OPINION

By Cherno Baba Jallow

“Governors are appointed, councils are elected,’’ Talib Bensouda, who recently won re-election as mayor of the Kanifing Municipal Council, once said in a speech. “Councils should not report to governors; councils report to the people,’’ he added.

Perfectly stated. Democracy is the will of the people. The people, that is, gets to decide who decides for them. In The Gambia, people have a say in who their local government councillors and chairpersons are, but not who becomes their governor.

Mayor Bensouda’s position on this matter comes from the heart. He is both puzzled by and anguished over a local government system deliberately catering to a minister and governors at the expense of local councils, the legitimate custodians of power and authority.

Predicting the future in politics is an ill-conceived leap into uncertain territory, but it’s probable that if he became president, Bensouda would champion significant changes to the way governorships are attained or run in The Gambia. He would ask for demarcation lines between what governors could do and not do as agents of central government. He would come up with ways to revamp local councils, protecting them from the intrusive and dictatorial abuse of governors and local government ministers. And he would call for the hiring and firing of governors be done by the people, not the president. Making governors elected officials, and hence accountable to the people, would remove one of the last anomalies of Gambian democracy.

A reform in local government is key. But this issue deserves a sustained presence in the public imagination, and up until public opinion assents to, and legislative reforms downstream from, it.

So Bensouda’s re-election means he gets to stay for five more years, and with it, a chance to build on his political capital and flesh out his ideas on the management of government affairs. He won re-election not because he had an “impressive” first term —- he didn’t; it was a mix-bag —— but rather because of his political charm and his lofty ambitions to bring ameliorative changes to the conditions of his constituents.

Bensouda’s essence isn’t really anchored in his past, his last five years in office. It is in his future, in the strong belief that he has the potential to be a great leader, a trailblazer in Gambian politics. His United Democratic Party should take a closer look at him for a potential leader and a challenger for the presidency in 2026.

At the moment, Bensouda is riding a crest of urban popularity. He gets wide berth among those displeased with President Adama Barrow’s juvenile incompetency, turned off by Ousainou Darboe’s political hubris and incensed at Halifa Sallah’s stubborn inflexibility. He is young, eloquent and compelling. He exudes a tranquil bearing, far removed from the disorderliness of Gambian politics and the clangor of its discourse.

Going into his sixth year in office, Bensouda is accumulating executive experience, a good start for a sojourn into the presidency. He is the kind of a leader the UDP needs to broaden its reach, to smoothen its rough edges and to help make a compelling case against Barrow in 2026.

In the 2022 presidential election, three thunderclaps sank Darboe’s candidacy: he flaunted an aura of invincibility aligned with smug superiority, he had a (huge) likability problem and he had (zero) elective-office experience. The last two matter because they fundamentally matter to voters in deciding for and against those seeking to run the affairs of state. They won’t vote for politicians they don’t like. And they are leery of voting for those without the faintest of experience in running things. Darboe was and still is well-liked by his supporters. But he struggles to find love from the rest of the electorate. He has been running for the presidency since 1996, but the electorate, excluding the UDP members, sees his lack of elective-office experience as an embarrassing, unsettling even, omission in his suitability for representative leadership.

The UDP is still unwilling to acknowledge or admit it publicly, that it has a leadership problem. So, it indulges itself in the self-perpetuating canard of a “stolen’’ election. The party would save itself a lot of precious time if it, among other things, concentrated on finding a replacement for its perennially-losing candidate. That would help it abandon its long-running, if constraining, culture of supine idolization and inflamed resentment. It would also, for once, bring to the fore of the party, an “ordinary’’ candidate —— a candidate in the mold of those seeking elective office by dints of ideas and persuasive abilities, and not by the cults of their personalities.

Those candidates shouldn’t be hard to find within the UDP. Consider Bensouda, Mayor Rohey Malick Lowe, Chairman Yankuba Darboe and Chairman Landing Sanneh. These young leaders are organically growing, and from the bottom-up. They are grinding it out, tackling the knots and bolts of constituent matters, something Darboe has never done throughout his political career.

