1 Sangomar field and in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks through its subsidiary FAR (Gambia) Ltd., and its role as the operator during drilling in the Gambian prospects, what measures, if any, were put in place to protect The Gambia against potential conflicts of interest from FAR Ltd especially in the context of question 4 below on migration of oil? PC Gambia (Petronas) could not properly perform this role as FAR Ltd.’s joint venture partner in The Gambia?
  4. Even if the primary reservoirs in the SNE-1 Sangomar have not extended into The Gambia, does this transaction meet the transparency expected in international investment agreements in oil and gas if oil migrates or has migrated from The Gambia into the SNE-1 Sangomar field?
  5. What due diligence did Woodside Energy and Petrosen carry out to validate FAR Ltd.’s finding that the SNE-1 Sangomar did not extend into The Gambia’s A2 block and to rule out any possibility of oil migrating from the underdeveloped reservoirs in the Gambian prospects into the SNE-1 Sangomar field?

In August 2022, FAR Ltd. reacquired 100% ownership of blocks A2 and A5 when PC (Gambia) Ltd., the subsidiary of Petronas that previously held the other 50% stake in the blocks, conveniently returned them to FAR Ltd. It is difficult to see the business case for Petronas’s involvement in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks and the justification it provided to its shareholders for taking such an enormous loss willingly.

In the meantime, FAR Ltd. has renegotiated a two-year extension to its exploration licence with the government of The Gambia, exempting it from the yearly commitment to drill a well and all other consequential taxes, fees, and expenses payable to the government.

FAR Ltd. reported that this would enable the company to consider options for delivering value while minimising its expenditure over the two-year extension period. The company aims to capitalise on the exploration data acquired from the two unsuccessful wells already drilled, without significantly drawing down existing capital.

This negotiation with the government of The Gambia would have been heavily influenced by legal advice from members of the same family or connected individuals acting on behalf of both the government and FAR Ltd. It is difficult to justify exempting FAR Ltd. from its contracted drilling obligations and all taxes and expenses payment to the government of The Gambia for the next two years, especially after having received US$127 million plus potential future millions.

There is no official gazette or publication indicating that parliamentary assent has been granted to exempt FAR Ltd. from its tax liabilities to the government of The Gambia. It would be a surprise if there had been. The government of The Gambian remains cash strapped and unable to meet basic needs for hospitals, schools, police, and infrastructure. With this arrangement, FAR Ltd. is arguably recouping every penny it claimed to have spent in The Gambia through its subsidiary under its so-called corporate social responsibility.

In the meantime, FAR Ltd. has outlined its plan for prospects Panthera, Jatto, and Malo in its A2 block, each of which it claims (as it did with the other unsuccessful prospects) contain multiple potential oil-bearing reservoir targets. However, any exploration on these prospects is conditional on FAR Ltd. finding a suitable joint venture partner to fund the cost. Thus, the extension granted to FAR Ltd. is likely to be longer if it cannot find a joint venture partner with deep pockets and one should add relevant expertise. This situation places The Gambia in a precarious position.

Given that the Gambian wells were found not to contain significant oil and gas reserves, it could be argued that FAR Ltd. strategically avoided the costs and risks associated with further exploration and development. However, this outcome also meant it evaded the possibility of discovering and developing untapped resources, which would have required them to pay royalties to the government of The Gambia. The real issue lies in the decision of the government of The Gambia to sign away 100% working interest in its exploration blocks without thoroughly exhausting all possibilities. This decision leaves The Gambia with nothing to show for its potential resources—a short-sighted move that is difficult to justify.

FAR Ltd. would likely point to the extensive cautionary exemption statement in its presentations, which it would claim absolves it of any liability for inaccuracies in its geophysical data.

Senegal/Gambia Relations

On 24 March 2024, Senegal elected a new president, Mr. Bassirou Diomaye Faye, after Macky Sall was forced by popular pressure to step down at the end of his final term. The new government, with Prime Minister Ousman Sonko at the helm, has vowed to follow and apply principles of honesty in governance. In his inaugural visit to The Gambia, the first since his election, President Faye extended an open arm of cooperation, solidarity, and respect to the government of The Gambia. This reflects his new foreign policy, which places a bold emphasis on unity and solidarity within Africa. He emphasised that the bond between the two countries will be strengthened and that nothing will change from what has already been established. It is hoped that this new government will reflect the level of honesty in governance it has spoken about in its actions, bringing transparency to all matters relating to dialogue, exploration, and production of the shared natural resources between the two countries. However, a recent high-level intergovernmental meeting between the two countries, attended by President Faye, Prime Minister Sonko, and The Gambian Vice President Jallow, focused on key areas of strategic importance but notably omitted the most sensitive topic: oil and gas. This omission raises concerns about future developments.

The curse of oil and gas in African Countries

Oil and gas have been a curse for almost all producing Sub-Saharan African countries. These nations are endowed with vast natural resources that could have propelled them into the league of developed countries. However, they have failed due to sheer mismanagement and chronic corruption. This is what sets them apart from successfully managed countries like Norway, Qatar, and the UAE, which have similar vast resources. Senegal could turn a new and refreshing chapter in resource management in Africa by emulating the successes of Norway—eliminating corruption, strengthening efficient institutions, and setting up a responsibly managed Sovereign Wealth Fund. It will need to act quickly to register any success because the era of oil and gas is rapidly ending as the world transitions to renewable energy. For The Gambia, the curse has struck even before oil and gas are discovered!

Conclusion

The results from FAR Ltd.’s exploration drilling in the SAMO-1, Bambo-1, and Soloo Deep prospects have confirmed the presence of oil. In the cases of SAMO-1 and BAMBO-1, although the reservoirs were of excellent quality, they were unable to trap the oil due to underdeveloped seals. The oil in these prospects likely migrated to an accumulation zone, which remains unidentified. The most likely location of this accumulation zone is in the SNE-1 Sangomar field. However, FAR Ltd.’s inability to identify the accumulation zone or confirm the migration path of the oil leading to speculation about oil migrating to the SNE-1 Sangomar field is due to several factors: its lack of technical expertise and funds, approach to exploration, drilling, and the accuracy of its geophysical survey data.

This failure is not FAR Ltd.’s alone. The government of The Gambia’s policy on oil and gas exploration has also failed at the level of execution. There is a serious lack of transparency in the relationship between Gambians, the government of The Gambia and FAR Ltd. This relationship appears to operate beyond confidentiality and into the realm of secrecy. Given the country’s weak institutions and the lack of proper regulatory oversight on oil and gas exploration, a vacuum is created where important decisions on matters of national interest are made by connected individuals behind closed doors. The national interest is put at risk when the performance of relevant stakeholders cannot be measured or when failures are not sanctioned.

With Senegal progressing at speed with oil production, there is an urgency for the government of The Gambia to expedite its oil and gas exploration with vigour. The exploration should be competently executed to achieve the purpose of finding an accumulation zone in The Gambia or at the very least establish the migration path of the oil from The Gambia to an established accumulation zone across the maritime boundary with Senegal, anywhere within the subbasin. The resources deep under the seabed in the Senegal/Gambia subbasin, in particular the SNE-1 Sangomar field should not be claimed by Senegal alone. It is overly simplistic to rely solely on surface maritime boundaries as the criterion for determining whether a country should share the natural resources below the seabed with its immediate neighbour. Similarly, it should not be necessary to provide evidence of oil and gas migration from The Gambia to the SNE-1 Sangomar field to justify such sharing. The government of The Gambia should initiate proactive inter-governmental dialogue with Senegal for greater clarity and understanding of the hydrocarbon and geophysical formation across their maritime boundaries. They must agree a protocol for joint resource and revenue sharing on exploration and production of oil and gas in the Senegal/Gambia subbasin of the MSGBC.

Successive governments since independence have failed The Gambia on all the indices of development. It is the smallest country in mainland Africa and potentially by far the easiest to develop if it had the right leadership and progressive orientated people. But despite its manageable size and potential natural resources, The Gambia has suffered the misfortune of having extremely poor leadership and an unenterprising population. The wealthy and so-called intellectuals and professionals have become the biggest enablers of the forces both internally and externally that undermine the economic and political sovereignty of the nation. All of these, give weight to previously held reservations that The Gambia cannot be a viable state. The saga of the exploration of oil and gas on The Gambia’s maritime coast and many other recent developments in the nation’s history should open frank discussion by the people about the future of the country. The Gambia is on the cusp of becoming a failed state (if not already) and there is not a flicker of light shining through this long dark tunnel that it has any chance left to its own accord to save itself. Developing a country requires a collective national effort. If this cannot be achieved, an appealing alternative for The Gambia, given Senegal’s new and dynamic leadership committed to justice, might be to consider full integration with Senegal. This would, in a way, correct the injustice of the Berlin Conference, where the two brotherly nations were divided without their consent. But Senegal, wary of its ‘tainted’ oil and gas lottery win, might shut the door on The Gambia. In that case, The Gambia risks drifting into the wilderness and becoming a basket case – an unsettling prospect. The only way to avoid this fate is for The Gambia to build strong institutions and demand its fair share of the resources in the Senegal-Gambia sub-basin. The Gambia must be resolute in this pursuit. For The Gambia, for Justice, for Development!

Reference Material

  1. Assessment of the Undiscovered Oil and Gas of the Senegal Province, Mauritania,
    Senegal, The Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau, Northwest Africa
    By Michael E. Brownfield and Ronald R. Charpentier
  2. The SNE Discovery Offshore Senegal – Moving a Frontier Basin to Emergent
    Eric Hathon, Exploration Director, Cairn Energy PLC 12th June 2018
  3. Lithostratigraphy and Characterisation of Paleocene Limestones for Optimal
    Exploitation (Senegal, West Africa): Comparative Study of the Bandia and Popenguine
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    PRODUCTION) BLOCK A5
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    OE 25 June 2020 FAR signs Gambia JOAs with Petronas. Seeks drilling partners.
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    Gambia/Senegal 4th June 1975
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    February 26, 2018
  24. Petronas’ petroleum stake acquisition gets Gambia nod by Fatou Touray Kerr Fatou –
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  25. Offshore Engineer: Far Signs Gambia JOAs with Petronas. Seeks Drilling Partners
    Jun 25, 2020
  26. Offshore Mag: Multiple oil shows from Bambo well offshore The Gambia
    Dec. 23, 2021
  27. The drillship Stena IceMAX has finished drilling and formation evaluation operations for
    FAR’s deepwater Bambo-1ST1 side-track well offshore The Gambia.
    CSN: Bambo-1 well drilling commences offshore The Gambia
    December 8, 2021
  28. Petroleum Africa: Bamboo-1 Well Offshore The Gambia Nears Total Depth
    Monday, December 6, 2021
  29. Status and Prospect of Drilling Fluid Loss and Lost Circulation Control Technology in
    Fractured Formation
  30. Jingbin Yang,1 Jinsheng Sun,1,2, * Yingrui Bai,1 Kaihe Lv,1 Guodong Zhang,1 and
    Yuhong Li3
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    By Ben Sayers and Richard Cooke; TGSPublished at: December 12, 2018
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    Fred Akanni, Editor August 7, 2017.
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    By E. Hathon1, Publisher: European Association of Geoscientists & Engineers
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  35. EIK: FAR The Gambia signs new joint operation agreement with PC The Gambia:
    Published 27th June 2020.
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    capping stacks can be used to stop spills when the blowout preventer fails.
    January 14, 2014, By Antony Matson, Mauricio Madrid
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  38. Oil and Gas: Drilling Technologies – www.oil-gasportal.com
  39. The Design of Geological Exploration with Side Track Drilling by Stanislav V. Varushkin,
    Zhanna A. Khakimova – PERM Journal of Petroleum and Mining Engineering.
    Volume/Tom 18 N0. 1 2018.
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    By Julia Payne, November 10, 2017
  41. AOW: Technical Aspects of The Gambia A1. Overview of Tenure Over the A1 Block. –
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Editor’s Note: On August 5, 2024, The Fatu Network reached out to FAR Ltd, inviting them to respond to the claims presented in this exposé. As of the time of publication, FAR Ltd has not provided a response.

This article was updated on 25.10.24 to correct the following points:
  • The African Legal Support Facility (ALSF) did not provide support to the Government of The Gambia in its arbitration proceedings with African Petroleum.
  • Mr Jerreh Barrow is not related to President Adama Barrow.
The Lawyer for FAR Ltd (Gambia) Ltd has denied on behalf of his mother that she was the local counsel for the Government of The Gambia on Energy, Oil and Gas.

REBUTTAL (Verbatim): By: Jerreh Barrow, Jambanjelly

It was with keen interest I read through Mr. M’bai’s featured article (The Saga of a Small Nation and its Missing Oil and Gas Resources) on the Fatu Network. Given the importance of some of the issues raised to the Gambian public, it is necessary to set the record straight. However, because this article will end up being too long if I try to address all the problematic parts, I will therefore focus on the most serious errors and misrepresentations. In my view, the crux of his suggestions, which needed to be addressed, centered around the question:

SHOULD THE GAMBIA AND SENEGAL SHARE RESOURCES IN THE SANGOMAR-FIELD?

The author said, YES. I would however implore each and every reader to answer this question objectively, but only after reading the following:

According to the author: “Because The Gambia and Senegal share the same sub-basin, then they should share the oil and gas found in the SNE-1 Sangomar field” and that “Senegal is the sole beneficiary of a vast oil and gas field in the shared Senegal/Gambia sub-basin.”

He also said: “Under normal circumstances, applying principles of equity, these resources should be shared, regardless of the discovered accumulation zone being on the Senegalese side.”