Forged out of the embers of a quasi-military dictatorship in 1996, the UDP arrived on the scene at a highly unpropitious time: constitutionalism was dead and buried, democracy was in full retreat and a young military leader (then-Captain Yahya Jammeh), having already enjoyed the saccharine taste of power, was beginning to force himself onto the political scene, plotting an overwhelming control of the country’s future. With the ruling party, the PPP, banned and with an opposition scene dotted with fledgling parties, Jammeh was poised for a comprehensive dominance of the soon-to-be-revived phase of multiparty politics. But the UDP’s emergence helped prevent that, and to the country’s benefit.

The UDP’s strongest asset in its 27-year lifespan, a common denominator in the longevity of political parties, has been its fortitude, the staying power inherent in mass movements. The party’s character is moored in the firmness of resolve of its members. But it lacks a leader with a Jawarasque charm and eloquence, his first-rate political skills, his ability to inspire even those on the other side and his capacious understanding of the fine details of electoral politics. Darboe has been in politics for 27 years, but it has never been his true vocation in life.

A few years hence, and all political things held equal, the UDP will be presented with another opportunity to show if it really wants to govern the country with young and fresh hands (read: Bensouda, et al). Or if it is still determined to gift Darboe the presidency as compensation for “his years of suffering for The Gambia.’’

By Katim S Touray, PhD

His Excellency, President Macky SALL of the Republic of Senegal

Avenue Léopold Sédar Senghor,

Dakar, SENEGAL

Your Excellency, President Sall,

First, allow me to express my sincere condolences to you and our relatives, the good people of the Republic of Senegal on the sad loss of lives, and my sympathies to those injured and/or who have lost property in recent disturbances in your country. May Allah, Subhanahu wa ta’ala (SWT) grant the deceased eternal Jannah, quickly heal the injured, replace the lost properties, and bring back peace to your country.

Your Excellency, I am Gambian, but I am also writing as your brother and fellow Saloum Saloum. I come from Ballanghar in Saloum, The Gambia, but I have uncles in Dinguiraye in the Département de Nioro du Rip. In addition, one of my sisters is married in Ngayène Sabakh (Département de Nioro du Rip), and another is married in Nganda (Département de Kaffrine). As such, I have a moral duty to speak up on the recent disturbances and ongoing crisis in Senegal. As we say in Wolof, Your Excellency, Mbokka ma chi boole. I am concerned because we (Gambia and Senegal) are blood relatives.

The recent tragic disturbances in Senegal came after the leader of the opposition Party PASTEF, Ousmane Sonko (who is also the Mayor of Ziguinchor) was acquitted of rape charges but convicted and sentenced to 2 years in prison for corrupting young people. As a result, Senegal exploded! Never, in the wildest imaginations of many of us would we have expected Senegal, a beacon of hope, an island of peace and Teranga (hospitality), in a sea of conflict and strife in Africa, especially the Sahel region, would come to this.

The recent protests, Your Excellency, follow similarly motivated pro-Sonko protests in 2021 in which an estimated 13 lives were lost.

It should not have come to this, Your Excellency. You have achieved a lot for Senegal — and Africa — during your political career. Early in your first term as President, you articulated your vision for Senegal in your Plan Sénégal Emergent (PSE — Plan for an Emerging Senegal [PES]). You achieved a lot in implementing the PSE, including the new Aéroport international Blaise Diagne (AIBD), and the transformation of the formerly sleepy Diamniadio into a hub city to ease the pressure on Dakar, the Capital of Senegal.

You achieved all of these during over two decades of public service. Between April 2000 and May 2003, you served as Special Advisor for Energy and Mines to President Abdoulaye Wade. In addition, you held two ministerial positions, you served as a Member of the National Assembly of Senegal, you were elected President of the National Assembly, and you were Mayor of Fatick, your hometown.