And that: “It should not be necessary to provide evidence of oil and gas migration from The Gambia to the SNE-1 Sangomar field to justify such sharing.”

From the first quote above, the main (geological?) justification Mr. M’bai gave for the claim is that both Gambia and Senegal are located in the same ‘sub-basin’ and therefore should share the ‘oil and gas resources found in Sangomar.’ I noted that he has also given Mauritania-Senegal as a ‘precedent’ for joint field development. What he did not understand though is that, in addition to sharing the MSGBC and/or any sub-basin, there are other criteria (principally geological) that must be met by those resources to be the subject of joint field development or sharing.

Geological Criteria for Cross-border Resource Sharing

The international practice of cross-border joint resource development has well-established geological criteria. The primary condition essential for even contemplation of ‘resource sharing’ is ‘common reservoir,’ which is different from ‘common sub-basin.’ Once a common reservoir is established, the presence of hydrocarbons on both sides of the internationally recognized boundary, the type and other characteristics of hydrocarbon if it exists, among others are investigated. A geological sub-basin basically is a subdivision of a basin and comprises a structurally separate unit of a basin. It may include reservoirs, seals, source rocks. A ‘Reservoir’ on the other hand, is a single sedimentary rock unit such as sandstones, limestones capable of holding and discharging fluids in this instance, hydrocarbons. There could be many reservoirs in a sub-basin.

An analogy to the ‘sub-basin’ – ‘resource sharing’ notion being suggested by the author would be equating a basin to a country, a sub-basin to a region, and a reservoir to a farm/land. To suggest that if we share a sub-basin, then we should share the resources in that ‘sub-basin’ would be equivalent to suggesting that two settlements in a region, say West Coast Region, should share the lands in their respective settlements simply because they are in the same West Coast Region. We know ownership of land is attained by well-established criteria, not simply by residing in a locality. Another analogy would be that the North Atlantic being a geographic subdivision of the Atlantic Ocean. If the author’s reasoning is anything to go by, then it would be conceivable that because the Gambia and the USA share the North Atlantic Ocean, then the Gambia should share the fish in US waters. I don’t think that is how natural resource sharing works. I’m not saying such established rules are fair, all I’m saying is that is the accepted and operated norm.

The author further stated: “It should not be necessary to provide evidence of oil and gas migration from The Gambia to the SNE-1 Sangomar field to justify such sharing,” implying there need not be any geological basis for such sharing, but he has also noted that:

“The exploration should be competently executed to achieve the purpose of finding an accumulation zone in The Gambia or at the very least establish the migration path of the oil from The Gambia to an established accumulation zone across the maritime boundary with Senegal, anywhere within the subbasin.”

The author made numerous references to “Senegal/Gambia sub-basin,” apparently coined to implant in the reader’s mind a picture to support his theory. For the record, the most common nomenclature used in geoscience circles for the subdivisions of the MSGBC is not “Senegal/Gambia” but rather “Northern sub-basins” starting from the Gambia River all the way to Senegal River and Casamance sub-basin, from the Gambia River to the south.

As to why the Gambian wells have not yet found oil, I have to state here that oil and gas are natural resources and like all natural resources, they are finite and unevenly distributed. Meaning they are found in certain locations and not in other locations, and at any such location, their boundaries start somewhere and end somewhere. A simple analogy will be different minerals such as gold are found in different parts of the world or even different parts of the same country. To bring this closer to home in the Gambia, the mineral sands are mainly found along the coast. Laterites are mainly exposed in the eastern parts of the country, kaolinite mainly in Kundam area, plastic clays are found in riverine areas etc. This is just how geology has decided!

Precedents for Cross-border Resource Sharing

The reader also referenced the Senegal-Mauritania joint field development as a precedent to support the claim. There are differences between that and the Gambia-Senegal situation as explained in Figure 1 on the two maps and explanations that follow.

Figure 1: Two maps, to the left a Mauritania-Senegal maritime border map, marked by the white dotted line, and to the Right, Senegal-Gambia border marked by the black line.

Senegal-Mauritania Map:

  1. From the left map, you will notice that the Greater Tortue Oil field (marked by a small oblique dotted black line with a yellow irregular polygon), is located right on the established internationally agreed and accepted Mauritania-Senegal northern border. Neither on the Senegalese side nor on the Mauritanian side of the maritime boundary.
  2. Note on the Mauritanian side of the border, Tortue-1 well was drilled in 2015 and it made a discovery, then in 2016, Guembeul-1 was drilled on the Senegalese side, which was also a discovery. In 2016 Ahmeyim-1 was drilled on Mauritanian side, it was a discovery, and GTA-1 was subsequently drilled on the Senegalese side in 2019 and it made a discovery. Information collected such as reservoir properties confirmed that these resources are located/hosted in the same reservoir (note, I do not say sub-basin). Also note to the north of the GTA is another field called Greater BirAllah, which is indeed located in the same subbasin as the GTA, but not on connected reservoirs. This is located within Mauritania’s maritime boundary, and since no connected reservoirs have been established has not been a subject of any joint field development.

Gambia-Senegal Map Now let us look at the Senegal-Gambia Map on the right. To the north were the SNE wells (numerous drilled between 2016-2018), all of them encountered significant oil. Then to the south of the border on the Gambian side, in 2018 Samo-1 was drilled and it was an unsuccessful well (not a failure though, in exploration jargon unsuccessful wells do not equate to a failure). Then in 2021, the Bambo-1 well was drilled very close to the border to test the extent of the Sangomar field and it was unsuccessful (not a failure). The desire to find oil on the conjugate reservoirs on the Gambian side of the border partly explains the reason FAR’s efforts were directed towards establishing the extension of the Sangomar field.

Let me hasten to add that I am not suggesting that none of the reservoirs in Senegal extends into The Gambia or that those that may extend are not oil bearing in the Gambia. No, far from that. On the contrary, the reason why Gambia continues to search/explore for oil is because there are strong indications that some of the reservoirs in the Gambian jurisdiction are oil-bearing, whether they are extensions of reservoirs in Senegal or not. The reason being that the Mauritania-Senegal-Guinea-Bissau (“MSGB”) Basin lies approximately at depths ranging from 50 to 1,500 metres (Figure 1).

From 1,504km² of modern 3D seismic data acquired in Blocks A2, prospects and leads similar to the “shelf edge” plays FAR has successfully mapped [three] prospects and leads (Figure 2).

A2 Update Reservoirs on the Carbonate Shelf edge are highly compartmentalized. This is one of the reasons over 10 appraisal wells were drilled in the Sangomar field.

Legal Basis for Resource Ownership

According to the author:

  1. The absence of international law detailing how ownership rights over these resources should be determined has led to “safari justice” in some parts of the world, where might prevails and weaker countries struggle to protect their interests. Another aspect of this issue is related to the jurisdiction of maritime boundaries.
  2. “It is commonly assumed that strict adherence to surface maritime boundaries automatically determines ownership rights of resources deep below the seabed, which can lead to significant injustice.”
  3. “Under normal circumstances, applying principles of equity, these resources should be shared, regardless of the discovered accumulation zone being on the Senegalese side.”

He seems to suggest in point 1 above that there is no international law on ownership rights over resources in this maritime zone. However, there is the Law of the Sea, which provides the comprehensive legal framework for the governance of the world’s oceans and, as indicated by the author, both The Gambia and Senegal are signatories to this convention.

Article 56 of the Law of the Sea, speaking about “Rights, jurisdiction and duties in the exclusive economic zone” (where these resources are located) states that, “States have sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.”

To end this particular subject and from the above, it is clear that his conclusions are defective in many different dimensions. Neither a geological basis, nor a precedent or legal ground for such a claim has been provided.

WHAT FAR’S ACQUISITION OF 100% INTEREST IN A2 AND A5 MEANS!

On this theme, the author’s wrong understanding of the concepts of ‘working interest’ and ‘revenue share’, referring to FAR’s interest in the Gambia, noted that:

“The license deal, giving FAR Ltd 100% working interest in blocks A2 and A5, effectively meant The Gambia owned none of its oil and gas resources upon discovery. All rights to explore, drill, produce, and sell resources from the blocks belonged to FAR Ltd and other licence holders. The Gambia had imprudently hinged its hopes on royalties’ payment at production. This arrangement, despite any savings The Gambia might have made from associated expenses, was to say the least, disadvantageous. Even Senegal had the foresight to retain an 18% interest in its blocks.”

It is important to explain the difference between the concepts of ‘working interest’ and ‘revenue shares’. First and foremost, holding 100% working interest in an oil and gas licence does not equal owning 100% of the revenues, as insinuated by the author. On the contrary, working interest in oil and gas agreements represents the share of investment that a company contributes towards the fulfillment of the work obligations. The percentage that the company/government takes, referred to as government/company’s take, is determined by the application of the fiscal regime (royalty is not the only revenue stream for government). The fiscal regime is a package of tools (see below) at government’s disposal deployable for capturing ‘economic rent’. It is worth mentioning that the Gambian licensing regime is not a PSA, as purported by the author, but rather a ‘Royalty-Tax regime’. These are two different mechanisms for capturing economic rent.

Equating working interest to revenue share is an oversimplification of a rather intricate calculation of revenues that takes into account the cumulative resource expenses, operating cost, royalty (including the rate), transfer pricing rules, thin capitalization, double taxation, signature and other bonuses etc. See below in Figure 2, a comparison of the different government takes for different projects in the region. This is a result comparing the Government’s take in various oil and gas licences in the region, including the Gambia, Senegal and Guinea. You can see that Government’s take in most of these projects is over 60%, contrary to the author’s misrepresentation. The Petrosen 18% participating interest is part of government’s take but not the total government take.

Figure 2: A chart showing the Government’s take in a number of Oil and Gas projects in the region including the Gambia and Senegal.

In frontier exploration such as the Gambia, and many other places in the world, governments will almost always only hold a minority working interest, which is often a ‘carried interest’, because they don’t want to contribute/put tax-payer’s hard-earned monies into a highly risky business as oil exploration. This is what prevails in Ghana, Nigeria, Namibia and Norway (during the early days of its exploration journey). Article 10 part 14 of Ghana’s Petroleum Exploration Act states that, “A petroleum agreement shall contain a term that the Corporation shall (a) hold an initial participating carried interest of at least fifteen per cent for exploration and development…” Such arrangements may change as the basin matures, and with dwindling risk, States become bolder in asserting control. Again, remember it does not represent government’s take! Refer to Article 18.1 of the A2 and A5 licences, which gave the government right to take up to 15% participating interest in these licences at development and production. Basically, what that means is that FAR will bear all of the exploration cost, which at the time of their exit is over $100 million, but if they find commercially viable oil, government can immediately get up to 15% interest. Meaning it will be responsible for funding 15% of the cost of development and production. But government’s entitlement to the revenues, as I said, will in addition include taxes such as Corporate Income Tax, royalty (often representing the largest chunk of government’s take), additional profit payments and bonus.

FAR Farming-out to Petronas

Executive Summary This benchmarking study compares the terms prevailing in Gambia’s three signed contracts, for blocks A1 (BP), A2 and A5 (FAR and Petronas), with terms prevailing in other oil projects selected for their similarities.

But it is important to understand the limitations of a fiscal benchmarking exercise. Projections at this high level cannot embrace nuance of interpretation, which requires extensive analysis across a dozen jurisdictions. Also, fiscal regimes are compared under one notional set of economics. They need to be tested against different market conditions. Specifically, in the Gambian case:

  • Prospectivity: GoTG must obtain the best view of prospectivity, and test different prospectivity scenarios: what results look like for both government and investor look very different depending on whether the field is 100 million, or 1 billion barrels of oil.
  • Project economics: A similar approach must be adopted for costs, including those associated with water depth: the apparent difference in signed GoTG agreements for example is largely due to lower royalties in the deeper water A1 and A4 blocks, an industry norm to make such projects more attractive to investors.
  • Senegal: The Senegalese analogue should be studied in more depth, to determine the position of companies operating there with regard to extending into Gambia.

Figure 1: “Government take” (AETR) results for GoTG’s two signed agreements, based on the PEPLA, relative to projects from Senegal (3 projects), Mauritania, Liberia, Guinea, Ghana and Guyana. Detail in body of report.

Figure 1 shows “government take” results for the Gambian contracts versus a selection of other projects, mainly along the West African continental shelf. What these results mean, and how these projects were selected, is discussed below.

Sharing of risk and reward is a common and normal practice in a highly risky and capital intensive venture like the Petroleum business. I wrote on this topic in 2017 and to avoid repetition, readers are referred to The Point newspaper article of 14th April, 2017, titled: GAMBIA’S PETROLEUM SITUATION: Erin-FAR DEAL: https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/article/gambias-petroleum-situation-erin-far-deal

TRANSPARENCY

The author had on numerous instances decried the lack of transparency around the governance of the sector. In particular he concluded that:

  1. “There is a serious lack of transparency in the relationship between Gambians, the government of The Gambia and FAR Ltd. This relationship appears to operate beyond confidentiality and into the realm of secrecy.”

And

  1. “It is difficult to justify exempting FAR Ltd. from its contracted drilling obligations and all taxes and expenses payment to the government of The Gambia for the next two years, especially after having received US$127 million plus potential future millions. There is no official gazette or publication indicating that parliamentary assent has been granted to exempt FAR Ltd. from its tax liabilities to the government of The Gambia.”
  2. Comments: The relationship between the Gambians, the government and FAR is primarily prescribed in the A2 and A5 licences, premised on Petroleum Act 2004 and many other legislations such as NEMA, IVAT etc. For example, the NEMA sets out the environmental obligations during the execution of these licences. The IVAT prescribed the fiscal obligations.