Your Excellency, you continued your rise to power in July 2004, when you were appointed as Prime Minister, a position you served in until June 2007. You have served as President of Senegal for the past 11 years, starting in April 2012. During this time, you also served as Chairperson (2015–2016) of ECOWAS, the regional economic grouping of 15 West African States, and as Chairperson (2022–2023) of the African Union, with 55 member States from Africa.

It is clear, Your Excellency, that you have been incredibly blessed, coming as you do from humble beginnings. On the other hand, the recent tragic riots in Senegal show that you risk tarnishing your — so far — great legacy. Senegal has since Independence in 1960 been a bastion of democracy and peaceful coexistence, a country of dialog. However, events in the last few weeks have caused many to wonder whether Senegal, the country of Teranga (hospitality) has, under your leadership, lost its way.

Your Excellency, after over two decades of your service to Senegal and Africa, it is time for you to move on. You should have confidence that your legacy will last for a long time, if not forever. You should also be thankful for, and content with what Allah, SWT has blessed you with, and accept that there is nothing you can do for Senegal that you have not yet done. Besides, Senegal does not need a President who thinks he or she is indispensable because that would be an affront to the capacity of Senegalese to manage their affairs.

Your Excellency, I urge you to reconsider your attitude to the opposition protests. For this reason, I am glad to learn that you plan to address the nation of Senegal on June 25. I urge you in that address to adopt a reconciliatory attitude toward the recent tragic events in the country, and as many have called for, inform Senegalese that you will not run for a third term in office.

I hope, Your Excellency, that Mayor Sonko and other opposition groups can be encouraged to join the national dialog you recently launched. Furthermore, I suggest that the national dialog in the end proposes and that you accept, a way forward for Senegal including withdrawing the cases and nullifying the convictions against Mayor Sonko.

I also hope that the national dialog proposes that protestors arrested in the recent tragic events, and security personnel involved in controlling the protestors should be granted amnesty. I also suggest that you, as well as members of your party and administration, should be granted immunity from prosecution for any and all acts committed up to, but not after, the declaration of that amnesty. I believe that Senegalese have the heart to forgive, and that what Senegal has in the future is much more than whatever damage has been done in the recent disturbances.

Finally, Your Excellency, I would like to mention an Open Letter I wrote to former President Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia in 1999. I suggested to him that he should listen to those who criticize him constructively or suffer the fate of the former Shah of Iran and former Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Republic. President Jammeh did not heed my warning and was, with your firm support of The Gambian people, forced out of office 17 years after I wrote my letter to him.

I sincerely hope Your Excellency, that you will listen to the pleas of the many people who are calling on you to declare that you will not run for a third term in office, and that you will engage the Opposition in a dialog to bring the Senegalese family together again. May Allah SWT guide and bless your efforts in that regard.

Dewenati, and Eid Mubarak!

I thank you!

Alhagie M. Dumbuya

Director of Research and Library Services

National Assembly of The Gambia

Email: [email protected]

Overview

Constituency Development Fund (CDF) is a political development tool that is increasingly gaining popularity among parliaments and parliamentarians worldwide, more so in developing countries. The Gambia could be considered among the latest countries to adopt a CDF approach to development when the budget for it was approved by the National Assembly in 2021.

CDF is considered an arrangement that allows a Member of Parliament (MP) to facilitate the spending of funds dedicated and directly earmarked for development project(s) in his or her constituency. In other words, CDF is a mechanism that gives MPs a degree of authority to identify and implement projects in their constituencies. The ‘good’ intent is to provide, through parliament, initiatives that would address inequalities in terms of developments around the country. For some countries, the MP plays the lead role of presiding over constituency opinions on what, where and how the fund is spent or will be spent.

Over the years, arguments have emerged from among the public both for and against the execution of CDF by MPs. The proponents for CDF pointed out some of the benefits of the initiative, noting that it brings about direct visibility of the MP through the projects implemented in the constituency. Those against the approach argued that the implementation of projects is exclusively reserved for the Executive. They posited that parliament is the supreme audit institution which alone has the mandate to approve the spending of national resources and ensure that such resources are effectively accounted for by implementing institutions. For this reason, parliament cannot be a referee and a player at the same time. In other words, parliament cannot be an audit institution of how national resources are spent, at the same allowing Parliamentarians themselves to become spending officers of that resource. The question that might arise would be, who shall hold Parliament accountable?

To the proponents of this latter argument, Parliament would be deviating from its traditional mandate of legislation, oversight/scrutiny and representation as in the case of an auditor becoming an accountant. As such, this will dilute Parliament’s position to effectively monitor and scrutinize projects that it has itself implemented.

 CDF in The Gambia

It may be argued that the ultimate objective of CDF is to eliminate poverty at grassroots the level and bridge the gap of development imbalances across the various regions of the country through the projects and programmes implemented under the initiative. It is against this understanding and craving desire that, in 2021, The Gambia joined the list of countries that adopted CDF as the National Assembly appropriated sixteen million two hundred thousand dalasis (D16,200,000) for use by parliamentarians on development projects in their constituencies. Each of the fifty-three (53) elected National Assembly Members (NAMs) was allocated the sum of three hundred thousand dalasis (D300,000) for that purpose. In 2023, CDF allocation was increased to twenty-nine million dalasis (29,000,000) cumulatively to include both elected and nominated NAMs, thereby allocating each five hundred thousand dalasis (D500,000).

By virtue of his role as Chief Executive Officer, the Clerk of the National Assembly is the accounting officer and vote controller of CDF. There is no law yet on CDF in the country. However, the National Assembly Authority, through the Office of the Clerk, developed a CDF Policy to guide the disbursement and implementation process of the fund. The onus lies with the Authority, through the Office of the Clerk, to ensure that before funds are disbursed, the requests and proposals submitted by NAMs fulfil procurement rules and requirements. All procurements of goods and services are made by the Office of the Clerk. No NAM handles the CDF in cash. They only implement what has been procured, and this procurement is strictly done in line with their submitted proposals and The Gambia Public Procurement Act.

The CDF policy constitutes a CDF Committee and CDF Contracts Committee. The National Assembly Authority serves as the CDF Committee while the Contracts Committee of the National Assembly also serves as the CDF Contracts Committee. The CDF Committee considers and approves project proposals submitted by NAMs as well as addresses complaints of disbursement and management or other matters relating to the fund. The Contracts Committee considers all procurements relating to CDF and ensures that contracts are awarded to the most responsive bidders/suppliers.

Furthermore, the policy establishes a Monitoring and Evaluation Team with the mandate of conducting field visits at least quarterly to verify the implementation of projects at the Constituency level by NAMs and report back to the CDF Committee. To ensure accountability, the policy further tasks the Office of the Clerk to submit to the CDF Committee a quarterly summary report of project proposals received and approved or otherwise, status of disbursements of funds, and implementation status of projects for which monies have been disbursed.

 CDF in Other Jurisdictions

In most jurisdictions where CDF is being implemented there is a law usually an Act of Parliament to guide the process. In Zambia for instance, CDF was originally introduced in 1995. The Constituency Development Fund Act, 2018 established under the Zambian Constitution provides for the management, disbursement, utilisation and accountability of the CDF. The Act establishes CDF Committees in constituencies and their composition reflects a cross-section of the MP, councilors and civil society.

Kenya first introduced CDF in 2003. The recent law that the country has on CDF is the Constituencies Development Fund Act, 2013 which makes it mandatory for the provision of at least 2.5% of all the national government ordinary revenue collected in every financial year to the Fund. The Act equally establishes a CDF Board with a Chief Executive Officer as well as a CDF Committee for every constituency.

Also, Zambian CDF is managed by local councils through special constituency accounts opened for this purpose, contrary to what obtains in The Gambia. Under Zambian law, the CDF does not only comprise monies appropriated by Parliament but also grants, fees, council contributions or donations received for purposes of the Fund whereas in The Gambia, monies earmarked for CDF are only those appropriated by the National Assembly from the national budget.