    With respect to the specific obligations of FAR, these are all summarized in the A2 and A5 licences, which are all public documents. Readers are referred to the following:

    1. Gazette No. 41, of 31st July, 2023, where A2 & A5 licences, Petronor licences, Deeds of Amendments of the A2, A4 and A5 licences were publicized.
    2. Gazette No. 65 of 20th October 2023, and No. 35 of 24th June 2024 on the annual public report on Petroleum operations by the Petroleum Commission since its establishment.
    3. Numerous local and international newspaper publications, press statements etc. regarding the licensing round, outcomes and BP’s exit.

See below under the heading BP LICENCES the other publications, and National Assembly updates on the sector.

FAR Drilling

According to the Author:

  1. “In a 2018 appraisal, Cairn Energy reported that no 3D seismic data was available for this prospect, suggesting that FAR Ltd relied on less accurate 2D data or none at all for its assessments”
  2. “Since The Gambia’s A2 block is physically contiguous with the SNE-1 Sangomar field, as shown by 3D seismic data, the migration of a large volume of oil from there into the SNE-1 Sangomar field would be quick and effortless.”
  3. “In 2020, FAR Ltd moved on to its next drilling prospects, the Soloo and Bambo wells. These are located to the north of the A2 block, nearly side by side on an elevated gradient of the PSET shelf trend, part of the SNE-1 Sangomar field extending into the A2 block. The available 3D seismic data predrill confirmed the geological formation as a continuous extension of the SNE-1 Sangomar field into The Gambia”

Comments: First, I seriously doubt Cairn was accurately quoted in the first item, because Cairn understands that in the year 2018, no company would drill a deep offshore well on 2D data. This is because the cost of acquiring 3D is so insignificant compared to the cost of drilling, no sensible person would drill on 2D in the year 2018. The second point is that in the first quote, he says no 3D and in the second he said there is, which squarely contradicts each other. The truth is that both wells were drilled using 3D. Cairn was probably referring to the Jammah-1 well which was drilled in 1979 (40 years ago) on 2D. He also says the well is located in the A5 block, which is not the case, as can be seen in the maps he showed.

He further stated that:

  1. “FAR Ltd further indicated that the oil migration path from the SAMO well charts towards the Bambo and Soloo wells, which were mapped to be in the same two primary reservoirs as the eight others, and now twenty-three, wells that FAR Ltd and its joint venture partner Woodside Energy have drilled in the SNE-1 Sangomar field. The Bambo and Soloo prospects are even closer to BP’s previously held A1 block than the SAMO-1 prospect.”
  2. “The results from FAR Ltd.’s exploration drilling in the SAMO-1, Bambo-1, and Soloo Deep prospects have confirmed the presence of oil.”
  3. “In 2020, FAR Ltd moved on to its next drilling prospects, the Soloo and Bambo wells.”

In 1, 2 and 3, the author in one sentence refers to ‘Soloo well’ in another ‘Soloo Prospects’, ‘Samo well’ and ‘Samo-1 prospect’, ‘Samo-1, Bambo-1, and Soloo Deep prospects’. What he does not understand is that there is a difference between a ‘well’ and a ‘prospect’. Samo-1 and Bambo-1 are wells and the names are simple labels. The ‘Samo prospect’ has a geological connotation, referring to the aggregate of target reservoirs. Furthermore, there is no ‘Soloo well’ contrary to the quotes in 2 & 4. The real issue that needs to be understood here is that deep water oil exploration is such a technologically challenging, financially risky and knowledge intensive activity that only a serious and committed investor will spend many years and over $100M to undertake in a frontier environment.

BP Licence
The author asked:

  1. “It would be interesting to know the composition of the negotiation team, including the legal personnel on both sides, for this settlement. It remains unclear what factors determined the $30 million settlement and how it was utilized by the Gambian government, as no public disclosure has been made.”

Comments:
I refer readers to the Ministry’s press release of the 18th of April 2018, updating the general public on the results of the evaluation and listing the companies involved in the licensing round. When BP was granted the licence, publications were made in local newspapers. For example, on the 2nd of May 2019, The Standard newspaper published an article titled “Gambia, BP Sign Oil Exploration Deal.” There was also a press statement regarding BP’s exit made by the government’s spokesperson, which was featured in local newspapers, including The Point in its article of the 12th of August 2021 titled “Gov’t Gets Back D1.5B from BP.”

Furthermore, the BP licence, containing the terms and conditions of the grant, was published in the Gazette as a public notice on Gazette Number 20 of 27th March 2020 (GN. No 59/2020). Subsequently, see the October 28th, 2021, Standard newspaper publication titled “Gambia Opens Mini Licensing for Block A1,” as well as Gazette Number 55 Vol. 138 of 8th December 2021 (GN. No 185/2021).

Also, refer to the press release issued around August 2021, which listed those who supported the Government in the BP negotiation, including the African Legal Support Facility, Addleshaw Goddard, DLA Pipers, and Open Oil. Having worked with individuals from these entities for years, I can attest to their competence, and a simple web search will provide information on these organizations. Furthermore, the African Legal Support Facility has published information about its support for The Gambia’s Petroleum Sector. The BP negotiations ended very well for The Gambia and on terms consistent with the agreement. I also refer readers to BP’s public statements of February 12 and August 4, 2020, on its policy shift that resulted in its exit from The Gambia.

In addition, during numerous National Assembly sessions, the NAMS and, by extension, the public were informed about developments surrounding exploration activities. For instance, during the fourth session (12th November–22nd December 2020), in response to Question No. 209/2020 by Hon. Alh Mbow of Upper Saloum, the Hon. Minister updated on the FAR-PETRONAS licence, the Petronor agreement, and the BP licence situation.

Similarly, during the second ordinary session of the 2021 legislature, in response to Question 4 by Hon. Alhagie Mbow – Upper Saloum Constituency, the Honourable Minister provided specifics on the funds received from 2017 to 2021 and where these funds were deposited. Likewise, in 2022, during the fourth legislative session, in response to Question No. 0176/2022 from the member for Bakau, the Hon. Minister elaborated on FAR’s acquisition and its extension. In 2023, answers to Questions 141/2023, 143/2023, and 144/2023 gave an overview of FAR’s tenure. These submissions also included details of the funds received.

Equally, during the recent third ordinary session of the 2024 legislative session, information about the situations concerning FAR, Petronor, and BP was provided. I believe these are public records!


African Petroleum Matter
Similar misrepresentations are found in the article regarding the African Petroleum arbitration and the subsequent settlement agreement. The fact, backed by records, is that African Petroleum initiated arbitration against The Gambia in 2017. At some point, given the very good job done by the lawyers representing The Gambia, the company, through partners, persistently requested an out-of-court settlement. This request was accepted in 2020 after strategic considerations, and the negotiations ended on terms very favorable to The Gambia.

A press briefing was held in September 2020, where the details of the agreement terms were given, including the payments made to the government. It is also worth stating that the African Legal Support Facility did not fund The Gambia’s costs for this arbitration, as claimed by the author. Instead, these costs were reimbursed by African Petroleum as part of the settlement. Referring to the legislative updates, this matter, as mentioned above, is in the public domain.


FAR’s Gambian Operations
In questioning and attempting to discredit FAR’s records and efforts in The Gambia, the author suspected that one of the reasons for FAR’s failure could be attributed to the use of a 6th-generation drillship, Stena Drillmax. This is despite quoting Cath Norman as saying that the discoveries in Senegal were made with a 5th-generation vessel.

A careful reading of Cath’s statement shows that she was highlighting the comparison of speed and cost regarding the use of the 7th generation, not necessarily questioning operational capability. A simple internet search on Stena DrillMax and IceMax, used in The Gambia in 2018 and 2021 respectively, will demonstrate the operational capability of these vessels.

The author also noted:
“Given FAR’s stakes in the SNE-1 Sangomar field and in The Gambia’s A2 and A5 blocks through its subsidiary FAR (Gambia) Ltd., and its role as the operator during drilling in the Gambian prospects, what measures, if any, were put in place to protect The Gambia against potential conflicts of interest from FAR Ltd., especially in the context of migration of oil? PC Gambia (Petronas) could not properly perform this role as FAR Ltd.’s joint venture partner in The Gambia.”

The insinuation that FAR (plus Petronas) somehow invested over a hundred million dollars in exploration in The Gambia during the tenure of their licenses as part of a scheme, with the objective of “not finding” oil but conniving with Senegal, lacks evidence.

Conclusion
There are good records on how the Petroleum Sector has been governed, and these are available to anyone interested in the matter.

 

RESPONSE TO MR. BARROW’S REBUTTAL (Verbatim)

By: Ousman F. M’Bai

Should The Gambia and Senegal Share Resources in the Sangomar Field?

The article does not suggest that shared sub-basin resources automatically lead to joint ownership by states. Instead, as Mr M’Bai argued, the matter involves two key points:

  1. The presence of shared reservoirs in the s400 and s500 series, as shown in the article under the subheading The Second Well – Bambo-1 (Side Track-1) & Soloo, and in Map 18, which illustrates the reservoir series extending into The Gambia.
  2. Even if shared reservoirs were not present, as FAR Ltd. erroneously reported, the migration of oil from Gambian prospects is a critical factor. See the section on oil migration in the article.

In summary, if shared reservoirs exist, oil migration is less relevant. However, both points remain vital in understanding resource claims.

Common Nomenclature for Subdivisions of the MSGBC

On the first page of the article, the common nomenclature is explicitly acknowledged. However, using the term “Northern Sub-basin” without further qualification is overly abstract and fails to clearly identify the location. The article provides a more accurate and comprehensive geographical context for the sub-basin, supported by Maps 1 and 2.

Precedents for Cross-Border Resource Sharing

The difference between the Mauritania-Senegal maritime boundary map and the Senegal-Gambia map is that the former is more natural and accurate. In contrast, the latter seems deliberately drawn to restrict the SNE Sangomar fields within Senegal’s territorial waters. In the article Oil Does Not Care About Boundaries by a geology expert, GeoExpro Magazine, this boundary is criticised as unreliable. Mr M’Bai echoed this criticism in his analysis, particularly in the discussion above Map 19.

Legal Basis for Resource Ownership

The article does not dispute the existence of international laws governing resource ownership. What is the law question. Rather, it focuses on HOW these laws should be applied, particularly concerning:

  1. The exploitation of natural resources across maritime boundaries.
  2. The migration of resources like oil and gas between these boundaries.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) underscores principles such as equitable dealing, good faith negotiations, and respect for sovereignty, as discussed under the subheading The Law – Conflict Over Natural Resources Along Maritime Boundaries.

FAR’s Acquisition of 100% Interest in Blocks A2 and A5

At no point does Mr M’Bai equate working interest with revenue sharing. Instead, the article correctly outlines the implications of FAR Ltd.’s acquisition of 100% interest in Blocks A2 and A5, highlighting the consequences of The Gambia’s short-sighted approach. FAR capitalised on this without making significant discoveries, leaving The Gambia with little benefit. The AETR chart referenced applies only at the point of production and provides no immediate consolation. The consequences are further explored in the section FAR Laughing All the Way to the Bank.

FAR Farming Out to Petronas

While it is true that sharing risk and reward is common in capital-intensive ventures, the lack of financial transparency in the FAR-Petronas relationship in The Gambia remains deeply concerning.

Transparency

The core argument remains that the relationship between FAR Ltd. and The Gambia was marked by secrecy. Examples include the concealment of the drilling accident and the sale of its stake in the SNE Sangomar field to Woodside Energy. In response to your specific points:

  1. Gazette Nos. 41 and 65 relate to events occurring long after FAR Ltd. had surrendered its licence and exited The Gambia. Informing Gambians after FAR’s departure is moot.
  2. Your comments on the FAR drilling are misplaced. The article distinguishes between the SAMO well in Block A5 and the Bambo well in Block A2, and the reliance on 2D seismic data is discussed under SAMO Well. You appear to confuse SAMO with Jammah-1, a mistake similar to Cath Norman’s conflation of SAMO with Bambo in her interview with Gavin Colery.

Moreover, FAR did not spend $100 million of its own funds in The Gambia. No transactional evidence has been provided to substantiate this claim.

BP Licence

Mr M’Bai’s central argument concerning the BP negotiations is unchanged:

  1. The composition of the Gambian and BP negotiation teams has not been disclosed.
  2. While you refer to international legal practitioners, the local Gambian firm retained remains unnamed.
  3. A press release from August 2021 is referenced, but you do not specify the source or provide sufficient detail.
  4. The public has never been informed of the factors determining the $30 million settlement, leaving doubts about the outcome.

African Petroleum Matter

You claim that the settlement details were disclosed in a September 2020 press release, but:

  1. The specific press release is unidentified.
  2. The local Gambian firm involved remains undisclosed.
  3. If arbitration costs were reimbursed, evidence of such reimbursement has not been publicly provided.
  4. The settlement was among the weakest achieved, a topic to be explored in greater detail in my next article.

FAR’s Gambian Operations

Your comments here fail to grasp the severity of FAR Ltd.’s actions and their impact on The Gambia. You repeat the unsubstantiated claim that FAR spent over $100 million on exploration without providing any documentary proof. FAR’s financial and operational incompetence casts doubt on the accuracy of its finding that the s400 and s500 reservoirs do not extend into The Gambia. The Petroleum Commission did not independently verify this, and neither Woodside Energy, Petronas, nor Petrosen conducted due diligence, despite standing to gain from exclusive ownership of the sub-basin’s resources. For further details, see the GeoExpro Magazine article Oil Does Not Care About Boundaries.