Moreover, in Kenya, 75% (three quarters) of the money allocated as CDF in a single year is divided equally among the constituencies, and the other 25% (one quarter) is allocated based on the poverty ranking of constituencies using a formula which ensures that poorer constituencies get more money. Similarly, in Tanzania, the Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund Act, 2015, makes it mandatory to allocate 25% equally to each constituency, and 75% to be allocated in such manner as 45% in relation to the population of people living in a constituency; 20% in relation to the poverty margin; and 10% in relation to the size of the geographical area of a constituency. In Nigeria, CDF has been initiated through a government policy since 1999. The fund is divided on a 60:40 ratio between the House of Representatives and the Senate respectively (Busari, 2018).

Without a doubt, these practices in both Tanzania and Kenya go against the common feature that characterises CDF in most countries, including The Gambia where the same-size-fits-all measurement is used. In The Gambia, every constituency is allocated an equal amount of funds from the CDF regardless of their size, development needs or other considerations and needs. A lump sum amount is appropriated in the budget, and it becomes the responsibility of the CDF committee to ensure that every constituency is allocated their equal share, pro rata.

In Nigeria, although the fund is divided equally among legislators of both chambers, except for their leadership which is alleged to have the greater share, implementing the zonal intervention projects (as it is referred) does not involve cash payments or any other form of payment to a legislator. The duty of the legislator is simply to identify the location and the type of project to be sited. Once this is done, it is included in the budget of the relevant MDA by the National Assembly (Busari, 2018). Senator Ayogu Eze (cited in Nnamani, Ekoh & Joe-Akunne, 2021) corroborated that the role of the National Assembly in Nigeria is to identify projects for their constituency while the executive arm of government will identify a contractor to execute the project.

Meanwhile, an important provision in the Kenyan CDF Act worth mentioning is an “Emergency Reserve” which is not less than 5% of the total amount due to the constituency, made available only during emergencies or urgent unforeseen needs for expenditure within the Constituency. There is no such thing in The Gambia’s CDF policy. In practice, what is often deducted is a 10% withholding fee which is the directive of the Income and Value Added Tax Act, 2012 regarding government contracts.

The Debate

In almost all countries where CDF is introduced, views have been expressed on both for and against the use of the fund. Understandably, there are those that lauded the introduction of the initiative as it brought about the desired developments that were envisaged. Tsubura (2013) submits that CDFs have potentially positive effects on electoral democracy in developing countries. Given that many MPs in developing countries raise funds to directly support the daily lives of their constituents, he notes that CDFs, if designed and implemented in transparent and accountable ways, have the potential to mitigate the influence of political finance on electoral competition as well as level the electoral playing field.

Baskin (2011) indicates that the policy tool can redress the imbalance between executives and legislatures, mitigate the “winner take all” quality of elections, give legislators a way to deliver essential goods and services to constituents, provide an opportunity for popular participation in development projects, and strengthen ties of constituents to representatives and legislatures. Aman & Murti (2022) agree that despite its flaws, CDF ensures fast delivery of assistance on social and cultural needs, directly benefiting constituents and business communities, easily accessible, and less bureaucratic processes involved, stressing that it is one of the few funds that go directly to rural people.  Gikonyo (2008) observes that since CDF was introduced in Kenya, it has made a great impact with numerous projects coming up throughout the country.

Highlighting some of the opinions in favour of CDF, Zyl (2010) indicates that the initiative empowers the legislature by allowing them to allocate and spend money independently of the executive, and allow MPs to respond directly to concrete demands from their constituents, something that they may not be powerful enough to make the executive do. Robertson, Awuor & Okotto (2020) indicate that of the many projects that were being funded by CDF in Kenya, education, health and water/sanitation are the key projects that greatly impact community welfare.