I trust this addresses the points raised in your note. Given this, I do not accept that the premises of our article are unclear to the extent that an interview with you is necessary to address the written questions we previously sent. I would, however, appreciate it if you could use your best endeavours to provide a written response to those questions.

The Danger of One-Sided Stories and Why Gambians Must Embrace Truth and Fairness Over Falsehood And Lies

OPINION

By Melville Robertson Roberts

In the age of social media, where misinformation spreads faster than facts, there is a painful and dangerous trend festering within our national discourse and this is the habit of embracing one-sided stories. It is time Gambians reflect deeply on the damage this causes to reputations, to truth, and to the collective conscience of our nation.

It has now been more than 15 hours since I openly and publicly challenged Gambians to present a single video clip, a single shred of credible evidence that Foreign Minister Dr. Mamadou Tangara insulted Gambian protesters in New York.

The silence has been deafening and not because evidence is hard to find, but because there is none. And yet, a segment of our society has chosen to hold onto hearsay and emotionally charged narratives, without giving even the courtesy of verification.

Are we now a nation where accusations are louder than truth? Why are we so vindictive to the extent that we refuse to be objective and honest in our condemnation? Lutah Gambian bi sohorr? Muna fen? Muna sauce?

Tangara’s only real “crime” in the eyes of some is that he served under former President Yahya Jammeh. But so did hundreds of thousands of Gambians, including many who today cloak themselves in activism. Many thrived under Jammeh’s rule, some even sought his favour, and a good number were beneficiaries of his generosity, with their parents’ livelihoods tied to his administration. Why then is Tangara singled out?

To those who hurl insults at him now, were your voices equally loud when you or your families benefited from the same system? Did you show the same outrage when you accepted scholarships, contracts, or salaries under that government?

Let us not allow our sense of justice to be poisoned by selective memory.

The recent scathing remarks made by our ambassador in Turkey, directed at his own boss, only added salt to a festering wound. Such public betrayal, rather than invoking accountability, reveals a deep disregard for professionalism and the dignity of public service.

If there are grievances, let them be handled through proper diplomatic and institutional channels and not through backstabbing character assassinations that only serve to divide us further.

We must rise above this toxic culture of mob judgment. I speak of this ill because there is no Gambian alive who is better placed to talk on this menace than I who have experienced such false and evil propaganda. I am a living testament of such callous acts where unsubstantiated nonsense are carried like badge of honour by vengeful and unscrupulous individuals.

If we want to be a country of fairness, truth, and dignity, we must learn to listen before we condemn. We must insist on evidence before we judge. We must be willing to hear both sides most especially when reputations, careers, and national unity are on the line.

Gambians deserve better. Dr. Tangara deserves better. The truth no matter how inconvenient must always triumph over manufactured outrage.

The next time a whisper campaign begins, ask yourself: Where is the evidence? Who benefits from this story? And most importantly, have I heard the other side?

Let us not be a nation that dances to the rhythm of cheap propaganda and forgets the sounding beat of truth and justice.

M R R.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect The Fatu Network’s editorial stance.

GCCPC Launches Competition and Consumer Protection Ambassadors Club at Kotu Senior Secondary School

Today, June 4, 2025, the Gambia Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (GCCPC) launched the Competition and Consumer Protection Ambassadors Club at Kotu Senior Secondary School, a pioneering initiative to empower young Gambians as champions of consumer rights and fair competition. The vibrant event, held in the school, brought together students, teachers, and GCCPC representatives in a dynamic celebration of youth leadership, marking a significant step toward a fairer marketplace in The Gambia.

The launch featured inspiring speeches, a student-led play, a lively debate, and a shared vision for change. Under the theme of fairness and empowerment, the event positioned Kotu’s students as the heartbeat of a growing consumer protection movement.

A Movement Ignited

Muhammed Lamin Drammeh, GCCPC’s Advocacy and Communications Officer, set an electrifying tone with his address. “Today, we’re not just starting a club; we’re launching a movement, and you, the students, are at its heart!” he proclaimed to a packed hall of enthusiastic students. Drammeh emphasized the GCCPC’s mission to transform students into advocates who will educate their communities about consumer rights and the benefits of fair competition. He envisioned a Gambia where businesses thrive ethically and consumers are empowered to demand fairness, a vision the students are now tasked to realize.

Drammeh highlighted the club as a “launchpad” for leadership, offering opportunities to develop public speaking, critical thinking, and advocacy skills through workshops, mock trials, and community campaigns. He also announced an exciting incentive: the top two graduating club members will secure paid three-month internships at the GCCPC, opening pathways to careers in law, business, or public policy.

Empowering Young Watchdogs

Fatou Nyang, GCCPC’s Consumer Protection Officer, connected with the audience by asking, “Have you ever bought a defective product or felt unfairly treated when paying for a service?” Her engaging speech outlined the Consumer Protection Act of 2014 and the GCCPC’s efforts to protect consumers, from resolving complaints through Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) to conducting market studies on issues like rising education costs. Nyang highlighted the Commission’s recent study on schools, addressing transparency and the treatment of vulnerable students, which resonated with the audience.

She urged students to embrace their roles as “watchdogs for fairness,” encouraging them to educate peers, identify unfair practices. “You’ll grow into responsible consumers and leaders who demand quality, fairness, and transparency,” Nyang said.

Students Take Center Stage

The launch was a vibrant showcase of student talent and potential. A student-led play, performed with humor and heart, brought consumer rights to life, depicting real-life scenarios of unfair market practices and demonstrating how to submit complaints to the GCCPC. The performance, both educational and entertaining, drew cheers and laughter from the audience, reinforcing the importance of knowing one’s rights and the Commission’s role in addressing grievances.

A lively debate followed, with students passionately arguing consumer protection issues, showcasing their critical thinking and eloquence. These activities underscore the club’s hands-on approach, where students will learn through mock trials, debates, and community outreach initiatives, equipping them to advocate effectively.

Competition as a Catalyst

Mr. Basiru Njie, Chief Economist at GCCPC, spoke on the importance of competition law, explaining how it fosters innovation and choice in the marketplace. His remarks highlighted how understanding competition issues empowers students to advocate for a fair economy, aligning with the club’s mission to nurture future champions.

A Commitment to Excellence

The event concluded with Sulayman Camara, Head of Humanities Department at Kotu Senior Secondary School, delivering heartfelt closing remarks. He expressed gratitude to the GCCPC for selecting Kotu as the home for this transformative initiative and pledged that the students would be exemplary ambassadors, carrying the Commission’s mission forward with dedication and pride.

A Strategic Investment in The Gambia’s Future

The Competition and Consumer Protection Ambassadors Club, launched by the GCCPC at Kotu Senior Secondary School, is a strategic investment in the nation’s future. As outlined in the club’s concept note, students will engage in interactive workshops with GCCPC experts, lead community campaigns, and develop leadership skills that will shape their careers and communities. The initiative aims to foster a culture of consumer awareness and fair competition, creating ripples of change across The Gambia.

The GCCPC’s commitment was evident, with pledges of resources, mentorship, and logistical support to ensure the club’s success. Kotu’s dedicated teachers, praised for their enthusiasm during prior GCCPC engagements, will guide the students, while the Commission’s partnership with the school lays a strong foundation for this movement.

As the event wrapped up with a lively group photo, the students’ enthusiasm was infectious. For them, the club is an opportunity to make a difference, to educate, advocate, and lead. One student ambassador shared, “I want to help my community know their rights and stand up for fairness. This club is our chance to shine.”

With the GCCPC’s launch of the Competition and Consumer Protection Ambassadors Club at Kotu Senior Secondary School, a seed has been planted for a legacy of empowerment, fairness, and opportunity. The students of Kotu are ready to lead, and The Gambia is watching.

Advancing Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion in Foni through Community Engagement

Women in Liberation and Leadership (WILL), in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) The Gambia, is implementing a comprehensive series of peacebuilding initiatives in the Foni region. These efforts aim to enhance community relations, foster social cohesion, and promote inclusive dialogue that challenges harmful social norms. By facilitating collective healing, the interventions seek to mitigate local tensions and cultivate trust among residents.

Funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the initiative encompasses community dialogues, town hall meetings, and the establishment of safe spaces that unite diverse societal groups, including women, youth, elders, and traditional leaders across five districts in Foni. These engagements provide participants with a platform to share experiences, articulate common concerns, and develop collaborative strategies for peaceful coexistence.

A key aspect of the program is the inclusion of women and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), whose perspectives are often marginalized in conventional peacebuilding efforts. By fostering a secure and supportive environment for open discourse, the initiative empowers these voices, ensuring their lived experiences contribute to broader reconciliation processes.

Additionally, the community sensitisation and educational efforts focus on addressing stigma, discrimination, and harmful social norms. These measures are designed to reduce prejudice, instill mutual respect, and reinforce a culture of peace throughout the region. Reflecting the essence of the initiative, a prominent women’s leader shared the following message during a community dialogue:

“While past events may have created divisions and altered perceptions, we firmly believe that open discussions and community engagement are vital for healing. These conversations enhance mutual understanding, prevent discrimination, and challenge stigma.”

Ultimately, these efforts aim to establish inclusive spaces where communities collaborate to rebuild social bonds, prevent future conflicts, and contribute to long-term peace and stability. By prioritising the voices of those most affected, WILL is fostering the emergence of a more cohesive and resilient society in Foni and beyond.

Salim Ceesay: The Gambian Footballer Balancing First Division Dreams with a Medical Career

By: Muhammed Lamin Drammeh

In The Gambia, football is a fever that surges through dusty streets under a blistering sun, yet dreams of glory often fade in the harsh light of reality. The First Division League, the heart of Gambian football, is an amateur crucible where players like Salim Ceesay, Hawks FC’s midfield maestro, chase fleeting triumphs on weathered pitches. Despite the Gambia Football Federation’s long promises to professionalize the league, players earn wages that might cover a week’s meals but little else and professional contracts abroad a distant mirage for most. Amid this struggle, Salim, a 2025 Medical Laboratory Science graduate from the American International University (AIUWA), weaves magic on the pitch and in the lab at Sukuta Health Centre. A rare Gambian footballer with a degree, he’s a beacon, daring a nation to dream beyond the goalposts. His degree is a rebellion against a system that starves ambition.

Barefoot Beginnings, Unyielding Ambition

Sanchaba’s sun-scorched streets were Salim’s first arena, where barefoot boys chased ragtag balls with boundless joy. “Football was my heartbeat,” he says, his voice soft with nostalgia. “Rain or shine, we played for love.” His talent shone early, earning him a spot in Wallidan FC’s youth academy, a feeder to the their senior team. Now at Hawks FC, a First Division powerhouse, his velvet passes and calm command outwit defenders like a chess grandmaster. Yet, in a league where match bonuses might cover a week’s meals but little else, Salim’s ambition burns brighter than the odds.

The Gambian First Division, with its 16 teams and passionate fans, is a cultural cornerstone, but its amateur status unchanged despite the Federation’s pledges offers little security. Only a few players juggle side jobs, and international scouts rarely visit the country. For Salim, a high school match became a turning point. A teammate’s injury, with no medic on hand, left the crowd pleading for help. “We were stranded,” Salim recalls, his tone resolute. “I saw sports and health collide.” That moment sparked a quest beyond the pitch, leading him from Kotu Senior Secondary School to AIUWA, where he earned a BSc with honors in 2025, a feat fewer than 5% of Gambian footballers achieve, as the desire to play football pressures force many to abandon education.

Grit on the Pitch, Precision in the Lab

Salim’s life is a relentless dance between turf and test tubes. “Dawn training with Hawks, daytime lectures, midnight study forged me,” he says. The First Division’s grueling schedule, weekend matches, midweek practices, and no off-season demands endurance, mirrored in his lab work at Sukuta Health Centre. There, his hands, once threading passes through Real de Banjul’s defense, now analyze samples with surgical care. “The pitch teaches you to push past exhaustion,” he says. “The lab demands the same.”

AIUWA’s first year tested Salim’s resolve, with assignments looming like defenders and exams striking like penalties. “I was nearly broken,” he confesses. “But football drills taught me: one more step.” His parents, unwavering supporters, fueled both dreams. “They never asked me to choose,” he says, gratitude in his voice. In a league where players rarely pursue higher education, Salim’s degree is a rebellion against a system that starves ambition.

A Hero for Gambia’s Dreamers

Salim’s story is a clarion call to Gambian youth, who watch First Division stars battle for fleeting glory. “Don’t pick one dream,” he urges. “Be an athlete, a scholar; be both.” In a nation where football’s allure overshadows the league’s meager rewards, his dual path inspires. He envisions a Gambia with professionalized leagues, world-class pitches, and thriving clinics. “Every child deserves to play, learn, and heal,” he insists.

The First Division’s amateur status, unchanged since the 1960s, limits prospects. The Federation’s unfulfilled promises, professional contracts, and better facilities leave players like Salim to forge their own paths. His fusion of top-flight football and a degree makes him an icon, defying a system that offers little security. “Football gave me purpose,” he says, “but education gave me power.”

A Legacy Beyond the Final Whistle

Salim dreams of international leagues, where talent meets reward, and a master’s degree to deepen his impact. “I’ll keep pushing,” he says, a spark in his eye. To young dreamers, his words are fire: “Chase every passion. Never quit.” His story demands change: fund the First Division, create scholarships for athlete-scholars, and build pathways for dreams to soar. In a land where football reigns but opportunity falters, Salim Ceesay is crafting a legacy that defies gravity, proving that heart and hustle can rewrite a nation’s future.

“I’d Rather Work Than Beg”: Blind Young Man Carries Loads to Earn a Living

Written by: Alieu Jallow

In the bustling market town of Wassu, Central River Region North, 25-year-old Ebrima Ndow stands out. Born blind in the quiet, remote village of Njokudawen, about 4 kilometres off the main road, Ebrima defies the odds every day, choosing hard work over handouts.

The Fatu Network’s reporter, Alieu Jallow, met him by chance while he was loading heavy goods onto a truck. Sweat lined his brow as he worked with quiet determination, relying on instinct built over years of experience.

“I don’t want to beg. I live on my sweat, and I want to avoid being disrespected or labelled as a liability. I could have done as others do by begging every day, but I’d rather earn something with my hands,” Ebrima said.

Ebrima works as a “hacker,” a local term for men who help load goods from shops onto trucks. Each day, he hitches a ride from Njokudawen to Wassu in search of work. His income fluctuates widely: some days he earns D300 or D250; on slow days, he makes as little as D40. Despite the unpredictability, he saves a small portion for a long-term goal.

“My plan is to mould blocks and build a modern house for the future,” he said.

He currently lives in a thatched hut shared with eight other people. Ebrima worries about safety and privacy, and he dreams of building a proper house where he and his siblings can live with dignity.

Ebrima also supports his married sisters, who receive little help from their husbands.
“I share my earnings with my sisters, both older and younger, after I gather a little, and I depend on what I make here. That’s why I keep coming back,” he said.

Still, he knows the physical work won’t be possible forever. With no formal education and no sight, he hopes to start a small business—something that can give him steady income and a future beyond carrying loads.

“All I need is a push to start something of my own,” he appealed. “I’m not asking for much—just the chance to work with dignity. Whatever amount I get, I don’t overlook it.”

For those moved by Ebrima’s story and wishing to offer support, he can be reached via Wave on (+220) 2047777. Ebrima’s story is one of quiet determination, a reminder that even in the toughest conditions, some people choose effort over pity, dignity over dependence.

Gambia Mangrove Redd+ Project Suspension: Beneficiaries Voice Concerns Over Economic Hardship

By Dawda Baldeh

The Gambia Mangrove Redd+ project, an essential effort for the restoration of the country’s mangrove ecosystems, is encountering major difficulties after the Ministry of Environment suggested it might assume control of the initiative.

The suspension of this project, which directly supports over one hundred and twenty-four communities, has triggered concerns about economic distress.

As attempts to resolve the current predicament unfold, beneficiaries have convened district chiefs, village leaders, and project officials to discuss the future of the project. During a meeting in Jarra Soma, Lamin Jobarteh, Executive Director of the West African Bird Studies Association (WABSA), characterised the project as successful, emphasising its positive impact on 134 communities that benefit directly. Mr. Jobarteh highlighted the importance of dialogue with the government to resolve the issues at hand.

“We have made significant progress, and it is crucial to engage in dialogue with the Ministry of Environment to tackle the problem. We operate under the ministry, and communication is essential,” he stated, expressing a desire for the project to continue.

Saikou Janko, Chairman of the Kombo Foni Forestry Association (KOMFORA), shared similar views regarding the project, describing the obstacles it faces as misunderstandings between the project consortium and the Ministry of Environment. He pointed out the project’s benefits to the communities, asserting that discussions with chiefs and village leaders will be vital in addressing the issue, especially since funding has been paused.

“I am optimistic that the ministry will reconsider its decision and permit the project to move forward,” he remarked. “If there are concerns, they should be resolved through dialogue to ensure the project’s continuation.”

Speakers highlighted the substantial impact of this mangrove planting initiative in their respective communities. “The project funders visited and expressed their satisfaction with the initiative; who are we to take any action to stop it?” he questioned.

After a meeting with district chiefs, village leaders, and project officials, a committee consisting of chiefs, village heads, and project beneficiaries has been formed to facilitate discussions with the Ministry of Environment.

Sheikh Sadibou Bondi, a resident of Joren Bunda Kunda in the Foni Jarol constituency and a project supervisor, stated that halting the project would adversely affect their economic activities.

“During the rainy season, many families depend on this project, and it has greatly improved our lives. Imagine earning D700 daily as a labourer,” he said. He urged the government to allow the project to proceed. “Through this project, we have established gardens, constructed houses, and paid school fees for our children,” he added.

Meanwhile, Edrissa Njie of Katamina village and Babucarr Fofana of Jarra Sankuya expressed similar sentiments regarding the project’s impact on their communities. “In Jarra Sankuya, we managed to raise D1.2 million from this project in just one year. We built our women’s garden and even maintained our road. Some individuals constructed houses and started small businesses. Every day of work means payment, and if this stops, we will suffer as we lack formal employment,” Mr. Fofana lamented.

Mariama Sora, another direct beneficiary of the project, expressed her dismay upon learning of the project’s suspension. “I had planned to build my house this year after saving some money from this project. Now that it’s halted, I won’t be able to finish my house. This is disappointing, and we are urging the government to let the project continue,” she pleaded.

The Gambia Mangrove Redd+ project, which aims to restore biodiversity and protect the environment, is facing serious challenges following allegations of fund mismanagement and threats of ministry takeover.

However, an audit by donors (Orsted) found no evidence of wrongdoing, and in a publication last month, Orsted stated they were satisfied with the project’s results.

Chief Krubally Calls for Chiefs’ Travel Allowances, Tribunal Reform, and Support for Court Messengers

By Alieu Jallow

The Chief of Fulladou East, Muhammed Krubally, has urged authorities to provide travel allowances for district chiefs, implement urgent reforms to the District Tribunals Act, and enhance logistical support for tribunal court members, including the provision of uniforms and mobility support for Bart messengers.

Chief Krubally made these remarks during an exclusive interview with The Fatu Network’s Alieu Jallow on the sidelines of a community engagement led by Activista The Gambia in Basse. The session was part of a three-day capacity-building initiative aimed at promoting inclusive representation and assessing the effectiveness of the District Tribunals Act.

He highlighted that many chiefs across the country often have to rely on their own limited resources to travel for official functions, attend tribunal matters, or respond to community crises, a situation he described as “unsustainable and demotivating.”

“[As the] chiefs of URR, sometimes [we] travel to Banjul for a meeting without a dime. They don’t give us any allowances. We have to fuel our cars from back home. That’s a big challenge for us, to be honest. If you go to the High Court, you’ll see that they don’t work on weekends. But we work every day, even on Sundays, Saturdays, and sometimes at night. So, the government should consider us and see how best our welfare can be improved,” he added.

Regarding tribunal court operations, Chief Krubally stressed the importance of equipping Bart messengers with proper uniforms and transport to improve the efficiency and professionalism of court processes. He also reiterated the need to revise the current tribunal laws to align with present-day realities and ensure fairness for all parties.

“The government should look into how it can reform the District Tribunal Act, because times have changed, and the current fines no longer reflect today’s realities.

Concerning our Bart messengers, we’ve long been raising the issue that they don’t even have uniforms. They need to be identifiable, but up to now, nothing has been provided. We’ve taken this concern to the higher authorities, but we haven’t seen any action.

“We also appealed to them to at least provide one motorbike to help ease the process of delivering messages. Sometimes, the messengers face real difficulties travelling to the villages to deliver letters, messages, or sermons,” he appealed.

Activista The Gambia’s community engagement brought together traditional leaders, youth representatives, women’s groups, and civil society actors to discuss the importance of inclusive governance and access to justice in rural Gambia.

Chief Krubally’s remarks add to growing calls from grassroots leaders for systemic reforms to strengthen local governance and improve service delivery.

President Ibrahim Traoré’s Major Accomplishments

By: The Fatu Network Editorial

Since taking office in 2022, Burkina Faso’s President Ibrahim Traoré has implemented a nationalization strategy focused on local ownership and self-sufficiency across key sectors. In the tomato processing industry, Traoré established factories that are 100% owned by Burkinabé citizens through a shareholding system where locals invest as little as 10,000 CFA francs, with no foreign investment or bank loans involved.

The president has also nationalized road construction by purchasing all necessary equipment and training hundreds of Burkinabé to operate the machinery, aiming to build 5,000 kilometers of paved roads annually compared to the mere 3,000 kilometers constructed since independence.

His industrialization efforts include the launch of “Itaoua” electric vehicles with the “Sahel” model, named after the AES Sahel region comprising Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali, manufactured at a domestic EV assembly plant.

Traoré has mandated that judges, lawyers, and students wear locally-made uniforms using Burkinabé fabric, supporting the domestic textile industry.

This approach extends to other sectors, with the president establishing locally-owned milk processing factories that produce butter, cheese, yogurt, and fresh milk.

Source: Information compiled from Flying To Meet The President Of Burkina Faso by Wode Maya, published on his official YouTube channel in May 2025. This fact-finding mission provided direct insight into Burkina Faso’s progress, featuring interviews with citizens to gain firsthand knowledge of the country’s developments.

NPP’s Push for Permanence with Its New Bureau

By: The Fatu Network Editorial

The National People’s Party (NPP) recently inaugurated its new headquarters in Bundung, a move party officials described as a major step toward strengthening its institutional foundation. The event brought together supporters and senior officials, with President Barrow using the occasion to highlight the broader significance of the milestone.

“The inauguration of the National People’s Party (NPP) Headquarters in Bundung marked a pivotal moment in transforming NPP into a lasting institution,” Barrow said. “We are consolidating a political organisation that is not centred on any individual or personality but deeply rooted in its membership and the aspirations of the Gambian people.”

He went on to highlight his government’s achievements under NPP leadership, citing the construction of over 1,000 kilometres of roads, the establishment of the largest hospital in Farato, expanded access to electricity and clean water, and the development of thousands of new classrooms and schools.

Describing the headquarters as more than just a physical space, Barrow added: “It is a home for every NPP supporter, a centre for democracy, and a beacon of growth and prosperity for all generations.”

Is Senegal Snatching Our Oil Wells? The Gambia Deserves the Truth Now!

By Musa Ousainou Yali Batchilly
Secretary General and Party Leader, Gambia Action Party (GAP)

The Gambia Action Party (GAP) registers deep concern and a strong sense of urgency over the disturbing audio clip that recently resurfaced from former President Yahya Jammeh regarding the issue of oil in The Gambia. This has sparked renewed public interest and skepticism about the fate of our natural resources—particularly our offshore oil wells—and whether they are at risk of being exploited by foreign powers, especially our immediate neighbor, Senegal.

Adding fuel to this national debate is the insightful interview conducted by Alieu Ceesay of QTV with Jerreh Barrow, the Director General of the Petroleum Commission, aired on April 1, 2025, on QTV’s State of Affairs. The information presented, while informative in parts, left many questions unanswered and has only deepened the anxiety of the citizenry.

GAP believes it is time the Government of The Gambia and the Ministry of Petroleum come forward with full disclosure. The allegations made by the former President are serious. They cannot be swept under the carpet as mere political utterances or dismissed as outdated rhetoric. Gambians have every right to know:

  1. Are our oil wells being compromised or shared unfairly with Senegal?
  2. What are the binding terms of the agreements signed with foreign oil companies and neighboring states?
  3. Is there a clear, transparent petroleum policy in place that protects The Gambia’s sovereignty and national interest?
  4. Why is the government silent in the face of these loud claims?

This is not the time for the Ministry of Petroleum to remain in its comfort zone. Transparency and proactive communication are not optional—they are a democratic obligation. The natural resources of this country belong to the people. No administration, past or present, has the moral or constitutional right to mortgage the destiny of generations unborn.

The Gambia Action Party stands firm in calling for:

  1. A comprehensive and public report on the status of The Gambia’s offshore oil blocks and any current bilateral agreements involving Senegal and other foreign interests.
  2. A National Assembly hearing to probe the claims made by former President Jammeh, with testimonies from the Ministry of Petroleum, the Gambia National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), and the Petroleum Commission.
  3. An immediate clarification from the government to either debunk or confirm the existence of covert deals or concessions that might disadvantage The Gambia.
  4. A citizens’ forum or public sensitization drive to inform Gambians about the state of our oil industry and what benefits, if any, are currently accruing to the nation.

The Gambia must not become a passive observer in matters that threaten our economic future and national sovereignty. If Senegal is indeed encroaching on our oil reserves, then it is not only an act of economic aggression—it is a betrayal of regional brotherhood. If these claims are false, the government must set the record straight with evidence, not silence.

The Gambia Action Party will continue to hold the government accountable. We are not in the business of playing politics with the future of our nation, and we urge all well-meaning Gambians, civil society actors, and the media to join in this national call for truth, transparency, and sovereignty.

The time for answers is now. Silence is not an option.

Musa Ousainou Yali Batchilly
Secretary General and Party Leader
Gambia Action Party (GAP)

China’s Infrastructure Revolution:
Why West Fears East

OPINION by: Seringe S.T. Touray
Editor-In-Chief, The Fatu Network

Reviving the Ancient Silk Road

In Beijing, as we transition into Spring, temperatures fluctuate – a contrast to the invariable political climate governing China’s 23 provinces and other administrative divisions. Out here, the contrast between local realities and mainstream media narratives couldn’t be more obvious. An example of this juxtaposition can be seen in the coverage of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The BRI symbolizes one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects in our modern history, and, in my opinion, the most ambitious of all. Exactly how ambitious? Depends on who you ask, and what the angle is. Now, let’s take a closer, unfiltered look.