Despite its numerous benefits and merits, there are concerns that CDF monies are not managed in a transparent manner; that many CDF projects are not useful to local communities; and that local communities are not sufficiently involved in its management (Gikonyo, 2008). Tsubura submits that CDFs are controversial as they directly involve MPs in the utilisation of public resources. He agrees with concerns generally raised by scholars, civil society organisations and Western donors that CDFs erode the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of the government, an arrangement that secures checks and balances in democracies. Tsubura emphasizes that in democratic systems, the legislature is mandated to make policies through the formulation of legislation and to oversee the executive while the executive implements such policies for the provision of public services, arguing that the CDF approach blurs the boundaries of these distinct functions of the government branches.

Zyl disagrees in totality that CDF barely makes any positive impact, and thus the concept or the initiative should be discouraged by all means. He argues that CDFs have a more negative impact on accountability and service delivery that most poor countries can ill afford. He stresses that the risks associated with CDFs should be taken more seriously by governments, donors, CSOs, and other actors involved in the development process. Apparently, Zyl’s concern is that CDFs may breach the key democratic principle of the separation of power by conferring the executive function of budget execution on the legislature. As a result, CDFs may compromise the ability of legislators to represent the electorates and to oversee the work of the executive. In a public statement in May 2022, the Rt. Hon. Halifa Sallah of The Gambia claimed that CDF promotes the self-perpetuating rule of NAMs, and as such, he called for the fund to be scrapped from the National Assembly budget. The Rt. Hon. Sallah argued that the CDF is utilised through a top-down approach instead of a bottom-up. He, therefore, suggested that the fund should rather be diverted into the development budgets of the local and municipal councils to allow them to manage and utilise from the grassroots (Voice Newspaper, 2022).

Busari (2018) alleges that even though the lawmakers in Nigeria are not allowed direct access to the fund, they have devised several means of getting a cut from the zonal intervention project fund every year, noting that one of such dubious means is by inflating the budgets of government agencies. This position is shared by Nnamani et. al. who insinuates that a preponderance of the Nigerian masses views the concept of constituency project as a conduit pipe through which the nation’s treasury is being drained. The authors cited a Daily Trust report of 2010 which alleges that former President Obasanjo accused Senators and members of the House of Representatives of corruption through budget padding and collection of unjustifiable allowances amounting to billions of naira by inserting items in the budget which are not actually required by ministries, and connive with contractors in executing constituency projects to take kick-backs.

 Lessons to Learn

In The Gambia, very little has been written about CDF from the public. This may be attributed to the infancy of the implementation of the initiative in the country.

By way of good practice, countries that have newly adopted CDF could learn a lot from those that have long initiated it. Countries such as Zambia and Kenya, have utilized their past experiences to make a series of adjustments and improvements on the allotment, implementation and supervision of projects sponsored by the fund.

On this account, the first lesson to learn may include introducing a quarter system in the distribution of CDF to ensure equity. It is obvious that constituencies, whether in The Gambia or elsewhere, are different in size and population. Therefore, introducing a percentage or quarter system will help address inequalities among constituencies and bridge the gap among the populace.

Also, there should be CDF committees in the constituencies, recognized by the law. The law will make it mandatory for the public to initiate projects which will be implemented by the committee and scrutinized by the National Assembly through its oversight function. In that, the law may allow the MPs to suggest to the committee but may not have the unilateral authority to decide on the types of projects implemented in their constituencies.

However, couching this into law will avoid a scenario advanced by Benson (2018) that “the approach taken in the implementation of the CDF in Nigeria tends to point to the fact that constituents are often vulnerable to manipulations by their representatives who withhold information from them. Most of the system operations seem to be shrouded in secrecy, and as such, constituents are not aware of the essence of the policy. They may sometimes seem to be taking part in meetings, but they really do not make an input to the project selection or the siting of such projects in their constituencies. They merely attend those meetings as nominal participants and play no part in the decisions that are made.”

Thirdly, the implementing countries of CDF may contemplate on making an Act instead of a policy. The Act, which is more binding than a policy, will detail out the manner of distributing the funds, identify implementing agencies and accounting officers, and outline penalties among others. The policy is merely a guideline which may be subverted to suit convenience. As a matter of fact, the violation of an act will be more grievous.

 Conclusion

Different approaches have been adopted by different countries to allow them to conveniently implement projects and programmes under CDF in order to meet their overall developmental needs and objectives. Some of the factors that guide the allocation and implementation of the funds include both cultural and geopolitical considerations.

There may not be a “the” way of institutionalising the CDF. However, as a newcomer in the CDF realm, the National Assembly of The Gambia can continue to learn from the experiences, successes, challenges and best practices of parliamentary jurisdictions that have vibrantly flourished through the effective and efficient utilisation of the funds.

As a matter of fact, CDF could be a very fast way for the legislature to respond to the development needs of their constituencies as they are closer to the people than the executive. However, stringent checks are necessary to control the tendency for excesses in the course of fund allocation, implementation or award of contracts to prospective bidders.

REFERENCES

• THE CONSTITUENCY DEVELOPMENT FUND ACT, 2018. Parliament of Zambia. Retrieved on Monday, June 12, 2023, at https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/acts/The%20Constituency%20Development%20Fund%20Act%20No.%2011%20of%20%202018.pdf
• Gikonyo, W. (2008). The CDF Social Audit Guide: A Handbook for Committees. Retrieved on Monday, June 12, 2023, at https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/4f81bdf7-0ed4-461b-8a77-9dd76022b434/popular_20080808.pdf
• Constituencies Development Fund, 2013. Parliament of Kenya. Retrieved on Monday, June 12, 2023, at https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Kenya/Kenay%20Devolution/Constituency%20Development%20Fund%20Act%20(2013).pdf
• Tsubura, M. (2013). The Politics of Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) in Comparative Perspective. University of Sussex. Retrieved on Monday, June 12, 2023, at https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=573003097124109029109028029099067102004031054052030066103127096126127093090026064007006034063101028059032066027108008126065106046016071077042066002093088076127076096068080057089024002092067081002092124071123081065029107031024003030114077108029104086104&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE
• Baskin, M. (2011). Constituency Development Funds. Retrieved on Tuesday, June 13, 2023, at https://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/files/agora-documents/Constituency%20Development%20Funds_0.pdf
• Aman, A. & Murti, R. (2022). Constituency Development Fund: Can it work? International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Retrieved on Tuesday, June 13, 2023, at https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/constituency-development-fund-can-it-work
• Robertson, O., Awuor, F. O. & Okotto, L. G. (2020). Efficacy of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) Projects on Community Welfare in Kenya: A Case of Nambale Constituency. Retrieved on Tuesday, June 13, 2023, at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3730588
• Zyl, A. V., (2010). What is Wrong with the Constituency Development Funds? International Budget Partnership. Retrieved on Tuesday, June 20, 2023, at https://internationalbudget.org/publications/brief10/
• Busari, K., (April 22, 2018). ANALYSIS: How Nigerian lawmakers share N100 billion zonal intervention fund annually. Premium Times. Retrieved on Tuesday, June 20, 2023, at https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/265828-analysis-how-nigerian-lawmakers-share-n100-billion-zonal-intervention-fund-annually.html?tztc=1
• Nnamani, D. O., Ekoh, L. A., & Joe-Akunne, I. (June 2021). Constituency Projects and its Implication for Democratic Development: Focus on Nigeria National Assembly. Retrieved on Wednesday, June 21, 2023, at http://ijeais.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/6/IJAMR210625.pdf
• Benson, J. F. (2018). LEGISLATOR-CONSTITUENCY RELATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN NIGERIA: THE CASE OF THE CONSTITUENCY DEVELOPMENT FUND. Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London. Retrieved on Wednesday, June 21, 2023, at https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/9515/1/Benson%2C%20J%20-%20PhD%20Thesis%20-%20IALS%20-%202019.pdf
• Manneh, K. A., (May 28, 2022). Halifa Sallah Tasks Journalists to Investigate Constituency Development Fund. Voice Newspaper. Retrieved on Thursday, June 22, 2023, at https://www.voicegambia.com/2022/05/28/halifa-sallah-tasks-journalists-to-investigate-constituency-development-fund/