Launched in 2013 by China’s Head of State, Xi Jinping, the initiative plans a connection between Asia, Europe, and Africa through roads, railways, ports, and other infrastructure investments. Essentially, it aims at distributing trade and economic opportunities globally.

To many, this lays out a new world order guided by China, a communist region of Asia often seen as a rival of the West, thus welcoming a more cautionary rather than positive assessment of the BRI. But are there legitimate concerns about the project? Or are criticisms clouded by anxiety over what some economists, even in the West, describe as a future rapidly tilting in favor of Chinese world dominance?

With over 140 countries participating as of 2024, the BRI encompasses 75% of Earth’s population, and over half of global GDP. To quote a portion of the official descriptions of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), “The Belt and Road Initiative is a bid to enhance regional connectivity.”

When President Xi introduced the BRI in Kazakhstan in 2013, what started as an idea to revive the ancient Silk Road trading routes evolved into something far more ambitious, despite minimal coverage from the West. But back in East Asia, on this eastern side of the Eurasian continent, Xi’s vision to connect China with the rest of the world through land and sea routes quickly took root, drawing nourishment from its five-thousand-year history as it evolved into the modernized concept it is today.

For those unfamiliar with the original Silk Road, it was a sophisticated network of trade routes that connected China with parts of Asia, the Middle East, and Europe over 2,000 years ago. And it wasn’t just about silk—spices, tea, gold, and even ideas and cultures moved along these routes, shaping much of early global exchange.

Now, there’s just a little twist, if I may say. The “Belt” in Belt and Road isn’t really a belt, neither is the “Road” an actual road—not in a literal sense, or traditional sense for that matter. Whereas “Belt” refers to overland trade corridors that stretch through Central Asia to Europe, the “Road” is actually a series of maritime shipping lanes running through Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and on to Africa and Europe. But confusing names aside, the idea is bold, with China eager to knit together infrastructure, trade, and cooperation on a global scale.

Since its introduction, the Belt and Road has expanded to six major corridors. The most notable is the headline-grabbing $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, among others connecting Western China, Russia, Mongolia, Southeast Asia, and beyond.

Separately, ports are being constructed or upgraded from the South China Sea to the Mediterranean. That’s not all. China has also busied itself with what it calls the Digital Silk Road focused on building digital infrastructure and expanding technology cooperation among participating countries. This came side-by-side with the development of a Health Silk Road for health cooperation and medical infrastructure also among participating countries.

Additionally, the BRI rolled out the Ice Silk Road for Arctic shipping routes and cooperation in the polar regions, mainly with its longtime geopolitical ally, which, according to the world map, spans both Eastern Europe and Northern Asia. That’s right – Russia.

By 2017, the Communist Party under President Xi officially incorporated the BRI into its national policy, adding a target completion date of 2049. It’s worth mentioning that this would coincide with the 100th anniversary of modern China. This is also to say, the BRI isn’t just another infrastructure project; more than that, it’s become a central part of Xi’s long-term global strategy, strictly guided by his worldview.

Much of the misinformation, or perhaps innocent misconceptions, found in some mainstream coverage originates from widespread speculation. There appears to be increasing ambiguity regarding the sources of finance for this long-term megaproject, with unsubstantiated mainstream media-propelled rumors speculating about the drying out of funds, leading to project dead ends. In reality, funds for the extensive projects are funneled through a variety of institutions, namely the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with over $100 billion in capital, the $40 billion Silk Road Fund, and China’s policy and commercial banks.

The Centre for Economics and Business Research projected that the BRI will boost world GDP by $7.1 trillion yearly by 2040, nine years before its scheduled completion. Even the World Bank estimates increased trade flows and reduced costs for member countries through the BRI.

Eastern vs. Western Worldviews

China’s approach to global infrastructure development through the BRI stands in notable contrast to Western models, whose development aid often comes with stringent political and economic conditions. The Chinese have instead introduced a “non-interference” policy in domestic affairs and present the BRI as a mutually beneficial economic partnership – an approach which has proven particularly attractive to developing nations that have historically felt marginalized by Western-dominated international institutions.

Oftentimes, China’s distinctive governance model is misunderstood in the West. A clear example of this is the broad Western-driven perception of China as a one-party state, much like the perception many have of the Russian Federation, under President Vladimir Putin.

The truth is, the Chinese political system currently includes up to eight legally recognized non-Communist parties participating in the political process, alongside China’s ruling Communist Party. The huge difference? Rather than compete for power – a move that often leads to distortions of reality and manipulations in a battle of narratives to garner support – Chinese political parties participate in what’s called “multiparty cooperation and political consultation” under CCP leadership. In essence, they each provide input on policy decisions and serve specific social and professional constituencies, functioning more as advisory bodies than adversarial opposition parties in the Western sense.

Another key difference between China and Western countries lies in their media philosophies. While some Western media organizations take an approach of constructive journalism (i.e. emphasis on solutions and positive developments), this approach seems secondary to the dominant model. What’s the dominant model? This oftentimes prioritizes conflict, controversy, and critical perspectives. This is, to be fair, partly driven by commercial realities and democratic ideals. Here, Western journalism adopts the role of a watchdog, hence ‘watchdog journalism,’ and deems its probing and confrontational approaches as essential to achieving greater transparency and accountability in a democracy.

Compare this with China’s approach, and you’ll notice a difference. Here in China, the media are largely state-directed in a way that promotes national unity, social harmony, and developmental achievements. Moreover, this direction aligns with the government’s own agenda. The West often dismisses this philosophy as propagandist in nature. Yet, for the overwhelming majority of Chinese people, this model plays an important role in fostering stability in China by reinforcing a shared national vision.

These differences do not end there. They extend to public attitudes towards leadership. I was struck by the widespread respect the Chinese express for President Xi during my visits to both Beijing and Anji. The first thought that sprang to my mind was the contrast between this and the polarized political climates seen in countries like the U.S. and U.K., where disrespect for leaders in many instances depends on party affiliation. Western media likes to portray Chinese citizens as resentful of a repressive government. However, my conversations with Chinese people from different walks of life reveal genuine pride, both in their leadership and national progress.

When Perception Meets Reality

Personally, I find that these inconsistent portrayals stain the record of some Western media that have also frequently labelled the BRI as “failing,” “collapsing,” or a “debt trap.” This attitude can also be observed in a wide range of content disseminated across the internet, not the least of which is the widely viewed 2024 YouTube video titled ‘How China’s Belt and Road Initiative Collapsed.’ The video uses dramatic language and imagery, depicting “half-built ghost projects” especially across African nations, and other participating nations “drowning in debt.” They further claim that related protests are “exploding” on different continents.

These frame the BRI as a geopolitical strategy rather than a development effort. But the fact of the matter is, it’s not exactly a zero-sum-game. Both can be true regarding China’s aims, so long as it aims in good faith. Such negative coverage invokes phrases like “setting the stage for a new cold war,” casting China’s infrastructure investments as tools of control.

A major concern associated with the BRI, according to some experts from the West, is the ‘risk’ it poses to its member countries, where experts fear such countries, mostly African, will grow more dependent on China in a power imbalance due to unsustainable debt. To support this theory, a 2023 study by AidData, which was conducted with the World Bank, Harvard Kennedy School, and the Kiel Institute, claimed that China has already issued $240 billion in emergency loans to 22 countries between 2008 and 2021, mostly to assist those struggling with BRI-related obligations.

The report warns that the lack of transparency over this $240 billion bailout could have global ramifications.

Here’s what’s interesting: this Western portrayal clashes with research and perspectives within China. In my discussions with the Chinese – and this includes government officials, scholars, as well as locals in Beijing and Anji – the BRI is consistently seen as a means of sharing prosperity across the world, particularly with member countries. A means of fostering mutually beneficial development. Even scholars like Deborah Brautigam of Johns Hopkins University challenge the “debt trap” narrative. In Brautigam’s own findings, she notes that “Chinese banks are willing to restructure the terms of existing loans and have never actually seized an asset from any country.”

Here’s the stranger bit. When countries fail to repay loans from Western nations or institutions, they sometimes do face debt restructuring, loss of economic sovereignty through imposed policy reforms, credit downgrades, and reduced access to future financing. In some cases, they are pressured into privatizing or relinquishing control of key national assets.

And even the Western borrowers are not immune. You might recall that during its debt crisis, Greece was compelled by the EU and IMF to privatize major assets, including handing over operations of 14 regional airports to Germany’s Fraport AG to secure bailout funds (Reuters, 2015).

Similar scenarios have affected some African nations. Let’s consider Tunisia, for instance. The North African country also faced demands to cut its subsidies and privatize some of its state-owned firms, sparking public backlash over fears of foreign control (Al Jazeera, 2023). The point of these examples is not whataboutism. The point is that the same mechanisms Western countries enforce when borrowers can’t repay loans are the very mechanisms they accuse China of enforcing, as if such enforcements are unheard of, when they’ve long been standard practice.

You might notice that mainstream media coverage frequently distorts the BRI’s scope through subtle framing. Reports describing the participation of “only” 140 countries obscure the fact that this represents about 75% of the world’s population—an extraordinary diplomatic feat. Criticism of the BRI’s “slow” progress ignores that it launched in 2013 with a 2049 target, making it a long-term vision. Yet it’s judged as though it should have revolutionized global infrastructure in just over a decade—an expectation not applied to Western-led efforts.

One might speculate that this pattern of negative framing reflects broader anxieties about China’s rise. Why? Let’s shift to Goldman Sachs – the global financial giant that projected China surpassing the U.S. as the largest economy by 2035-2040. And if that’s not enough reason for anxiety, President Xi himself has laid out China’s expectations, which see 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic and the completion date set for the BRI, as the year China fully emerges as a modernized and socialist superpower. All this, alongside China’s growing regional influence in the Indo-Pacific.

To squeeze in a final example, China’s rapidly-growing BYD provides yet another case study portraying some western media distortions of the economic achievements of the Asian country. While there’s a strong presence of global brands like Toyota, Mercedes, Volvo, BMW, Audi and the like, they’re hardly any match for the rapid growth of BYD electric vehicles marking their territory on Chinese streets.

2024 saw BYD capturing a whopping 34.1% of China’s new energy vehicle market. By comparison, Tesla held only 6%, which isn’t terrible considering Musk’s company shares the local market with other competing global car brands, but with Tesla declining to 5.6% by early 2025, there’s much concern for Elon Musk to ponder as his company strives to stay relevant in Asia. Yet, in spite of this, some Western narratives remain steadfast in continuously underestimating Chinese innovation.

You might recall that back in November 2011, Musk laughed dismissively when a Bloomberg reporter asked him questions about what could become a future tight race between Tesla and BYD, which was slowly taking off at the time. “I don’t think they have a great product. The technology is not very strong,” Musk said, further declaring that Chinese manufacturing couldn’t compete on price.

As time has taught us exactly fifteen years later, Musk’s claims couldn’t be further from the truth. Yet similar dismissive attitudes to this day continue to shape some Western coverage of Chinese economic advances.

To throw in a couple of notable testimonials in favor of the BRI, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad joined many developing countries who have welcomed the initiative for its addressing of infrastructure gaps and strategy for fostering growth. Mohamad praised it as a stringent mechanism for poverty reduction in landlocked Central Asian countries. Perhaps even more notably, the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, also described the BRI as a vehicle for accelerating the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

So far, the BRI has attracted over $1 trillion in investments across more than 150 partner countries, and has delivered railways, ports, highways, and digital infrastructure at a scale unmatched by Western-led efforts (World Bank, 2023; Council on Foreign Relations, 2024).

To those raising concerns over the ecological impact of BRI projects, China has pretty much remained transparent regarding its renewable energy investments, with President Xi publicly pledging to end all overseas coal financing. In fact, during my visit to Beijing, I’ve seen firsthand China’s sustainable commitment. Its international training centers, strategic planning, and discussions tailored to partner countries were on display at the inauguration of the Anji International Media Training Base on May 15, which I attended at the invitation of the government. The emphasis? China’s globalist vision and ecological civilization.

Remember, even in the West, China is still widely considered to be the global leader in renewable and green energy. It’s also the largest producer of renewable energy capacity.

To conclude on a more personal note, I had the pleasure of climbing one of the seven wonders of the world – the Great Wall of China. While this isn’t relevant to the BRI, it symbolizes something noteworthy: the value of experiencing anything firsthand, or in this case, China’s achievements following a five-thousand-year history of its own making, brings about something of a spiritual awakening in a world engulfed in a geopolitical battle of narratives. I’m not asking you to take my word on China’s vision or its potential for connecting the world through ambition; rather, I encourage you to approach geopolitics with an open mind and seek diverse sources of information while questioning dominant narratives – especially when they seem to consistently maintain existing power structures.

The end.

From Gunjur to Knoxville: Alhassan Darboe Nominated for Black EXCEL-ence Award

By: Alieu Jallow

Alhassan “Alex” Darboe, a Gambian-born real estate entrepreneur and community advocate, has been nominated for the prestigious Black EXCEL-ence Award. The award, part of the 2nd Annual Black EXCEL-ence Summit, honors individuals who have made significant contributions to the Black community through leadership, service, and positive impact.

Darboe, originally from Gunjur in The Gambia, moved to Knoxville, Tennessee, over fifteen years ago as an international student. Since then, he has become a prominent figure in the local real estate industry. But his influence goes beyond property sales. Through philanthropy and mentorship, he has empowered countless young people in both Africa and the U.S., with a strong focus on entrepreneurship and building generational wealth through real estate.

This year’s summit theme, “Legacy, Leadership, and Leverage,” highlights individuals who are not only making a difference in their communities but also creating opportunities for others. While only one nominee will ultimately receive the award, Darboe’s selection as a finalist is already a meaningful acknowledgment of his legacy and influence.

According to the organizers, Darboe was nominated because his “leadership, commitment, and impact exemplify the very spirit of this honor.” From mentoring aspiring entrepreneurs to giving back to his hometown, his story embodies the kind of excellence the summit aims to celebrate.

In a message of gratitude, Darboe expressed how much the recognition means to him—not just for what it represents, but for the people who made it possible.

“To all of you who took the time to nominate me: thank you. Your belief in me is a reminder that I do not stand here alone. To my incredible clients, both past and present, thank you for trusting me and choosing my business to guide you through one of the most important journeys of your lives. Your support fuels everything I do. This nomination is not just a personal milestone—it’s a collective one. And for that, I am sincerely and deeply grateful.”

Nominees and their families have been invited to attend the summit, which promises not only a celebration of achievement but also an opportunity to connect and be inspired by fellow changemakers.

Repairing Broken Hearts and Damaged Reputations: WAVE Initiatives Campaign Against Discrimination Towards Witch-Hunt Victims

By: Dawda Baldeh

Sixteen years ago, in 2009, families were torn apart, and hearts and reputations were shattered when former Gambian dictator Yahya Jammeh initiated what was described as a politically motivated campaign labeling individuals as witches and wizards. Many families faced devastation as their parents were forcibly detained and made to consume concoctions, resulting in the deaths of over 40 people.

To restore and rebuild these damaged reputations, the Women’s Association for Victims and Empowerment (WAVE) yesterday completed a two-day engagement with communities and stakeholders aimed at combating discrimination against witch-hunt victims in The Gambia. Prisalla Yagu Ceesay, Co-founder and Senior Technical Advisor of WAVE, emphasized the significance of the two-day event in uniting victims, law enforcement officers, civil society organizations, and the media to assist victims in overcoming past traumas.

“Our goal is to restore social cohesion among the alleged victims in society, reduce stigma, and rehabilitate communities and individuals who have been subjected to the witch-hunt campaign,” she stated. She further mentioned that the aim is to support victims labeled as witches and wizards in rebuilding their lives while providing them with mental and physical assistance.

Hassan Baldeh, a police superintendent, described the plight of former President Jammeh’s alleged witch-hunt victims as troubling. He highlighted the crucial role the police could play in safeguarding victims, stressing that society must protect them from all forms of discrimination. “It’s disheartening to witness people discriminating against these individuals accused of witchcraft. Hearing their stories was very emotional for me, and it’s tragic that security forces were used to mistreat citizens,” he expressed. Baldeh further emphasized the importance of people supporting one another to foster harmonious living. “We must ensure that such atrocities do not occur again,” he added, pointing out that the police are dedicated to protecting citizens’ rights.

Ismaila Sonko, a resident of Esso village in the North Bank Region, recounted the incident of his father’s arrest in 2009. His father was among many accused of witchcraft by former President Jammeh. “When the soldiers arrived, they told my father he had health issues and were taking him to the hospital. He insisted that there was a hospital next to his house and should be taken there, but the soldiers refused. He was released after three days,” he recalled.

Before his arrest, he was healthy and fit, but after his release, he developed serious health problems. Mr. Sonko reflected on the societal impact that this allegation had on his father and praised WAVE for leading this initiative to assist victims in recovering from trauma and advocating for legislation to prevent further suffering. “People are aware that the allegations were false,” he added. Mr. Sonko’s father passed away in 2016, prior to Jammeh’s defeat by coalition leader President Barrow.

This initiative is supported by the Peace Building Fund, UNDP, and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. At the conclusion of the program, participants reiterated the call for the implementation of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) recommendations regarding the witch hunt to prevent further discrimination against victims.

GFF’s Ambitious Vision Clashes with Critics’ Outrage

Written by: ML Drammeh

The Gambia Football Federation (GFF) has unveiled a bold consultancy deal with a university professor to transform its amateur league into a professional powerhouse by 2026, but a chorus of critics led by former presidential candidate Sadibou Kamaso and echoed by two senior sports journalists and an entrepreneur, slammed the consultancy contract as a ‘smokescreen’ for mismanagement, pointing to alleged crumbling pitches and squandered funds as proof the GFF’s dream is built on shaky ground.

A Vision Unveiled Amid Skepticism

On May 28, 2025, the GFF took a significant step toward professionalizing Gambian football, signing a consultancy contract with Professor Momodou Mustapha Fanneh, a Gambian scholar with a Ph.D. in Economics from Fordham University. Presided over by GFF Second Vice President Ebou Faye, the agreement aims to craft a business plan to elevate the nation’s amateur league to professional status. “Our league is at an amateur stage, and we want to take it to another level to fulfill our election promise,” Faye declared, highlighting the need for clubs to gain financial and structural capacity to employ players and compete with Africa’s professional teams. “Clubs lose out financially when transferring players,” he added, referencing the expiration of the GFF’s UEFA Assist program for professionalization.

General Secretary Lamin M. Jassey dubbed the initiative a ‘legacy project,’ while Finance Director Kemo Ceesay lauded Fanneh’s expertise, expressing confidence in a 2026 rollout. Fanneh, acting dean of the University of The Gambia’s School of Business and Public Administration, embraced the role as a ‘national call’.

“This policy will create meaningful change for our football and the people working around it,” he said, urging swift action to harness Gambia’s youthful talent.

A Firestorm of Criticism

Yet, the announcement has sparked a firestorm. Sadibou Kamaso, a former GFF executive and 2022 presidential candidate for Team Restore Confidence, unleashed a scathing critique. “This is a carefully calculated move to misappropriate funds that should be used for meaningful development programs,” he said, questioning Fanneh’s suitability. “With all due respect to Prof. Fanneh, this is not his domain. The professional league isn’t just a business plan where you plug in figures and a nice intro.”

Kamaso’s frustration stems from what he sees as a pattern of missed opportunities. He points to the UEFA Assist program, launched in 2021 to professionalize Gambian football at no cost. The initiative included Zoom meetings with first-division clubs, a UEFA delegation visit to Banjul, and a 2021 study tour to Morocco, where Kamaso, Faye, and Competition Director Baboucarr Jobe studied a successful professional league model, fully funded by Moroccan hosts. Kamaso claims the GFF ignored the resulting report and botched follow-ups, citing a mismanaged email from then-Competition Manager Modou Jagne with a retroactively dated meeting reminder and a decision to delay professionalization to 2024/2025. “To announce a consultancy contract now is not only disrespectful to stakeholders but to all Gambians,” Kamaso fumed. “This madness has to stop.”

Crumbling Pitches, Shattered Trust

Kamaso’s outcry is amplified by voices from the media and diaspora. Momodou Gajaga, a sports presenter at QTV, minced no words: “How on earth can you professionalize your league when you don’t have a proper football pitch?” His question cuts to the heart of a broader critique: the dire state of Gambian football infrastructure. Another senior Gambian Sports journalist Baboucarr Sey echoed this sentiment : “Let’s stop fooling ourselves. We CANNOT have a professional league without playable pitches. It’s that simple. FIFA has pumped millions of Dalasis into our football infrastructure, yet we can’t point to a single stadium built from scratch. Where did it all go? Who’s accountable? Dusty community fields and poor lighting—this is an insult to Gambian football lovers. It’s a smokescreen, not development.”

From across the Atlantic, Gambian entrepreneur Alhasan Alex Darboe, based in the U.S., piled on: “The GFF is a funny and incompetent bunch. A good doctor would tell you, cure follows proper diagnosis. We have terrible, knee-damaging, leg-breaking pitches littered across the country. Instead of using FIFA funds for infrastructure, they hire a business professor with no experience in professionalizing leagues for optics. They’d never let an inexperienced surgeon operate on them, but they’ll spend millions on incompetent contractors. Dr. Fanneh is a great business professor, not a sports expert.” Darboe’s blunt assessment ended with a rallying cry: “We’re not buying it. Enough is enough.”

A Legacy or a Mirage?

The GFF’s consultancy deal is a high-stakes gamble. Can Professor Fanneh, despite lacking sports-specific experience, deliver a blueprint that transforms Gambian football?
This consultancy contract is more than a business plan, it’s a test of whether Gambian football can rise above its fractured foundation. Will the GFF score a historic goal for progress, or will critics like Kamaso, Gajaga, Sey, and Darboe be proven right, exposing another chapter of unfulfilled promises? As the nation watches, one thing is clear: without addressing the crumbling pitches and eroded trust, the dream of a professional league risks remaining a cruel mirage.

EFSCRJ Demands Accountability Over Scabies Outbreak at Brufut Quranic School

By: Alieu Jallow

The EF Small Centre for Rights and Justice (EFSCRJ) has called for urgent action and full accountability over a scabies outbreak at Daara Madina Suwaneh, a Quranic boarding school in Brufut Heights, where 57 out of 101 children were recently diagnosed with the disease.

In a strongly worded statement issued Tuesday, EFSCRJ blamed systemic neglect by key state institutions for the outbreak and called for immediate investigations, prosecution of those responsible, and the closure of the school pending a full assessment.

“We consider this outbreak as symptomatic of the perennial dereliction of duty by public institutions,” the Centre said, referencing Section 17 of the Gambian Constitution, which obliges public bodies to respect and protect human rights.

The Ministry of Health confirmed the outbreak on May 27, noting on its Facebook page that the affected children were found to be without “adequate medical care at the time of the investigations.” The Ministry said it is now working to provide treatment and improve hygiene at the facility. However, EFSCRJ says the problem goes beyond treating scabies.

“The children of this school have a right to the highest attainable standard of living, including hygiene, sanitation, healthcare, and safety,” the organization stated, noting that the outbreak “meant the necessary monitoring and accountability by public institutions were absent.”

EFSCRJ drew parallels to past tragedies involving children in institutions, including the 2021 Bilal Islamic School fire that killed nine, the 2022 Malagen investigation into abuse at Penny Appeal homes, and the acute kidney injury outbreak that claimed over 70 lives that same year.

“In all these cases, relevant authorities issued statements, made visits, and promised accountability, yet until today, no tangible action has been taken against perpetrators. The Gambia Police Force neither arrested nor prosecuted anyone for this fatal incident in which the right to live was destroyed with impunity,” the statement said.

EFSCRJ issued six specific recommendations, including:

  • A joint investigation by the Ministries of Health, Gender and Children, the NHRC, and the police;
  • Closure of the Daara and thorough inspection of its facilities;
  • Legal action against individuals found responsible for negligence;
  • Nationwide monitoring of all child-centered boarding schools;
  • Full implementation of the Minimum Standards of Quality Care for childcare centers;
  • Continuous oversight by all relevant government agencies.

The Centre also reminded authorities of their legal responsibilities under Section 199 of the Children’s Act, which mandates inspections of childcare facilities every six months.

“If this was done, these deaths and diseases in boarding schools and childcare homes would have been avoided,” the statement added.

“Public institutions are created for a purpose, and they must be seen to fulfill their purpose with diligence, effectiveness, and efficiency,” EFSCRJ concluded. “EFSCRJ will continue to monitor this matter to ensure transparency and accountability.”

The Janneh Commission: Fact-Finding or Overreach? Revisiting the Janneh Commission’s Mandate

Written by: Momodou Ndow

Whenever there is a controversy, Gambians tend to take sides, and the debate quickly becomes partisan. Rather than focusing on facts or substance, many resort to defending, deflecting, and insulting. The truth becomes secondary to loyalty. People create enough noise to bury inconvenient truths.

According to Mustapha Darboe ofThe Republic, during an interview on Kerr Fatou, members of the UDP, NPP, and APRC were all implicated in the looting of Goloh’s assets. To quote Mustapha: “Mole mang kaati jang. Gambiano nengo leh diyata, moe tiling ndingo mang siya. Nee taata foe yalongko sange ntay la hero fanang daa beh kuwol kono lay.”

Yep, I totally agree with Mustapha Darboe. Gambianol mang tiling! Ngee jubadi denge barri, motah dayka bi kaliss coat. With that said, my aim in this piece is to focus on substance, and let the noise pass me by.

The Role of a Commission of Inquiry

What exactly is the function of a Commission of Inquiry?

“A commission of inquiry is a fact-finding body, typically established to investigate matters of public interest or to gather information necessary for policy decisions. Their main job is to conduct thorough investigations, make findings based on evidence, and provide recommendations for action.”

When the Janneh Commission of Inquiry was established in July 2017, Mr. Surahata Janneh and Mrs. Amie Bensouda were appointed as Chairman and Lead Counsel, respectively.

As Chairman, Mr. Janneh was responsible for setting the agenda, moderating discussions, approving materials, prioritizing tasks, communicating decisions, and ensuring the commission reaches a conclusion.

Ms. Bensouda, as Lead Counsel, was tasked with developing investigative strategies, identifying and examining witnesses, presenting evidence, ensuring fairness, advising on legal matters, and contributing to the final report.

The Sale of the Assets: A Legal Question

In the wake of The Republic’s explosive investigative report implicating the Janneh Commission in the sale of Goloh’s assets, a fundamental question arises: If the TRRC as a fact-finding commission (just like the Janneh Commission), was not involved in implementing its recommendations, why was the Janneh Commission involved in disposing of assets? Did they have the legal authority to do so?

Constitutional lawyer Mr. Lamin Darboe argues that the Janneh Commission did not have the legal mandate to sell the assets. According to him, Section 202(2)(D) of the Constitution makes it clear that the Commission’s authority was limited to preserving, not disposing of, those assets.

Here is what Section 202 states:

Functions and powers of 202 Commission:

(1) A Commission of Inquiry shall –

  • (a) make a full and impartial investigation into the matter in respect of which the Commission is established; and

  • (b) furnish in writing a report on the results of the inquiry, including a statement of the reasons leading to the conclusions of the Commission.

(2) A Commission of Inquiry shall have all the powers, rights and privileges of a judge of the High Court at a trial in respect of –

  • (a) enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise;

  • (b) compelling the production of documents;

  • (c) issuing a commission or request for the examination of witnesses abroad;

  • (d) making interim orders.

Regarding his remarks about Section 202 (2)(D): Mr. Darboe emphasizes that interim orders are, by definition, temporary. They are designed to maintain the current “state of affairs” or “prevent harm” until a final decision is reached.

Therefore, the Commission could only issue such orders, not permanently dispose of assets. If this interpretation is correct, and it appears to be both reasonable and constitutionally valid, it raises serious ethical concerns about the actions of the Janneh Commission. Both Mr. Janneh and Ms. Bensouda are seasoned lawyers who must have understood that the Constitution does not grant the Commission the authority to sell any assets.

This leads to an important question: Why did Mrs. Bensouda, as Lead Counsel and legal adviser to the Commission, not caution against selling the assets? Her role was precisely to guide the Commission on legal matters, and if the mandate only allowed preservation through interim orders, then the sale of assets was outside its scope.

Minister Sillah Clarifies GCAA Reform: ‘We’re Handing Over Assets, Not Selling Them’

By Michaella Faith Wright

The Minister of Transport, Works, and Infrastructure, Ebrima Sillah, has clarified that the government is not selling public assets under the ongoing reforms at the Gambia Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA), but rather handing them over to capable operators who can run them efficiently without incurring losses to the state.

Speaking on Coffee Time with Peter Gomez, Minister Sillah emphasised that the current initiative aims to ensure that critical national assets are managed competently and sustainably.

“We are not selling any assets. What we are trying to do is hand over the assets to someone able and capable of running them amicably, without bringing any losses to the state,” Minister Sillah explained.

He also pointed out that no government anywhere is expected to continuously provide funds to cover the salaries of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).

“No government will give you money to be able to pay the salaries of SOEs. In our current situation, the government remains one of the biggest employers, especially for highly qualified and educated people. NGOs and the private sector also play a major role in employment, but when it comes to investing in training and professional careers, it’s primarily the government,” he said.

Minister Sillah said some reforms are necessary, citing the Gambia Civil Aviation Authority as an example. He explained that the Authority is currently performing dual roles—regulatory and operational, which should ideally be separated.

“At the airport, when there’s no electricity at the terminal, when water supply fails, or when the air conditioning system isn’t working, the operating company must be held to account. Even issues like poor toilet conditions that people complain about—these are the things we deal with daily,” he noted.

He further revealed that a draft bill is being finalised to legally address these operational and regulatory challenges.

“The draft has been prepared by the Ministry of Justice in collaboration with a consultant. Once approved by the Cabinet, it will be taken to the National Assembly for legislation,” he stated.

Minister Sillah assured the public that the goal of the reforms is to enhance efficiency, professionalism, and service delivery without compromising state interests.

Power Play or Foul Play? Gambia WFA Election Sparks Legal Scrutiny

By Muhammed Lamin Drammeh

In a showdown that has rocked Gambia’s women’s football Association election, Adama Jarju’s Team Tahawal Women Football has challenged the re-election of Sainabou Cham as President of the Gambia Women’s Football Association (WFA) on May 24, 2025, alleging constitutional violations and electoral misconduct, and has submitted a petition to the National Assembly Select Committee on Sports to cancel Cham’s unopposed victory, thereby igniting a fierce battle for transparency and justice that threatens the future of women’s football in Gambia.

Roots of the Controversy

The conflict began at a failed congress on May 10, 2025, when Team Tahawal, led by Adama Jarju, raised alarms over the electoral process, alleging “systemic failures.” Their petition, submitted on May 25 and signed by Jarju, Secretary General Assan Jatta, and 1st Vice President Alpha Badjie, Esq., outlines serious breaches of the WFA Constitution and the Gambia Football Federation (GFF) Electoral Code, prompting their refusal to participate in the May 24 congress.

Team Tahawal’s Allegations

On election day, Jarju, Team Tahawal’s presidential candidate, withdrew after completing the nomination process, citing “constitutional malpractice.” This left incumbent Sainabou Cham to secure victory unopposed. The petition details several violations that, according to Team Tahawal, undermined the election’s legitimacy.

The electoral committee was allegedly formed in violation of Article 29.2 of the WFA Constitution, which mandates that “Elections shall be conducted by an electoral committee which shall be elected by the General Assembly in the AGM before the elective congress in compliance with the GFF Electoral Code.” Instead, stakeholders were compelled to vote on the committee’s approval during the May 10 congress, a process that failed to meet the required two-thirds majority under Article 30.4, which states: “A proposal for an amendment to the Statutes shall be adopted only if two-thirds of the members present and eligible to vote agree to it.” With 43 eligible voters, at least 29 votes were needed, but the vote resulted in only 25 in favour and 13 against, rendering the committee’s appointment “unconstitutional and invalid,” the petition argues.

The petition further alleges that the Upper River Region Football Association (URRFA) was allowed to vote despite a High Court injunction barring their participation due to unresolved legal issues. Team Tahawal called this a “direct affront to the rule of law,” noting that URRFA lacks active women’s football programs and a legitimate executive body, as its leadership’s term had expired without a valid congress.

Additionally, unauthorised voters, including regional presidents who serve on the GFF Executive Committee, allegedly cast ballots, violating Articles 22.3 and 22.4 of the WFA Constitution. These articles restrict voting to authorised delegates from the 10 First Division clubs, 12 Second Division clubs, and seven Regional Women’s Football Committees, as outlined in Article 11.1. The petition claims these presidents, who are not members of the Regional Women’s Football Committees, voted to support Cham, their GFF colleague, and that “bona fide members of the Regional Women’s Football Committee were side-lined,” with some regions bringing more than the allowed three delegates to “stack the vote.” A specific example cited is the Women’s Football Coordinator of CRRFA, who was barred from attending by her Regional President.

The petition also points to violations of the GFF Electoral Code, which governs WFA elections as an allied association. Article 4 requires the electoral committee to be elected at least six months before the congress, a rule ignored in this case. Furthermore, no Election Appeals Committee was established, as mandated by Article 12, leaving no mechanism for addressing grievances. The petition highlights concerns raised by Mary Decker, the electoral committee’s vice chair, who warned of a “series of constitutional violations” that would “seriously undermine her integrity” if she presided over the election. Despite her objections and a request to “clear her head,” Ba S. Jabbie, another committee member, “unilaterally took it upon himself” to proceed, an action Team Tahawal deems “against the doctrines of natural justice and fair play.”

The petition also questions the committee’s composition, noting that it originally included Mr. Jawla of the National Sports Council (NSC) as chair, alongside Decker and Jabbie. Team Tahawal requested Jawla’s recusal due to his role as NSC Executive Director, but no replacement was appointed, leaving Decker and Jabbie to oversee the process.

Ba S. Jabbie’s Defence

In an interview with The Fatu Network, Ba S. Jabbie dismissed the allegations as “false and misleading.” He insisted he lacked the authority to subvert the constitution, emphasising his role as an impartial overseer unaffiliated with the GFF or WFA. Jabbie recounted arriving at the May 10 Annual General Meeting (AGM) to find a heated debate over the electoral committee’s legality. A vote, he said, mandated the committee to dissolve the executive and set a new election date for May 24. Both camps, including Jarju’s, participated in the nomination process, and all but one club confirmed the new date. Jabbie argued that Jarju’s withdrawal on election day left the committee no choice but to proceed, stating, “I cannot preside over an election as a single person.”

Mary Decker’s Reservations

Mary Decker, the electoral committee’s vice chair, expressed caution on election day, as reported by other journalists. “I am not here to butcher any constitution,” she declared, emphasising her role was to conduct the election, not interpret rules. Citing a “series of constitutional violations,” Decker voiced reluctance to proceed and requested time to “clear her head,” highlighting her concerns about the process’s integrity.

Team Tahawal’s Demands

Team Tahawal’s petition calls for urgent action from the National Assembly Select Committee on Sports, demanding the “immediate nullification of the election results,” an independent audit by a neutral body, fresh elections under strict constitutional and electoral code compliance, and the suspension of officials responsible for the irregularities. “The credibility and future of women’s football depend on lawful, transparent, and accountable leadership,” the petition states, urging the Committee to address the matter with the urgency it deserves.

The National Assembly Select Committee on Sports has yet to respond, but the outcome of this petition will significantly shape the future of women’s football in Gambia.

Push for Women’s Representation in District Tribunals Gains Ground in Upper Fulladou West

By Alieu Jallow

Efforts to improve inclusive representation in local justice delivery are taking shape in Upper Fulladou West, where the district chief has taken concrete steps to include women in the district tribunal court, a move influenced by ongoing advocacy from Activista The Gambia.

Chief Ali Modou Touray of Upper Fulladou West said he has formally recommended a woman from Sare Silleri to serve on the tribunal following a series of community consultations. His decision is part of broader efforts to ensure the tribunal reflects the diverse community it serves, particularly women.

“The absence of women in tribunal courts often leads to delayed judgments. Many women are hesitant to open up about their issues, especially in a setting dominated by men. This can result in outcomes that don’t always favour them,” Chief Touray explained.

He noted that his consultations included engaging women from across his district to help identify a suitable female representative. This process led to selecting a woman who showed strong interest in serving. A formal recommendation was submitted to the Chief Executive Officer of the Janjanbureh Area Council, but nearly two years later, her appointment remains unconfirmed.

Chief Touray expressed frustration over the delay and emphasised the importance of representation in achieving fair and timely justice. He also commended Activista The Gambia for its sustained advocacy and capacity-building programs, which he said have improved the knowledge and effectiveness of tribunal members.

“The capacity-building trainings have not only enlightened my team but have also created space to discuss long-overdue reforms, including a review of the outdated District Tribunals Act of 1933. For instance, there are fines where, if someone is found guilty, they are charged D50. This no longer reflects today’s realities,” he said.

The Chief further called for youth representation in tribunal courts, arguing that their perspectives are essential in building a more responsive justice system. However, he pointed out that poor wages for tribunal members remain a major challenge.

“It’s difficult for my members to meet their basic needs with the current salary structure. Most of them don’t even have the means to travel to Bansang for court hearings regularly. This makes their work extremely difficult. I’m calling for reforms and increased remuneration,” Chief Touray added.

Activista’s ongoing work in the district is part of a broader advocacy effort to promote inclusive representation and improve justice delivery at the grassroots level, with a focus on both gender and youth inclusion.

Deputy Speaker Njie Meets Austrian Parliamentary President to Strengthen Bilateral Cooperation

Editor’s Note: The following is a press release issued by the National Assembly of The Gambia. It is published here in full, without edits.

26th May 2025 – Vienna, Austria

The Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly of The Gambia, Hon. Seedy S.K. Njie, on Monday, 26th May 2025, paid a courtesy call on His Excellency Walter Rosenkranz, President of the Austrian Parliament, at the Austrian Parliament Building in Vienna.

Hon. Njie is currently in Vienna at the invitation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), underscoring The Gambia’s increasing engagement with international institutions, particularly in the area of peaceful nuclear applications and development.

The high-level engagement with the Austrian Speaker aimed at advancing parliamentary diplomacy and exploring opportunities for enhanced bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Discussions centered on strengthening institutional collaboration in areas of technical assistance, human resource development, and capacity building between the legislative institutions of both countries.

Both parties exchanged views on the role of parliaments in fostering global partnerships, promoting democratic governance, enhancing oversight, and supporting sustainable development. The dialogue also emphasized the potential for cooperation in professional development and technical exchange programs for parliamentary members and staff.

Deputy Speaker Njie highlighted the National Assembly’s commitment to fostering strategic partnerships that support legislative effectiveness, transparency, and innovation. He commended Austria’s strong parliamentary governance structures and expressed keen interest in formal cooperation frameworks, including training programs and inter-parliamentary exchanges.

As a tangible outcome of the meeting, Hon. Njie proposed the establishment of a Parliamentary Friendship Committee between the two legislatures—a proposal that received immediate endorsement from President Rosenkranz. The Austrian Speaker pledged to dispatch a parliamentary delegation to Banjul before the end of 2025 as a demonstration of Austria’s commitment to enhanced collaboration.

In his remarks, President Rosenkranz welcomed the initiative and lauded The Gambia’s parliamentary leadership for its proactive engagement in international dialogue. He reaffirmed Austria’s readiness to partner with The Gambia in promoting good governance, institutional development, and global peace through strengthened legislative cooperation. President Rosenkranz further directed his Clerk to liaise closely with his Gambian counterpart to operationalize the agreed initiatives.

The meeting was also attended by His Excellency Kronsteiner, Honorary Consul of The Gambia in Vienna; senior officials from both legislative institutions; and Mr. Sainey Konteh, Director of Table Office at the National Assembly of The Gambia.

This visit marks a significant milestone in The Gambia’s parliamentary diplomacy and reflects its broader foreign policy commitment to fostering cooperation, knowledge-sharing, and institutional development with global partners.

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